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Abstract
This dissertation discusses a modern version of a 
constitutional struggle which has characterized American 
democracy since the first days of the Republic: the citizen's 
right to privacy versus the government's need to guarantee 
"national security." It addresses the Supreme Court's 
landmark Fourth Amendment wiretapping decision of June 1972, 
U.S. v. U.S. District Court, which ruled unconstitutional the 
so-called "Mitchell Doctrine", the Nixon Administration's 
attempt to gain Judicial sanction for "national security" 
wiretaps without prior court order of suspected "domestic 
subversive" groups. In its unanimous Keith decision, the 
Court upheld the "primacy of warrants" in domestic 
intelligence investigations. Keith remains the citizen's 
primary protection against the "uninvited ear" of government 
eavesdroppers.
This study locates the origins of the Mitchell Doctrine 
in the Cold War struggle between the Executive Branch, which 
claimed expansive "national security" wiretapping powers, and 
the Judicial and Legislative Branches, which established 
"barriers" limiting the executive's domestic intelligence 
powers in response to revelations of surveillance abuses 
during the 1960s. The Mitchell Doctrine represented the
xii
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Nixon Administration's attempt to circumvent these "barriers" 
by taking advantage of escalating societal fears about social 
disorder.
This dissertation also examines the polarization of 
American society during the 1960s, through an analysis of the 
history of the White Panther Party of Ann Arbor, Michigan, a 
radical counterculture group whose inflammatory rhetoric led 
to considerable police and FBI surveillance. A model is 
proposed for future historical analysis of the clash between 
the "Movement" and the "conservative establishment" during 
the sixties, focusing on the effects of a widening 
"perception-reality gap" at both ends of the political 
spectrum.
This study concludes by analyzing cycles of wiretapping 
"reform" since the Keith decision. Concerns about government 
surveillance during the Watergate era resulted in the 
establishment of numerous reforms. However, the 1980s saw a 
partial dismantling of reforms, renewing the possibility of 
future domestic intelligence abuses. Recent "terrorist" 
bombings have resulted in draconian wiretapping proposals 
from both the Clinton Administration and the Republican- 
controlled 104th Congress, which, if enacted, would erode the 
citizen's right to privacy in the interest of domestic 
security.
xiii
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Introduction
The country doesn't give much of a sh_t about 
bugging....Host people around the country think 
it's probably routine, everybody's trying to bug 
everybody else, it's politics. That's my view. 
—  President Nixon tc H.R. Haldeman, June 21, 
1972 (from White House tapes released June, 
1993) .*
On June 19, 1972, the United States Supreme Court handed 
down a unanimous decision in U.S. v. U.S. District Court, the 
so-called "Keith Case". Justice Lewis Powell refuted the 
Nixon Administration's claim of an "inherent Presidential 
authority" to wiretap without judicial warrant individuals 
suspected of being "national security" threats —  the so- 
called "Mitchell Doctrine," named after Attorney General John 
N. Mitchell. The Supreme Court's decision established the 
absolute requirement of securing judicial warrants prior to 
initiating wiretaps on U.S. citizens. It remains the 
citizen's primary protection against the "uninvited ear" of 
government eavesdroppers.2
June 19, 1972, however, was a poor day for Court
publicity. The Watergate burglary, two days earlier, 
captured the public's attention. Nevertheless, the 
constitutional issues presented in U.S. v. U.S. District
‘New Orleans Times Picayune. May 18, 1993, A-l, A-6.
2407 U.S. 297, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 32 L. Ed. 752 (1972).
1
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2Court are as historically significant as any presented in 
Watergate. The case represented a powerful attempt by the 
Executive Branch to modify the Constitution's separation of 
powers by weakening the Judiciary. It is thus surprising 
that U.S. v. U.S. District Court has received relatively 
little attention from scholars.
Although the initiative to secure High Court sanction 
for virtually unlimited power to wiretap "domestic radicals"
has become known as the "Mitchell Doctrine," it was very much 
a Nixon initiative. From his first days in office in January 
of 1969, President Nixon pursued policies —  public and 
private —  designed to increase the Executive's power to 
pursue "domestic subversives": anti-war demonstrators, New 
Left activists, Black nationalists, hippies, the media, 
college professors, and others who publicly opposed Nixon's 
policies. Elected in 1968 on a "law and order" platform, 
Nixon soon became obsessed with surveillance, in and of 
itself.
Restrained by several Supreme Court decisions pertaining 
to wiretapping, and unhappy over Lyndon Johnson's
unwillingness to utilize the Title III wiretapping provisions 
of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control Act, the Nixon
Administration unveiled the Mitchell Doctrine in June, 1969 
during the "Chicago Conspiracy" trial of New Left activists, 
including Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman. Opposition from 
civil liberties groups forced the Administration to back down
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3until late 1970, when public hysteria over radical bombings 
presented a more favorable moment for anti-crime measures. 
The decision to renew the Mitchell Doctrine also may have 
been related to the failure of the so called "Huston Plan," 
in which the Administration sought to centralize the 
surveillance capabilities of U. S. intelligence agencies 
under White House control.
The case the Nixon Administration utilized to test the 
constitutional validity of the Mitchell Doctrine, U.S. v. 
Sinclair. Plamondon. and Forrest, involved a little-known 
Michigan radical organization, the "White Panther Party," —  
a surprising choice for so important an initiative.3 The 
group had at best twenty fully-operational "chapters" across 
the country; total active membership at its peak (1970) 
probably did not exceed 200.4 However, the group's 
leadership included two relatively high-profile radicals: 
counterculture leader John Sinclair, who received a prison 
sentence of 9-10 years for possession of two marijuana 
cigarettes, and Lawrence Robert "Pun" Plamondon, one of the 
first white "political revolutionaries" to make the FBI's
3321 F. Supp. 1074 (1971).
Estimate based on White Panther documents in the John 
and Leni Sinclair Papers, Michigan Historical Collections, 
Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, box 17, 
file 31 [hereafter JLSC/BHL]; also FBI Report, dated October 
23, 1970, entitled "RE: White Panther Party (WPP) National 
Convention September 23-25, 1970," 22-23, located in the John 
and Leni Sinclair "Red Squad Files."
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"Ten Most Wanted" list.5 The White Panthers gained national 
notoriety for: (1) their close association with the Youth
International Party, or "Yippies," one of the Nixon 
Administration's least-liked New Left/counterculture groups; 
(2) their support for the Black Panthers, a principal target 
for Nixon Administration surveillance and counter­
intelligence ("COINTELPRO") measures; and (3) Sinclair's 
management of the MC-5, a rock band that gained considerable 
prominence in 1968-1969.
Despite the White Panthers' notoriety, timing and chance 
explain the Administration's decision to use U.S. v. 
Sinclair. Plamondon. and Forrest to test the Mitchell 
Doctrine. When the original federal indictments were handed 
down against Sinclair and Plamondon in October, 1969 for 
conspiring to bomb a CIA office in Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
eleven months earlier, the White Panther Party did not 
interest the FBI or the Justice Department, although the 
group had been targeted for intensive Detroit "Red Squad" and 
Michigan State Police surveillance since the mid-sixties. 
Only after U.S. District Judge Damon Keith granted the 
defense's motion for discovery of electronic surveillance in 
October, 1970, did the Justice Department decide to make the 
case an Administration priority. Attorney General Mitchell's 
December 14, 1970, response to Keith admitted that the
5Mark Sabljak and Martin H. Greenberg, Most Wanted: A 
History of the FBI's Ten Most Wanted List (New York: Bonanza 
Books, 1990), 180-81.
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government had inadvertently picked up several of defendant 
Plamondon's conversations while conducting "national 
security" [warrantless] wiretaps of the Black Panther Party 
during the spring of 1969. Mitchell claimed that the 
Administration considered the wiretaps to be within the 
President's inherent constitutional powers, and therefore 
could not be disclosed to the defense.6
On January 25, 1971, Judge Keith issued his decision 
refuting the Administration's position and ordering the 
government to disclose the fruits of its illegal surveillance 
to White Panther defense attorneys William Kunstler, Leonard 
Weinglass, and Hugh "Buck" Davis. Keith did not disguise his 
anger:
The Government... argues that the President, acting 
through the Attorney General, has the inherent 
Constitutional power: (1) to authorize without
judicial warrant electronic surveillance in 
'national security' cases; and (2) to determine 
unilaterally whether a given situation is a matter 
within the scope of national security. The Court 
is unable to accept this position. We are a
country of laws and not men.
The case became a cause celebre. The Supreme Court decided
8-0 against the government on June 19, 1972, the lone
abstention being newly-appointed Justice William Rehnquist,
6Personal papers of White Panther Attorney Hugh M. 
"Buck" Davis, Jr. [hereafter "Davis Papers"]; I am grateful 
to Mr. Davis for allowing me access to his legal files. See 
also U.S. v. U.S.D.C.. E. Dist.. Mich.. 444 F.2nd. (1971).
7U.S. v. Sinclair. 321 F.Supp. 1074 (1971).
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who, as Assistant Attorney General the previous two years, 
had assisted in drafting the government's Keith briefs.
The Supreme Court's refutation of the Mitchell Doctrine 
dealt the Nixon Administration a major blow in its legal 
offensive against the New Left and selected Black 
nationalists. In nearly every pending case involving 
warrantless wiretapping, the Justice Department dismissed the 
charges rather than disclose the results of its surveillance. 
Whether Keith's decision resulted in fewer warrantless 
wiretaps against radicals, or merely forced the FBI and other 
intelligence agencies to keep such measures secret, is 
unclear, in spite of much partisan comment. A related issue 
is whether the primary motivation behind the Mitchell 
Doctrine was to bolster law enforcement at a time of 
increasing social disorder, or to institute, at the 
discretion of the Executive, dragnet-style wiretapping of 
political opponents, which might impose a "chilling effect" 
on all dissent.8
The Keith decision represented a modern version of one 
of the basic constitutional struggles characterizing American 
democracy since its inception: the citizen's right to privacy 
versus the government's responsibility to ensure "national
8For one view of the "chilling effect" thesis, see Frank 
J . Donner, The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of 
America's Political Intelligence System. (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1981), 3-29.
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security," addressed in the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Previous presidents, starting with Franklin Roosevelt in
1940, had authorized "national security" wiretaps of U.S.
citizens without court order, for political as well as
justifiable domestic security reasons. Such U.S.
intelligence agencies as the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and National
Security Agency (NSA) engaged in ever-greater surveillance of
American citizens during the Cold War. A combination of
secret Executive directives, Congressional disinterest,
Supreme Court indecision, and the pervasive influence of FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover resulted in a substantial gap
between wiretapping "law" and intelligence agency practice by
the mid-sixties. Significant challenges to secret
wiretapping surfaced in the mid-sixties, as revelations about
FBI excesses prompted several Congressional investigations.
In addition, an increasing number of Supreme Court decisions
handed down by the Warren Court, particularly the Berger9 and
9Beraer v. New York. 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18
L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967).
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Katz10 decisions, firmly established that Fourth Amendment 
protections against unreasonable search and seizure pertain 
to telephone conversations involving U.S. citizens. Nixon 
was correct to insist that his administration was held to 
different standards than his predecessors in the areas of 
surveillance.
The Nixon Administration sought to go further in the 
area of warrantless surveillance than any previous President. 
The Administration's attempt, via the Mitchell Doctrine, to 
gain authorization to wiretap any citizen it unilaterally 
deemed a "national security" threat challenged one of the 
Constitution's most important checks upon the Executive: the 
requirement that the government secure warrants from a 
neutral third party —  the Judiciary —  in cases of Fourth 
Amendment intrusions for law enforcement purposes. This 
assault on the so-called "primacy of warrants"11 was truly 
unique in the history of the United States, and represented 
an unparalleled threat to the average American's right to 
privacy. It also threatened to restrict political dissent.
10Katz V. U.S.. 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 
576 (1967).
"For an excellent history of the evolution of the 
"primacy of warrants" vis-a-vis searches and seizures under 
the Fourth Amendment, see Congressional Research Service, The 
Constitution of the United States of America. Analysis and 
Interpretation. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1973), in Senate Documents. 92nd Congress, 2nd 
Session, Document No. 42-82, 1039-1086 [hereafter "CRS"].
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Making the Mitchell Doctrine a priority early in his 
Presidency, Nixon sought to take advantage of public fear of 
social turmoil —  especially campus unrest and radical 
bombings —  in order to secure Supreme Court approval. The 
politics of fear and division had characterized Nixon's 
entire political career. As Stanley Kutler points out, it 
was Nixon's combative, uncompromising personality, as well as 
his desire to bolster Executive power, that ultimately led to 
his downfall; the "Wars of Watergate" had many precedents 
from his first term in office, as he pursued his many 
"enemies" with a ferocity rarely surpassed by any American 
President.12
The Administration's argument in the Mitchell Doctrine 
initially focused upon the wiretapping provisions of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, the first 
Congressional legislation in more than three decades on this 
much debated topic.13 The Act's Title III outlawed 
wiretapping by private citizens, while enumerating procedures 
under which the government and law enforcement officials 
could initiate surveillance of U.S. citizens, including a 
court order for nearly all surveillance. However, it 
included a "brief and nebulous paragraph" outlining two 
circumstances under which a President could order
12Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate: The Last 
Crisis of Richard Nixon. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990).
1318 U.S.C., Pub.L. 90-351, Title III, Sec. 802, 82 Stat.
112.
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surveillance of citizens without a warrant: (1) to protect 
the nation from external attack, and (2) to prevent the 
overthrow of the government by force.14
The details surrounding the origins of the paragraph 
remain unclear. President Johnson was satisfied with the 
warrant requirements of the Omnibus Act, and requested only 
the "external attack" exception. Neither he nor his Attorney 
General, Ramsey Clark, wanted wide "national security" powers 
for the Executive.15 Documents recently uncovered by 
Alexander Charns suggest that FBI Director Hoover persuaded 
several friendly Congressmen and Senators to include the 
"overthrow" provision, so that the FBI could continue to 
conduct "national security" wiretaps.16 Whatever the origin 
of the passage, the Nixon Administration's interpretation was 
expansive: domestic "national security" threats such as the 
Michigan White Panthers constituted as great a threat to the 
government as any external threat. The history of the U.S. 
v. U.S. District Court case demonstrates that neither Judge 
Keith, nor the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, nor the 
Supreme Court agreed.
14Quoted in Edith J. Lapidus, Eavesdropping On Trial. 
(Rochelle Park, New Jersey: Hayden Book Company, 1974), 96.
15Ibid. . 6-7, 13, 40, 93-96.
^Alexander Charns, Cloak and Gavel: FBI Wiretaps. Bugs. 
Informers, and the Supreme Court. (Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 1992), 31-93.
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Although the Mitchell Doctrine's legal theories have 
become associated with the Nixon Administration, many of the 
constitutional issues presented by the Administration in U.S. 
v. U.S. District Court were not new. Executive claims of 
"inherent power" were made as early as 1807, when President 
Thomas Jefferson took actions to mobilize the nation for war 
against Britain without Congressional approval. The Nixon 
Administration's argument in Keith stressed that because 
"domestic subversives" are as dangerous to the nation's 
security as "foreign" threats, the Executive Branch possesses 
the constitutional power to utilize warrantless "national 
security" wiretaps to monitor their activities. Opposing the 
government's position, defense attorneys relied upon 
Youngstown v. Sawver. a landmark case involving President 
Truman's unsuccessful attempt to utilize the "inherent power" 
argument as justification for seizing American steel mills 
during the Korean War. Justice Robert Jackson's opinion in 
Youngstown outlined an "outward-inward axis," whereby the 
Judiciary may properly grant the Executive wide latitude in 
areas of foreign affairs, but nonetheless should allow "no 
such indulgence" in domestic areas.17
The intellectual forebears of the Mitchell Doctrine were 
not Presidents. They included Supreme Court Justices Byron 
White and Abe Fortas, as well as FBI Director Hoover. The
l7Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawver. 343 U.S. 579 
(1952).
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concept that a President has "inherent" powers under the 
Constitution to initiate surveillance of U.S. citizens in 
"national security" cases was first introduced by Justices 
White and Fortas in footnote 23 of the Katz decision in 1967, 
the decision which ruled that wiretapping without a warrant 
was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. With prophetic 
accuracy, Justices Douglas and Brennan realized the 
footnote's potential, calling it an "unwarranted green light 
for the Executive Branch to resort to electronic 
eavesdropping without a warrant in cases which the Executive 
Branch itself labels 'national security' matters."18
An important contributor to the Mitchell Doctrine was J. 
Edgar Hoover. At two trials of Justice Department employee 
and suspected spy Judith Coplon, 1949-1954, during which the 
FBI's wiretapping tactics were subjected to considerable 
public scrutiny for the first time, Congress debated 
legislation that required federal judges to issue court 
orders approving wiretaps. Throughout the crisis, Hoover 
maneuvered behind the scenes, urging an alternative bill that 
would allow the Attorney General, without a warrant 
requirement, to authorize wiretaps, and making the results 
admissible in court. Hoover insisted that many federal 
judges lacked sufficient credentials to be entrusted with 
"security matters," an argument that was not overlooked by 
Justice Department lawyers in the Keith case. As a result,
l8Quoted in Lapidus, Eavesdropping on Trial. 25.
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no new laws were passed, effectively allowing the FBI to 
continue secretly wiretapping at will.19 Two decades later, 
as Congress again drafted wiretapping provisions incorporated 
in the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968, Hoover's influence 
was again felt.
A number of complex and interconnected factors led the 
Nixon Administration to initiate the Mitchell Doctrine less 
than six months after taking office: (1) new legislative and 
judicial challenges to the "cult of Executive expertise" that 
had traditionally characterized Presidential direction of 
foreign affairs and domestic security matters;20 (2) renewal 
of the "intelligence versus evidence" wiretapping debate, 
between law enforcement and intelligence agencies and civil 
libertarians, which pitted those who believed wiretapping 
should be "tactical" against those who supported long-term 
wiretapping for "intelligence" purposes;21 (3) the 
increasing polarization of society, influenced by two highly 
visible ideological camps: the "Movement" (the increasingly 
militant New Left, Black nationalist, counterculture/youth, 
and anti-war groups) versus the "conservative establishment" 
(police, intelligence officers, and other conservative
19Charns, Cloak and Gavel. 32-33.
20Quoted in Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts 
Between Congress and the President. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1985), 26.
21James Q. Wilson, "Buggings, Break-Ins & the FBI," 
Commentary. vol. 65, no. 6, (June, 1978): 52-58.
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Americans who supported the Nixon Administration's actions 
against the Movement) j72 and (4) elected in 1968 on a 
largely "law and order" platform, the Administration was 
under enormous pressure to utilize the full resources of 
government in the so-called "war on crime." These pressures, 
when combined with the fondness of the new Administration for 
"getting even" with perceived enemies, provided the backdrop 
for the illegal activities that would culminate in Watergate.
During the late sixties the American public's acceptance 
of the "cult of Executive expertise," and, by implication, 
its willingness to accept absolute secrecy surrounding 
intelligence agencies, was challenged for the first time. 
Two factors were responsible: an unpopular Vietnam War and 
increasing public awareness of widespread surveillance of 
U.S. citizens by secret intelligence agencies. More than any 
other issue, the Vietnam War seemingly exposed the folly of 
granting a President too much independence in foreign 
affairs. The ensuing "credibility gap" between what 
President Johnson told the American people about the conflict 
and the realities of U.S. involvement helped destroy his 
Presidency.
Americans supported their intelligence agencies and law 
enforcement officials until widespread revelations of
22An amorphous term, the "Movement," as it is used here, 
refers to individuals and groups espousing a wide variety of 
principles and goals, who were nonetheless united in their 
radical opposition to traditional American values and mores, 
the Vietnam War, and the "conservative establishment."
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intelligence abuses surfaced in the mid-sixties. Such 
support was grounded in Cold War orthodoxy, as well as the 
extreme secrecy that shrouded the surveillance activities of 
the intelligence community. In addition, most Americans were 
unaware that the FBI, CIA, NSA, and military intelligence 
were conducting widespread surveillance within the U.S. until 
the scope and purpose of these activities gradually became 
known.
Both Congress and the Supreme Court share some of the 
blame for these Executive Branch abuses. Together, they 
allowed a "cult of Executive expertise" to emerge, vis-a-vis 
foreign policy and national security. Congressional 
deference to the Executive in time of war has historically 
been the norm, largely because of the constitutional 
provision making the President "Commander in Chief" of 
military forces. In domestic security areas, the President 
heads the Executive Branch, which is responsible for 
enforcing laws. Thus, with few exceptions, Congress has 
allowed the Executive wide discretion over intelligence 
policy. As for the Supreme Court, beginning with the U.S. v. 
Curtis Wright decision in 1936, it has also generally 
deferred to the Executive in both foreign policy and domestic 
security areas.23
23U.S. v. Curtis Wright Corp.. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See 
also Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts. 108-110.
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Tensions in American society during the 1960s eroded the 
"cult of Executive expertise." Congress was slow to 
challenge the President over the Vietnam War. However, in 
the areas of wiretapping and surveillance, Congress did 
respond, despite the influence which J. Edgar Hoover exerted. 
Beginning with the Russell Long and Joseph McClellan 
Committees in the mid-1960s, and culminating with Title III 
of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968, Congress assumed an 
increasingly important role in legislating the nation's 
surveillance policies.
Similar circumstances explain the role the Supreme Court 
assumed over domestic surveillance policy by the late 
sixties. After several decades of indecisiveness, the 
liberal Warren Court handed down two important decisions in 
1967: Katz v. U.S. and Berger v. New York. The effect of 
these decisions can be summarized as follows: (1) the Fourth 
Amendment protects people as well as places; (2) electronic 
surveillance constitutes a search and seizure subject to the 
limitations of the Fourth Amendment; and (3) law enforcement 
agencies must have probable cause prior to seeking electronic 
surveillance, and should seek a judicial warrant for a 
limited and clearly specified time period. The Court was 
divided over these issues, Justice White in particular 
finding himself in the opposition. His dissent in Katz 
introduced the possibility that in "national security" cases, 
electronic surveillance might be instituted by the Executive
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without prior court order. Despite the Court's divisions, 
Katz and Beraer introduced the Supreme Court as a powerful 
force in regulating national surveillance policy. In fact, 
Katz provided Congress with much of the language used in the 
wiretapping provisions of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Act 
of 1968.
The divisiveness which characterized the Supreme Court 
in Berger and Katz centered upon the proper role that 
wiretapping and bugging should have in law enforcement, as 
well as the degree to which the Judiciary should intercede 
between the Executive and the public as a neutral third 
party. The split in the Berger decision was particularly 
bitter. In his dissent, Justice White charged that the Court 
was moving toward a position which would make all wiretapping 
unconstitutional. An important component in the Berger
debate was the "intelligence versus evidence" issue. The 
case involved a New Jersey statute that permitted 
eavesdropping under the authority of court orders from state 
judges. In a 6-3 decision, the majority termed "odious" the 
law's sixty-day authorization period and lack of requirement 
for a specific termination date. Lawyers for the State of 
New Jersey claimed that wiretapping and other electronic 
surveillance are the most important law enforcement 
techniques available to fight "organized crime." They
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defended long-term surveillance as necessary for obtaining 
adequate "intelligence" about criminal suspects.24
The positions expressed in Berger reflected the division
of opinion between America's intelligence community and civil
libertarians and privacy advocates since the end of World War
I, over the "proper" duration of surveillance.25 Privacy
advocates, such as former Attorney General Clark and Justices
Douglas and Brennan, believed that surveillance of U.S.
citizens should be kept to an absolute minimum, and limited
to specific tactical purposes such as investigating organized
crime suspects. Privacy advocates argued that suspects are
innocent until proven guilty; that agencies should have
probable cause prior to initiating surveillance; and that
when surveillance is instituted, it should be as brief as
possible to minimize overhearing of conversations involving
innocent people. The privacy invasion involved in lengthy
surveillance far outweighs any possible law enforcement or
"national security" benefits which might be derived from it.
As Justice Clark's majority decision stated in Berger;
Few threats to liberty exist which are greater 
than that posed by the use of eavesdropping
devices.... The Fourth Amendment...proscribes a
24Lapidus, Eavesdropping on Trial. 20-23.
25James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace; A Report on America's 
Most Secret Agency. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), 5-15. 
This outstanding study traces the history and evolution of 
the super-secret National Security Agency (NSA).
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constitutional standard that must be met before 
official invasion is permissible.26
The opposing position was championed by law enforcement 
and intelligence agency officials. Their position commonly 
reflected conservative views popular in Cold War America. 
They argued that in the fight against crime, or struggle 
against communism at home and abroad, the preservation of 
social stability had to be an overriding priority. Law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies should be allowed to 
initiate long-term "strategic" surveillance in instances 
where "organized crime" is occurring or where the "national 
security" may be threatened. Surveillance, they insisted, is 
at worst a victimless crime; effective prevention of law 
breaking or protection of the nation from internal 
"subversion" and/or external attack justifies eavesdropping 
for extended periods of time. Supporters of this position 
commonly argued that neither politicians in Congress nor 
federal judges were qualified to recognize threats to the 
social order.
An additional factor which contributed to the timing of 
the Mitchell Doctrine was the social disorder of the sixties. 
Most important were the urban riots, starting with Watts (Los 
Angeles) in 1965 and, in particular, Detroit in 1967. The 
Detroit riots are historically important because they 
resulted in law enforcement initiatives sponsored by
26Quoted in Lapidus, Eavesdropping on Trial. 21.
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President Johnson and Attorney General Clark, which laid the 
groundwork for the significant expansion of intelligence 
agency abuses that occurred during the Nixon years. Shocked 
by the level of violence and destruction in Detroit, the 
Johnson Administration issued directives to the intelligence 
community, demanding more information concerning the 
underlying conditions that commonly lead to riots and 
information about future uprisings, so that local law 
enforcement could respond more effectively. An interagency 
task force was set up to coordinate domestic intelligence. 
Clearly, the "intelligence" side of the surveillance debate 
carried the day. However, the Supreme Court decisions in 
Katz and Berger that same year, combined with the 
Congressional restrictions on surveillance included in Title 
III of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Act, created a situation where 
Executive agencies secretly pursued surveillance policies at 
odds with both the Judicial and Legislative Branches. 
Neither President Johnson nor Attorney General Clark were 
fully aware of the enormous expansion in domestic 
surveillance that their own post-Detroit initiatives had 
created.27
By late 1968 many law enforcement and intelligence 
agency officers believed that they had been undermined by a 
liberal Supreme Court, a Democratically-controlled Congress,
^Christopher H. Pyle, Military Surveillance of Civilian 
Politics. 1967-1970. (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 
1986), 50-51.
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and an Attorney General so loathe to wiretap that he refused 
to implement those provisions of the Omnibus Crime Act. In 
addition, the sheer expansion of the intelligence agencies, 
coupled with a more vigilant and less deferential media, 
meant that preserving secrecy was increasingly difficult. 
Such was the confusing state of intelligence affairs when 
Nixon took office in early 1969. An enormous gap separated 
wiretapping law and practice. All indicators pointed to 
increasing restrictions on surveillance and an end to the 
"cult of secrecy" that had characterized the intelligence 
community throughout the first two decades of the Cold War.
The relationship between the polarization of society 
during the sixties and the Mitchell Doctrine is both 
deceptively simple and extraordinarily complex. At the most 
elementary level, President Nixon, like his predecessor, 
sought improved intelligence concerning those radical groups 
that either committed or had the potential to commit violent 
acts. Finding an opening in the vaguely worded "national 
security" passage of the Omnibus Act, Justice Department 
lawyers, ostensibly led by William Rehnquist, researched and 
utilized the "inherent Presidential power" legal precedents 
available to them, particularly Justice White's dissent in 
Katz.28 Attorney General Mitchell promoted a legal
28The scope of then Assistant Attorney General 
Rehnquist's involvement in formulating the Mitchell Doctrine 
was first revealed in 1971, during his testimony before the 
"Ervin Committee," (Hearings on Federal Data Banks. Computers
(continued...)
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initiative which first sought to establish precedent in 
several U.S. District Courts, and later, in the White Panther 
case, advanced on appeal to the Supreme Court. There are at 
least three problems with this too simple scenario: (1) it 
ignores the enormous differences of opinion separating the 
Johnson and Nixon Administrations concerning wiretapping; (2) 
it ignores the complexity of the social and political 
divisions that divided America during Nixon's first term; and 
(3) it sidesteps the issue of Nixon's willingness to break 
the law for political purposes.
The historiography of the sixties has, more often than 
not, reduced the complex social divisions in American society 
to good guy-bad guy scenarios, in which extremists on both 
sides increasingly supported violence in response to each 
action of their opponents —  incrementally progressing 
towards "revolution." While these authors are correct in 
pointing to causal connections among events, perceptions, and 
actions on society's extremes, there is a need for a more 
substantive historical model that: (1) attempts to explain 
the internal dynamics as to why individuals acted and reacted 
as they did; (2) does not reduce the divisions in society to 
simplistic formulas; and (3) incorporates how the rest of
28 ( continued)
and the Bill of Rights. U.S. Senate, Committee on the 
Judiciary, chaired by Senator Sam J. Ervin). See Donner, The 
Aae of Surveillance. 75. One year later, as a newly- 
appointed Supreme Court Justice, he disqualified himself from 
taking part in the U.S. v. U.S. District Court decision.
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America responded to the social changes that occurred during 
the decade.
My working model begins with the premise that social 
disorder in the United States during the late sixties and 
early seventies was the worst of this century. Two parallel 
"Movements" moved 180 degrees in a few years, each 
progressing from a strictly nonviolent approach towards one 
that increasingly advocated violence as an acceptable option: 
the civil rights movement evolved into the Black Power 
movement, at the same time that a student-led anti-war 
protest movement turned into a widespread youth and 
counterculture rebellion. A vast majority of Americans did 
not march in demonstrations or join radical groups, but they 
did not have to take part to be affected by them. The 
actions of the radical minority received mass media 
attention, helping the passions of the decade influence 
nearly all of society. The impact of polarization was 
widespread.
The rate of change during the sixties far exceeded 
society's ability to comprehend it. The gap between 
participants' perceptions of events and reality widened 
enormously, propelled by the most powerful reform movement 
since the 1930s. As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., states, America 
entered an "age of whirl."29 Under the most tranquil of
29Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of History. 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986), xi.
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conditions, perception and reality never correspond 
precisely. Instead, they interact in a two-way "recursive 
loop," in which some degree of separation exists between 
message and content. During the sixties the rapid pace of 
change, combined with the variety and scope of highly charged 
issues and events, created a widening of the 
perception/reality gap throughout American society, creating 
what George Soros has termed "far from equilibrium" 
conditions.30 The era's passions and the biases extended 
into every community, with cultural battle lines defined by 
such seemingly innocuous aspects of lifestyle as length of 
hair, style of clothing, and music. It was the White 
Panthers' love for communal living, rock music, "hippie" 
clothing, long hair, and psychedelic drugs that irritated 
conservative Detroit residents, and led to near-constant 
police and FBI surveillance. In turn, this surveillance and 
harassment increasingly "radicalized" the group.
As the passions of the 1960s unfolded, two diverse but 
identifiable opposing groups —  the "Movement" and the 
"conservative establishment" —  developed a sense of self 
identity. As former Students For a Democratic Society (SDS) 
leader Todd Git1in points out in The Sixties, as the decade 
progressed, student protest evolved into resistance,
30George Soros, Underwriting Democracy. (New York: The 
Free Press, 1991), 23.
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eventually resulting in calls for "revolution.1,31 In 
response, law enforcement officials, supported by a large 
segment of society, heightened surveillance and increasingly 
utilized harsh —  occasionally illegal —  tactics against the 
Movement.
Each major event in the struggle brought significant 
responses and counter-responses. For example, Nixon's 
escalation of the Vietnam War into Cambodia in 1970 spawned 
the most widespread campus demonstrations in U.S. history, 
including Kent State, where four unarmed students were shot 
to death by Ohio National Guardsmen. For both sides the gap 
between perception and reality widened: the Movement became 
increasingly convinced that the existing political system 
(postwar liberalism) was bankrupt, while the conservative 
establishment became increasing convinced that the Movement 
was bent on the violent overthrow of the U.S. Government. 
The result of this social division was two highly biased 
groups so threatened by their opposition that both 
increasingly supported extreme measures. By the early 
seventies violence was commonly viewed as an acceptable 
option, by both sides.
The election of Nixon in 1968 was clearly a victory for 
conservatives. The campaign's "law and order" slogans 
promised to get tough with the Movement on several fronts,
31Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: Years of Hope. Davs of Rage. 
(New York: Bantam Books, 1987), 378-408.
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including increasing wiretapping and other surveillance.
Therefore, the unveiling of the Mitchell Doctrine after only
five months was, on one level, an attempt to keep campaign
promises by initiating bolder law enforcement techniques
against suspected criminals. It was also part of the
Administration's attempt to differentiate its policies from
those of the previous Democratic administrations. As John
Mitchell stated a decade after leaving office:
The leaders before us...were too busy pandering to 
the crazies, the kooks trying for a 
counterrevolution. But we thought it was time to 
speak for people who weren't kooks, who weren't 
vitriolic....The country was coming apart....You 
had bomb-throwers on campus, their gutless 
teachers egging them on....So guess who had to 
quell the violence and disorder? We did. The 
American people expected their government to 
act....We tried to do as they wished."32
Nixon grappled with the Vietnam conflict at home and 
abroad, just as Johnson had. From his first days in office, 
he dedicated considerable White House and Justice Department 
resources to infiltrating the peace movement. Nonetheless, 
he remained frustrated with what he believed was a lack of 
substantive intelligence concerning planned demonstrations 
and other civil unrest. At his insistence, and supported by 
FBI Director Hoover, various intelligence agencies searched 
in vain for proof that the New Left was receiving monetary 
support and/or instructions from Communist nations.
32Quoted in Curt Smith, Long Time Gone: The Years of 
Turmo i1 Remembered. (South Bend, Indiana: Icarus Press,
1982), 15, 18.
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The combination of social disorder, an increasingly 
unpopular war, and concern about inadequate intelligence —  
just as new Congressional and judicial barriers to 
surveillance were being erected —  created enormous 
frustration within the new Administration. It was Nixon's 
fate to enter the White House as all of these forces came 
together. He responded, in part, with the Mitchell Doctrine: 
a constitutional initiative intended to sidestep recent 
attempts by the Legislative and Judicial Branches to limit 
wiretapping. The Mitchell Doctrine was one of a series of 
Nixon/Mitchell initiatives intended to preserve the 
Executive's surveillance power over suspected "enemies," when 
faced with potent new challenges to this authority, 
challenges that previous Presidents had not been forced to 
deal with.
Being held to new standards concerning surveillance 
policy —  and being convinced that the nation's security was 
threatened from internal subversion —  did not justify 
widespread law breaking and subverting of constitutional 
rights and protections. There can be little doubt that 
Nixon's willingness to subvert ethical and legal principles 
in the interest of gathering intelligence was a primary 
reason for the failure of the Mitchell Doctrine, as well as 
for Watergate.
The history of U.S. wiretapping and domestic 
intelligence policy and practice since the June, 1972, Keith
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decision has demonstrated that the debate concerning the 
citizen's right to privacy versus the government's right to 
self-preservation is far from over. The nation's interest in 
privacy issues such as domestic wiretapping has ranged from 
lethargy to long periods of gradually mounting concern 
(following revelations of substantial abuse) to brief periods 
of anger (when the scope of abuse and public uproar prompts 
congressional and Executive "reforms"), back to lengthy 
periods of lethargy, until further revelations of abuse begin 
a new cycle. By the early eighties, Americans returned to a 
state of lethargy, influenced by the backlash against 
Watergate era reform "excesses." The Reagan Administration 
even resurrected the use of "national security" to shield its 
surveillance and wiretapping policies from public view.33
The current atmosphere of extreme public concern over 
crime and security has underscored the public's disinterest 
in surveillance and privacy issues. For many Americans, the 
seriousness of the crime problem warrants granting law 
enforcement and U.S. government officials plenty of leeway to 
initiate wiretaps of suspected criminals and "terrorists." 
On a "rights versus security spectrum," a majority favor 
security, something the law enforcement community is fully
33Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, The COINTELPRO 
Papers. Documents from the FBI's Secret Wars Against Dissent 
in the United States. (Boston: South End Press, 1990), 23-32. 
See also Athan Theoharis and John Stuart Cox, The Boss: J. 
Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition. 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), 432-434.
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cognizant of.34 The "terrorist" bombings of the World Trade 
Center and the Oklahoma City federal building parallel 1968, 
when Congress passed the nation's first wiretapping law: 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. 
Without the widespread public concern over crime that existed 
in the late sixties, the bill, authorizing the Justice 
Department to make sweeping privacy invasions, would not have 
received the support necessary for passage. By the same 
token, the Mitchell Doctrine —  a request that the Judicial 
Branch grant the Executive widespread surveillance powers —  
was a Nixon Administration attempt to take advantage of 
public fears about crime. Such a request would have been 
impossible in a more stable era.
The combination of public lethargy over surveillance and 
privacy issues and anti-crime hysteria that currently exists 
in America has created an excellent opportunity for law 
enforcement and intelligence agency officials to promote 
extreme measures. The "Digital Telephony Act" was introduced 
in the spring of 1992 by the Justice Department under 
President Bush and, with the support of the Clinton 
Administration, became law during the fall of 1994.35 This 
initiative will require U.S. telephone companies to install
^Quoted in Marc Stickgold, "Yesterday's Paranoia is 
Today's Reality: Documentation of Police Surveillance of
First Amendment Activity," University of Detroit Journal of 
Urban Law, vol. 55, no. 4, (Summer, 1978), 883, n. 58.
3SNew York Times. March 8, 1992, 22; April 19, 1992, E-2; 
April 30, 1992, D-l, D-5.
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computer technology and software allowing the FBI to 
intercept digital communications. The Justice Department 
argues that criminals increasingly have been able to shield 
their communications from the government, using encryption 
devices and other sophisticated techniques. New fiber 
optics-based telecommunications systems, soon to be the 
industry standard, cannot be wiretapped by conventional 
methods. An FBI spokesman recently asserted: "we need a cop 
on the information superhighway to catch criminals."36 
Privacy advocates have responded by saying that Digital 
Telephony is unnecessary, and will provide the Executive 
Branch with instantaneous access to the nation's 140 million 
telephones —  a temptation, they predict, which will likely 
lead to future surveillance abuses.
Although funding for Digital Telephony has been stalled 
in Congress, the post-Oklahoma City atmosphere of fear has 
virtually assured implementation. Additional legislation has 
also been proposed; the Clinton Administration is currently 
lobbying Congress to pass its "Omnibus Counterterrorism Act 
of 1995," a package of anti-crime/terrorism measures that 
includes sweeping revisions of domestic intelligence 
guidelines and statutes. Supporters claim the expanded 
wiretapping authority will allow the government to better 
prevent future "terrorist bombings." Opponents fear the
36Washinaton Post. March 12, 1994, p. C-7. On the
Clinton Administration's revisions, see Washington Post. 
March 12, 1994, C-l, C-7.
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Administration is reacting to events rather than proceeding 
with caution, in an area where serious abuses of 
constitutional rights have occurred in the past. The latest 
round concerning the citizen's right to privacy versus the 
government's right to protect domestic security suggests the 
folly of believing that wiretapping of "innocent" citizens is 
simply what persons such as Mitchell and Nixon did. Rapid 
technological innovation and overreaction to momentary crises 
suggest this problem is unlikely to benefit from a policy of 
benign neglect.
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Chapter One
"Law and Order," the Sixties, and 
the Polarization of American Society
I.
The people of this country want an end to 
government that acts out of neutrality or 
beneficence or indulgence toward criminals. They 
want government that will set itself up as an 
irreconcilable enemy of crime, a government that 
will wield its full powers to guarantee that for 
the criminals....society's retribution will be 
ample and swift and sure.1
Richard M. Nixon's victory in the 1968 Presidential 
election owed a great deal to the social disorder of the 
sixties. Very early in his campaign, he began utilizing the 
theme of "law and order," accusing the Democrats of harboring 
a "permissive attitude" toward the rising level of crime and 
lawlessness in the nation. He criticized President Johnson's 
"War on Poverty," claiming that the initiative overemphasized 
the link between poverty and crime and underemphasized law 
enforcement as a deterrent to crime. He attacked Attorney 
General Ramsey Clark, for refusing to implement fully the 
wiretapping provisions of the Omnibus Act, as well as the 
Supreme Court, for granting criminal suspects additional
‘Excerpt from Richard Nixon's position paper entitled 
"The Crusade Against Crime," presented to the Republican 
Committee on Resolutions (the "platform committee"). Quoted 
in New York Times. August 1, 1968, 20.
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rights against self-incrimination in the Miranda and Escobido 
decisions.2
The issue suited Nixon's conservative personality and 
background perfectly: his greatest political successes had 
come by taking advantage of divisive issues, and attacking 
his opponents relentlessly. His early political victories, 
first against Democratic Congressman Jerry Voorhis (1946), 
and then Democratic Senator Helen Gahagan Douglas (1950), 
both in his home state of California, were helped by his 
repeated accusations that they were "soft on Communism." He 
continued the tactic as a freshman Senator, acquiring 
national recognition by accusing former State Department 
official Alger Hiss of membership in the Communist Party. As 
Vice-President under Dwight D. Eisenhower, his career 
continued to make headlines only when he engaged in conflict 
—  be it the stoning of his car by leftist students in Latin 
America in 1958, or his celebrated "kitchen debate" with 
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in 1959.
As much as the successes of his early "red-baiting" 
tactics may have taught him, the political setbacks he 
suffered in the early sixties —  a narrow defeat in the 1960 
Presidential race, followed by a surprising loss to Pat Brown 
in the 1962 California Gubernatorial election —  also 
contributed much to his divisive and combative personality. 
His bitterness over these back-to-back losses would influence
2New York Times. May 9, 1968, 1, 32.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
him for the remainder of his career. As he stated in his 
Memoirs: "Politics is battle, and the best way to fire up 
your troops is to rally them against a visible opponent... in 
the end it usually comes down to a contest between allies and 
enemies...Our fractious politics.... is the price we pay for 
avoiding dictatorship, where enemies are ruthlessly 
eliminated.1,3
The social disorder of the sixties helped Nixon's 
astounding political comeback. He had retired from politics 
after the 1962 loss, moving to New York to practice law. 
Following Lyndon Johnson's landslide victory over Barry 
Goldwater in 1964, an enormous void existed in the national 
leadership of the Republican Party. Between 1964 and 1966 
Nixon emerged as the G.O.P.'s elder statesman, campaigning 
tirelessly for a number of Congressmen and Senators. A 
frequent theme in his campaign speeches was that the 
Democratic Party coddled "Un-American" anti-war campus 
protestors, and their "gutless" college professors. Timing 
was in his favor: as the nation moved right in response to 
widespread social disorder, his political fortunes improved. 
Establishing a "Nixon For President Committee" as early as 
March, 1967, he formally entered the race February 2, 1968.
By early February crime had displaced civil rights as 
the top domestic issue, and was second only to Vietnam as the
3Richard Nixon, In the Arena: A Memoir of Victory.
Defeat, and Renewal (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 
245-46.
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most important to the nation's voters.4 However, law and 
order ultimately became the pivotal issue of the campaign, 
since neither the Republican opposition nor the Democratic 
nominee, Hubert H. Humphrey, was willing to present a 
significant challenge to President Johnson's handling of the 
war. Nixon, a staunch supporter of American involvement in 
Indochina, largely sidestepped the issue during the campaign, 
hinting that he had a "secret plan" to end the conflict.5 
Thus, the Vietnam War did not become a hotly contested 
campaign issue.
Nixon's opposition in the campaign also recognized the 
importance of addressing the issue of "crime in the streets," 
although with less success. Humphrey found himself hamstrung 
—  the Democratic Party's liberal wing opposed its usage 
(claiming it had racist overtones), while the remainder of 
the party was increasingly appalled by urban violence.6 
Nixon's other principal opponent, Governor George Wallace of 
Alabama, a Democrat running as an "American Independent," 
promised to utilize both police and federal troops to quell 
urban disorders. The two extremes represented by Humphrey 
and Wallace allowed Nixon to position himself as a moderate,
4New York Times. February 28, 1968, 29.
sDennis Wainstock, The Turning Point: The 1968 United 
States Presidential Campaign (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and 
Company, 1988, 38.
6New York Times. August 30, 1968, 13; see also September 
13, 1968, 52.
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which gave his candidacy broad appeal. Throughout the race, 
public opinion polls showed Nixon leading Humphrey by a wide 
margin, on the issue of crime.7 Wallace's candidacy failed 
to make significant inroads outside of the South.
The public's increasing fixation with law and order 
during this election year paralleled, in almost direct 
proportion, declining interest in civil rights.8 The reasons 
were many and complex. Most importantly, the urban race 
riots of 1965-1968 left many Americans, especially middle 
class whites, increasingly fearful about social disorder. At 
the same time, the coalition holding together the traditional 
civil rights movement had collapsed, with organizations such 
as the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) no 
longer willing to adhere to strictly non-violent tactics. 
The combination of these factors created a "backlash" against 
civil rights among many whites, and contributed to the 
emergence of law and order as a potent political issue.9 The
7New York Times. February 28, 1968, 29; August 4, 1968, 
45; September 8, 1968, 77; September 13, 1968, 52; September 
15, 1968, 78; October 10, 1968, 51; October 30, 1968, 30.
8New York Times. February 11, 1968, sec. iv, 3.
9The issue of white voter "backlash" against blacks as 
a result of urban race riots and the "Black Power" movement, 
particularly in regard to the drop-off in white support for 
further civil rights gains, was a frequent theme in the New 
York Times throughout 1968: February 11, sec. iv, 3; August 
18, sec. iv, 14; September 12, 46; September 15, sec. iv, 14; 
October 6, sec. iv, 38-39, 132-38; October 13, sec. iv, 2; 
October 15, 46. See also Harold Faber, ed., The New York 
Times Election Handbook. (New York: The New American Library, 
1968), 21-22, 62.
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Wall Street Journal editorialized: "Precisely because the 
issue touches such fundamental and even primeval fears, it is 
ripe for demagoguery. "10
In the final analysis, Nixon's "law and order" message - 
- as well as his campaign's crafty use of the media —  were 
probably the most significant factors contributing to his 
election. During the 1960 Presidential campaign Nixon had 
learned the hard way about the value of television as a 
medium through which to communicate with potential voters. 
By late 1967 he assembled an advertising and public relations 
staff skilled in "packaging" political candidates. This team 
collaborated on what were undoubtedly the most effective 
television advertisements for political candidates up to that 
time. One such advertisement entitled "Woman," described in 
The Selling of the President. 1968. focused on the law and 
order issue:
This one was designed to scare people. It showed 
a woman walking down a lonely street late at 
night...There was an announcer....telling how a 
violent crime was committed in America every sixty 
seconds. Watching it, you were sure the woman 
would not make it to the end of the street, or the 
end of the commercial, without being mugged.11
10Quoted in Wainstock, The Turning Point. 151.
nJoe McGinniss, The Selling of the President. 1968. (New 
York: Trident Press, 1969), 112.
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The printed caption at the conclusion of the advertisement 
read: "THIS TIME VOTE LIKE YOUR WHOLE WORLD DEPENDED ON
IT."12
Throughout the campaign, New York Times columnists Tom
Wicker and James Reston issued warnings, first to the
Republican Party and later to candidate Nixon, concerning the
dangers of overdoing the law and order issue with such
vehemence. Shortly after the G.O.P. convention, Reston
termed law and order "a deliberate calculation...his best
issue...a campaign strategy that will be hard to beat." He
added a dire prediction: "He thinks he can tame the ghettos
and then reconstruct them, and he may very well make
reconciliation with the Negro community impossible in the
process."13 By mid-October, Wicker had similar predictions:
In this political climate that Nixon's tough talk 
helps to create...Nixon clearly risks making such 
a point of 'getting tough' that his election will 
be interpreted by every heavy-handed policemen in 
the country as a license to beat up somebody —  
probably somebody poor, black or young...he really 
is taking dangerous political advantage of the
country's undoubted concern about 'crime in the
streets' ,14
In politics, it is often impossible to precisely 
determine the degree to which a candidate genuinely believes 
in any given issue, as opposed to utilizing it for political
I2McGinniss, The Selling of the President. 1968. 253. 
This book contains verbatim scripts of "Woman" and several 
other Nixon television commercials in an appendix.
13New York Times. August 18, 1968, sec. iv, 14.
14New York Times. October 15, 1968, 46.
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advantage. Nixon is a case in point. While some have stated
that he merely reacted to the rebellious times, rather than
initiating conflict,15 others have pointed out the inherent
contradiction between Nixon's repeated calls for national
unity and his campaign statements that were clearly intended
to foster social divisions.16 John Dean, who followed the
Nixon administration into office in 1969, leaves no doubt
concerning his opinion on the matter:
The Republican Party was ripped to shreds in the 
'sixty-four election just before I got to the 
Hill...I was with the Judiciary Committee looking 
at the politics. It looked to me like the 
Republicans had only two issues to make a comeback 
with: crime and defense. I didn't know anything 
about defense, so I became a crime expert. That's 
how I wound up in the Justice Department...I was
cranking out that bulls t on Nixon's crime policy
before he was elected. And it was bulls t too.
We knew it. The Nixon campaign didn't call for 
anything about crime problems that Ramsey Clark 
wasn't already doing under LBJ. We just made more 
noise about it.17
II.
The Republicans in 1968 did not create the national 
crisis that spawned the ”law and order” issue. Nixon's 
election is a testimony to the fact that a majority of 
Americans were genuinely concerned with social instability,
15Philip B. Kurland, Watergate and the Constitution. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 219.
16Kutler, The Wars of Watergate. 60-62.
17John W. Dean III, Blind Ambition. The White House 
Years. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976), 385-86.
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and consequently supported candidates promising to "get 
tough” on crime. Although the Nixon campaign undoubtedly 
took advantage of the social disorder of the period, its 
rhetoric alone could not have created such a widespread 
national consensus for law and order. A recent study by 
political scientist John Gilliom points out that "crisis 
issues" rarely become national priorities without the twin 
influences of: (1) top-down political interest from
nationally-prominent candidates and/or office holders (which, 
in turn, sets the agenda for the national media), and (2) 
"local manifestations of broad public problems."18 By late 
1968 most Americans believed they were witnessing lawlessness 
and/or other social disorder in their local communities and 
everyday lives. The media's election-year focus on the issue 
heightened these concerns.
Although a thorough historical analysis of nineteen 
sixties social disorder in America is beyond the scope of 
this study, an understanding of how the Nixon Administration
18John Gilliom, Surveillance. Privacy, and the Law: 
Employee Drug Testing and the Politics of Social Control. 
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994), 77.
This excellent study examines the anatomy of the "drug 
crisis" of the late 1980s: a crisis made possible by several 
factors: (1) the public's genuine concern over drugs in
society, and specifically in the work-place; (2) the Reagan 
Administration's election year [1986] "War on Drugs"; and (3) 
the national press' fixation on the so-called "crack" 
epidemic. The net result of this partially-manufactured 
crisis was that within the span of a few years a majority of 
Americans agreed to "sacrifice" a considerable degree of 
their privacy to allow random, warrantless, drug-testing in 
the work-place.
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rode "law and order" into the White House in 1969 requires 
some understanding of the key events and social themes of the 
period: most importantly, discontent among radical blacks and 
college-age whites that eventually coalesced in a "Movement" 
for change. This Movement took many forms: those opposed to 
the Vietnam War; those favoring increased social and economic 
justice for blacks; those angry at what they viewed as 
unnecessary U.S. influence over Third World nations; those 
anxious about living in a nation with a preponderance of the 
world's nuclear bomb arsenal; and those dissatisfied with the 
prevailing liberal Democratic "solutions" for society's ills. 
The two principal currents of the Movement most responsible 
for social disorder during the sixties were: (1) the Black
Power movement that evolved out of the non-violent civil 
rights movement, and (2) an increasingly militant New 
Left/counterculture movement, in which the Michigan White 
Panthers played a role, that was the "cutting edge" of a 
larger youth revolt against authority.19 An equally 
important factor was the reactionary response of the 
"establishment," particularly law enforcement and the 
intelligence agencies. As the decade progressed, these three
,9Clearly the "New Left" and the "counterculture" were 
separately occurring and very different movements: the former 
composed primarily of "political" college students and the 
latter of "cultural revolutionaries." They are grouped 
together here only for the purposes of a brief overview of 
sixties social disorder. They did have certain important 
commonalities: essentially middle-class white youth alienated 
with society, who became increasingly militant as the decade 
progressed.
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strands of mutually-reinforcing discontent came together, to 
create the worst social disorder of this century. The three 
did not evolve independently: the New Left was heavily
influenced by the civil rights/Black Power movement, while 
the "establishment" backlash against student activism 
increased in direct proportion to each new militant action.
Important antecedents can be found in earlier periods. 
Black Power evolved out of the "modern" civil rights 
movement, which began with the Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka. Kansas decision in 1954, outlawing segregation in 
public schools. In 1955, with the successful Montgomery, 
Alabama, Bus Boycott, which desegregated public buses, the 
movement adopted a Gandhian variety of non-violent civil 
disobedience, which became known as "direct action." This 
strategy, modified somewhat by the Reverend Martin Luther 
King, Jr., proved very successful over the following decade, 
in one historical civil rights victory after another.
The Second Reconstruction was successful due to a number 
of factors: King's non-violent approach, the determination of 
blacks to put their bodies on the line for civil rights, 
national media attention to Southern white brutality against 
non-violent blacks, and a developing middle-class Northern 
white consensus for keeping the century-old promises of full 
citizenship specifically guaranteed by the 13th, 14th, and 
15th Amendments. National leadership also played a 
significant, albeit delayed, role. The election of liberal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Democrats (Kennedy and Johnson) in 1960 brought only gradual 
change in national civil rights policy. Elected by the 
narrowest of margins in 1960 —  with considerable Southern 
support —  President Kennedy paid lip service to civil rights 
while advocating a gradualist, "go slow" approach. He 
favored the use of executive orders when necessary and
avoided a national civil rights bill. In this manner he
hoped to make contributions to civil rights without 
alienating white Southerners. Discussing the conflict 
between the liberals' essentially amoral pragmatism and the 
overwhelmingly moral issue of civil rights, Charles Morris 
states:
As pragmatic liberals, they were prepared to 
accept, even embrace change. But their insistence 
that it proceed incrementally and at a pace that
could be readily absorbed by the existing
political structure seemed arid and unfeeling in 
the face of the pressing issues that were churning 
to the surface.... in the South.20
However, events soon moved them to act. Southern white
brutality and violence convinced Robert Kennedy, the
President's Attorney General brother, to dispatch Federal
Marshals to Alabama during the Freedom Rides of 1961, as well
as to enforce the admission of black college student James
Meredith to the University of Mississippi in 1962. 1963 was
the turning point: nationally-televised scenes of white
Birmingham police using high-pressure fire hoses and attack
20Charles R. Morris, A Time of Passion: America 1960- 
1980. (New York: Penguin Books, 1986), 67.
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dogs against non-violent black children stunned the nation. 
As Allen Matusow states, civil rights "came to seem no longer 
the program of zealots, but a policy of moderate men."21 
Following the assassination of Kennedy in November, 1963, 
President Johnson continued the liberals' support of civil 
rights. By 1965 civil rights had become the nation's top 
domestic priority. Responding to another nationally- 
televised episode of white police brutality against non­
violent black protesters at Selma, President Johnson went on 
television to ask Congress for a sweeping voting rights bill 
—  which passed later tL t year.
Two events galvanized Northern white sympathy (and 
guilt) for civil rights legislation: the brutal
confrontations between white police and non-violent black 
protestors at Birmingham (1963) and Selma (1965). It was 
during these clashes that King's strategy of non-violence, 
coupled with the presence of the national media and the 
willingness of "cracker" police chiefs to lose their self- 
control, allowed the nation to see black citizens being 
beaten, gassed, and clubbed for doing nothing more than 
attempting to hold public sit-ins on courthouse steps and/or 
to engage in peaceful marches. This national disgrace forced 
two reluctant Presidents (Kennedy and Johnson) to become 
genuine supporters of civil rights.
2IAllen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of America. (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1984), 88.
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The modern civil rights movement that had been so 
successful under the leadership of Martin Luther King, Jr., 
for the decade following the Brown decision underwent 
significant changes during the 1965-1967 period. First, the 
universality of King's non-violent strategy failed to hold 
sway with a variety of black movement groups, most 
importantly SNCC. This organization of mostly college-age 
blacks had been in the forefront of "direct action" since the 
first sit-ins in Greensboro, North Carolina in 1960. It was 
mostly SNCC cadres in 1961 who, following CORE'S lead, 
travelled South on the Freedom Rides, where they met with 
considerable white brutality. SNCC also made up a
preponderance of the volunteers who travelled to Mississippi 
in the early sixties to register blacks to vote, again facing 
white violence and intimidation on an almost daily basis. By 
the time of the confrontations at Birmingham and Selma, SNCC 
leaders were openly critical of non-violence and increasingly 
advocated arming themselves for self-defense.
An additional factor that changed the overall direction 
of the civil rights movement was the urban violence that 
erupted in Northern cities, beginning with Watts, Los 
Angeles, in August of 1965, the first significant "race riot" 
of the sixties, where six evenings of violent uprisings 
resulted in thirty-four dead and almost four thousand 
arrested. Characterized by violence, burning, and looting 
(and occasionally even a festive atmosphere), the riots
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
symbolized the impotence of existing civil rights strategies
in confronting de facto segregation, discrimination, and
poverty —  problems that sit-ins and marches did little to
alleviate. Harvard Sitkoff offers the following analysis:
Urban blacks chose to protest by 
rioting....because they had no other viable 
strategy of change...They rioted to protest the 
pervasiveness and depth of white racism in the 
supposedly racially egalitarian North...Most of 
all, they rioted to raise the economic questions 
which the civil rights movement had ignored... For 
the better part of the decade, Northern blacks 
watched their brethren in the South gain 
concessions by creating disorder...The movement 
shook the ghettos out of their lethargy...It 
proved that protest could succeed and it raised 
black consciousness.22
Watts was the prelude to four consecutive "long hot summers"
of rioting in the ghettos of nearly every large American
city. The net result of the disorder was the dissolution of
the middle-class white consensus for further civil rights
gains for blacks, which had supported liberal Democratic
reform since Birmingham. Occurring just as non-violence was
losing its mystique among young blacks, the riots also had
the effect of speeding the destruction of the civil rights
coalition of SCLC, CORE, and SNCC.
1966 was a turning point. In June, the coalition's 
leadership met for the last time to protest the shooting of 
James Meredith in Memphis, who had set out on a solo march 
from Tennessee to the Mississippi State Capital in Jackson to
“Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality. 1954- 
1980. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), 207.
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encourage blacks to register to vote. As the nation's civil 
rights leaders converged in Memphis and proceeded to finish 
the march, internal divisions and conflicting goals surfaced. 
Martin Luther King's leadership was openly challenged by the 
newer and more militant leaders of CORE and SNCC. On June 
16, 1966, SNCC President Stokely Carmichael abandoned the 
more moderate slogan of "freedom now," by angrily calling for 
"black power." This new slogan came to symbolize the
abandonment of King's strategy of non-violence, as well as 
the movement's commitment to racial integration. When the 
march concluded in Jackson a few days later, the civil rights 
coalition was all but dissolved. Within a few months all 
white supporters were purged from SNCC's ranks.
The Black Power movement contained both political and
cultural forms. The more positive and arguably longer-
lasting aspects included an increasing cultural awareness and
self re-evaluation by American blacks. In the first
important study tracing the legacy of Black Power, William L.
Van Deburg focuses on these more positive cultural forms:
The Black Power movement was not exclusively 
cultural, but it was essentially cultural...the 
movement raised both individual and group 
expectations, made black folk feel good about 
themselves, and steered them away from 'cultural 
homicide'.. .Afro-American culture was the central, 
irreducible, irreplaceable element in the ongoing 
struggle for psychological liberation and 
empowerment.23
“William L. Van Deburg, New Dav in Babvlon: The Black 
Power Movement and American Culture. 1965-1975. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), 9, 304.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
However, popular memory focuses almost exclusively on the 
violent, separatist aspects of the movement: the words of 
Malcolm X and the occasionally-violent actions of the Black 
Panthers.
Black Power had its destructive side. Several aspects 
of the movement made significant contributions to the 
heightened social disorder of the late sixties. Most 
important, of course, were the urban riots. In addition, 
many young blacks, following the lead of "new" leaders such 
as Stokely Carmichael, and influenced by writers such as 
Malcolm X, Marcus Garvey, and Frantz Fanon, adopted highly 
militant positions, calling for complete separation from 
white society. A fringe minority of black nationalists, most 
notably the Black Panthers, advocated "revolution" against 
what they viewed as white imperialist domination of black 
"colonies," the urban ghettos. The negativity which 
characterized the black nationalist message was rooted in the 
disillusionment many young members of SNCC and CORE 
experienced during the 1960-1965 period.
More than any other group, the Black Panthers came to 
symbolize violent black militancy in America during the 
sixties. Originating in Oakland California during the fall 
of 1966 under the leadership of Louisiana's Huey Newton and 
Texas' Bobby Seale, two former students at Merritt College in 
Oakland, the group took the title "Black Panthers for Self
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Defense."24 Borrowing their ideas directly from Malcolm X, 
the fledgling organization adopted a "Ten Point Program," 
emphasizing such things as full employment for blacks, an end 
to white police brutality in black neighborhoods, and a 
United Nations-sponsored plebiscite to address the issue of 
whether black "colonies" (ghettos) should remain a part of 
the United States, or declare their sovereign independence. 
Taking advantage of a California State law allowing public 
display of non-concealed weapons, the early Panthers 
patrolled the streets of Oakland, keeping a watchful eye on 
the activities of local police. If a black person was 
stopped or questioned, the Panthers would assist the person 
by citing appropriate state laws for the edification of law 
officers.
The breakthrough year for the Black Panthers was 1967. 
On May 2 they made national headlines when Huey Newton sent 
a small, fully-armed contingent of Panthers into the 
California State Capital in Sacramento to protest the 
Legislature's consideration of a ban on carrying guns in 
public. The event that made them a household name was the 
October 28, 1967, shoot-out with Oakland police, which left 
one officer dead and another wounded. Also wounded in the
MThe theory behind the black panther symbol was that the 
cat rarely attacks unless it is cornered —  indicating the 
strictly defensive character of the early organization. The 
symbol was first used by an all-volunteer, all-black group 
formed in Lowndes County, Alabama, 1965-66, as part of SNCC's 
voter registration campaign.
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gun battle was Huey Newton, who by now had become a national 
hero in the eyes of hundreds of black militants across the 
country. The image of young black militants wearing 
military-style clothing and openly carrying guns —  occurring 
simultaneously with the worst urban rioting of the century —  
had the effect of galvanizing many of the nation's militants 
who, like Stokely Carmichael, were increasingly frustrated 
with the "gradualism" of the civil rights movement up to that 
time. After the Oakland shoot-out, the Panthers were swamped 
with calls and letters from young blacks across the nation, 
requesting information on how they could start their own 
local chapters. The incident also created the decade's first 
imprisoned revolutionary martyr, as Huey Newton was charged 
with murdering the slain Oakland policeman. During Newton's 
three-year imprisonment, the leadership of the party was in 
the capable hands of Eldridge Cleaver, an ex-convict who, at 
age thirty-two in 1967, had spent half of his life in jail. 
Cleaver is credited with saving the party, by utilizing a 
multifaceted strategy of (1) making Huey a hero for "the 
cause"; (2) concentrating the party's efforts on community 
organizing and assisting poor blacks; and (3) seeking 
alliances with other organizations, such as SNCC.25
One factor contributing to the Black Panthers' 
reputation as the "vanguard" of the Black Power movement was
MThe Black Panthers' community programs included free 
breakfasts for children, "liberation schools" that taught 
racial pride, and legal assistance centers.
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the dissolution of SNCC. No longer the focus of young
blacks' involvement in the struggle, the organization lacked
a coherent strategy after the Meredith march, and its
leadership was torn by dissention. Succeeding Carmichael as
Chairman in 1967, Louisiana's H. Rap Brown called for open
rebellion. One of his inflammatory speeches occurred at a
black rally in Cambridge, Maryland, during the summer of
1967, as Detroit burned:
You'd better get you some guns. The Man's moving 
to kill you. The only thing the honky respects is 
force....I mean, don't be trying to love the
honkey to death. Shoot him to death. Shoot him
to death, brother, cause that's what he's out to
do to you. Like I said in the beginning, if this
town don't come around, this town should be burned 
down.26
By the end of 1967 the Black Panthers had chapters in dozens
of cities across the nation, and Congress passed legislation
making it a federal offense to cross state lines for the 
purpose of inciting riots (the so-called "H. Rap Brown law"). 
Of particular concern to J. Edgar Hoover and the intelligence 
community, however, was the possibility that Black Power 
would coalesce with a newer and, for the FBI, much more 
puzzling threat: the radicalization of white college students 
and former hippies.
The New Left and counterculture movements that emerged 
during the sixties followed very different evolutionary 
paths. However, they both evolved from the same raw
26Quoted in Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality.
217.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
material: the so-called "Baby Boomers." Another important 
contributing factor to the emergence of white youth 
radicalism was the pervasive affluence of the era. More than 
ten million World War II veterans enjoyed an extraordinarily 
high standard of living, largely due to wartime savings and 
the "G.I. Bill." Geoffrey Perrett estimates that by 1950, 
the enormous scope of assistance offered to veterans and 
their families via the G.I. Bill "embraced approximately one- 
third of the total population" and brought about "the only 
basic redistribution of national income in American 
history."27 Yet despite this affluence, many children 
growing up in fifties America came to differ with their 
parents as to the meaning of affluence. While their parents 
viewed the world around them from the perspective of the 
Great Depression and World War II —  both of which taught the 
value of sacrifice —  the children lacked such experiences. 
For a child growing up in a large suburban house with all of 
the creature comforts, adherence to the traditional American 
values of thrift and economy seemed ridiculous. The issue of 
the Cold War also widened the generational split. While 
their parents saw the "Bomb" as a weapon of salvation that 
brought victory against the Japanese, fifties children grew
^Geoffrey Perrett, Days of Sadness. Years of Triumph: 
The American People 1939-1945. (Madison, WS: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1985), 341, 11.
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up with civil defense drills at school.28 Lacking the 
experience that came from fighting an obvious foe, fifties 
children also struggled with the meaning of "Communist 
subversion" at home and abroad.
Growing up in fifties America, future members of the New 
Left and counterculture also experienced a unique form of 
alienation that David Riesman (The Lonely Crowd. 1950), 
William Whyte (The Organizational Man. 1956), and John 
Kenneth Galbraith (The Affluent Society. 1958) analyzed. 
Some of the themes they discussed included: (1) how "mass
society" was replacing the social cement of community and 
tradition; (2) the homogenizing effect of society's 
overwhelming pressure to conform, which robbed people of 
their individuality; (3) how "progress" was overrated and 
often self-defeating (witness the continuation of poverty, 
DDT, smog, and the "throw-away plastic society") ; and (4) how 
the dizzying pace of change rendered a parent's lifetime 
experiences utterly useless as a guide for dealing with the 
present. This may have meant little to teenagers: they 
nonetheless garnered plenty of alienation from television, 
James Dean, Mad Magazine, Elvis Presley, apocalyptic movies, 
and "Negro" rock-n-roll stations their parents knew nothing 
about. Future White Panther leader John Sinclair was a 
fifties youngster, growing up in working-class Davison,
28Paul Boyer, Bv the Bomb's Earlv Light: American Thought 
and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Acre. (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1985), 175-77.
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Michigan, not far from the huge General Motors plant in
Flint, where his father assembled Buicks for forty-three
years. As he would later recall, his early years were filled
with conformity and fish every Friday, until:
I just turned the radio dial one day sitting in my 
little bedroom....and BOOM! There it was— the 
music that would turn my whole life around and 
shoot all of us into a totally new future...These 
dudes opened their mouths to sing and a whole new 
race of mutants leaped out dancing and screaming 
to the future, driving fast cars and drinking beer 
and bouncing around half-naked in the back seats, 
getting ready to march though the 60's...What was 
even stranger was that it was an outlaw world from 
the beginning.. .We were outlaws from the very 
start...These black singers....whispering their 
super-sensual maniac drivel into the ears and 
orifices of the daughters of Amerika, turning its 
sons into lust-crazed madmen and fools, breaking 
down generations and generations of self-denial 
and completely destroying the sanctity of the 
Euro-Amerikan home forever.29
The first sign of the youth rebellion that would
eventually become the New Left occurred in 1960, when a group 
of college students from the University of California at 
Berkeley staged a demonstration on the steps of San
Francisco's City Hall to protest the House Un-American 
Activities Committee (HUAC) hearings, and encountered police 
fire-hoses and clubs for their trouble. The tactics they 
employed —  the "sit-in" —  they borrowed from the civil 
rights movement. As Todd Gitlin explains, the country's 
universities and other "zones of negativity" were galvanized 
into action by the young black activists of SNCC and CORE,
29John Sinclair, Guitar Armv: Street Writings/Prison
Writings. (New York: Douglas Books, 1972), 8-12.
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who were literally putting their bodies on the line for 
social change.30 As the sixties progressed, the phenomenon 
of white militants idolizing blacks in the Movement, always 
emulating but never quite catching up, would become one of 
the decade's important givens.
The fact that college campuses spawned the New Left was 
highly significant: the children of affluence possessed both 
the wealth and the leisure time to question the principles of 
the larger society. Beginning in the late-forties and 
continuing through the sixties, America's higher education 
system expanded at a previously unheard of pace, first to 
accommodate the enormous numbers of veterans pursuing degrees 
via the G.I. Bill, and later to house their Baby Boom 
offspring. By 1970, approximately 40 percent of all 17-21 
year-olds were enrolled. Not so ironically, the
"institutionalization" of higher education, as well as the 
"feel like a number" alienation it fostered, provided one of 
the first significant issues of contention for the New left.
The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), organized 
during the early sixties at the University of Michigan in Ann 
Arbor by students Tom Hayden and A1 Haber, was the 
organization that eventually came to define the New Left. 
The principles of the early SDS were concerned with what they 
viewed as contradictions between American principles and the 
actual practice of government. As an antidote to apathy and
30Gitlin, The Sixties. 83.
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alienation with modern society, SDS advocated "participatory 
democracy," whereby students would study controversial issues 
such as civil rights and atomic weapons, debate them in the 
open, and voice their opinions via actions, such as picketing 
and sit-ins. In Gitlin's words: "A 'movement' didn't simply 
demand, it did."31 The hallmark treatise of the early SDS 
was the 1962 Port Huron Statement, written primarily by Tom 
Hayden:
We are a people of this generation, bred in at 
least modest comfort, housed now in universities, 
looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit...As 
we grew....our comfort was penetrated by events 
too troubling to dismiss. First....the Southern 
struggle against racial bigotry, compelled most of 
us from silence to activism. Second, the 
enclosing fact of the Cold War, symbolized by the 
presence of the Bomb, brought awareness that 
we....might die at any time.32
Hayden's analysis then discussed issues of poverty, peace,
and the institutionalized "military industrial complex," and
advocated that university students lead the debate over these
issues, because the university "is the central institution
for organizing, evaluating, and transmitting knowledge."33
31Gitlin, The Sixties. 84. Gitlin joined SDS in 1962, 
having been involved in a Harvard peace organization called 
"Tocsin" during the previous two years. Moving to Ann Arbor 
in the fall of 1962, he was "elected" President of SDS for 
the 1963-64 year.
32Students for a Democratic Society, The Port Huron 
Statement. (New York: Students for a Democratic Society, 
1964), 3. Quotations taken from the second printing of
December, 1964, which was the first published edition; the 
previous edition was mimeographed.
33Ibid. . 61.
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He concluded with the statement: "If we appear to seek the 
unattainable, as it has been said, then let it be known that 
we do so to avoid the unimaginable.1134 Initially focused 
primarily on college campuses, SDS soon sent cadres into 
urban ghettos, to live among and assist the poor, and the 
South, to help SNCC and CORE with voter registration. 
Expansion was gradual until Vietnam gave thousands of 
previously-apathetic students adequate motivation to get 
involved.
Inherent in the title of "New Left" was a recognition 
that they were embarking on something totally novel: a new 
left. Locating a unique, unifying ideology that was divorced 
from the old left was a constant challenge. One way in which 
the New Left attempted to define itself was its general 
opposition to many of the policies of the Johnson 
Administration, reflecting the student movement's cynicism as 
to liberal beliefs. These differences can be summarized as 
follows: (1) while the liberals believed in politics as a 
means to solve social problems and resolve conflicts, the New 
Left saw politics as a conduit for creating a moral society; 
(2) while liberals had faith in the electoral process, the 
New Left was moving beyond mere elections to direct action; 
and (3) while post-war liberalism was staunchly anti­
communist, the New Left was attempting to detach itself from 
the Cold War. Ward and June Cleaver of Leave it to Beaver
^Ibid.. 63.
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may have been satisfied expressing their political beliefs in 
the ballot box, but the New Left ’’wanted decisions made by 
publics, in public, not just announced there."35 What 
bothered members of the New Left the most about liberals was 
their willingness to compromise ("politics is the art of the 
possible") and their ability to detach themselves from moral 
issues such as civil rights. Carl Oglesby, SDS's 1965-66 
President, termed this "managerial liberalism." Later 
writers such as Allen Matusow have termed it "corporate 
liberalism.1,36 Both mean the same thing: an optimistic,
"technocratic faith" that the world's problems can be solved 
—  gradually —  if the right minds are put to the task. 
Other features of liberalism that the New Left criticized 
included the liberals' support for big business, as well as 
their inability to see Third World nationalist movements as 
anything more than Soviet-inspired insurrections.
The New Left also possessed a self-fulfilling spirit, 
reflecting the youthfulness of its members. Marching in a 
protest or participating in a "teach-in" had the dual 
benefits of raising public awareness of issues, and making 
the participant feel good. Over time, as students enjoyed 
shared experiences of collective "actions," some believed 
that they were creating a totally unique "movement culture,"
35Gitlin, The Sixties. 134.
36Matusow, The Unraveling of America. 32.
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that was defined more by actions than words.37 
Unquestionably, the New Left's addiction to the feelings 
associated with "putting your body on the line" for social 
change was borrowed directly from the civil rights movement. 
Beginning in 1963, increasing numbers of white college 
students spent their summers in the South, assisting SNCC and 
CORE with voter registration of disenfranchised blacks. It 
was through these face-to-face encounters that many of the 
New Left's future leaders received their education in civil 
disobedience.
The desire to be expressive was something the New Left 
also had in common with the counterculture, the cultural 
radicals with whom they increasingly interacted as the issues 
of civil rights and Vietnam brought more and more young 
people into the streets by mid-decade. The counterculture 
remains something of an enigma —  both in the collective 
memories of contemporaries and in the grossly-distorted 
images portrayed by the popular media.38 However, there is
37The issue of a sixties "movement culture" will be 
addressed in later chapters. For a fascinating discussion of 
an earlier "movement culture," see Lawrence Goodwyn, The 
Populist Movement. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978) , 
vii - xxiii. Goodwyn argues that the Populist Movement was 
the United States' last genuine attempt to create a "movement 
culture"; that the struggle between a "cooperationist" 
society and a competitive one was fought only once —  and the 
competitive one emerged victorious. Many of Goodwyn's ideas 
also help us understand the 1960s.
38Any so-called "scholarly" analysis of the 
counterculture must begin with the acknowledgement that the 
historiography of this phenomenon is all but non-existent —
(continued...)
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general agreement over its origins: the black hipsters of the 
thirties and forties, and their white emulators of the 
fifties. In several cities across America, but especially 
Harlem, blacks created a totally unique cultural form, 
characterized by avant garde jazz, zoot suits, be-bop, and 
marijuana. In time, alienated whites, many of them 
intellectuals, emulated the black lifestyles. The best-known 
beatniks were Allen Ginsberg, William Burroughs, and Jack 
Kerouac, a talented group that produced poetry and fiction 
expressing profound alienation from fifties America. 
Implicit in the beat philosophy was a complete rejection of 
mass consumption and mass acquiescence, an absolute 
idolization of the black struggle, and a longing to strike 
out on the road to self-discovery. With the introduction of 
LSD (legal until 1966) into the counterculture scene by 
Timothy Leary and Ken Kesey in the early sixties, the path to 
self-discovery did not even require owning a car or leaving
38(.. .continued)
and that which does exist is woefully inadequate. Most 
studies dismiss counterculture members as apathetic drug 
freaks who were incapable of sustained political argument. 
For example, both Matusow and Gitlin, writing from 
intellectual leftist perspectives, criticize the non-serious 
nature of the counterculture, which they believe damaged the 
New Left's credibility. Less radical writers have been even 
less kind. Charles DeBenedetti's An American Ordeal: The 
Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 1990) goes so far as to blame the 
counterculture for damaging the credibility of the entire 
anti-war movement (p. 78). This is puzzling, particularly in 
light of the long-term influence the counterculture had on 
American society, including changes in sexual mores, activist 
concern for the environment and healthy eating, and the 
institutionalization of "hip" popular culture.
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home. In short, LSD helped bridge the gap between beat and 
hippie.
Other technological advances made possible the enormous 
expansion of the counterculture. For example, the 
introduction of the 45 rpm record allowed for the inexpensive 
purchase of the latest rock and folk music. Bob Dylan was 
the hands-down favorite: an ultra-alienated Midwesterner with 
a whiny voice and songs that inspired a generation. At the 
Newport Jazz Festival in 1965 —  the first gigantic gathering 
of Movement people of the era —  Dylan took advantage of 
another technological advance, the electric guitar and 
amplification. By this time the innovative Mersey Beat sound 
of the Beatles had also become an enormous influence on the 
American youth culture. In 1966 the group discovered LSD, 
and began releasing records so innovative that they 
anticipated changes in the Movement by several years. In 
less than two years their lyrics went from "I want to hold to 
your hand" to "Turn off your mind, relax, and float down 
stream."39 The Movement struggled to keep up: by 1967 the 
LSD-inspired "San Francisco Sound," led by the Grateful Dead, 
described the benefits of "tripping" on acid. Tens of 
thousands of white, middle, and working-class youth dropped 
acid, dropped out, and began gathering in small pockets of 
"liberated" communities across the nation. The lifestyle
39The latter is "Tomorrow Never Knows" from the Beaties' 
1966 "Revolver" album; a John Lennon composition.
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they adopted commonly involved voluntary poverty, 
"underground" newspapers, egalitarian communal living, 
decentralized "community schools" for their children, and 
free clinics (that obviously complemented "free sex"). The 
White Panthers evolved out of one such community near 
Detroit's Wayne State University: "Trans-Love Energies."
During the so-called "summer of love" in 1967, San 
Francisco's Haight Ashbury district became, for the 
mainstream press, a focal point for the new cultural 
radicals: what one reporter called "hippies.1,40 In fact, by 
mid-1967 this phase of the counterculture movement was 
already over, due to media overkill and police repression. 
As Matusow explains, peace and love were soon replaced by 
"the politics of rage," as the counterculture "became willing 
cannon fodder for the increasingly violent demonstrations of 
the New Left."41
The relationship between the New Left and the 
counterculture was complex. A second wave of New Left 
adherents who came of age during the mid-sixties related to 
the counterculture in ways that the "Old New Left" of Hayden, 
Gitlin, and others did not. On the other hand, by 1966 a 
majority of New Left faithful (old and new) were at least 
occasional users of marijuana and enjoyed listening not only
40Few, if any, cultural radicals referred to themselves 
as hippies. Yet in almost every modern-day documentary, the 
word is used to label the entire movement.
41Matusow, The Unraveling of America. 303.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
63
to Dylan, but also to the numerous forms of innovative rock 
and soul sounds carried into the SDS offices by new recruits. 
Thus, the New Left and counterculture influenced each other 
in a symbiotic, but not always harmonious, relationship. For 
better or worse, they marched together through the turbulence 
of the late sixties.
Black Power, the New Left, and the counterculture began 
to converge into a single "Movement" during 1967 and 1968. 
The increasing social disorder of this period owes much to 
this coalescence —  as well as to the conservative 
establishment's reaction to it. One of the most significant 
characteristics of these years was the dizzying pace of 
change, aptly described by Gitlin as "a cyclone in a wind 
tunnel."42 Frustration and impatience propelled the
Movement. Watching the civil rights coalition in Washington 
evaporate in the wake of urban riots (and in many areas turn 
to backlash), Black Power adherents became increasingly 
militant. The New Left and counterculture were obsessed with 
a Vietnam war that went on day after day, regardless of their 
protests. Contributing to the sense of frustration was the 
speed with which ideas, fashions, and trends came and went. 
For the Movement, what was "cool" and "hip" at any given 
moment was soon replaced. In an early 1969 article 
discussing the cultural influence of the Beatles, John 
Sinclair touched on this theme of rapid change:
42Gitlin, The Sixties. 242.
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The Beatles legitimized the dope scene for the 
popular media and have consequently been super­
instrumental in bringing about the hugest change 
in a generation's consciousness in history. I
mean, if you think things are the same now as
before Sgt. Pepper [a Beatles record] and the all-
American LSD year of 1967, and if you think the
Beatles didn't do it, check out where you were at
in 1966. Look in the mirror.43
The New Left responded to the changing times with ever- 
larger cadres of followers, as SDS chapters appeared on
campuses across the nation. But expansion had its costs on
the internal cohesion of the once tightly-knit organization. 
A policy of open admissions, combined with the rapidity of
change and multiplication of "causes," brought a newer, more
militant leadership, displaying "an alarming potential for 
mindless activism."44 Gradually —  one radicalizing 
incident after another —  the New Left and counterculture 
moved from protest (staging a sit-in or publicly burning 
draft cards) to "resistance," (blocking access to a military 
induction center or seizing a university building to protest 
military research on campus) and finally, for some, to 
"revolution" (bombing police stations and other symbols of 
the establishment) ,45
43(Ann Arbor Michigan) Argus, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 24 - 
February 7, 1969, 10. Underground newspaper in possession 
of author.
44Matusow, The Unraveling of America. 321.
45Isolated bombings do not cause revolutions. This is 
as close as America got to revolution during the sixties.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
65
A review of key incidents during the 1967-68 period that 
became symbols of the New Left/counterculture's increasing 
militancy includes: (1) a summer (1967) of the worst race
riots in U.S. history, especially Newark and Detroit; (2) the 
"martyrdom” of Argentine revolutionary fighter Che Guevara, 
killed in Bolivia in October, 1967, whose life-story inspired 
many radical students; (3) the bi-coastal "Stop the Draft 
Week" events, also in October, 1967, culminating in several 
days of radical students "street fighting" with police in 
Oakland,46 and, in Washington, D.C., a demonstration by the 
"MOBE" (National Mobilization Committee to End the War in 
Vietnam) at the Pentagon, which united the counterculture and 
the New Left; (4) several days of campus rioting at the 
University of Wisconsin at Madison in late October, 1967, 
after police attacks upon peaceful demonstrations against 
campus recruiting by Dow Chemical, the makers of napalm; (5) 
the escalation of the Vietnam War, which reached a climax as 
U.S. troop levels peaked at over half a million during the 
winter of 1967-68; (6) the assassinations of Martin Luther 
King Jr. (April 4, 1968) and presidential aspirant Robert 
Kennedy (June 6, 1968), which symbolized a national rejection 
of non-violence and a heightening of social divisions; (7)
^For Gitlin, who observed and took part in these street 
actions designed to delay the induction of new recruits into 
Oakland's military processing center, the fighting was "a 
watershed" for the movement. Matusow concurs, calling the 
street actions on October 20, 1967 "the Bastille Day of the 
New Left." See Gitlin, The Sixties. 252, and Matusow, The 
Unraveling of America. 328.
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the Columbia University shut-down in late April, 1968, led by 
SDS leader Mark Rudd, to protest the university's disregard 
for the local black communities and military research on 
campus; (8) the coalition between the Black Power and white 
radical movements, forged by a short-lived presidential bid 
by Black Panther Eldridge Cleaver on the California "Peace 
and Freedom Party," and (9) a week of battles between police 
and protestors in Chicago during the Democratic National 
Convention in late August, 1968, which further radicalized 
the New left.
During this period SDS leaders and followers struggled 
with a growing feeling of frustration, stemming from several 
sources. Most importantly, there was a collective sense 
that, as black people were seizing control of their destinies 
—  via urban riots, the Black Panthers' facing down "the 
Man," and blacks everywhere expressing their African cultural 
heritage —  the previous tactics of the New Left were proving 
impotent. An additional concern was the lack of a central 
ideology, at a time when SDS membership was at an all-time 
high. A New Left that had prided itself on doing rather than 
talking, was suddenly relegated to wearing "Free Huey" 
buttons and watching in envy as black nationalists upped the 
ante with police and the conservative establishment. The 
question that was increasingly debated in New Left circles 
was, "what does whitey do" when Vietnam comes home and real
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armed resistance to the establishment begins? Few had 
coherent answers.
The New Left's shift from protest to "resistance" was 
thus an attempt to overcome these feelings of powerlessness, 
as well as to remain relevant in a rapidly-changing Movement. 
When Gitlin crossed this threshold during the "street 
actions" against the Oakland draft induction center in 
October, 1967, his letters to friends spoke of an 
exhilaration that came from moving to the next level of "the 
struggle":
The white movement came into its own last 
week... It was not revolution, but it was 
insurrection in the legal sense and in the 
spirit...Now I take the idea of resistance damn 
seriously.. .1 hear that some SNCC guys were saying 
after Washington [the Pentagon demonstration], OK 
boys, you've become men now, we're ready to talk. 
They're right.47
Once the path to resistance was entered upon, 
"revolution" did not seem far away. The actions of Mayor 
Richard Daley's Chicago Police during the so-called "Battle 
for Chicago" convinced many in the New Left that the 
"available channels" for dissent in America were gone, and 
that violence was the only message the "establishment" would 
listen to. Chicago was the watershed for the Movement —  and 
for the sixties. Here, representatives of the
counterculture, led by the pseudo-organization Youth 
International Party (or Yippie), joined forces with the MOBE
47Gitlin, The Sixties. 252.
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and SDS to bring a "festival of life" to the Democrats' 
"convention of death." The demonstration had been planned as 
far back as the previous winter, by the newly politicized 
counterculture, under the non-direction of Jerry Rubin and 
Abbie Hoffman. The lifestyle and philosophy of Yippie were 
one in the same: that previously-apathetic cultural rebels 
should "live the revolution" by displaying their Movement 
lifestyles (sex in the streets, drugs, and rock music) in 
tandem with New Left "peace freaks" and other "politicos." 
Their favorite mode of expression was "guerrilla theater": 
disruptive and usually well-publicized street actions, 
whereby Movement people attacked conventional mores.48
Learning of the demonstration the following spring 
(1968), Mayor Daley refused the organizers permits to meet in 
"his" parks, and made no secret of his preparations to meet 
the demonstrators with force. This scared off much of the 
Movement, but not those, like Gitlin, who refused to allow 
their genuine fear of violence from depriving them of the 
chance to take part in so important an event —  even one 
where violence was quite likely. A representative sample of
480ne such "street theater" action which made Abbie 
Hoffman something of a legend within the movement involved 
the dropping of several hundred one dollar bills from the 
gallery of the New York Stock Exchange on the brokers below. 
As Abbie later described the event: "Pandemonium...Stock
Brokers scrambled over the floor like worried mice, scurrying 
after the money. Greed had burst through the business-as- 
usual facade." See Abbie Hoffman, Soon to be a Maior Motion 
Picture (New York: Perigee Books, 1980), 101.
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the intensity of social disorder that Chicago represented is
contained in this passage from David Farber:
At 11 P.M., Commander Lynsky formed a skirmish 
line of one hundred and twenty men...Most of the 
men were nervous and unenthusiastic...Almost 
all....were angry and worried about getting 
hurt...As the police approached, the crowd chanted 
over and over, 'Hell no, we won't go!' Hundreds 
of people screamed....'Pigs!' at the police in a 
kind of litany...the police kept coming...For a 
moment the two groups stood face-to-face...two 
thousand young people facing less than two hundred 
police...Then, suddenly, the police moved forward, 
some screaming, 'Get....out of here'...the 
skirmish formation dissolved. The police began to 
methodically club people, jabbing them in the back 
or chest...Some police beat people bloody. Some 
demonstrators fought back. They were beaten to 
the ground and then beaten some more.49
The following November, neither the New 
Left/counterculture nor the Black Power movements paid much 
attention to the election of Richard Nixon as President. By 
this time "establishment" politics was viewed as utterly 
meaningless and alien to most of the Movement —  just as 
Middle America came to view the radicals' increasing 
infatuation with violence. Many in the conservative 
establishment were convinced that the time was approaching 
when America would have to be defended from threats at home 
as well as abroad. Gitlin summarizes the mood as 1969 
approached: "The movement emerged committed to an impossible 
revolution; the Right emerged armed for power and a more 
possible counter-revolution...no centers were going to hold,
49David Farber, Chicago '68. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1988), 181-82.
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no wisdom was going to prevail."50 It was as if there were 
two completely different versions of reality present in the 
nation.
III.
The emergence of the "conservative establishment" 
explains Nixon's electoral majority in 1968. The most vocal 
and visible proponents were the so-called "forces of 
authority": the law enforcement community (local and state 
policemen, FBI agents, U.S. Attorneys, Justice Department 
officials, and intelligence agents), as well as conservative 
politicians at the local, state, and national levels. An 
analysis of their collective ideology, as well as their 
actions, will provide evidence concerning how individuals 
outside of the Movement influenced its development, and 
contributed to the worsening social disorder.
As was the case with the Movement, the conservative 
establishment also went through an evolutionary process 
during the sixties, characterized by the replacement of 
moderation with extremism. The internal dynamics propelling 
this "New Conservatism" included such things as: (1) disdain 
for the due process rulings of the liberal Warren Court —  
widely criticized by not only law enforcement officials, but 
leading Republicans and Southern "Dixicrats" as well; (2)
^Gitlin, The Sixties. 326
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anger and fear of blacks, for the new assertiveness 
associated with Black Power, as well as urban rioting; (3) 
contempt for the New Left, viewed as ungrateful and spoiled 
pseudo-intellectuals who threw away the advantages and 
leisure their parents worked so hard for; (4) hatred for 
those in the Movement who opposed U.S. foreign policy to the 
point of advocating victory for the Vietcong (and other Third 
World nationalist revolutions) ; and (5) an overall disgust 
with the Democratic Party, which, they believed, exuded an 
"atmosphere of permissiveness" during the sixties by refusing 
to crack down on student subversives and their "pinko" 
professors; they also criticized the Democrats' for spending 
millions to "appease" lawless inner-city blacks in the "War 
on Poverty" which they viewed as "boondoggle."
The cornerstone of the conservative establishment's 
philosophy centered upon the issue of personal 
responsibility: briefly stated, blacks and young people must 
take responsibility for their actions; government should not 
support social programs unnecessary if people took 
responsibility for their own lives. Intolerance of most 
forms of dissent was another given: it was just plain wrong 
to evade the draft, burn draft cards and/or American flags, 
or engage in civil disobedience beyond the letter of the law.
What the conservative establishment prescribed to remedy 
the problems facing American society was a mixture of old and 
new. It emphasized traditional, "old-fashioned values," such
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as hard work, respect for parents, and love of country; a 
favorite slogan was "America: love it or leave it." As for 
crime and dissent, there were regarded as one and the same, 
worthy of the latest surveillance techniques available, 
including wiretapping, hidden microphones, and the use of 
informers. Following the riots of 1967-68 and the violence 
at the Democratic National Convention in 1968, conservatives 
advocated fighting back with all available resources. The 
FBI unleashed two separate counter-intelligence (COINTELPRO) 
programs against the Movement, one targeting blacks and the 
other targeting the New Left. At the state and local levels, 
nearly every large city supported "special investigative" 
divisions or units ("Red Squads") devoted to surveillance of 
the Movement. Arrests (often for petty drug offenses) and 
harassment commonly occurred, as law enforcement officials 
became increasingly upset at being called "pig" and treated 
with contempt by political and cultural radicals.
It was common for both sides to attach differing 
symbolic meaning to the same events. Chicago '68 is a case 
in point. While the New Left emphasized unjustified police 
brutality ("The whole world is watching"), the conservative 
establishment saw evidence that student radicals sought the 
total destruction of the government.51 Thus, the net effect 
of such incidents was to push both sides closer to extremism.
5iA vast majority of Americans sided with the 
conservative establishment, a step toward the creation of 
Nixon's "Silent Majority."
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This much the Movement and the conservative establishment had
in common. By the end of the decade a significant number of
individuals on both sides came to see violence as entirely
justifiable. Some —  more than will admit it today —
believed that the nation was approaching revolution.
In a revolution, almost anything is possible, and 
the perception of reality ceases to act as a 
constraining influence on the participants' 
imagination.52
The "revolution" was one of the most common sixties
cliche words. Rare was the underground newspaper appearing
after 1967 that did not carry at least one reference to it.
Further confusing the matter is the fact that, for the
Movement, the word had several very different meanings.
Yippies, and those who followed them, were "living the
revolution" simply by existing; Abbie Hoffman wrote a
Movement best-seller entitled Revolution for the Hell of it.
Others, such as the Black Panthers and "action factions"
within SDS, were serious about their use of the word. By the
same token, many in the conservative establishment believed
whole-heartedly that armed insurrection was at hand. U.S.
Appeals Judge Ralph Guy, the U.S. Attorney for Detroit during
the late sixties, recently recalled:
Today it is easy to say that they [the police and 
FBI] must have been out of their minds to pursue 
this [warrantless wiretapping of radicals]...The 
anti-war movement was forming a coalition with the 
civil rights movement. The war made all of it 
seem more serious...1 took it a lot more seriously
52Soros, Underwriting Democracy. 173
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
74
once I became U.S. Attorney...I don't know if I 
ever thought that revolution was imminent, but 
they weren't college pranks either.53
Judge Guy's indecision concerning whether or not he actually
believed that a revolution was near during the late sixties
is a typical response among contemporaries looking back.
Historians too have generally treated references to "the
revolution" with great contempt. Typical of these viewpoints
is Allen Matusow's The Unraveling of America, a successful
survey of the period. Summing up the failure of the New
Left, he condemns it for its "commitment to revolution in a
nonrevolutionary situation."54 Many less-scholarly works,
including Todd Gitlin's The Sixties, say the same thing.
Gitlin discusses the Movement's euphoria following the
actions during "Stop the Draft Week" in October, 1967 as
leading SDS toward "the mirage of 'the revolution'"; summing
up his involvement in the New Left during the sixties, he
concludes that, as the levels of militancy increased, he
found himself "caught up in the collective hallucination (or
was it) of 'the revolution'."55 His words, like those of
former U.S. Attorney Guy, indicate that: (1) he is still
struggling with memories of the period, and (2) despite the
cliche status accorded to "the revolution" in the years since
53Interview with author, July 17, 1992, Ann Arbor,
Michigan.
^Matusow, The Unraveling of America. 343.
55Gitlin, The Sixties. 286, 3.
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(as well as the knowledge that no widespread armed rebellion 
actually occurred), he remains unconvinced that his beliefs 
concerning the revolution were, in fact, hallucinations.
The very fact that so many observers and participants 
who were on the front lines of the sixties used the word 
"revolution" with such frequency is significant. It 
indicates that some individuals were genuinely convinced that 
insurrection was at hand, or at least on the horizon. An 
excellent case in point for how otherwise reasonable people 
could see revolution where it did not exist is the story of 
Canadian journalist David Lewis Stein. An "establishment" 
reporter, Stein went to Chicago in 1968 to cover the 
Democratic National Convention, and ended up joining the 
Yippies. When he first encountered Rubin and Hoffman they 
concluded from his appearance (over thirty with short hair) 
that he was a police informant. By the following January he 
had joined the Movement, was increasingly committed to the 
idea of "revolution," and assumed an active role in the 
"street actions" protesting the inauguration of Richard Nixon 
in Washington, D.C. In the span of six months he progressed 
from a state of curious bewilderment with the Yippies to the 
position that street violence was "logical" and "the 
next....necessary step."56 An historian attempting to make 
sense of this is faced with a dilemma. Knowing that American
S6David Lewis Stein, Living the Revolution; The Yippies 
in Chicago. (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), 4.
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society was never very close to actual armed rebellion during 
the sixties (at least not on a mass scale), it is easy to 
dismiss such references as "guerilla fantasy."57 On the 
other hand, the frequency of such references, as well as the 
very real escalation of violence that occurred, culminating 
with Weatherman bombings, Chicago Pol ice/FBI murders of Black 
Panthers, and National Guardsmen shooting unarmed protesters, 
warrants a closer look at the relationship between 
perceptions, rhetoric, and "reality" during the late 
sixties.58
Existing studies commonly explain the increasing 
militancy of the Movement, as well as the corresponding 
increase in reaction from the Right, as a simple matter of 
cause and effect: that each step in the escalation of
militancy from the Movement generated a progressively harsher 
reaction from the conservative establishment which, in turn, 
created another cycle of escalation. This model is useful in 
several ways. First, its focus on the causal connections
57Matusow, The Unraveling of America. 330.
58Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, Agents of 
Repression: The FBI's Secret Wars Against the Black Panther 
Party and the American Indian Movement. (Boston: South End 
Press, 1988), 64-77. The assassinations of BPP leader Fred 
Hampton and associate Mark Clark occurred during a pre-dawn 
raid by Chicago Police at Hampton's apartment. The FBI's 
complicity, at minimum, involved providing (via an agent 
provocateur) police with a detailed diagram of Hampton's 
apartment, including where he slept. The court case 
involving the murders was settled in 1983 with a $1.85 
million settlement for the survivors and families of the 
deceased.
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between perceptions and events is a good starting point. 
Second, it is useful for explaining the progression toward 
extremism on both sides; it makes sense that being beaten on 
the head by a police club might "radicalize" a student. It 
makes sense that a policeman spat on by long-haired 
demonstrators and repeatedly called a "pig" might feel 
continuing anger. This simplistic model, however, is
insufficient for explaining the history of sixties social 
disorder. George Soros' "reflexive theory of history"
provides an effective framework for explaining sixties social 
disorder.59 The model's basic premises are summarized as 
follows: (1) there is always a divergence between thinking 
and reality —  called "bias" —  and therefore the 
participants' understanding of a given event in which they 
take part is "inherently imperfect"; (2) the perception- 
reality gap (bias), in turn, influences participants' 
actions, because decisions are based not on precise facts 
(reality), but on beliefs and expectations; (3) the resulting 
actions (which are based on an imperfect understanding of 
reality) also influence reality; thus, perception and reality 
are connected in a two-way "feedback loop"; (4) the extent of 
the divergence between perception and reality varies greatly, 
and is a "driving force of history,"; (5) situations can 
exist whereby events, either by chance or design, reinforce 
biases, which, in turn, further affects thinking (so
59Soros, Underwriting Democracy. 165-74.
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therefore reality); (6) if allowed to progress long enough 
without the intervention of a corrective mechanism, this 
widening of the perception-reality gap can contribute to 
social disorder.60
One of the principal tenets of Soros' theory is that 
"open societies" such as the United States possess "learning 
mechanisms" that prevent peoples' perception-reality gaps 
from widening too far: open societies are characterized by a 
relatively free flow of divergent ideas, which makes 
adherence to any one set of them (dogmatic thinking) less 
likely. Soros terms this "intellectual competition." In 
short, the participants' ability to recognize their own 
biases is critical to preventing instability. Lacking this 
ability, "closed societies" such as Stalin's Russia 
institutionalized a single set of dogmatic ideas —  which, 
for a time, were mutually-reinforcing. But only until the 
enormous divergence between perception and reality was 
exposed, via Mikhail Gorbachev's "Perestroika." The backlash 
against the old system, which Soros refers to as "boom/bust," 
was more swift and violent than anyone predicted: the former 
Soviet Union began a spiral into extreme social disorder that 
continues even now.61
Soros helps us explain how an advanced stage of 
instability occurred in the United States —  an open society
^Ibid. . xii, 152.
6lIbid. . 169, 189.
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—  during the sixties. There can be little doubt that the 
polarization of American society, with the Movement and the 
conservative establishment at polar extremes, represented a 
widening of the perception-reality gap for the participants 
of both camps. It is an error to assume that when the 
participants themselves claimed they believed revolution was 
upon them, that they were engaging in "collective 
hallucination.” This viewpoint negates the value of beliefs 
that were, in fact, deeply-rooted. This simplistic view also 
goes a long way toward explaining why reflective persons from 
both sides of the sixties debate —  former U.S. Attorney Guy 
and former SDS President Gitlin —  continue to struggle with 
what they may or may not have believed at the time concerning 
"the revolution." When Gitlin states that the Movement's 
"collective euphoria" following the violence at Chicago '68 
"masked a tremendous confusion about the nature of American 
reality, and our own impact upon it," he is only partially 
correct.62 The Movement was losing touch with "American 
reality"; but in doing so it was also creating its own unique 
reality, just as the conservative establishment was doing.
“Gitlin, The Sixties. 335; Matusow is even further 
wrong. He accuses the New Left of "totally misconceiving 
reality" and "lose[ing] touch with social realities," yet 
refuses to acknowledge that the movement had a coherent 
ideology of its own which could have created a world outside 
the mainstream. He also describes the New Left's increasing 
militancy after the Columbia University take-over of 1968 as 
the beginning of its "decline into madness." Such analysis 
hardly does justice to the New Left. See Matusow, The 
Unraveling of America. 335, 309.
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These independent realities are no less valid than the larger 
American "reality."
As the sixties evolved, both of society's polar extremes 
increasingly came to see the actions of their adversaries as 
sinister and conspiratorial: simplistic cause and effect. 
The "learning mechanisms" within American society that, under 
normal circumstances, would have acted to correct the 
widening perception-reality gap failed to do so. The 
participants' beliefs concerning society (that social 
disorder was worsening) influenced their actions (increased 
militancy from the Movement and heightened 
surveillance/repression from the conservative establishment), 
which, in turn, further reinforced their perceptions of 
events, in a recursive "feedback loop." The participants 
lost their ability to recognize their own biases, resulting 
in increasing social disorder which led intelligent people on 
both sides of the debate to genuinely believe that armageddon 
was near.
How and when did the initial, irreversible perception- 
reality gap for both camps originate? Did both camps reach 
the point of no return at the same time? What healing forces 
and/or events effectuated a correction in the biases of the 
polar extremes, pulling each camp back under the influence of 
the corrective mechanisms ("intellectual competition") within 
American society? Did the conservative establishment ever 
truly give up on the system of American democracy to the
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degree that the Movement did? After all, did they not 
participate in the election of Nixon, while the Movement 
largely ignored it? Is there a relationship between the 
conservative establishment's drift into dogmatic thinking and 
the law enforcement/intelligence community's increased 
willingness to "bend" or break the law to exact punishment? 
The answer to the latter question is found in Nixon's 
official and unofficial wiretapping policies, as they evolved 
from his first days in office —  the subject of the next 
chapter.
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Chapter Two 
Origins of the Mitchell Doctrine
I.
In framing a government which is to be 
administered by men over men, the great difficulty 
lies in this: you must first enable the government 
to control the governed; and in the next place 
oblige it to control itself...the great security 
against a gradual concentration of the several 
powers in the same department consists in giving 
to those who administer each department the 
necessary constitutional means and personal 
motives to resist encroachments of the 
others...Ambition must be made to counteract 
ambition. —  James Madison, Federalist No. 511
The history of wiretapping law and practice in the 
United States during the twentieth century has been 
accurately described as "torturous” and "intolerable.1,2 The 
Mitchell Doctrine evolved out of our constitutional system of 
"checks and balances." It was a constitutional challenge: 
Nixon, in the Executive Branch, requested that the Judicial 
Branch (the Supreme Court) recognize an "inherent power" to
‘Clinton Rossiter, The Federalist Papers. (New York: New 
American Library, 1961), 321-22.
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice. "The Challenge of Crime in a Free 
Society," 1967, page 203, quoted in Standards Relating to 
Electronic Surveillance. Recommended bv the Advisory 
Committee on the Police Function. (New York: American Bar 
Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal 
Justice, 1968), 13. (Hereafter "ABA Standards.")
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bypass the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirements concerning 
"national security" surveillance of U.S. citizens. The 
Mitchell Doctrine was an Executive encroachment into the 
"neutral zone" separating the branches of government, which, 
as Louis Fisher claims, passed beyond a "threshold of common 
sense and prudence," triggering a revolt in the Judiciary.3 
Thus, the Keith decision can correctly be viewed as one of 
the first of a series of Supreme Court "corrective actions" 
in response to the Nixon Administration's assertions of 
expanded constitutional powers, of which 1974's U.S. v. Nixon 
is the most important.
The historical and constitutional factors which paved 
the way for the Mitchell Doctrine included the emergence of 
an increasingly large and powerful Executive Branch, 
characterized by an expansion in presidential powers and 
responsibilities, as well as a pattern of Congressional 
acquiescence to Executive encroachments, particularly in the 
areas of foreign affairs and "internal security." Supreme 
Court indecisiveness over the issue of wiretapping and its 
relationship with the Fourth Amendment was a secondary 
concern.
Recent historical scholarship, however, has uncovered a 
number of previously-unknown facts which, when studied in
3Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and 
the President. 329. The potency of the constitutional rebuke 
in Keith was underscored by the unanimous 8-0 decision, 
written by Nixon appointee Justice Lewis Powell.
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conjunction with the constitutional issues, provide a more 
complete picture of the evolution of U.S. wiretapping law and 
practice, and the potential for abuse which ultimately led to 
the Mitchell Doctrine. First, Congressional acquiescence in 
wiretapping by law enforcement officials was at least 
partially due to institutionalized barriers of secrecy in 
response to World War II and the Cold War, that precluded 
effective Congressional oversight. As the Church Committee 
reported, many in the intelligence network possessed "a 
general attitude that intelligence needs were responsive to 
a higher law'1 —  the "higher law" being anti-communism.4 
Second, beginning with the Presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, 
a number of secret and vaguely-worded Executive Orders 
granted the FBI exemption from both Congressional oversight 
and Judicial restrictions concerning "national security" 
wiretapping.5 In addition, every President from FDR to Nixon 
utilized secret FBI wiretapping for political purposes, 
taking full advantage of a so-called "cult of executive 
expertise." Third, Congressional acquiescence was closely 
related to the extraordinary powers wielded by FBI Director
4U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Government 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 
Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans. (Books 
I-IV), 94th Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1976) [hereafter "Church 
Committee, Final Report, Book II").
5By the same token, secret and/or vague charters were 
granted to other intelligence agencies, such as the National 
Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency.
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J. Edgar Hoover. Some of the more notorious examples of 
Hoover's immunity from Congressional oversight include: (1) 
the FBI's virtual non-compliance with the ban on wiretapping 
included in the Federal Communications Act of 1934; (2)
Hoover's common practice of influencing "friendly" 
Congressmen and Senators; (3) the FBI's "neutralization" of 
Congressional inquiries into illegal FBI surveillance 
practices; and (4) the establishment of secret FBI 
counterintelligence (COINTELPRO) programs in the wake of the 
Yates v. U.S. and Jencks v. U.S. decisions in 1957, directed 
primarily against political dissidents.6 For much of his 
career, Hoover operated with little or no oversight from the 
Attorneys General, his superiors. Furthermore, he took 
advantage of Cold War fears to create a huge investigative 
agency more concerned with wiping out real or imagined 
"subversives" than with law enforcement and crime prevention.
Hoover's authority over "national security" wiretapping 
was threatened during the 1960s, on a number of fronts. 
Responding to the press disclosures and subsequent public 
uproar over illegal FBI surveillance in the Black v. U.S. 
case, Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach assumed the first 
real authority over FBI surveillance practices in more than 
twenty years.7 President Johnson sent a memorandum to all 
federal agencies, banning wiretapping except in instances
6Yates: 354 U.S. 298; Jencks: 353 U.S. 657.
73 8 5 U.S. 26.
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where "national security" was threatened. In addition, 
decades of Supreme Court indecision concerning wiretapping 
came to an end with the Berger v. New York and Katz v. U.S. 
decisions. Congress investigated alleged abuses by the FBI. 
Executive, Legislative, and Judicial encroachments during a 
period of intense social disorder created the worst crisis of 
Hoover's career. However, several other factors worked to 
Hoover's advantage. First, the social disorder that created 
a conservative backlash against civil rights also led many 
Americans to demand stronger "law and order" measures. 
Public fears stemming from urban riots and radical rhetoric 
created considerable congressional support for legalized 
wiretapping.
A significant turning point occurred in 1968, with the 
passage of the Omnibus Crime Control Act. Title III of the 
Act authorized law enforcement officials to conduct 
wiretapping under carefully proscribed procedures that were 
intended to comply with the Katz and Berger decisions of 
1967. The Act represented the first Congressional 
legislation on the subject since 1934, and was the first time 
that Congress recognized the legality of law enforcement 
wiretapping. The circumstances surrounding the Congressional 
debates and eventual passage of Title III were related to the 
social atmosphere of the era. The passage of a bill, by a 
nearly unanimous vote, authorizing wiretapping for a wide 
range of offenses —  and including a vaguely-worded
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authorization for warrantless "national security" 
surveillance, section 2511(3) —  would scarcely have been
possible during a calmer moment. But social disorder alone 
did not produce Title III. Recently declassified FBI 
documents reveal that the FBI's behind-the-scenes 
manipulation of the legislative process was a principal 
reason for the bill's passage. Hoover and his subordinates 
assisted in the drafting and amendment of several important 
passages in the final bill, including section 2511(3) —
which contained the legal justification for the Mitchell 
Doctrine.
The debate over the value of wiretapping as a law 
enforcement tool formed an undercurrent to the "law and 
order" debates during the election of 1968, and figured 
prominently in the first six months of Nixon's Presidency. 
The opposition of President Johnson and Attorney General 
Clark to section 2511(3) of Title III became a focal point 
for candidate Nixon's campaign. Once elected, he lost no 
time publicly declaring that his administration would expand 
the use of electronic surveillance in an anti-crime campaign. 
The Administration's unveiling of the Mitchell Doctrine on 
June 13, 1969, at the "Chicago Conspiracy Trial" of New Left, 
counterculture, and Black Panther activists was therefore 
very much in keeping with Nixon's promise to "crack down" on 
domestic radicals. It also demonstrated the Administration's 
staunchly "conservative establishment," anti-non-conformist
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ethos, which favored the social tranquility of the "silent 
majority” over the constitutional freedoms of the radical 
minority. The constitutional issues involved in the Mitchell 
Doctrine were not immediately realized by a majority of 
Americans. However, a series of newspaper editorials, as 
well as a well-publicized ACLU lawsuit against the 
government, forced Nixon and Mitchell to back down 
temporarily. Chicago Conspiracy Trial Judge Julius Hoffman 
delayed ruling on the Mitchell memo, and the long duration 
and overall complexity of the trial effectively buried the 
issue. Shortly after the ACLU announced its lawsuit, the 
Nixon Administration's public statements concerning 
wiretapping policy incorporated a new-found moderation, 
though secret memoranda circulating among the Justice 
Department, FBI, and its field offices told a different 
story. Refusing to give up on the Mitchell Doctrine, the 
Nixon Administration waited for a more opportune moment.
II.
Eavesdropping on electronic communications has been 
practiced in the United States since the mid-nineteenth 
century, when Union and Confederate spies listened in on each 
other's telegraph messages. With the rapid introduction of 
telephones by the turn of the century, the potentialities for 
eavesdropping on public and private communications increased 
considerably. In the wake of World War I the U.S. Army's
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secret eavesdropping unit, the "Black Chamber," established 
the precedent of illegally eavesdropping on trans-Atlantic 
cable communications•8 Soon thereafter, the technology for 
wiretapping telephones became available to state and federal 
law enforcement officials.
The first Supreme Court case addressing the 
constitutionality of wiretapping was Olmstead v. U.S.. in 
1928. Federal agents argued that their wiretaps of suspected 
bootlegger Roy Olmstead in Seattle, Washington, were legal, 
and that evidence garnered from them was admissible in court, 
despite a state law making the interception of telephone 
transmissions a crime. In accordance with the police 
techniques of the period, the wiretap had been installed 
without a court order. The Supreme Court upheld Olmstead's 
conviction in a five-to-four decision. One of the central 
issues in Olmstead concerned whether eavesdropping on 
electronic communications by law enforcement officials 
constituted search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 
The majority opinion, drafted by Chief Justice William Howard 
Taft, stated that because no physical trespass had occurred, 
"The [Fourth] Amendment does not forbid what was done here." 
He added that the Fourth Amendment provides protection from
8Bamford, Puzzle Palace. 4-9. The eavesdropping was in 
violation of the Radio Communications Act of 1912, which had 
been temporarily suspended for the duration of World War I; 
it also violated the agreements signed at the International 
Radio-telegraph Convention of 1912.
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the seizure of tangible items, not conversations.9 In a 
strongly-worded dissenting opinion, Justice Louis D. Brandeis 
argued that the seizure of conversations in a wiretap 
constitutes an invasion of privacy more heinous than the 
interception of mail; he warned of how such investigative 
techniques by government "breeds contempt for law" among 
citizens.10
The Court's divided opinion in Olmstead reflected 
several very different interpretations of the Fourth 
Amendment. Taft's opinion was in keeping with the Court's 
traditional interpretations concerning the Fourth Amendment: 
that the amendment was primarily intended to protect a 
citizen's home from unlawful intrusion. Because wiretapping 
was not deemed "search and seizure," the issues of whether 
the search was "reasonable," and/or subject the requirement 
of a court order (warrant) were not addressed. Brandeis' 
dissent spoke of a citizen's "right to be let alone," 
foreshadowing the increasing importance that Americans would 
place on privacy rights later in the century.
The first Congressional attention to the subject of 
electronic surveillance was the Federal Communications Act of 
1934, which provided that "no person not being authorized by 
the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or 
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect
9277 U.S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944, page 464.
10Ibid. . 475. Quoted in CRS. page 1068, note 2.
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or meaning of such intercepted communications to any 
person."11 The language of the legislation indicated that 
Congress may have been responding to a passage in Justice 
Taft's opinion in Olmstead: "Congress may...protect the
secrecy of telephone messages by making them, when 
intercepted, inadmissable in evidence in Federal criminal 
trials, by direct legislation."12 Three years later, the 
Supreme Court responded in kind, with Nardone v. U.S.. ruling 
that evidence obtained via wiretapping without the consent of 
the sender was inadmissable in Federal Court. A second 
Nardone decision was handed down in 1939, stating that under 
section 605 of the Federal Communications Act, evidence was 
barred from federal trials not only if obtained directly via 
wiretapping, but also through the use of leads obtained in 
the course of the surveillance —  the so-called "fruit of a 
poisoned tree."13 As Edith Lapidus points out, the Nardone 
decisions did not overturn Olmstead: rather, they "began the 
slow process of eroding the principle laid down in that case 
which encouraged wiretapping by placing it outside the 
restrictions of the Fourth Amendment."14 However, not until 
the Katz decision of 1967 would the Court overturn Olmstead.
"47 U.S.C. sec. 605.
12Quoted in Charns, Cloak and Gavel. 21.
13302 U.S. 379, 58 S. Ct. 275, 82 L. Ed. 314 (1937); 308 
U.S. 388, 60 S. Ct. 266, 84 L. Ed. 307 (1939).
14Lapidus, Eavesdropping. 17.
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During the intervening period a confused state of affairs 
existed with respect to wiretapping law and practice: the 
practices of the Executive Branch were in direct 
contradiction to the statutes of the Legislative Branch and 
rulings of the Judicial Branch.
By the time of the first Nardone decision, J. Edgar 
Hoover had held the office of Director of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation for thirteen years. Under his leadership, 
a pattern of FBI selective adherence to laws concerning 
surveillance of U.S. citizens had been firmly established. 
Before 1931, the FBI had taken the official position that 
wiretapping "will not be tolerated by the Bureau," while 
secretly condoning it, particularly in prohibition cases.15 
Throughout the 1930s, the policies of two Attorney Generals 
allowed the FBI to continued limited use of wiretapping. The 
response of the nation's top law enforcement officials to the 
first Nardone decision was indicative of their selective 
adherence to laws they did not agree with. Focusing on the 
precise wording of the Federal Communications Act —  
specifically the passage prohibiting the interception and 
dissemination of electronic surveillance interceptions —  
they decided the ruling did not apply to the FBI, because 
federal agents did not disseminate information outside of the 
government. Eleven days after the Nardone decision, Hoover 
informed all "Special Agents In Charge" in the field offices
15Quoted in Charns, Cloak and Gavel. 20.
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that Bureau policy would remain unaffected by the decision. 
The second Nardone decision brought a similar response.16
An additional dispensation which the FBI utilized to 
justify and expand its wiretapping policies owed its 
existence to concern about possible subversives and sabotage. 
On May 21, 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt issued, via a 
secret memorandum, the first "national security" 
authorization for warrantless wiretapping of U.S. citizens. 
Interpreting the Nardone decisions expansively, he asserted 
that the Supreme Court did not intend the decisions "to apply 
to grave matters involving the defense of the nation." 
Accordingly, he authorized the Justice Department and FBI to 
initiate "counterintelligence investigations" utilizing 
electronic surveillance. The memorandum further stipulated 
that the Attorney General's approval was required for each 
installation, and requested that the technique be limited as 
much as possible to "aliens."17
The long-term constitutional crisis resulting from 
Roosevelt's 1940 memorandum was also significant. What began 
as a limited granting of authority eventually expanded to 
such a degree that by 1947 Hoover's FBI possessed virtually 
unlimited authority to wiretap U.S. citizens. The original
16Ibid.. 23. See also Athan Theoharis, ed., From the
Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover. (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee,
1991), 131-33.
17Quoted in Athan Theoharis, "FBI Wiretapping: A Case 
Study of Bureaucratic Autonomy," Political Science Quarterly, 
vol. 107, no. 1, (1992): 104-5.
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Roosevelt memorandum called for Attorney General Robert 
Jackson's personal authorization and subsequent supervision 
of wiretapping practices, in accordance with the Justice 
Department's chain of command. Yet, as Athan Theoharis 
points out, Jackson "willingly ceded considerable latitude to 
his subordinate Hoover, fully expecting the FBI director to 
act as his and the president's servant." Within a week of 
Roosevelt's May 21 memorandum, Jackson and Hoover came to a 
mutual agreement that the FBI Director, and no one else, 
would keep all records of electronic surveillance, so as to 
minimize the risk of public exposure. "In effect," Theoharis 
adds, "Jackson's decision created a situation ripe both for 
political use and bureaucratic independence...[which] 
effectively negated the intended restrictions of Roosevelt's 
directive."18
Finally, Hoover's secret authority to wiretap Americans 
at will was further increased by President Truman in July, 
1946, after Attorney General Tom Clark sent an edited version 
of Roosevelt's 1940 memorandum to the new President and 
requested a renewal of authority.19 The Truman
authorization expanded the range and scope of potential 
crimes subject to the FBI's warrantless electronic
18Ibid. . 105.
19Clark's July 17, 1946 letter to Truman reproduced most 
of Roosevelt's 1940 wiretapping authorization, but omitted 
FDR's request that such surveillance be limited, as much as 
possible, to "aliens."
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surveillance. Removing references to "sabotage" and "fifth 
column activities," which would have conveyed the special 
wartime character of the Roosevelt memorandum, Clark acquired 
Truman's authority to utilize wiretapping against anyone 
suspected of "subversive activities," the definition of which 
he did not provide.20 As Alexander Charns states, 
"Oversight was virtually nonexistent, and Hoover was the 
attorney general in charge of wiretapping."21
The vast expansion of Hoover's investigative authority 
owed a great deal to Cold War American society: specifically 
the nation's overwhelming concern with both domestic 
subversion, the "Red Scare," and the containment of communism 
abroad. For the first time in U.S. history the military- 
industrial complex was not dismantled immediately following 
a major war. At home, the enormous intelligence network 
created during the conflict was further expanded, for the 
purpose of rooting out Communists and those sympathetic with 
their cause.22 The FBI underwent a major expansion, the
20Athan Theoharis, Spying on Americans: Political
Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston Plan. (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1978), 99-100.
21Charns, Cloak and Gavel. 23.
^Both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National 
Security Agency (NSA) were created in 1947. Although their 
secret charters authorized them to focus their investigations 
abroad (or in the NSA's case, to limit eavesdropping to 
international communications) , they frequently engaged in 
surveillance of U.S. citizens within the Continental United 
States. See Church Report. Book II, 102-4.
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number of agents growing from 4,886 in 1944 to 7,029 in 
1952.23
The all-encompassing fears of the Cold War era further 
increased the hesitancy of Congress and the Supreme Court to 
initiate oversight of the Executive in foreign affairs and 
"national security" areas. A "cult of executive expertise" 
had been recognized by the Supreme Court as early as 1936, in 
the landmark U.S. v. Curtiss-Wriaht Corp. case, in which 
Justice George Sutherland stated that in foreign affairs, a 
President should be allowed "a degree of discretion and 
freedom from statutory restrictions which would not be 
admissible were domestic affairs alone involved."24 
Although the decision was clearly limited to foreign affairs, 
it was later cited by presidents attempting to establish the 
concept of "inherent power" in domestic "national security" 
areas as well.25 Congressional acquiescence was reflected 
in several ways, from allowing President Truman to commit 
large numbers of U.S. troops in Korea in 1950 without their 
prior authorization, to its failure to establish precise 
standards governing domestic intelligence gathering.26
“Theoharis, "FBI Wiretapping," 101.
24299 U.S. 304.
“Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts. 108. See also Philip 
B. Kurland, Watergate and the Constitution. 172-74.
“Church Committee. Book II, 28-30, 277-79. The
Committee established that the intelligence agencies 
affectively concealed the full scope of their illegal 
domestic surveillance from Congress, beginning in 1939.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
97
Louis Fisher argues that the Founding Fathers neither 
anticipated nor intended the Legislative Branch to cede so 
much power to the Executive in the areas of national security 
and foreign affairs.27 Nor could the Executive Branch 
resist wiretapping political enemies. Both Roosevelt and 
Truman secretly requested FBI wiretaps of their political 
adversaries, setting another dangerous precedent.
What were the constitutional implications for Executive 
oversight of the FBI?28 Armed with vague ly-worded 
directives authorizing sweeping powers to wiretap, and soon 
able to blackmail Presidents, Hoover consolidated his 
position within the Executive Branch to such a degree that by 
1947 he was virtually untouchable. How he utilized this 
power during the next quarter-century will surely remain a 
subject of much historical debate and partisan commentary for 
years to come. However, the overwhelming weight of available 
evidence, including a number of recently-declassified FBI 
documents, supports Frank Donner's conclusion that Hoover's 
actions helped institute "the surveillance of dissent.... [as]
26(.. .continued)
domestic surveillance from Congress, the FBI, beginning in 
1939, provided the House Appropriations Committee with a 
limited amount of information concerning these activities, 
which the Church Committee believed should have influenced 
Congress to exercise greater oversight.
^Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts. 220, 330.
28Theoharis, "FBI Wiretapping," 107-115.
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an institutional pillar of our political order."29 Having 
studied the FBI Director's life for many years, Athan 
Theoharis states that Hoover "appears to have been a fearful 
and compulsive maverick...[who] exhibited an obsession with 
power...[and] identified political radicalism with filth and 
licentiousness, neither of which ever failed to arouse in him 
almost hysterical loathing."30 Under Hoover's direction, 
the FBI expanded its surveillance and counterintelligence 
actions against suspected "subversives," most of whom were 
guilty of little more than ideological non-conformity. 
Warrantless wiretapping was only one of a host of official 
and unofficial Bureau techniques against suspected radicals, 
including breaking and entering ("black bag jobs"), bugging, 
and using informers as agent provocateurs. Because a
majority of Hoover's "enemies" were political, he relied on 
the Smith Act of 1940, which made advocacy of violent 
overthrow of the U.S. Government a federal offense. The 
FBI's use of the Smith Act represented an additional example 
of how extreme "national security" measures passed during the 
crisis atmosphere of World War II were later utilized during 
the Cold War to stifle political dissent.
Hoover faced the first significant challenge to his 
unlimited wiretapping power during the two trials of Justice 
Department employee Judith Coplon, who was accused of spying
29Donner, Acre of Surveillance, xviii.
30Theoharis and Cox, The Boss. 16-17.
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for the Soviet Union. Information revealed by Justice 
Department and FBI officials during the trials brought to 
light the existence of warrantless FBI wiretaps of Ms. 
Coplon, both prior to and after the original indictment was 
handed down. Publicity surrounding the case resulted in the 
first sustained public debate over the potential benefits and 
drawbacks of wiretapping as a law enforcement tool. The 
National Lawyers Guild and the Washington Post led the 
opposition to FBI wiretapping practices, while Hoover and the 
Justice Department issued press statements attempting to 
defuse the crisis. Not surprisingly, Hoover charged the 
Guild with attempting to subvert the internal security. The 
Justice Department also released the text of President 
Roosevelt's 1940 wiretapping memorandum; Truman's 1946 
renewal letter was kept secret.31
Responding to the public debate over wiretapping, 
Congress began several hearings on the subject. Attempting 
to take advantage of the situation, the FBI sponsored a bill 
by Representative Emmanuel Celler that would allow the 
introduction of information garnered via wiretaps in court, 
in instances where the Attorney General had previously 
approved their installation. Other bills were more 
restrictive toward FBI practices. The one of most concern to 
the FBI proposed authorizing U.S. District Court Judges to
31Charns, Cloak and Gavel. 32-33; Theoharis, Spying on 
Americans. 100-105.
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approve "technical surveillance" via court orders, or 
"warrants." Hoover and his assistants lobbied vigorously 
against the bill. An FBI memorandum distributed throughout 
Congress contained derogatory information on eight federal 
judges, and argued that "no one Federal judge possesses 
sufficient information on the nation's security upon which he 
can base a decision."32 The FBI's involvement in the 
legislative process between 1951 and 1954 effectively blocked 
all potential wiretapping bills, including one requiring 
judicial warrants that had passed in the House of 
Representatives. These illegal actions prevented
Congressional oversight of federal law enforcement and 
preserved Hoover's unchallenged authority. Hoover's power to 
initiate microphone surveillance of U.S. citizens was further 
expanded in 1954, via a memorandum from Attorney General 
Herbert Brownell.33
The fact that Congress gave serious consideration to 
empowering federal judges to oversee FBI wiretapping 
reflected a shift in constitutional thought concerning the 
relationship between electronic surveillance and the Fourth 
Amendment since the Olmstead decision of 1928. Central to
32Quoted in Charns, Cloak and Gavel. 33. Twenty years 
later, the Justice Department argued essentially the same 
point in their Keith briefs.
33Ibid.. 34. "The effect of Brownell's sweeping
authorization....was that the highest ranking federal law 
enforcement official gave Hoover carte blanche to burglarize 
and bug."
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this shift was a change in the conception of Fourth Amendment
warrants. The Amendment contains two clauses, the first
stating that no unreasonable searches and seizures shall
occur against the peoples' "persons, houses, papers and
effects"; the second states that "no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause." Considerable debate has centered on
the issue of whether the two clauses are to be read
independent of one another, implying that "reasonable"
searches do not require warrants —  or in conjunction with
one another, implying that searches are only "reasonable" if
they meet the requirements of the second clause. The Supreme
Court wavered on the issue for decades, particularly in cases
involving "the scope of the right to search incident to
arrest."34 However, Justice Jackson's majority opinion in
Johnson v. U.S. in 1948 signaled an emerging shift in
interpretation, with the following passage:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is 
not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it 
denies law enforcement the support of the usual 
inferences which reasonable men draw from 
evidence. Its protection consists in requiring 
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the 
officer engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption 
that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's 
disinterested determination to issue a search 
warrant will justify the officers in making a 
search without a warrant would reduce the 
Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's
mCRS. 1043-44.
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homes secure only in the discretion of police 
officers.35
Yet at the time of the Johnson decision, the so-called 
'•primacy of warrants" had not yet been established in basic 
criminal investigations, let alone wiretapping cases.
Hoover enjoyed another decade of unchallenged authority. 
In 1954, and again in 1960, in two important cases involving 
the use of "bugging," the Supreme Court refused to restrict 
FBI practices.36 During the same period the Court remained 
silent on the issue of wiretapping.37 Even where the Court 
did act to restrain the FBI's anti-subversive campaigns, 
Hoover devised ingenious methods of circumventing their 
decisions. The 1957 Yates and Jencks decisions are a case in 
point. The rulings held that, absent a specific plan of 
action, the Smith Act of 1940 does not prohibit theoretical 
advocacy and/or the teaching of the principles of violent 
overthrow of government.
A year earlier, in anticipation of the Court's rulings, 
Hoover had initiated "COINTELPRO-Communist Party," a sweeping 
series of extra-legal FBI initiatives "designed to promote
3iIbid. . 1050; 333 U.S. 10, 13-14.
36Irvine v. California. 347 U.S. 128; Goldman v. U.S.. 
316 U.S. 129.
37Alexander Charns' criticism is appropriate: "For half 
a century the Supreme Court might as well have been writing 
rhyming couplets about eavesdroppers and wiretappers"; Cloak 
and Gavel. 76.
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disruption within the ranks of the Communist Party."38 Some 
of the methods utilized included wiretapping, bugging, break- 
ins, anonymous letter-writing campaigns, politically- 
motivated I.R.S. audits, the use of informers as agent 
provocateurs. and "bad jacketing": the practice of falsely 
and anonymously labelling targets as government informants. 
The premise underlying COINTELPRO was that although the FBI 
could not arrest and convict suspected Communist Party 
members for their non-conformist views, it could nonetheless 
"neutralize" their organizations. By the late sixties, 
similar COINTELPROS were conducted against the Socialist 
Workers Party, white hate groups (e.g. the Ku Klux Klan) , the 
Puerto Rican Independence Movement, the civil rights 
movement, and the New Left.39 Not all COINTELPRO actions 
were aimed at leftist groups. For example, the COINTELPRO- 
White Hate Groups program of the mid-sixties, initiated in 
the wake of the brutal murders of civil rights workers Andrew 
Goodman, Michael Schwerner, and James Chaney in Mississippi, 
proved enormously successful against the Southern KKK. 
However, a vast majority of COINTELPRO actions were directed 
against targets whose non-conformist politics were bitterly 
opposed by Hoover. Senator Frank Church condemned the FBI's
38Churchill and Vander Wall, The Cointelpro Papers. 41.
39In his 1992 study, Alexander Charns argues that an 
additional, previously undiscovered, FBI COINTELPRO was 
initiated against the Warren Court, with its overall purpose 
to "remake the Court in Hoover's image."; Cloak and Gavel, 
xiii-xiv.
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COINTELPRO tactics as "indisputably degrading to a free 
society."40
Executive branch duplicity involving wiretapping for 
political purposes continued throughout the Eisenhower and 
Kennedy years.41 Interestingly, the historical record of 
wiretapping abuses during the less than three years of the 
Kennedy Administration is significantly larger than for 
Eisenhower's eight years in office.42 Although the evidence 
clearly demonstrates the extent to which Attorney General 
Robert Kennedy initiated illegal wiretaps —  often with the 
advice and approval of the President —  the FBI tried to 
deflect criticism of its "national security" wiretapping 
practices during the crisis surrounding the Fred Black case 
in 1965 and 1966; part of their strategy was placing the 
blame for the wiretaps on Robert Kennedy. The Kennedys were 
strong supporters of utilizing electronic surveillance for 
investigative purposes, particularly against suspected 
organized crime "bosses." During all three years of his 
Presidency, John F. Kennedy introduced legislation to
40Church Committee. Book II, 10.
41Ibid. . 51-53, 63-65.
42For example, while the Church Committee's Final Report 
(Book II, pp. 63-65) mentions only a single wiretap ordered 
by the Eisenhower Administration for political purposes, it 
covers in detail a "pattern" fourteen separate Kennedy 
political wiretaps. The voluminous nature of "evidence" 
concerning Kennedy-era wrongdoing is described in detail in 
Victor Navasky, Kennedy Justice. (New York: Atheneum
Publishers, 1971).
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Congress that would have authorized federal agencies to 
wiretap in cases of national security, organized crime, and 
other serious crimes. While the historical record confirms 
that the Kennedys' anti-organized crime efforts were genuine, 
it is unclear to what degree their motivations for proposing 
wiretapping legislation were political, as opposed to 
strictly law enforcement-related. Also unclear is whether 
Hoover's influence in Congress played a role in preventing 
the passage of the Kennedy wiretapping bills.43
The most significant changes in U.S. wiretapping policy 
and practice since the late-1940s occurred between 1965 and 
1968, during the Presidency of Lyndon Johnson, as the FBI 
faced potent challenges to its unilateral control over 
"national security" surveillance from all three branches of 
government. First, Attorneys General Nicholas Katzenbach and 
Ramsey Clark began to exercise Justice Department oversight 
of the Bureau, largely absent since the late forties. In 
addition, President Johnson, while continuing to support 
"national security" wiretapping in principle, moved toward a 
position in which he believed that such surveillance should 
be limited to foreigners and their agents operating within 
the United States. This position put him at odds with 
Hoover, who had taken full advantage of the vagueness of the 
term "national security" for decades, and sought to preserve 
his authority to wiretap U.S. citizens, as well as
43Lapidus, Eavesdropping. 12.
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foreigners, without warrants. The primary challenge Hoover 
faced from the Legislative Branch consisted of hearings 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on 
Administrative Practice and Procedure, chaired by Senator 
Edward V. Long, an ardent opponent of wiretapping. Finally, 
the Judicial challenge to the status quo developed in the 
Katz and Berger decisions. Hoover was able to preserve 
considerable control over his fourth branch of government, 
thanks to the social disorder that increased simultaneously 
with the challenges to his authority. Congressional passage 
of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Act of 1968, containing a 
vague and open-ended "national security" passage, preserved 
the FBI's ability to wiretap without warrant.
Public debate on the wiretapping issue, largely dormant 
during the Kennedy years, increased dramatically after 1965, 
due in part to revelations of illegal FBI electronic 
surveillance in the case of Fred B. Black, a Washington, 
D.C., lobbyist. From February through June of 1963 the FBI 
bugged Black's hotel room, reportedly to investigate whether 
he had ties to racketeers. Having been convicted in 1964, 
and also losing the appeal, Black filed a writ of certiorari 
with the Supreme Court in February of 1966, alleging that his 
conviction be overturned because of government wiretapping of 
conversations between him and his lawyer. The Court voted 
against hearing the case. However, during preparations for 
a possible Supreme Court argument, the Justice Department
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
107
discovered the existence of the FBI's 1963 surveillance of 
Black. Attorney General Katzenbach ordered Solicitor General 
Thurgood Marshall to disclose not only the existence of the 
bugging, but also that the surveillance had picked up a 
series of attorney-client conversations. Hoover's reaction 
was utter shock. Katzenbach's refusal to back down to Hoover 
remains a mystery. He stated that he felt an "inescapable 
duty" to report such a serious constitutional affront. But 
Katzenbach also realized that illegal FBI electronic 
surveillance was coming under increasing public and 
congressional scrutiny, and acted to shield the Justice 
Department.44 Katzenbach had already issued the most 
stringent guidelines concerning electronic surveillance since 
the thirties, reminding Hoover of the Federal Communication 
Act's ban on wiretapping and stating "we should not make 
illegal use of electronic devices."45
Hoover tried to counterattack. First, he blamed the 
Kennedys for the Fred Black surveillance.46 Second, Hoover
44Charns, Cloak and Gavel. 36-40.
45Quoted in Theoharis, Secret Files. 149-50. This 
remarkable compilation of previously-secret documents 
contains a number of revealing Justice Department and FBI 
memorandum surrounding the Black crisis. It is unmatched as 
a compilation of primary sources concerning the Justice 
Department-FBI relationship at a time when Hoover's 
unquestioned authority was challenged for the first time.
‘“Charns, Cloak and Gavel. 70, 77-78. Charns points out 
that in December of 1966, as the Black crisis peaked, "the 
fight over who had authorized illegal FBI buggings during the 
years 1961 to 1964 —  Hoover or Robert Kennedy —  was
(continued...)
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sought out an informer on the Supreme Court, to keep him 
aware of developments in the Black v. U.S. case; Alexander 
Charns believes that Justice Abe Fortas filled this role, 
with the knowledge and support of President Johnson.47 
Third, in the fall of 1966, Hoover enacted significant 
reforms over FBI electronic surveillance (and other) 
practices. The results were successful: the Supreme Court 
refused to censure him, merely sending the Black case back to 
the District Court for a new trial. Katzenbach resigned as 
Attorney General, ostensibly to take up a new position as 
Under Secretary of State. Yet Hoover was clearly damaged by 
the incident, and had to enact such "reforms" as barring 
"black bag jobs," limiting all electronic surveillance to 
cases related to national security, requiring specific 
Attorney General approval of all such surveillance, and
46(.. .continued) 
splashed on the front pages of the nation's newspapers. To 
prepare his case for the media, Hoover declassified a number 
of documents pertaining to microphones and wiretaps that had 
been shown to Attorneys General Kennedy and Nicholas 
Katzenbach. Hoover accused Kennedy, and Kennedy accused 
Hoover, of lying about his role." This battle was renewed in 
1969, following revelations that the FBI had illegally 
wiretapped and bugged the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. 
for several years prior to his assassination in 1963. See 
Kenneth O'Reilly, Racial Matters: The FBI's Secret File on 
Black America. 1960-1972. (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 
341-42, 417 (note 62). Robert Kennedy was unable to defend 
himself during the 1969 debate, due to his assassination the 
previous year. One additional point: this smear campaign was 
secretly supported by President Johnson, who worried about 
the potential threat Robert Kennedy posed in the 1968 
presidential race.
47Charns, Cloak and Gavel. 52-63, 69-75.
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instituting the first thorough record keeping system for 
electronic surveillance.
In 1965 Hoover also defused a potent threat from 
Congress. Concerned about the Edward Long Committee's 
investigation of governmental surveillance, Hoover sent 
Assistant Director Cartha "Deke" DeLoach to speak with 
Senator Long. Following the meeting, DeLoach informed his 
boss that the threat had been effectively "neutralized.” 
Just how DeLoach silenced a ranking member of the U.S. 
Senate, whose Subcommittee had been investigating the FBI's 
electronic surveillance techniques for two years, is not 
absolutely clear.48
Hoover had correctly viewed the crisis surrounding the 
Black affair with extreme seriousness. By the early sixties 
American society was becoming less deferential to 
governmental wrongdoing justified by appeals to "national 
security." Americans realized that individual privacy was 
threatened by the expanding bureaucratization of government, 
and the Warren Court responded to these concerns. In 1967 
the Court turned its attention to surveillance issues in Katz 
v. U.S. and Berger v. New York, establishing a new 
interpretation of the relationship between wiretapping and 
the Fourth Amendment. The decisions ultimately brought about 
the most significant changes in U.S. wiretapping law and 
practice since the end of World War II.
48Theoharis, Spying on Americans. 361-67.
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During the sixties the Warren Court took up the cause of 
criminal justice reform. In the Mapp v. Ohio (1961) and 
Gideon v. Wainwriqht (1963) decisions, the Court enacted due 
process reforms, applying the exclusionary rule to evidence 
obtained by unreasonable search and seizure, and guaranteeing 
a defendant the right to counsel.49 Neither decision 
received significant national criticism. In fact, the 
Court's rulings demonstrated the national government's desire 
to professionalize law enforcement at the state and local 
levels. However, by the time of the Court's decisions in 
Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) and Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 
the national consensus for due process reform was threatened 
by an anti-reform, "law and order" sentiment, fueled by white 
backlash against urban rioting.30 In Escobedo the Court 
ruled that "a confession obtained during police questioning 
of a suspect in custody following their denial of his request 
to consult counsel was inadmissible as evidence against 
him."51 The Miranda decision further expanded a suspect's 
rights, ruling that police were required to issue pre­
interrogation warnings to suspects of their rights to remain 
silent and to have counsel present during questioning; 
lawyers were to be provided to indigent suspects only if they
49Mapp: 367 U.S. 643; Gideon: 372 U.S. 335.
S0Escobedo: 378 U.S. 478; Miranda: 384 U.S. 436.
51John T. Eliff, Crime. Dissent, and the Attorney 
General: The Justice Department in the I960's . (Beverly
Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1971), 30.
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requested them. The timing of these decisions, as crime 
rates rose and the anti-war and Black Power movements played 
in the nightly news, increased public opposition to the 
Warren Court. John T. Eliff's study of the Justice 
Department during the sixties points out that the Warren 
Court's unwillingness to moderate decisions or slow down the 
pace of reform, coupled with the Johnson Administration's 
failure to estimate the backlash against the rulings, made 
"law and order" a potent political issue.52
In 1967 the Court turned its attention to the subject of 
electronic surveillance, with the Katz and Berger decisions. 
Because the architects of the Omnibus Crime Act in 1968 would 
later claim that Title III had been drafted in compliance 
with these decisions, they merit close examination.53 In 
its six-to-three decision in Berger. the Court examined New 
York's newly-enacted statute permitting court-ordered 
wiretapping and ruled it unconstitutional, finding fault with 
several of its provisions. In a decision that demonstrated 
how far the Court's thinking on the issue of warrants and 
electronic surveillance had evolved since Olmstead. Justice 
Tom Clark, writing for the majority, stated that the New York 
statute was "a blanket grant of permission to 
eavesdrop...without adequate judicial supervision or
52Eliff, Crime, 28-49.
53The issue of whether the provisions of Title III of 
Omnibus were "in harmony" with the Berger and Katz has been 
the subject of considerable historical debate.
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protective procedures," and thus violated the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.54 For sixty consecutive days, New 
York authorities had wiretapped Chicago businessman Ralph 
Berger, and later charged him with conspiracy to bribe the 
Chairman of the New York State Liquor Authority. The primary 
evidence used to convict him were wiretaps. Of particular 
concern to the Court were several of the New York statute's 
provisions, including: (1) the lack of a probable cause
requirement prior to the issuance of a judicial warrant; (2) 
the absence of a requirement of "particularity" in the 
warrant process, as to what specific crime had been committed 
and the persons, places, or things to be seized, as is 
required by the Fourth Amendment; (3) the excessive duration 
of the surveillance [two months], which amounted to a series 
of intrusions pursuant to a single showing of probable cause;
(4) the failure to require specific termination dates; and
(5) the lack of a notice requirement, whereby the target(s) 
of surveillance would be informed of the government's 
wiretaps prior to trial. The Court also found the State of 
New York's arguments concerning the importance of wiretapping 
as a law enforcement technique to be unpersuasive.55
The seven-to-one decision in Katz centered upon the 
issue of microphone surveillance of suspected criminal
^"Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance —  Title III 
of the Crime Control Act of 1968," Rutgers Law Review, vol. 
23, no. 2, (Winter, 1969), 326.
55Lapidus, Eavesdropping on Trial. 20-21.
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Charles Katz in a public location [telephone booth], where no
physical trespass of a home or office had occurred.56
Charging Mr. Katz with illegal wagering via telephone across
state lines, the government submitted as evidence in court
only six conversations, averaging three minutes each, a
minuscule amount of eavesdropping in comparison with the
Berger case. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled the
bugging unconstitutional, arguing that surveillance and
recording constitutes search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. Justice Potter Stewart's majority decision
focused on the issue of a citizen's right to privacy, echoing
the words of Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead;
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. 
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, 
even in his own home or office, is not a subject 
of Fourth Amendment protection.... But what he 
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area 
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.57
Prior to Katz the Court had regarded physical trespass as the 
basis for an unconstitutional search; afterwards, the test 
for a constitutional search became the concept of privacy.58 
However, the decision did not support any absolute right to 
privacy. Justice Stewart argued that the Fourth Amendment
“Justice Thurgood Marshall did not take part in the Katz 
decision, having been Solicitor General during the Johnson 
Administration.
57Quoted in Lapidus, Eavesdropping on Trial. 24.
“Richard E. Morgan, Domestic Intelligence: Monitoring 
Dissent in America. (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 
1980), 121.
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protects individual privacy only against certain kinds of 
governmental intrusion, suggesting that the type of 
surveillance used against Katz might have been 
constitutional, had a judicial warrant been acquired. He 
suggested several "safeguards" that were lacking in Katz's 
surveillance: (1) showing probable cause to a neutral
magistrate before the search; (2) observing precise limits 
during the search, which could have been fixed in advance via 
a court order; and (3) notifying the judge of what had been
seized, once the search has been completed.59 These
restrictions implied not only that eavesdropping falls within 
the protections of the Fourth Amendment, but also that in 
order for an electronic surveillance "search and seizure" to 
be deemed "reasonable," it must be preceded by a court order, 
in accordance with the Amendment's "probable cause" 
requirement. The Court simply meant to underscore the
"primacy of warrants."
The Berger and Katz decisions contained suggestions 
which invited Congressional legislation. The two decisions 
also contained a number of alternate concurring opinions and, 
in the case of Berger. three powerful dissents, which 
demonstrated deep divisions within the Court. The only 
constant throughout both decisions was Justice Hugo Black's 
vehement dissents, in which he espoused two basic points: (1) 
that the Founding Fathers would have outlawed eavesdropping
S9Ibid. . 25.
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in the Bill of Rights had they desired to do so, and (2) that 
the majority's decisions placed such unrealistic restrictions 
upon the use of electronic surveillance by law enforcement 
officials that it would be "completely impossible for the 
State or Federal Government ever to have a valid 
eavesdropping statute." Black worried about the implications 
of the Court venturing into "broad policy discussions and 
philosophical discourses on such nebulous subjects as 
privacy."60 In direct opposition, Justice John Harlan's 
concurring opinion in Katz emphasized that when using the 
public telephone, Mr. Katz had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. This position was further supported by Justice 
William Douglas' concurring opinion in Berger. in which he 
described wiretapping as "the greatest of all invasions of 
privacy.1,61
Katz was, in part, a response to the dissenting opinions 
in Berger. Justice Stewart's decision made clear that where 
law enforcement officials followed "appropriate safeguards," 
wiretapping would be entirely constitutional. Essentially, 
the Court established a test for determining whether a 
wiretapping statute would meet its approval, and indicated 
that it would only support laws that closely followed the 
principles of "precision and narrow circumscription."52
^Ibid.. 22, 26.
6lIbid. . 25, 22.
62CRS. 1071, n. 16.
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Precisely which combination of statutory requirements the 
Court would require to meet its "appropriate safeguards" 
threshold immediately became a subject of considerable 
debate, and influenced the Congressional deliberations 
surrounding Title III of the Omnibus Act. Privacy advocates 
and civil libertarians believed that the restrictions laid 
down by the Court in both decisions were necessary to protect 
citizen rights. "Law and order" advocates agreed with 
Justice Black that the Court had once again overstepped its 
authority by handing down two overly restrictive decisions, 
further "tying the hands" of law enforcement.
The issue of "precision and narrow circumscription" 
enunciated by the Court in the Berger and Katz decisions, 
brought into the public discussion the so-called 
"intelligence versus evidence debate" concerning the nature 
and purposes of domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens, a 
debate previously limited to a small segment of the general 
population: intelligence officers, law enforcement officials, 
and intelligence policy-makers and oversight officials. 
Hoover considered surveillance without court order in cases 
potentially threatening to the nation, for non-prosecutorial 
purposes, as entirely legal. The vagueness of the term 
"national security" further clouded the issue. Flagrant use 
of the term by government agencies during the Cold War also 
raised important constitutional questions, such as: (1) who 
should be allowed to define the scope of what constitutes a
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"national security" threat?; (2) should the definition be 
limited to foreign nations and their agents operating within 
the U.S.?; (3) is the mere existence of electronic
surveillance an abridgement of constitutional rights?; and 
(4) can electronic surveillance by intelligence agencies 
and/or law enforcement entities for the purpose of protecting 
"national security" be effectively conducted under the 
restrictions outlined in the Supreme Court's "narrow 
circumscription" theory? These were a few of the 
surveillance-related questions some debated during the 1967- 
1968 period, as Congress drafted the nation's first 
comprehensive wiretapping statute: Title III of the Omnibus 
Crime Act. Because the debate occurred within an atmosphere 
of increasing social disorder, and because of Hoover's 
manipulation of the legislative process, section 2511(3) of 
the Omnibus Act was included in the final version of the 
bill, and became law. The section's vague passage, asserting 
the Executive Branch's "inherent powers" to wiretap in 
instances where the "national security" was threatened, 
represented a significant departure from the "narrow 
circumscription" guidelines of Berger and Katz —  and a 
became primary justification for the Mitchell Doctrine.
Throughout Hoover's career he supported surveillance for 
"investigative" or "strategic" purposes. He felt that 
electronic surveillance was a necessary component to 
effective law enforcement, and that the collection of
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surveillance data in no way abridges a citizen's rights. He 
objected to the "probable cause" requirement in regard to 
wiretapping, due to the fact that intelligence gathering "is 
not ordinarily based on the belief that a crime has occurred 
or is about to occur"; instead, "it seeks, among other 
things, to find out if there are grounds for believing a 
crime is in the offing."63 As Frank Donner notes, the
Bureau "insisted that it wore two separate and quite
different hats: a general investigative hat for probing
violations of law and, far more important, an internal 
security intelligence hat" [not measurable by] "such workaday 
yardsticks as arrests and convictions.,,<S4 Justices Brennan 
and Douglas argued otherwise: law enforcement agencies should 
be restricted to "tactical" surveillance: short-term
wiretapping under court order for the purposes of generating 
evidence for a trial. They found that the practice of long­
term warrantless surveillance violated First, Fourth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. This side of the debate did not 
receive significant public support until the sixties. 
Between the passage of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 
and the issuance of President Truman's secret Executive Order 
regarding wiretapping in 1947, Hoover formulated the basic 
FBI domestic surveillance policies that would remain in 
effect through the mid-sixties. He began with the premise
63Wilson, "Buggings, Break-Ins & The FBI," 53-54.
^Donner, Age of Surveillance. 69-73.
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that the Federal Communications Act's ban on the interception 
and divulgence of wiretaps did not pertain to the FBI's 
'•national security" wiretaps, conducted for strictly 
investigative purposes, and not to be used for prosecutorial 
purposes. This assumption received the tacet approval of FDR 
and Truman, but was kept secret from both the Supreme Court 
and Congress for decades.65 Hoover's interpretation of the 
Nardone decisions of 1937 and 1939, which banned wiretapping 
and ruled all evidence resulting from it inadmissable in 
trials, was equally innovative; he maintained that 
wiretapping was permissible when used strictly for 
"intelligence" purposes. This policy had the advantage of 
allowing agents to conduct electronic surveillance of U.S. 
citizens, as long as the information was not disseminated 
outside of the Bureau and Justice Department.66 The major 
drawback was the inability to use openly wiretap information 
in criminal proceedings. The Nardone decisions ruled that 
information acquired by federal agents via illegal wiretaps
65The issue of the legality of the FDR and Truman
memorandums has never been definitively settled. Athan
Theoharis leaves no doubt concerning his position on the
matter: "under existing law and court rulings, between 1934 
and 1968 wiretapping was illegal." See Theoharis, "FBI
Wiretapping," 102.
“From the late forties through the mid-sixties the FBI 
was not required to seek Attorney General approval for most 
wiretaps.
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was subject to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule.67 
However, the government commonly hid the existence of 
wiretaps from the defense, rendering them powerless to 
challenge it.
The flaws in FBI wiretapping policy became evident 
during the Judith Coplon crisis of the early fifties and the 
Fred Black crisis of the mid-sixties. The public debate 
during both cases revealed that Hoover's assumptions 
regarding the propriety of secret wiretapping for 
"investigative" purposes was not an opinion shared by all. 
The legality of FBI "national security" wiretapping was 
seriously challenged by both the Supreme Court and Congress - 
- although neither entity acted forcefully to curtail it.68
67e.g. "the fruit of the poisoned tree." The 
exclusionary rule regarding general evidence brought fourth 
by law enforcement officers was extended to the States in 
Mapp v. Ohio in 1961. In regard to wiretapping evidence (a 
la Nardone), the Court did not extend the exclusionary rule's 
protections to the States until 1968 in Lee v. Florida.
68Charges of Supreme Court and Congressional 
"acquiescence" and "indecision" in regard to FBI wiretapping 
practices have been overblown. The Court's inaction is 
understandable: (1) their rulings from the late thirties
onward consistently adhered to the Nardone decision's ban on 
wiretapping; yet the primary method at their disposal for 
enforcing oversight was excluding from trials any evidence 
attained via wiretaps, an admittedly weak "stick"; (2) 
because of the FBI's policy of keeping the existence of all 
wiretaps secret, the Court could only act when the FBI's taps 
were revealed via "leaks," such as occurred during the Coplon 
and Black cases; and (3) faced with the decision of the 
Executive Branch's principal law enforcement division (FBI) 
to not adhere to the Nardone rulings, the Court waited for 
Congress to legislate on the subject. Under normal 
circumstances of constitutional "give and take," this 
probably would have happened. The failure of Congress to
(continued...)
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Hoover was undeterred. Instead of modifying FBI policy, he 
lobbied Congress for legislation that would allow the FBI to 
introduce the fruits of "national security" wiretaps in 
court. He also lobbied to keep Congress from enacting 
legislation that would limit FBI wiretapping practices. He 
was able to weather the occasional "leak" regarding FBI 
surveillance activities by putting up a multi-phased defense: 
(1) leaning on the presidential directives from FDR and 
Truman; (2) stressing "his" interpretation of the Federal 
Communications Act of 1934: and (3) reasoning that the
Nardone decisions were not intended to apply to federal law 
enforcement agencies, or areas involving the protection of 
"national security."
The numerous restrictions the Court placed on 
surveillance practices in Katz and Bercar pcsed a challenge 
to existing FBI policy.69 Yet Katz contained two items 
which might preserve the FBI's appeal to "national security."
68 (... continued) 
take action wasn't due to a lack of interest in the issue; 
Edith Lapidus estimates that between 1934 and 1967 at least 
sixteen sets of Congressional hearings were held, "aimed 
largely at filling the gaps and blocking loopholes in 
existing Federal law banning eavesdropping" [emphasis in 
original] (Eavesdropping on Trial. 11). The primary reason 
Congress failed to act was Hoover's manipulation of the 
legislative process, in opposition to bills that would have 
limited his wiretapping authority.
“Alexander Charns argues that after Berger, the FBI "saw 
the writing on the wall" and began thinking about putting 
pressure on Congress to amend the Federal Communications Act 
to "allow wiretapping under appropriate safeguards" see Cloak 
and Gavel. 84-85.
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In footnote 23 of his majority opinion, Justice Stewart 
stated: "Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by 
a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a 
situation involving the national security is a question not 
presented in this case."70 Justice Byron White's concurring 
opinion went a step further, stating that the warrant 
requirement should not be required if the President or the 
Attorney General authorized electronic surveillance for 
reasons of national security. White's opinion spoke of an 
"inherent presidential authority," flowing from the 
Constitution, which empowered the Chief Executive to "protect 
the security of the Nation."71
The involvement of Justice Fortas in the drafting of the 
two "national security" passages was recently revealed in 
FOIA documents, included in Alexander Charns' book. In two 
separate letters to Justices Stewart and White, both dated 
November 11, 1967, Fortas urged them to limit the scope of 
their decisions to non-national security surveillance; his 
letter to Stewart urged that the Justice "insert something
reserving national security cases in which maybe the
Constitution would permit electronic espionage on 
authorization by the President or the Attorney General." 
While Stewart omitted any reference to presidential
70Quoted in "Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance," 
Rutgers Law Review. 334.
71Lapidus, Eavesdropping on Trial. 25; Charns, Cloak and 
Gavel. 86, [quotes from Charns].
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authority, his footnote responded to Fortas' request.72 
Since Fortas had acted as liaison for both the Johnson White 
House and the FBI during the Fred Black case, these two 
letters raise the possibility of Hoover's involvement.73 
Justices Douglas and Brennan vehemently disagreed with the 
dictum, arguing that it represented "a wholly unwarranted 
green light for the Executive Branch to resort to electronic 
surveillance without a warrant in cases which the Executive 
Branch itself labels 'national security' matters." Douglas 
added that the Fourth Amendment's protections of citizens are 
negated when the Executive Branch assumes "both the position 
of adversary-and-prosecutor and disinterested, neutral 
magistrate."74 The FBI concluded that Katz had "'no effect 
on eavesdropping in national security cases'".75 Therefore,
^Charns, Cloak and Gavel. 86.
73The Fortas-Johnson-FBI relationship was rooted in the 
long-time friendship of Johnson and Fortas, dating back to 
LBJ's first Senate race in 1948. When Johnson appointed 
Fortas to the Supreme Court in 1965, he enlisted the support 
of FBI White House liaison Cartha "Deke" DeLoach to ensure 
that minimal opposition would be offered in Congress. The 
Johnson-Fortas friendship continued throughout the remainder 
of Johnson's presidency, eventually involving the use of 
Fortas as an informer for both the White House and the FBI. 
Charns terms this arrangement a "separation of powers 
squaredance that Hoover had choreographed"; see Cloak and 
Gavel. 55.
74389 U.S. 347, 359-60.
75Letter from Fred M. Vinson, Jr., Assistant A.G. 
Criminal Division to Hoover, January 23, 1968; quoted in
Charns, Cloak and Gavel. 87.
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the Beraer and Katz decisions had little immediate effect on 
FBI surveillance practices.
III.
Congress turned to the subject of wiretapping and 
privacy in the fall of 1967. The end result was Title III of 
the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968, the first significant 
Congressional legislation on the subject since 1934. Title 
III banned most forms of electronic communications 
eavesdropping, including both bugging and wiretapping, but 
for the first time authorized electronic surveillance under 
carefully circumscribed procedures.76
Senator John McClellan, the Democrat from Arkansas who 
was floor manager for the final bill, stated during the 
debates that the "'first major purpose of the Title III is to 
protect privacy of communication....[The bill] has been 
carefully drafted to meet the letter and spirit of the 
constitutional tests set out in Berger and Katz.',,7? In 
accordance with Beraer and Katz. the Act required: (1) a
court order for nearly all interceptions, but listed a wide 
array of offenses for which a warrant could be obtained; (2) 
probable cause be presented to a judge upon written
76The Act required that states first pass legislation 
"harmonious" with the federal statute.
^Quoted in Athan Theoharis, "Misleading the Presidents: 
Thirty Years of Wire Tapping," The Nation. June 14, 1971, 
748.
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application for the surveillance(s); (3) each warrant
authorize surveillance for a maximum of thirty days, subject 
to an indefinite number of renewals; (4) notice of the 
interception be given to person(s) targeted within ninety 
days after termination; and (5) federal judges report 
periodically to Congress. The Act allowed warrantless 
surveillance under two circumstances: during a forty-eight- 
hour emergency and to protect "national security," under the 
"inherent authority" of the President.
The latter provision, outlined in section 2511(3), came
directly from Justices Stewart and Whites' "national
security" passages in the Katz decision, and closely
resembled several private statements Hoover had made
concerning the propriety of "national security" wiretapping,
since the early fifties:
Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 
605 of the Communications Act of 1934... .shall 
limit the constitutional power of the President to 
take such measures as he deems necessary to 
protect the Nation against actual or potential 
attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, 
to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed 
essential to the security of the United States, or 
to protect national security information against 
foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall 
anything contained in this chapter be deemed to 
limit the constitutional power of the President to 
take such measures as he deems necessary to 
protect the United States against the overthrow of 
the Government by force or other unlawful means, 
or against any other clear and present danger to 
the structure or existence of the Government. The 
contents of any wire or oral communication 
intercepted by authority of the President in the 
exercise of the foregoing powers may be received 
in evidence in any trial hearing, or other 
proceeding only where such interception was
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reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or 
disclosed except as is necessary to implement that 
power.78
A long and somewhat complicated passage, section 2511(3) 
quickly became a source of controversy, and helped stimulate 
the election year "law and order" debate. Its vague language 
allowed the FBI to continue "national security" wiretapping. 
More importantly, the "brief and nebulous paragraph" paved 
the way for the Nixon Administration to assert an "inherent 
authority" to wiretap U.S. citizens, via the Mitchell 
Doctrine.79
The circumstances surrounding how section 2511(3) became 
included in Title III involved several historical forces, all 
of which converged during the spring of 1968: (1) the Beraer 
and Katz decisions provided Congress with the strongest 
possible invitation to correct the "intolerable" state of 
U.S. wiretapping law; (2) an atmosphere of mounting social 
disorder, combined with election year politics, led 
increasing numbers of Americans to support "law and order" 
initiatives, including wiretapping; and (3) Hoover decided to 
support Title III —  with the "national security" loophole he 
helped draft.
Congress began considering sweeping new wiretapping 
legislation in 1967, and by the spring of the following year 
two very different bills were under consideration: Senator
78Quoted in Lapidus, Eavesdropping on Trial. 256.
79Ibid. . 96.
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McClellan's, which eventually became Title III, and Senator 
Edward Long's "Right of Privacy Act."80 As its title 
indicates, the latter bill called for strictly limited 
wiretapping in national security cases involving foreign 
powers and/or their agents. It was supported by the Johnson 
Administration and twenty-two additional Senators, including 
co-leader Philip Hart. The failure of the Long bill seems 
something of an historical anomaly. One might wonder how a 
bill in sympathy with the Supreme Court's decisions, and 
which enjoyed the support of the President, Attorney General, 
and nearly half of the Senate, could have been defeated in 
favor of McClellan's bill.81 One part of the equation, the 
relative impotency of the President and Attorney General, is 
easily explained. By the spring of 1968 the Congressional 
"law and order" critics of the Administration were openly 
attacking Johnson and Clark for "coddling criminals" by 
refusing to support such initiatives as expanded wiretapping 
and a legislative attempt to overthrow the Miranda
80Ibid. . 40, 13, 15. The so-called "McClellan bill"
which became Title III, (S 675), was actually an amalgamation 
of Senator Hruska's bill, (S 2050), which had been introduced 
in mid-1967 in response to the Berger and Katz decisions, and 
McClellan's January 1967 bill; Long's bill, (S 928), was very 
similar to one introduced at approximately the same time in 
the House, (HR 5386), by Representative Celler.
81For example, with twenty-three Senators in opposition, 
the McClellan bill could not have overridden a Presidential 
veto —  had one been delivered.
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decision.82 Despite President Johnson's repeated calls for 
sweeping anti-crime legislation, including support for 
wiretapping in national security areas, his administration 
was linked with the liberal Warren Court.83 The situation 
worsened following Attorney General Clark's July 8th 
testimony in front of the Senate Appropriations Committee, in 
which he reiterated his opposition to wiretapping as a law 
enforcement tool.84 Even the "President's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice" abandoned 
Johnson; in a January, 1967 report entitled "The Challenge of 
Crime in a Free Society," the Committee supported wiretapping 
for law enforcement purposes as well as in areas of national 
security.85
The degree to which public concern over lawlessness
overshadowed the Congressional debates on the Omnibus Act was
discussed in a New York Times editorial of June 7th:
A spectator listening to the debate....would have 
reason to doubt whether the Bill of Rights could 
get fifty votes if it were up for 
consideration...Members....were more intent on 
demagoging against crime and putting themselves on
82The anti-Miranda offensive soon became a "red meat" 
issue for the G.O.P.
83In his "State of the Union" address in 1967, Johnson 
stated "'we should outlaw all wiretapping, public and 
private....except when the security of the nation itself is 
at stake.'" Quoted in Lapidus, Eavesdropping on Trial. 13.
MNew York Times. July 9, 1968, 25.
85Lapidus, Eavesdropping on Trial. 14.
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record in favor of law and order than they were in
analyzing....this bill.84
In this political environment, the opportunity for thoughtful 
debate was limited. The assassination of Martin Luther King, 
Jr., on April 4 led to a wave of urban rioting. Only in the 
Senate did any significant debate over Title III occur. 
Senators John McClellan and Spessard Holland favored the 
wiretapping provisions; Senators Philip Hart and Edward Long 
were opposed. Athan Theoharis claims "Congress failed to 
fulfill its legislative responsibilities" by including
section 2511(3) in the final bill.87 Senators Long and Hart 
stated that section 2511(3) "gives the President a blank 
check to tap or bug without judicial supervision, when he 
finds, on his own motion, that an activity poses a 'clear and 
present danger to the Government.'" Hart later amplified his
position on the floor of the Senate, asserting that the
President could unilaterally declare the Black Muslims or 
even civil rights advocates "clear and present dangers," and 
initiate wiretaps on them; he worried about the extension of 
warrantless surveillance into "areas that do not come within 
our traditional notion of national security."88 McClellan 
claimed that if the President believed there were an
organization "whether black, white or mixed, whatever the
86New York Times. June 7, 1968, 38.
87Theoharis, "Misleading the Presidents...," 745.
88Ibid. . 748.
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name and under whatever the auspices —  that was planning to
overthrow the government, I would think we would want him to
have the right." McClellan clearly believed that the bill
limited surveillance to groups planning overt acts, as
opposed to those merely exposing radical or unpopular
programs. Yet he was willing to go along with the open-ended
wording of section 2511(3), leaving to the President the task
of defining it.89 Undeterred, Hart argued:
If, in fact, we are here saying that so long as 
the President thinks it is an activity that 
constitutes a clear and present danger to the 
structure and existence of the government, he can 
put a bug on without restraint, then clearly I 
think we are going too far.90
Senator Holland attempted to assuage Hart's concerns, stating
that he believed the Senator was "unduly concerned about this
matter." He added that "nothing affirmative in the
statement" would expand the President's powers in internal
security areas. Hart concluded with a prophetic statement:
As a result of this exchange, I am now sure no
President, thinking that just because some
political movement in this country is giving him 
fits, he could read this as an agreement from us 
that, by his own motion, he could put a tap on.91
Despite Hart's assurance, the majority report on Title III,
written by McClellan, was also vague as to whether a
89Ibid. . 749.
^Ibid.. 749.
91Ibid. . 749.
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President's powers to initiate surveillance extended to both
domestic and foreign threats:
It is obvious that whatever means are necessary 
should and must be taken to protect the national 
security interest. Wiretapping and electronic 
surveillance techniques are proper means for the 
acquisition of counterintelligence against the 
hostile action of foreign powers. Limitations 
that may be deemed proper in the field of domestic 
affairs of a nation become artificial when
international relations and internal security are 
at stake.92
The passage certainly implies that domestic groups could
reasonably be considered within the scope of the President's 
statutory authority. However, its language was as ambiguous 
as section 2511(3) itself, leaving no definitive answer to 
the question of whether Congress considered "internal 
security" synonymous with "national security."
The ambiguity of section 2511(3) may have been
intentional. Although the passage was included in 
McClellan's bill as early as January of 1967, evidence exists 
that Hoover was behind it. During the debate on the Senate 
floor, McClellan said the language of section 2511(3) "was 
approved and, in fact, drafted by the Administration, the 
Justice Department."93 When one considers that both
President Johnson and Attorney General Clark vehemently 
opposed McClellan's bill —  and in fact sponsored opposing
748,
^"Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance," 343.
93Quoted in Theoharis, "Misleading the Presidents...,"
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bills in both the House and Senate —  it seems unlikely that 
they drafted the language of section 2511(3).
Recently-released FBI documents indicate that Hoover and 
his assistants concluded by early 1967 that, in light of the 
Supreme Court's intentions of restricting warrantless 
wiretapping, they had to support Congressional legislation on 
the matter. Alexander Charns, who unearthed these files, 
argues that by 1968, the combination of Congressional probes 
and Court decisions "forced Hoover to support legislation 
that would require him to ask a neutral and detached judicial 
official to do what Hoover had been doing on his own for 
decades.1,94 Reviewing a series of FBI memos and other 
correspondence, Charns points out that as early as 1966 the 
Bureau had corresponded with Senator James Eastland, the 
powerful Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, on the subject. 
Hoover's strategy was two-fold: (1) ensuring that any
proposed wiretapping and bugging provisions would allow for 
such devices to be used against non-national security 
targets, and that the fruits of the surveillance be 
admissible as evidence in court, and (2) leaving open the 
availability for the FBI to continue its traditional 
warrantless "national security" eavesdropping against anyone, 
whether a U.S. citizen or not. Although the FBI considered 
the warrant requirement of Title III to be "cumbersome," they 
believed it would provide excellent intelligence concerning
’■‘charns, Cloak and Gavel. 91.
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organized crime activity that would be usable in court.95 
Hoover's reluctant approval of warrants for some types of 
surveillance did not represent as significant a shift in his 
thinking as Charns intimates. During the Congressional 
debate he focused his energies on ensuring that section 
2511(3) was included in the final bill —  essentially 
providing another vague statutory grant of authority allowing 
the FBI to continue "national security" wiretapping at will.
Yet, as Charns explains, Hoover did not get all of what 
he wanted:
The FBI had argued that authority to place 
electronic intercepts 'to protect the United 
States against the overthrow of the Government by 
force or other unlawful means' should be expanded 
by adding the phrase, 'from domestic groups or 
individuals whose activities he deems inimical to 
the national security of this country.'"96
Whether or not McClellan refused to include Hoover's
suggested wording, it was a shrewd maneuver. The "domestic
groups or individuals" passage would surely have encountered
enormous opposition —  quite possibly enough to doom the
entire bill, or at least section 2511(3), to failure. By
keeping the wording vague, the McClellan bill left open the
question of interpretation, in the meantime allowing the FBI
to continue widespread "national security" surveillance. In
the end, both of Hoover's strategies proved successful. Yet
he was concerned that the two sections of section 2511(3)
9SIbid. . 91-92.
^Ibid.. 93.
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would only "fulfil the Bureau's needs in the security 
field...[if they]...are held constitutional by the Supreme 
Court."97 He undoubtedly recognized that future
revaluations of illegal FBI "national security" wiretaps 
could prove as disastrous as the Coplon and Black cases had 
been, and therefore looked forward to a positive legal 
determination as to the constitutionality of section 2511(3) .
By early June the bill had become virtually unstoppable, 
due to the public's clamor for "law and order" which 
intensified following the assassination of Robert Kennedy on 
June 6. Attempts by Senators Hart and Hiram Fong to limit 
Title III to "national security" areas and to strike section 
2511(3) from the final bill were quickly defeated.98 Debate 
in the House of Representatives was almost non-existent, and 
the few critics who spoke against the bill expressed their 
opposition in general terms, ignoring the Senate's debate 
surrounding section 2511(3) altogether.99 Signing the 
Omnibus Crime Control Act into law on June 19, 1968,
President Johnson expressed "strong reservations" concerning 
Title Ill's "unwise and potentially dangerous" sanctioning of
"ibid.. 93.
98New York Times. May 24, 1968, 1. The final vote in the 
Senate was 72 to 4.
"Theoharis, "Misleading the Presidents...," 749. The 
final vote in the House was 368 to 17. The New York Times 
also ignored the Senate debate concerning section 2511(3), 
discussing the McClellan-Hart exchange as related to their 
differing opinions concerning Title Ill's constitutionality. 
See, for example, May 9, 1968, 29.
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law enforcement surveillance power in "an almost unlimited 
variety of situations," and urged Congress to consider its 
repeal.100 Coming from a lame duck President, the words had 
little effect.
Between the passage of the Omnibus Act and the election, 
the Justice Department refused to enact Title III. Attorney 
General Clark continued to block FBI requests for "national 
security" wiretaps, believing the statute was 
unconstitutional.101 Candidate Nixon assailed Johnson and 
Clark as "soft on crime." Liberals stood discredited on 
Vietnam, the economy, and "law and order," even before the 
violence at the Chicago Democratic Convention made a Nixon 
victory seem inevitable.
One example of national dissatisfaction with the Johnson 
Administration was the American Bar Association's June, 1968 
report entitled "Standards Relating to Electronic 
Surveillance," released by the ABA's Advisory Committee on 
the Police Function. Drafted during the Congressional 
debates concerning the Omnibus Act, the report demonstrated 
the ABA's opposition to the Administration's ban on 
wiretapping in all but national security areas. In fact, 
several of the report's passages resembled positions that 
Hoover had taken on the subject. Defending the FBI's 
interpretation of the Federal Communications Act, the report
100New York Times. June 20, 1968, 1, 23.
101Church Committee. Book II, 106.
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stated "Whether it is 'right' or 'wrong,' it is probably 'too 
late' to change it now."102 The first Nardone decision was 
described as "a judicial exhortation without as yet majority 
legislative support and no executive backing at the level of 
prosecution," —  a situation which "reduced respect for the 
law."103 Turning to the Berger and Katz decisions, the ABA 
report opined that "not everything that is constitutional is 
necessarily desirable," and then proceeded to use New York 
State's new wiretapping statute (which the Supreme Court 
eventually found unconstitutional) as evidence that "The fear 
that authorized electronic surveillance techniques might 
seriously impair free communication thus appears 
unfounded. "1(M Finally, the report intimated that when the 
Court supports bad laws, such as "a policy of prohibition 
rather than regulated use" of wiretapping, it is not 
surprising that they "have not been successful in controlling 
the use of these techniques."105 Such assertions would be 
understandable, had they originated from the FBI, or even a 
"conservative establishment" citizen's anti-crime group,
102ABA Standards. 16, n. 15.
103Ibid.. 17, n. 19.
104Ibid. . 87-88.
105Ibid. . 97.
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rather than a division of the chief policy-making entity for 
the nation's legal profession.106
IV.
Turning to the 1968 campaign in his Memoirs. Nixon notes 
"I was especially intent on getting across my stark 
differences with Humphrey on the issue of crime and 
justice.”107 Two weeks after the election, official "leaks” 
from the Nixon transition team made clear the 
Administration's intent to use wiretapping as part of a broad 
anti-crime offensive.108 By mid-December the House
Republican Task Force on Crime, convinced that the new 
Administration would move immediately to implement Title III, 
urged Nixon to work out eavesdropping guidelines prior to 
initiating his law enforcement surveillance policies.109
Nixon's selection of former law partner and campaign 
manager John N. Mitchell as Attorney General indicated the 
importance he placed on this position, as well as his desire 
to supervise closely the activities of the Justice
10<The Advisory Committee on the Police Function did 
contain a former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern 
District of New York, as well as a "Retired Inspector" with 
the FBI. See ABA Standards, ix.
107Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. (New 
York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978) , 321.
108New York Times. November 24, 1968, 80.
109New York Times. December 16, 1968, 1. See also
December 17, 1968, 46.
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Department. Mitchell possessed the two qualities that 
Richard Nixon demanded of his closest advisors: absolute 
loyalty and a "goal-oriented approach" to the law. As a 
recent study by Nancy V. Baker indicates, the practice of 
appointing a friend or political advocate to the post of 
Attorney General has been common: since 1933 every President 
except Johnson "named either a campaign manager or national 
party chairman as attorney general sometime during his 
administration."110 Yet the combination of Mitchell's 
inexperience in public office, his intense loyalty to Nixon, 
and his results-oriented approach to the law meant that the 
Justice Department was prepared to vehemently pursue "law and 
order." Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee on 
January 14, 1969, Mitchell asserted that his Justice
Department would utilize Title III wiretapping "not only in 
national security cases but against organized crime and other 
major crimes." Responding to Senator Fong's reminder that 
Title III surveillance represented "a new road that we are 
taking," Mitchell insisted the new power would be used 
"carefully and effectively." Finally, Mitchell responded to 
Senator Sam Ervin's comment concerning the frequent use of 
attorneys general as political "advisors and agitators": "my
110Nancy V. Baker, Conflicting Loyalties: Law and
Politics in the Attorney General's Office. 1789-1990. 
(Lawrence, KS: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1992), 21.
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activities of a political nature....have ended with the 
termination of the political campaign.1,111
The new Administration portrayed an overall tone of 
moderation during its first few weeks in office. New York 
Times legal correspondent Fred P. Graham, who closely 
followed Administration wiretapping policies, reported that 
"in fact the Nixon Administration will use the power 
sparingly.1,112 Press releases from the Justice Department 
in January and February claimed Title III was proving 
effective against "organized crime" and "suspected 
racketeers." Mitchell also encouraged states without 
wiretapping statutes to enact them, so that they could 
acquire evidence not otherwise obtainable.113
The Administration's tone changed virtually overnight, 
as a result of the Supreme Court's March 10, 1969, decision 
in Alderman v. U.S.114 In a five-to-three ruling, the Court 
held that criminal defendants have a right to inspect the 
logs of unlawful FBI surveillance against them. The ruling 
established procedures for federal district courts to follow 
in determining whether criminal convictions were "tainted" by 
illegal FBI surveillance. The government argued that trial
luNew York Times. January 15, 1969, 1, 22.
112New York Times. January 19, 1969, sec. iv, 3.
113New York Times. February 12, 1969, 1, 22; March 9,
1969, 32.
114394 U.S. 165.
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judges should be authorized to screen the contents of 
wiretaps in their chambers, or in camera. to determine 
whether the information tainted the prosecution's case; 
whenever a judge found this to be the case, he could disclose 
only those portions of the logs to the defense. It also 
argued that disclosure of '’sensitive" electronic surveillance 
information concerning foreign embassies and suspected spies 
would endanger the national security by exposing 
"counterespionage" methods to foreign governments.115 
Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold warned that if the 
decision went against the government, it would have to 
dismiss important pending cases rather than disclose the 
surveillance transcripts. Writing for the majority, Justice 
White rejected the Justice Department's argument that 
defendants' rights would be adequately protected if trial 
judges conducted in camera reviews, adding that if such 
hearings were "to be more than a formality and petitioners 
not left entirely to the reliance on Government testimony," 
the defendant and his lawyer must be allowed to inspect 
transcripts of bugged or wiretapped conversations.116 In 
his dissenting opinion, Justice Fortas favored in camera
uiNew York Times. January 9, 1968, 14; January 30, 1968, 
26; March 6, 1968, 19; May 3, 1968, 15; March 11, 1969, 1, 
22. Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold, a Johnson appointee 
whose position was renewed by Nixon, had argued against 
disclosure of surveillance logs to defendants since early in 
1968.
116New York Times. March 11, 1969, 1, 22.
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inspections in cases involving "national security material," 
which he narrowly defined as "those specifically directed to 
acts of sabotage, espionage, or aggression by or on behalf of 
foreign states."117
Although the government's position in Alderman had been 
formulated during the Johnson Administration, Nixon and 
Mitchell fully supported it. In response to the setback, 
Mitchell took several steps to undermine the Court's ruling. 
First, he criticized the decision in testimony before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Criminal Laws 
and Procedures, on March 18.118 Second, Solicitor General 
Griswold petitioned the Court to reconsider part of its 
ruling, so that eavesdropping by federal agents to gather 
"foreign intelligence" information would be constitutional. 
Referring to section 2511(3) of Title III, Griswold stated 
that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures did not apply to "foreign intelligence" 
surveillance —  and that the Court should recognize the 
legality of warrantless surveillance in this narrow category. 
Griswold cited the case of Cassius Clay, [Muhammed Ali], who 
had been overheard in wiretaps on a foreign embassy in 1965. 
The government's case against him for draft evasion was 
delayed because the government acknowledged the
I17Quoted in New York Times. March 16, 1969, sec. iv.,
15.
ll8New York Times. March 19, 1969, 18.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
interceptions, and Clay's defense demanded disclosure. 
Submitting the logs of the Clay surveillance to the Supreme 
Court with his petition, Griswold asserted that the 
interceptions did not taint Clay's trial. He added that an 
examination of the logs would make it clear that the wiretap 
was instituted for the purpose of gathering sensitive foreign 
intelligence information. Griswold then presented a thinly- 
veiled threat: the government was prepared to discontinue 
informing the Court about the existence of illegal 
wiretaps.119
The Court's response of March 24, 1969, delivered in two 
unsigned opinions and a concurring opinion by Justice 
Stewart, rejected the government's petition, but held that 
the legality of warrantless "foreign intelligence 
eavesdropping" had not yet been decided.120 The Court's 
response left open the possibility that section 2511(3) of 
the Omnibus Act might be constitutional —  in cases involving 
"foreign intelligence." Some twenty cases involving illegal 
government surveillance, including those of Clay and Teamster 
leader Jimmy Hof fa, were sent back to the lower courts, where 
the judges were to conduct hearings to determine if the 
eavesdropping was illegal and second, whether the appellants
119New York Times. March 20, 1969, 29.
120The Court's March 24, 1969 clarification of issues 
addressed in Alderman became known as Giordano v. U.S.: 394 
U.S. 310. The Giordano case had originally been included as 
part of the Alderman decision.
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had Fourth Amendment standing. Where the judges so decided, 
the full transcripts were to be disclosed to the defense.121
The impropriety involved in the Mitchell Justice 
Department's response to Alderman went far beyond public 
criticism of the Court. Immediately following the decision, 
according to Alexander Charns, Mitchell sent the Justice 
Department's Director of Public Information, Jack C. Landau, 
to meet with Justice Brennan, to relay Mitchell's message 
that the FBI and CIA conducted electronic surveillance of 
some 125 foreign embassies in Washington, D.C. Landau also 
informed Chief Justice Warren that Mitchell "wanted to assure 
the Court that he would do everything in his power to stop 
congressional moves to limit the Supreme Court's jurisdiction 
concerning national security surveillances." Warren
interpreted the message as a threat: reverse Alderman or face 
future legislative action. In his memoirs, the Chief Justice 
related that this was the only incident he was aware of in 
which the Executive Branch had tried to influence the Supreme 
Court in such a ham-handed manner. Justice Douglas believed 
that during this period his chambers were bugged.122
Nixon was appalled by the Alderman decision. The 
Administration wanted to prosecute high-profile anti-war 
cases against Cassius Clay, Dr. Benjamin Spock, and others 
indicted during Johnson's Presidency. Mitchell also realized
121New York Times. March 25, 1969, 1, 26.
122Charns. Cloak and Gavel. 98-100.
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the ruling's impact on future cases involving electronic 
surveillance prior to the passage of Title III. For example, 
by the time of the Alderman decision, it was rumored that the 
Justice Department would seek indictments against several 
organizers of the demonstrations in Chicago during the 
Democratic National Convention in August of 1968, and that 
their cases would rely upon information from warrantless 
wiretaps.123 In fact the government's indictments against 
the so-called "Chicago Eight" (later reduced to seven) were 
handed down on March 20th, alleging conspiracy to cross state 
lines for the purpose of inciting a riot, the so-called "H. 
Rap Brown Law" which Congress had passed in 1968.124 The 
indictment involved a "who's who" of anti-war and 
counterculture leaders, including Jerry Rubin, Abbie Hoffman, 
Bobby Seale, Tom Hayden, Rennie Davis, John Froines, Lee 
Weiner, and David Dellinger. Just as the violence in Chicago
l23New York Times. March 12, 1969, 20. The previous
December the Justice Department had disclosed in a different 
case that Jerry Rubin "had been overheard as the result of 
electronic surveillance directed against others in the 
interests of national security." See Eliff, Crime. Dissent, 
and the Attorney General. 205. The issue of how the 
Government's case against domestic radicals pertained to 
their request in the Alderman appeal that the Court recognize 
as constitutional warrantless "foreign intelligence" 
wiretaps, was not raised until the unveiling of the Mitchell 
Doctrine on June 13th.
l24The Johnson Administration had conducted the first 
high-profile conspiracy trials against the anti-war movement 
beginning in late 1967, with a case against noted child 
psychologist Dr. Benjamin Spock, for counseling draft 
resistance; the following year the "Oakland Seven" were 
indicted for conspiracy to conduct anti-draft "riots." The 
Nixon Administration expanded the use of these trials.
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in 1968 was a watershed of sixties social disorder, the 
"Chicago Eight" case symbolized the degree to which the 
conservative establishment was prepared to counterattack, 
utilizing the full powers of the government and legal 
system.125
The primary danger the Alderman decision posed to the 
Administration involved the discretion it granted to federal 
judges to determine the legality of a given wiretap.126 In 
addition, Judges could decide whether surveillances involved 
the national security, regardless of what the government 
argued. The consequences were revealed in early June at the 
Clay trial in Houston, Texas, where U.S. District Judge Joe 
Ingraham ruled that four of the government's wiretaps were 
clearly illegal, and ordered their disclosure —  despite the 
opposition of a team of Justice Department officials. Upon 
the defense's cross-examination of FBI officials who had been
125The best sources on the case are as follows: John 
Schultz, The Chicago Conspiracy Trial. Revised. Updated 
Edition. (New York: Da Capo Press, 1993); Jason Epstein, The 
Great Conspiracy Trial. (London: Faber and Faber, 1970);
Arthur Kinoy, et. al., Conspiracy on Appeal: Appellate Brief 
on Behalf of the Chicago Eight. (New York: Center for
Constitutional Rights, 1971); J. Anthony Lukas, The Barnvard 
Epithet and Other Obscenities: Notes on the Chicago
Conspiracy Trial. (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); Judy 
Clavir and John Spitzer, The Conspiracy Trial. (Indianapolis, 
IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1970); and Ramsey Clark, et. 
al., Contempt: Transcript of the Contempt Citations.
Sentences, and Responses of the Chicago Conspiracy 10. 
(Chicago: Swallow Press, 1970). This important trial
deserves a scholarly reappraisal.
126However, granting authority to judges was in keeping 
with the Berger and Katz decisions, as well as the letter of 
the law in Title III of the Omnibus Act.
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involved in the surveillance, it was revealed that wiretaps 
had been kept on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Nation of 
Islam leader Elijah Muhammad long after President Johnson's 
June 30, 1965, ban on non-national security surveillance. 
Judge Ingraham did prevent disclosure of a single wiretap log 
which Mitchell had claimed involved "foreign intelligence" 
that might "prejudice the national interest"; he refused to 
rule on Mitchell's assertion that the authorization was 
legal.127 The timing of the disclosure of the King and
Muhammad wiretaps, just as the Justice Department was 
implementing Title III and assuring the public that it was 
proceeding "cautiously and carefully," had a significant 
impact within the Administration.
The Administration's dissatisfaction with the Alderman 
decision, as well as the Court's rejection of a petition for 
a rehearing, was revealed in mid-June, in Justice Department 
initiatives that seem to have been coordinated. On June 10 
the Justice Department released some two thousand pages of 
wiretap transcripts of suspected New Jersey Mafia members 
that had been collected between 1961 and 1965 as part of a 
federal racketeering investigation. The public release 
shocked the defense lawyers in the case, who had requested 
disclosure, but neglected to specify only to the defense.
127New York Times. June 7, 1969, 29. See also Eliff, 
Crime. Dissent, and the Attorney General. 205-206.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
147
The disclosures also doomed the government's case against 
several suspected crime bosses.
The reasons for the Justice Department's unprecedented 
disclosures were unclear at the time: the New York Times was 
content to reprint excerpts, in violation of the privacy 
rights of the individuals who were overheard.128 Within
three weeks, the ulterior motive behind the FBI's public
disclosures became increasingly apparent; New York Times 
reporter Bernard Collier quoted an anonymous FBI agent as 
follows:
You're going to see more of it...And its authentic 
stuff...Organized crime is deeper than almost
anybody realizes, but we are convinced that if the
public is shown what is going on....there will be 
a kind of public reaction we need so we can get in 
there and clean the situation up.
Collier argued that the FBI hoped to prove that the Alderman
decision prevented the government from utilizing
incriminating evidence in court. In Collier's view, the
government was gambling that the public would be more
disgusted with the contents of the wiretaps and the fact that
the government's "hands were tied" regarding their use than
with the knowledge that the FBI had instituted them
illegally.129
The Justice Department's next step was the introduction 
of the Mitchell Doctrine on June 13, 1969, at the Chicago
l28New York Times. June 11, 1969, 1, 34; June 14, 1969,
1, 16.
l29New York Times. June 22, 1969, sec. iv, 16.
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Conspiracy Trial. On May 9 defense lawyers William Kunstler 
and Leonard Weinglass filed a "Motion for Disclosure of 
Electronic Surveillance, for a Pretrial Hearing, to Suppress 
Evidence and to Dismiss the Indictment," inquiring if the 
government had instituted electronic surveillance against any 
of the defendants. In accordance with the Alderman decision, 
the motion specifically requested that a pre-trial taint 
hearing be held, and, if the facts warranted, the 
government's evidence be suppressed, or the case dismissed. 
The motion was no "shot in the dark"; in mid-March, press 
coverage of the government's request for a rehearing of the 
Alderman decision contained intentionally-leaked information 
that the government planned to indict the Chicago 
conspirators, introducing transcripts of electronic 
surveillance concerning several of the defendants. The New 
York Times reported that the Chicago case was one of several 
that the government would likely drop rather than disclose 
the sensitive nature of its wiretapping operations.130 
Thus, the Kunstler motion was delivered in expectation that 
the government had in fact conducted illegal surveillance 
against one or more of the defendants.
130New York Times. March 12, 1969, 20. Jason Epstein 
concludes that the Justice Department's "hint" that it might 
be forced to drop the charges against the Chicago 
conspirators if the Supreme Court did not modify its Alderman 
decision was an attempt "to provoke an expression of public 
outrage against the Court for jeopardizing the case against 
the Chicago radicals." See The Great Conspiracy Trial. 102- 
103.
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Attorney General Mitchell responded with a two-page 
affidavit, supported by a thirty-two page legal opinion and 
five sealed exhibits of wiretap transcripts, outlining one of 
the most sweeping assertions of Executive power in the 
history of the United States.131 The principal components 
of what became known as the "Mitchell Doctrine" were as 
follows: (1) the government admitted that it had conducted
electronic surveillance affecting seven of the eight 
defendants: Dellinger, Davis, Hayden, Seale, Rubin, Hoffman, 
and Weiner; (2) Mitchell was willing to turn over a small 
quantity of transcripts involving Weiner and Seale, but only 
under a "protective order" forbidding public disclosure; (3) 
as for the much larger quantity of material concerning Davis, 
Dellinger, Hayden, Rubin, and Seale, the government claimed 
that the intrusions were legal, based on the following 
dictum:132
This affidavit is submitted in connection with the 
government's opposition to the disclosure to the 
defendants of information concerning the 
overhearing of conversations of certain of the 
defendants which occurred during the course of 
electronic surveillances which the government 
contends were legal...On various occasions the 
defendants Davis, Dellinger, Hayden, Rubin and 
Seale participated in conversations which were
I3IOne of the most accurate and detailed discussions of 
the Mitchell Doctrine is contained in Arthur Kinoy, et. al., 
Conspiracy on Appeal. 300-331.
,32Mitchell's June 13, 1969, affidavit made no mention of 
surveillance of Abbie Hoffman; during the Chicago Conspiracy 
Trial the Government submitted additional sealed exhibits of 
transcripts which concerned Hoffman. See Kinoy, Conspiracy 
on Appeal. 302.
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overheard by government agents who were monitoring 
wiretaps which were being employed to gather 
foreign intelligence information or to gather 
intelligence information concerning domestic 
organizations which seek to use force and other 
unlawful means to attack and subvert the existing 
structure of the government. The records of the 
Department of Justice reflects that in each 
instance the installation of the wiretaps involved 
had been expressly approved by the then Attorney 
General...I certify that it would prejudice the 
national interest to disclose the particular facts 
concerning these surveillances other than to the 
court in camera...copies of those exhibits are not 
being furnished to the defendants;133
(4) in support of his assertion, Mitchell presented a lengthy
legal brief, reportedly prepared by Assistant U.S. Attorney
William H. Rehnquist, of the Justice Department's Office of
Legal Counsel, which stated:134
There can be no doubt that there are today in this 
country organizations which intend to use force 
and other illegal means to attack and subvert the 
existing forms of government. Faced with such a 
state of affairs, any President who takes 
seriously his oath to 'preserve, protect and 
defend the Constitution' will no doubt determine 
that it is not 'unreasonable' to utilize 
electronic surveillance to gather intelligence 
information concerning those organizations which 
are committed to the use of illegal methods to
133The Papers of Justice William O. Douglas, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Container 672, Subject Files: 
"Wiretapping, 1954-1970."
134Rehnquist's involvement in the preparation of the 
Mitchell Doctrine opinion is mentioned, without 
documentation, in Lapidus, Eavesdropping on Trial. 96. 
However, On October 10, 1972, in a memorandum concerning the 
Laird v. Tatum case, Justice Rehnquist admitted that he had 
"assisted in drafting the brief," although he was "not 
officially responsible" for the handling of the case. See 
"Memorandum of Mr. Justice Rehnquist," in The Papers of 
Justice William A. Brennan, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Case Files for October, 1971 Term, No. 71-288, 
"Laird v. Tatum," Container 284, pages 5-6.
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bring about changes in our form of government and 
which may be seeking to foment violent civil 
disorders;135
(5) perhaps the boldest assertion of the Mitchell/Rehnquist
initiative was the wholesale rejection of the role that
neutral magistrates had been assigned by both the Supreme
Court and Congress as to the necessity of warrants in
electronic surveillance cases:
The question of whether it is appropriate to
utilize electronic surveillance to gather
intelligence information.... is one that properly 
comes within the competence of the executive and 
not the judicial branch;136
(6) in support of the dictum, Rehnquist's brief relied upon 
two principal arguments: first, that section 2511(3) of the 
Omnibus Act authorizes the Attorney General, as the 
President's representative, to conduct warrantless "national 
security" surveillance against groups that seek the overthrow 
of government, and second, that the President possesses
"inherent power," both as Commander in Chief and as protector 
of the Constitution, to utilize such surveillance as he deems 
necessary to prevent the overthrow of government by force;
(7) the case law which the Justice Department relied upon in 
their brief involved instances where the Supreme Court had 
recognized certain "special powers" of the Executive in 
foreign affairs, such as U.S. v. Curtiss-Wricrht: and (8) to 
support his position, Mitchell attached the various
135Quoted in New York Times. June 14, 1969, 1, 34.
I36lbid. . 34.
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Presidential directives regarding electronic surveillance, 
from Franklin Roosevelt's 1940 memorandum to President 
Johnson's 1965 restriction of surveillance to "national 
security" cases.
Many immediately recognized the constitutional
significance of the Mitchell Doctrine. Reviewing the past
"national security" wiretapping practices of every Attorney
General since 1940, Sidney Zion asked whether it was unfair
to condemn Mitchell's latest initiative. He received two
responses, the first from an unnamed "Federal judge not known
for softness on criminals," who stated:
The department's position is arrogant as 
he11...Among other things, they seem to be urging 
an end to Marbury vs. Madison, which would be a 
joke, son, if it wasn't so shocking.
A second response came from Professor Yale Kamisar of the
University of Michigan Law School:
There are significant differences [between
Mitchell's actions and those of his
predecessors] .. .None of the other guys had the 
chutzpah to tell the courts they had no competence 
to decide eavesdrop questions. In fact, they 
tried to get Congress to set up a court-order 
system. Now, having sold the system by 
emphasizing the protections of judicial scrutiny, 
Mitchell claims the power to eavesdrop at will on 
'domestic subversives,' whatever that
means...Beyond that, there is a great symbolic 
difference between quietly tapping in violation of 
the law and achieving the imprimatur of the 
courts.
In response to Zion's inquiry as to why the Attorney General 
was no longer satisfied with secret wiretaps, Kamisar added: 
"I suspect....that he simply smells blood. He knows the
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Supreme Court is wounded, and he wants to exploit the wounds 
before the healing process sets in."137 A New York Times 
editorial on June 21 was even more critical, warning that the 
Fourth Amendment itself was threatened by the Mitchell 
Doctrine, and concluding that "any attempt to bypass 
constitutional rights is in itself a form of subversion and 
a threat to the existing structure of government.1,138
The Mitchell Doctrine was occasioned by the Chicago 
Conspiracy case, which, in mid-June, remained in the pre­
trial stage. The timing of Mitchell's affidavit underscored 
how critical prosecuting the Chicago Eight was for the 
Administration. The Alderman decision required that the 
government submit the transcripts of all electronic 
surveillance to U.S. District Judge Julius Hoffman, so that 
a pre-trial hearing could be conducted. The Judge would then 
rule as to the legality of the surveillance; if he decided 
any of it was illegal, he would be required to disclose all 
pertinent transcripts to the defense, unless he believed that 
surveillance had been conducted for the purpose of "foreign 
intelligence," as had occurred with one of the five 
transcripts reviewed in Judge Ingraham's Houston court the 
week before.
137New York Times. June 22, 1969, sec. iv. , 16.
138New York Times. June 21, 1969, 26. The next day the 
Times reported that thirteen law professors had sent a letter 
to Mitchell on June 21, expressing their opposition to his 
wiretapping doctrine. See June 22, 1969, 53.
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In Chicago, the Justice Department faced a dilemma: the 
enormous discretionary powers the Alderman decision granted 
to judges in cases involving electronic surveillance. The 
Justice Department was looking for ways to prevent future 
disclosures. One method would have been to attempt 
convincing the judge that the surveillance was only to gather 
"foreign intelligence" information.139 Justice Stewart's 
March 24 decision in Giordano indicated that the Supreme 
Court had not yet ruled on this issue. Judge Ingraham had 
given tacit recognition to Nixon's premise by refusing to 
disclose one transcript that Mitchell claimed involved 
"national security." Even with a conservative judge such as 
Hoffman, it was unlikely that the government would have been 
able to prove that all of the transcripts concerning the 
Chicago defendants represented "foreign intelligence" 
information. Johnson and Nixon had ordered the CIA and FBI 
to search for evidence of "foreign" financial and other 
support for the various protest movements, with no 
success.140
The Justice Department could have dropped the charges 
against the Chicago conspirators. However, the case seemed 
too important for the Administration to abandon. It 
represented a public forum to silence anti-war protesters, so
,39Hiding the existence of the Jerry Rubin surveillance 
would have been difficult at best, after reports that 
surfaced in December, 1968.
l40Donner, Age of Surveillance. 259-63.
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that Nixon and Kissinger could have a free hand to conduct 
their Vietnam strategy.141 By backing down after so much 
pre-trial publicity, the Administration would have sent a 
message of weakness to radical dissenters it wished to avoid 
at all costs. Thus, the trial took on an unmistakably 
political character. The Administration carefully selected 
"leaders" from the entire dissent spectrum, including the 
Yippies (Rubin and Hoffman), the "MOBE," (Hayden, Dellinger, 
and Davis), and the Black Panthers (Seale). The charges, 
conspiracy to cross state lines for the purpose of inciting 
rebellion, were also designed to spread fear among potential 
dissenters: by the logic of conspiracy law, any two people 
discussing the possibility of going to another state for a 
rally or peace march would be liable for prosecution, and 
face up to five years in prison. Attorney General Clark 
reportedly favored indicting only the Chicago Police, 
following the President's Commission Report, which 
characterized the affair as a "police riot."142 Yet the 
Nixon Administration decided to make the case a priority, 
sending a team of Justice Department officials to Chicago to 
coach U.S. Attorney Thomas Foran, and to assist with the
141Nixon considered the anti-war movement to be an 
encouragement to the North Vietnamese and detrimental to his 
negotiating stance. As he stated in his memoirs, "I 
considered that the practical effect of their activity was to 
give encouragement to the enemy and thus prolong the war." 
See Nixon, Memoirs. 350-51.
142Epstein, The Great Conspiracy Trial. 31-34. See also 
Farber, Chicago '68. 205.
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coordination of "expert” prosecution witnesses, including 
informers and agents provocateurs from the full spectrum of 
U.S. intelligence agencies.143
Unwilling to drop the charges, and determined not to 
chance any more damaging public disclosures of surveillance 
transcripts, the Nixon Administration opted for the Mitchell 
Doctrine —  a strategy asserting the Executive's power to 
completely bypass the role of the independent magistrate in 
any area(s) deemed important to the "national security." By 
asserting that the wiretaps of the defendants' conversations 
were legal, the Administration hoped that Judge Hoffman would 
rule on their legality in camera. which would prevent the 
disclosure of transcripts to the defendants.
The Nixon Administration's decision to introduce the 
Mitchell Doctrine on June 13 was motivated by other important 
long-term concerns. The Administration's request for a 
rehearing in the Alderman case probably had little to do with 
their concern over the possible exposure of FBI and CIA 
wiretapping operations against foreign embassies.144 If the 
Justice Department really wanted authority to conduct 
warrantless eavesdropping to gather "foreign intelligence"
143Schultz, The Chicago Conspiracy Trial. 388-92. See 
also Pyle, Military Surveillance of Civilian Politics. 183- 
88.
144If foreign embassy staffs were not aware of U.S. 
surveillance practices prior to the Alderman decision, they 
were certainly tipped off by the numerous press accounts 
concerning the Government's petition for a rehearing in the 
case.
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information, and that transcripts be reviewed by judges in 
camera to prevent full disclosure, as Griswold had argued, it 
should have been content with the Court's clarification of 
the ruling in Giordano.145 Justice Stewart's assertion that 
the Court had not yet decided on the legality of "foreign 
intelligence eavesdropping" left open the possibility that 
the Court might recognize the constitutionality of section 
2511(3) of the Omnibus Act —  but only in cases involving 
"foreign intelligence." In short, the government received 
almost all of what it asked for, short of a definitive ruling 
on the legality of warrantless surveillance for the purpose 
of conducting "foreign intelligence." And there were 
indications, in addition to Stewart's rather blunt "hint," 
that such a ruling was not far off; for example, Judge 
Ingraham's decision in the Clay case to prevent disclosure of 
the one transcript which Mitchell had said involved "foreign 
intelligence.1,146 Yet the Administration was clearly not 
satisfied with this, opting instead to assert, via the 
Mitchell Doctrine, that section 2511(3) of the Omnibus Act 
pertains to domestic as well as foreign "threats."
In fact, the likelihood that the Court would recognize 
the legality of warrantless surveillance only involving 
"foreign intelligence" may explain the decision to propose 
the Mitchell Doctrine. By the late sixties, the process of
145See New York Times. March 20, 1969, 29.
146See New York Times. June 7, 1969, 29.
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narrowing the boundaries of permissible "national security"
eavesdropping was underway. However, the open-ended nature
of "national security" was essentially preserved, thanks to
Johnson's failure to define the parameters of "national
security," Justice Stewart's footnote in the Katz decision,
and section 2511(3) of the Omnibus Act. The Alderman
decision, as well as the clarification in Giordano, altered
the situation by narrowing the definition of "national
security" to mean "foreign intelligence." Regardless of what
the Administration intended, its utilization of the words
"foreign intelligence" backfired. As Justice Stewart wrote:
The Court has not....addressed itself to the 
standards governing the constitutionality of 
electronic surveillance relating to the gathering 
of foreign intelligence information —  necessary 
for the conduct of international affairs, and for 
the protection of national defense secrets and 
installations from foreign espionage and sabotage. 
Mr. Justice White has elsewhere made clear his 
view that such surveillance does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment... the issue remains open.147
Stewart's words made clear that the Court was moving toward
a narrow definition of "national security," which threatened
the Administration's planned prosecution of domestic
radicals.148
147Quoted in Rutgers Law Review. "Wiretapping and 
Electronic Surveillance," 348.
148As Frank Donner states, if the Government was forced 
to reveal the transcripts of warrantless surveillance in 
court, "the entire national security game, with its dubious 
claims of linkages between domestic targets and foreign 
principals so substantial as to justify executive 
intervention, would be exposed." See Donner, Age of 
Surveillance. 246.
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Had they been willing to abide by a completely new set 
of rules concerning electronic surveillance, Nixon and 
Mitchell might have been satisfied with Stewart's 
clarification of the Alderman decision. However, preserving 
—  in fact expanding —  their access to surveillance was high 
on the Administration's domestic policy agenda. Title III of 
the Omnibus Act offered a legal method whereby both the 
Justice Department and the States could utilize electronic 
surveillance against suspected criminals. True, the court- 
order requirement was, in the FBI's view, "cumbersome," 
requiring such things as probable cause, thirty-day 
extensions, particularity as to the types of criminal 
activity expected, and eventual notice to the target(s). 
Title III left open the question of whether long-term 
"investigative" surveillance, much preferred by law 
enforcement and intelligence agency officials, could pass 
constitutional scrutiny.
The Administration could also have continued to pursue 
the policy of secretly wiretapping and preventing disclosure. 
But this option was no longer tenable: (1) by the end of the 
sixties public opinion had changed regarding wiretapping and 
privacy, thanks to numerous revelations of illegal FBI 
wiretapping and bugging, from an increasingly-aggressive 
national media; (2) by 1969, both the Supreme Court and 
Congress generally opposed warrantless wiretapping in 
domestic areas; and (3) another scandal involving illegal FBI
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surveillance of U.S. citizens would likely be more damaging 
to the aging Director, because the defenses that he had 
traditionally relied upon, including open-ended Presidential 
directives and Judicial and Congressional silence, were no 
longer present.
The Nixon Administration's unwillingness to play by the
new rules was made clear in the Mitchell Doctrine. Yet the
doctrine represented much more than an attempt to preserve
the Executive Branch's traditional powers of surveillance; it
also claimed the power to utilize any "national security"
surveillance in court, which was sweeping in its
implications. Theoretically, the FBI could now legally
initiate a wiretap against any and all, listen for as long as
it liked, and submit in court whatever incriminating
information it came across. As Frank Donner states, this
"prosecutive option" had always been considered "highly
important" by the FBI and other law enforcement entities:
A point is reached in the intelligence process 
when....the need for sanctions and publicity takes 
precedence over the secret collection of 
information.149
Traditionally, the FBI had been prohibited from utilizing the 
"national security" surveillance in court, thanks to the 
Federal Communications Act of 1934, interpreted as banning 
the interception and divulgence of warrantless surveillance. 
The Mitchell Doctrine, therefore, promised a way out of this
149Donner, Age of Surveillance. 245.
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dilemma. Donner suggests another possible benefit which the 
Administration hoped to gain from the Mitchell Doctrine: the 
so-called "chilling effect." If the government possessed the 
power to eavesdrop at will, the net result would be less 
dissent, which of course, is precisely what Nixon desired.
Several components of Mitchell's affidavit and 
Rehnquist's supporting brief were virtually identical to 
positions Hoover had taken during the Coplon and Black cases, 
as well as during the Omnibus Act debates: (1) the
preservation of the Justice Department's free hand to wiretap 
at will and without court order all persons deemed "national 
security" threats; and (2) the ability to utilize the fruits 
of these surveillances in court, as per section 2511(3) of 
the Omnibus Act. Hoover was unable to convince Senator 
McClellan to authorize specifically warrantless surveillance 
of "domestic groups or individuals whose activities he [the 
President] deems inimical to the internal security of this 
country." Thus, he made it clear that he would only be 
satisfied that section 2511(3) fulfilled "the Bureau's needs 
in the security field" if "these portions of the Act are held 
constitutional by the Supreme Court."150 In the Alderman 
decision the Court gave notice that it may concede the 
constitutionality of only half of section 2511(3): the
portion dealing with strictly "foreign" threats. The 
Mitchell Doctrine was therefore a temporary fulfillment of
I50Charns, Cloak and Gavel. 93.
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Hoover's wishes, predicated upon the hope that the courts 
would eventually accede to it. Though the Supreme Court 
might ultimately find it unconstitutional, the government 
would have a free hand during the intervening period, which 
meant continuing the use of warrantless "national security” 
wiretaps against any person(s) or groups(s) it desired.
V.
Regardless of whether the Mitchell Doctrine was 
originally put forward as a short-term strategy focused on 
the Chicago Conspiracy Trial or a long-term initiative 
intended to preserve the FBI's unchecked "national security" 
surveillance powers, the Nixon Administration backed away 
from it within a month of its introduction.151 On June 26, 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a lawsuit in 
U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., charging that the 
Mitchell Doctrine was unconstitutional. The suit was filed 
on behalf of nine anti-war and Black Power organizations, as 
well as the "Chicago Eight," and claimed that the 
government's doctrine violated the First Amendment protection 
of free speech, as well as the Fourth Amendment's guarantee
,5,In fact signs that the Administration would back down 
came as early as June 19th, when Nixon stated: "our attitude 
toward electronic surveillance is that it should be used very 
sparingly, very carefully —  having in mind the rights of 
those who might be involved —  but very effectively to 
protect the internal and external security of the United 
States." See New York Times. June 20, 1969, 20.
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against unreasonable searches and seizures. The complaint 
continued:
By announcing a policy of unfettered searches and 
seizures, the defendants have created a chill and 
a pall on all those who would desire to associate 
with those persons and groups caught within the 
dragnet of the announced policy in violation of 
the associational rights protected by the First 
Amendment.152
Christopher Lyndon's New York Times article on the lawsuit 
concluded that the Justice Department's new policy "would 
provide retroactive justification of the surveillance of Mr. 
[Elijah] Muhammad and Dr. King...[and] also implies the 
department's intention to continue its eavesdropping on black 
militants and other radicals, without going through the 
procedures established by the crime control act."153 
Immediately, the Nixon Administration adopted a much more 
moderate stand. On July 14th, Mitchell played down the 
government's surveillance practices, claiming that the 
Justice Department had actually reduced the number of 
wiretaps and bugs since the Nixon Administration took office, 
and noting that a number of "national security" wiretaps had 
been discontinued, because they were "not productive." 
Responding to charges by Senators Ralph W. Yarborough (D) of 
Texas and Carl T. Curtis (R) of Nebraska that many 
Congressional and Executive Branch telephones were tapped, 
Mitchell stated that "It would be inconceivable beyond any
152Quoted in New York Times. June 27, 1969, 1, 17.
153Ibid. . 17.
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consideration to place a tap to a member of Congress or on 
anyone else in Government." He added that popular concern 
over the government's surveillance practices was 
"exaggerated.1,154
An additional factor that may have influenced the 
Administration's decision to retreat from the Mitchell 
Doctrine was the delayed ruling on Mitchell's affidavit in 
the Chicago Conspiracy Trial. Judge Hoffman was silent until 
September 9th, on the eve of the trial, when he declared "I 
have determined....that the most appropriate procedure would 
be to conduct a hearing after the jury trial."155 This 
ruling was in direct contradiction with the Alderman 
decision, which had ordered pre-trial hearings be held in all 
electronic surveillance cases. The ruling effectively 
allowed Hoffman to delay deciding both the legality of the 
specific wiretaps and the constitutionality of the Mitchell 
Doctrine, until at least the following spring.156 He
154Quoted in New York Times. July 15, 1969, 1, 25.
155In fact, Judge Hoffman did not rule on the matter 
until immediately following the verdicts in the trial: 
February 20, 1970.
156Judge Hoffman's loyalty to the Mitchell Justice 
Department was discussed by one of the Judge's law clerks. 
Sometime in July, after the Mitchell affidavit had been filed 
and the defense requested access to additional transcripts, 
the clerk asked Hoffman to "dwell upon the fourth amendment 
implications" of his denial of the defense's motion. In 
response, Hoffman gestured toward his desk and said "There's 
the Attorney General's affidavit." Soon thereafter, the 
clerk's constitutional concerns led to his dismissal. See 
Schultz, The Chicago Conspiracy Trial. 6.
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therefore impounded all of the surveillance transcripts 
presented by the government and began the trial on September 
26.157
Rather than continuing its direct judicial assault 
against the Alderman decision, the Justice Department, 
throughout 1969, attempted to overturn the decision via 
Senator McClelland Judiciary Committee.158 Title VII of a 
proposed organized crime bill required that before FBI 
transcripts of illegally-obtained surveillance be turned over 
to a defendant, the trial judge would have to determine that 
its disclosure was in the "interest of justice.1,159 As John 
Eliff asserts, this action "placed the Executive Branch 
firmly on the side of an assertion of Congressional power to 
overrule constitutional decisions by simple legislation."160 
Although the anti-Alderman component of McClellan's bill was 
later dropped from what became the Organized Crime Control
I57Epstein, The Great Conspiracy Trial. 113.
l58During the Government's appeal to the Supreme Court 
for a rehearing in the Alderman case, Mitchell had sent a 
Justice Department representative to threaten this very 
action, if the Court refused to modify its decision. See 
note 122.
159Quoted in Eliff, Crime. Dissent and the Attorney 
General, 77. This position was virtually identical to 
Griswold's argument in the Government's petition for a re­
hearing, following the Alderman decision.
160Ibid.. 77-78. Citing the Supreme Court's "near
unanimity in requiring disclosure of electronic surveillance 
records without judicial screening," in Alderman. Eliff is 
particularly critical of Mitchell's blatant Executive Branch- 
directed Legislative maneuver to circumvent the Court's 
constitutional ruling.
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Act of 1970, the Senator remained an ardent defender of the 
Administration's wiretapping policies.161
Having pursued the Mitchell Doctrine "in the open" 
during the first six months of 1969, culminating with the 
June 13 Mitchell affidavit, the Nixon Administration suddenly 
became virtually silent on the subject of wiretapping and 
surveillance.162 This silence masked an increasing
willingness to conceal surveillance activities under the 
mantle of "national security." As early as April of 1969, 
Special White House Counsel John Erlichman hired ex-New York 
policeman John Caulfield to set up a special White House 
"investigations unit" to conduct various political 
surveillance and "dirty tricks" campaigns against "enemies" 
of the Administration, such as Senator Edward Kennedy.163 
Before long the unit took the title of "plumbers," due to 
their primary responsibility: locating "leaks" within the 
government's bureaucracy concerning foreign policy and other 
secrets. Illegal (warrantless) wiretapping was a favorite
161In a series of statements on the floor of the Senate 
during the Summer and Fall of 1969, McClellan extolled the 
successes of Title III of the Omnibus Act, which he had been 
so instrumental in achieving the passage of. He carefully 
avoided any references to "national security" surveillances. 
See Theoharis, "Misleading the Presidents," 748.
162A Gallup Poll released in mid-August indicated that 
the American public was almost evenly divided on the issue of 
wiretapping as a way to obtain criminal evidence: 46 percent 
supported its use, while 47 percent opposed. Seven percent 
were undecided. See New York Times. August 21, 1969, 21.
163J. Anthony Lukas, Nightmare: The Underside of the 
Nixon Years. (New York: The Viking Press, 1976), 13-16.
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plumbers tactic, and by the end of the year seventeen 
wiretaps were instituted against Pentagon officials, 
journalists, and others —  beginning what Mitchell would 
later call the "White House horrors."164 At the same time, 
the Justice Department began a series of warrantless wiretaps 
on a number of New Left, counterculture, anti-war, and Black 
Power movement groups. The most popular target was the Black 
Panthers, whose importance to the FBI and Justice Department 
had escalated rapidly under the New Administration.165 
These wiretaps were instituted prior to the Justice 
Department's issuance of any specific guidelines to the FBI 
concerning the proper procedures to conduct electronic 
surveillances under Title III; in short, they were patently 
illegal.166 An important corner had been turned.
Mitchell's May 6, 1969 memorandum to Hoover outlined the 
Administration's interpretation of Title III, and presented 
the FBI with guidelines for the use of electronic 
surveillance. The memo began with an assertion that section 
2511(3) of the Omnibus Act "recognizes the constitutional 
power of the President to authorize interceptions in certain
164Kutler, The Wars of Watergate. 116-120. These initial 
Nixon Administration wiretaps included Department of Defense 
employee Morton Halperin.
1650'Reilly, Racial Matters. 298-99.
166The first such guidelines were issued on May 6, 1969, 
in a memorandum from Mitchell to Hoover. Hoover disseminated 
the guidelines to his field offices on June 3rd. See the 
next two notes below.
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specified instances involving the security of the nation."
No attempt was made to differentiate between foreign and
domestic targets. Mitchell then outlined a clear delineation
between surveillance for "investigative" purposes, which, he
believed, did not require a court order, and surveillance for
the purposes of criminal prosecution, in which he advocated
requesting a warrant only in certain situations. Implicit in
the memo was the Administration's position that in "most
national security cases" in which no immediate prosecution
was perceived, the FBI need not seek a court order.
Mitchell's overall contempt for the discretionary powers
granted to judges in the Omnibus Act and the Alderman and
Giordano decision was also made clear in the memo:
Although in the court order procedure, the Act 
provides a means for safeguarding from public 
disclosure, prior to prosecution, the existence of 
an electronic eavesdropping device.... enforcement 
of these provisions is left to the discretion of 
the judge...Moreover, Section 2518(8) (d) provides 
that within 90 days the judge shall advise the 
subject of the court order and, in his discretion, 
make available part or all of the intercepted 
communications...In these circumstances, there can 
be little assurance that sensitive data, in a case 
not brought to prosecution, can be protected from 
public disclosure.
Mitchell then focused on the issue of how evidence
obtained via "national security" surveillance could be
introduced as evidence in court where such interception was
"reasonable":
The requirement that the interception be 
"reasonable" applies only where the Government 
seeks to introduce at trial evidence obtained 
through the interception. In those instances
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where authority to intercept for non-prosecutive 
purposes is requested, the "reasonableness” 
standard would not, it appears, have to be met 
[emphasis in original].167
On June 3, 1969 Hoover issued "SAC Letter 69-31" to the 
FBI's field offices, passing-on Mitchell's instructions. 
Although the Omnibus Act had been in effect for nearly a 
year, this letter contained the first set of Title III 
guidelines sent to the field. The six-page document outlined 
Mitchell's requirements almost to the letter, but added 
Hoover's advice that "extreme caution" be taken in 
disseminating electronic surveillance outside of the Bureau, 
if "evidence of possible criminal conduct" were discovered in 
the surveillances. Hoover conceded that the instructions 
presented "certain serious problems.... such as the manner of 
identifying information as coming from an electronic 
surveillance when disseminating information of a possible 
criminal conduct," but added that the Department of Justice's 
Criminal Division was preparing a "'Manual for Conduct of 
Electronic Surveillance,'" which would undoubtedly be of much 
use to the field offices.168
The overall message of Mitchell's memo and Hoover's 
instructions to the FBI field offices was that the Nixon 
Administration refused to recognize the Alderman and Giordano
I67Mitchell Memorandum to Hoover, May 6, 1969, Davis
Papers.
I68Hoover Memorandum to all Special Agents in Charge, 
"SAC Letter 69-31," June 3, 1969, Davis Papers.
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decisions; specifically, the Administration rejected the 
Court's suggestion that "national security" (warrantless) 
surveillances be narrowed to instances involving "foreign 
intelligence." Choosing to ignore the will of both the 
Judiciary and Congress, the Administration was simply not 
willing to part with the freedom to wiretap anyone it wished. 
For both Mitchell and Hoover, the primary concern was with 
preventing "leaks" of warrantless electronic surveillance in 
cases being considered for criminal prosecution.
The Mitchell Doctrine offered a way out of the dilemma, 
in several ways: (1) rather than narrowing the definition of 
"national security" as the Supreme Court suggested, the 
Administration boldly proposed an expansion, asserting that 
both foreign and domestic individuals and/or groups may fall 
under its rubric; (2) the doctrine declared that only the 
President and the Executive Branch were qualified to 
determine what constituted a "national security" threat, 
thereby sidestepping the considerable discretionary powers 
which both Congress, in Title III, and the Court, in Alderman 
and Giordano, imparted to judges; and (3) as if to answer 
Mitchell and Hoover's primary concern, the doctrine asserted 
that evidence obtained via warrantless "national security" 
surveillances could be used in court. A recipe for
unlimited, unsupervised wiretapping at the whim of the 
Executive Branch had been unveiled in Chicago, and until the 
federal courts could get around to addressing its
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constitutionality, the legal "grey area" within section 
2511(3) of the Omnibus Act and Justice Stewart's decisions in 
Katz and Giordano provided the Administration with adequate 
justification to secretly proceed as if the Mitchell Doctrine 
were constitutional.
There is no small irony in the fact that on November 26, 
1969, in the same courtroom that Mitchell issued 
wiretapping's Declaration of Independence, "Chicago Eight" 
defense attorney Leonard Weinglass sought expert testimony on 
the nation's "youth culture" from White Panther leader John 
A. Sinclair.169 Neither Sinclair nor Mitchell could have 
realized it at the time, but their paths would soon 
intersect. Thirteen months later, Mitchell would issue 
virtually the same affidavit in Judge Damon J. Keith's 
Detroit courtroom, at the CIA conspiracy trial of Sinclair 
and two other White Panther leaders, setting the stage for 
the landmark U.S. v. U.S. District Court case. How Sinclair 
and the White Panthers came to interest Mitchell and the 
Justice Department is the subject of the next chapter.
l69Clavir and Spitzer, The Conspiracy Trial. 239-40. At 
the time of Weinglass' request, Sinclair was in Marquette 
Prison in Michigan. Judge Hoffman denied the defense's 
request.
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Chapter Three 
Michigan's White Panther Party
I.
Our culture, our art, our music, newspapers, 
books, posters, our clothing, our homes, the way 
we walk and talk, the way our hair grows, the way
we smoke dope and f k and eat and sleep —  it is
all one message, and the message is FREEDOM!...Our
program of rock and roll, dope, and f king in the
streets is a program of total freedom for 
everyone...We breathe revolution. We are LSD- 
driven total maniacs in the universe. We will do 
anything we can to drive people out of their heads 
and into their bodies. Rock and roll music is the 
spearhead of our attack.. .With our music and our 
economic genius we plunder the unsuspecting 
straight world for money....and revolutionize its 
children at the same time...We don't have guns yet
—  not all of us anyway —  because we have more 
powerful weapons: direct access to millions of 
teenagers is one of our most potent, and their 
belief in us is another. But we will use guns if 
we have to —  we will do anything —  if we have 
to. We have no illusions.. .we have taken the 
White Panther as our mark to symbolize our 
strength and arrogance and to demonstrate our 
commitment to the program of the Black Panther 
Party as well as to our own —  indeed, the two 
programs are just part of the same whole thing. 
The actions of the Black Panthers in America have 
inspired us and given us strength.. .we're as crazy 
as they are, and as pure. We're bad.
—  John Sinclair, "White Panther State/meant," 
19681
The White Panther Party, located in Detroit and Ann 
Arbor, was one of the leading white counterculture
‘Sinclair, Guitar Armv. 103-05.
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"revolutionary” groups during the sixties.2 The evolution 
of the group from the "Artists Workshop" (1964-1967) through 
"Trans-Love Energies" (1967-1968) and finally to the White 
Panther Party (1968-1971) was influenced by a combination of 
local events in southeastern Michigan, as well as a number of 
national forces and events, which affected the entire 
spectrum of "the Movement." Beginning shortly after John 
Sinclair's arrival in Detroit in 1964, the group went through 
several very different incarnations: first, as the "Artist's 
Workshop" collective, a small tightly-knit and multi-racial 
group of beatnik poets, jazz musicians, and avant-garde 
artists, living in the vicinity of Detroit's Wayne State 
University (WSU); then, as "Trans-Love Energies," an attempt 
at coalition from Detroit's radical and counterculture
2The following factors made the White Panthers a 
"leading" radical organization: (1) John Sinclair's July,
1969 imprisonment on marijuana charges —  nine and a half to 
ten years for giving two "joints" to an undercover police 
officer —  became a cause celebre for the counterculture 
movement and New Left during the two and a half years that he 
was incarcerated; (2) the White Panther Party (WPP) also 
gained national notoriety in 1969 and 1970 for its militant 
rhetoric, spearheaded by Lawrence Robert "Pun" Plamondon, one 
of the first "mother country white radicals" to go 
underground during the sixties; (3) the WPP developed a 
national organization, with chapters located across the 
country and in England; (4) by mid-1970, as most other 
national radical organizations underwent fragmentation and 
bitter internal factionalism, the WPP's organizational 
structure remained intact, leading several groups such as the 
Youth International Party (YIP) and Tom Hayden's "Red Family 
Commune," to seek an alliance.
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groups3; and finally, as the White Panther Party, a 
politically-focused counterculture organization, described by 
"Minister of Defense" Pun Plamondon as "the hippie 
counterpart to the Black Panthers, and the armed counterpart 
to the Yippies"4 Local events, such as the hippie "Love-in" 
and the Detroit riots of 1967 —  as well as events of 
national significance, such as the widespread availability of 
LSD in 1966, and the overall movement from "resistance" to 
"revolution" in radical circles following the Chicago 
demonstrations —  combined to create the White Panthers.
Increasing police surveillance and harassment of the 
group influenced its development. And with each major 
organizational change came increasing militancy. The White 
Panthers' evolution occurred in Detroit, a city with: (1) an 
historical influx of a wide variety of races and 
nationalities, all competing for the "American Dream"; (2) a 
prevalence of progressive/pro-labor organizations, dedicated 
to wrestling power from Detroit's corporate elites; (3) 
"white flight," a rapidly-advancing demographic shift of 
middle and upper-class whites away from an increasingly poor
inspiration for the name "Trans-Love Energies" came 
from the rock and roll band Jefferson Airplane; specifically 
the song "Trans-Love Airways."
4Kathleen Stocking, "A Personal Remembrance: Ann Arbor's 
Famous Radicals, Then and Now," Monthly Detroit, vol. 5, 
(February, 1992), 80. The group underwent yet another shift 
in ideological focus in late 1971, renaming itself the 
"Rainbow People's Party" (RPP); the organization lasted until 
1973.
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inner-city; and (4) an ultra-conservative, white Police 
Department, which included a notorious Special Investigation 
Bureau (SIB), or "Red Squad." Originating in the 1930s, the 
Detroit Red Squad conducted widespread surveillance of non­
conformist groups in the city, and often operated in 
collusion with wealthy automobile industry executives, and 
other white corporate elites. By the Cold War era the Red 
Squad's mission became overwhelmingly political, its officers 
focusing on organized labor, civil rights, and 
Socialist/Communist groups. A pattern of overt intimidation 
to stifle dissent was established. With the dramatic 
increase in social disorder during the 1960s, the Red Squad, 
working closely with special units of the State Police, 
amassed thousands of files on individuals and groups.
The ultra-conservative ideology characterizing the state 
and local police forces in southeastern Michigan accurately 
reflected the larger white community, as well as the 
mainstream media.5 In this environment, the cultural revolt 
presented by the Artists Workshop/Trans-Love Energies was 
viewed with hostility. A wide array of surveillance tactics 
were employed, including undercover informants, physical 
surveillance ("tailing"), photography/video-taping, and
sIn the American Historical Review. 99, (April, 1994), 
450-52, Leo Ribuffo observes, "the 'sixties' was not a 
radical era, but a polarized era." As was the case with 
nearly every major American city during the decade, the 
radical fringe in southeastern Michigan comprised a very 
small minority.
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harassment —  J ai Sinclair, for example, was arrested for 
marijuana possession three times within a span of twenty- 
eight months. As the sixties progressed and the numbers of 
so-called ''hippies" expanded, the resulting escalation of 
police surveillance and intimidation contributed to the 
increasing level of militancy and radical rhetoric (e.g. 
"posturing") from groups such as Trans-Love Energies. At the 
same time, the increasing friction between the New Left, 
Black Power, and anti-war movements and the forces of the 
conservative establishment resulted in an atmosphere of 
increased polarization. Local Detroit underground
newspapers, such as the Fifth Estate and Trans-Love's Warren- 
Forrest Sun carried the news of each flash-point in the 
expanding national and international confrontation. In 
addition, as Sinclair and the "MC-5" toured America, they 
encountered other counterculture organizations and 
revolutionary incidents.
From the earliest days of the Artists Workshop, the 
group emphasized cultural rebellion from "straight" society, 
as opposed to political revolt. Unlike the New Left and 
anti-war movements, whose tactics included picketing, 
demonstrations, and "teach-ins," the Artists Workshop 
demonstrated its dissent in the isolated lifestyles of its 
members: the poetry they wrote, the music they performed and 
listened to, the underground psychedelic press they 
contributed to, the clothes they wore, and the drugs they
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consumed. In accordance with the speed of change during the 
sixties, ideology and tactics underwent sweeping changes in 
haste. After 1965, what was considered militant at any given 
time was quickly criticized as trivial and pointless. The 
Artists Workshop, a tightly-knit group of jazz aficionados 
and beatnik poets who isolated themselves from the larger 
society, was almost elitist in orientation, as had been the 
case with "beat" groups since the fifties; their small 
numbers and self-imposed exile from "straight" society 
contributed to feelings of superiority over those unaware of 
society's meaninglessness. Change came in 1966, when the 
group created Trans-Love Energies, an organization with an 
open recruiting policy, which actively sought new converts to 
the counterculture. One of the primary catalysts for this 
change was the introduction of LSD, which, by many accounts, 
turned large numbers of disaffected Detroit youth into 
"hippies" virtually overnight, and convinced individuals such 
as John Sinclair of the potential for a widespread 
counterculture/youth revoIt.
Additional changes during 1967 and 1968 resulted in the 
creation of a political wing of Trans-Love Energies: the 
White Panther Party. Prior to this time, the focus had been 
strictly cultural; in fact, part of their ethos contained a 
strong dislike for New Left and anti-war "politicos" who 
spoke of militant change but refused to live outside of the 
established culture. Several incidents explain the decision
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to embrace both cultural and political tactics. First, after 
repeated marijuana busts and expanding police harassment, the 
group saw a need to organize for self defense. The 
experience of living through the Riots of 1967, as well as 
the police crack-down that followed (which ultimately drove 
them from Detroit to Ann Arbor in the Spring of 1968), had an 
impact. Participation in the "Battle of Chicago," in 1968, 
convinced them of several things. Jerry Rubin and Abbie 
Hoffman of the Youth International Party lacked rudimentary 
organizational skills; Sinclair recognized the need for the 
counterculture to become better organized. The Chicago 
police's violent response to the demonstrators had the effect 
of "radicalizing" a previously pacifist counterculture; many 
counterculture "freeks" who had previously shed all 
allegiance to "politics" decided that in order to preserve 
their culture, they would defend themselves through political 
activism.
The origins of the White Panthers owed a great deal to 
the heroic status which white radicals accorded the Black 
Panther Party during the mid to late-sixties. The 
willingness of Huey Newton, Bobby Seale, and other Black 
Panthers to face down police, even engaging in gun battles, 
brought feelings of "white guilt" and envy throughout the New 
Left and counterculture. Both Sinclair and Plamondon were 
heavily influenced by the vanguard status of the Black 
Panthers. In 1968, when Eldridge Cleaver and Huey Newton
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advised white radicals that the best way to demonstrate 
support for the BPP was to create white support groups, 
Trans-Love responded by forming the White Panther Party. In 
doing so, they acted forcefully to answer one of the central 
questions facing the entire white movement after 1967: "What 
will whitey do?"
The White Panthers do not fit neatly into any precise 
historical definition of counterculture group.6 They shared 
much in common with the Youth International Party (YIP), 
particularly an overwhelmingly cultural focus.7 They also 
shared with the Yippies a preference for tongue-in-cheek 
"street theater," rather than anti-war speeches and other 
political activities, although they recognized the Vietnam 
War's influence on the overall polarization of society. The 
group was dedicated to "living the revolution," via a 
counterculture lifestyle. However, the White Panthers' 
organizational skills were antithetical to the ideas espoused 
by Yippie gurus Rubin and Hoffman, with whom the WPP enjoyed 
close relations. The organizational structure of the WPP, 
like the Black Panthers, featured a "Central Committee" of 
high-ranking Ministers, to provide overall leadership and
6Theodore Roszak claims "the counter 
culture....possesses all of the liabilities which a decent 
sense of intellectual caution would persuade one to avoid 
like the plague." See his The Making of a Counter Culture. 
(Garden City, NJ: Anchor Books, 1969), xi.
7In fact, a WPP-YIP merger was experimented with during
1970.
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planning, as well as Deputy Ministers, and Secretaries. 
Although they paid lip service to a "no leaders" concept, a 
central feature of the counterculture, the White Panthers 
relied upon leaders for direction and inspiration. The WPP 
leadership, which included John and Leni Sinclair, Pun and 
Genie Plamondon, "Skip" Taube, Gary Grimshaw, Ken Kelley, and 
David Sinclair, possessed skills not typically associated 
with counterculture groups, including several years of 
experience publishing newspapers and books and creating a 
wide variety of avant-garde art, managing several commune 
houses, and organizing large rock and roll concerts and 
tours. In addition, the group was adept at distributing 
information, not only through publishing, but also via the 
music of the MC-5. The WPP recruited young converts, first 
in high schools and colleges across Michigan, and later on a 
national scale. By mid-1970 there were several dozen WPP 
chapters, scattered in cities and college towns across 
America, with varying degrees of loyalty to the National 
Headquarters in Ann Arbor.
The issue of perception versus reality was central to 
the White Panther Party's evolution. Borrowing from both the 
Black Panthers and Yippies, Sinclair and Plamondon 
constructed a myth: namely, that the group was a leading 
national radical organization, ready to take on the State to 
prevent it from destroying their way of life. They sought to 
provide harassed hippies across the country with the means to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
181
defend themselves against the "pig onslaught." This posture 
found realization in the group's rhetoric, as well as local 
and national events which, they believed, would transform it 
into reality. In doing so, they responded to the teachings 
of Black Panther Huey Newton: "Power is the ability to define 
phenomena and make them act in a desired manner."8 The 
national prominence of the MC-5, the expansion of the WPP 
across the country, and the increasing interest of the FBI in 
stifling the group's activities reveals that this small 
number of "politicized freeks" did partially succeed in 
making posturing accord with reality.
Sinclair and Plamondon utilized overblown and 
exaggerated rhetoric, seeking radical acceptance from "white 
movement heavies" and Black Panthers. The WPP issued press 
releases and held press conferences, attempting to spread its 
gospel to as many potential recruits as possible —  serving 
notice that if attacked, it would respond in kind. Pun 
Plamondon, in particular, cultivated the image of a white 
revolutionary who was not afraid of moving the struggle to 
the next level —  violence against the police and/or other 
symbols of the establishment. The degree to which Plamondon 
and the White Panthers actually contemplated or carried out 
acts of violent revolution, as opposed to merely expressing
8Quoted by WPP leader Genie Plamondon in the Ann Arbor 
Argus, August 5, 1970, 2. From the Underground Newspaper 
Archives, Labadie Collection, Hatcher Library, University of 
Michigan, Ann Arbor. [Hereafter Labadie MSS, UM.]
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a desire to see them happen, is difficult to determine. Few 
Ann Arbor White Panthers went beyond occasional target 
practice sessions with hunting rifles, and posing with 
weapons for photographs. The only violent act for which any 
of the WPP leadership was ever convicted was an assault 
charge, levelled against John Sinclair, for allegedly 
attacking an Oakland [Michigan] County police officer at an 
MC-5 concert in 1968.9 However, the image the WPP sought to 
portray, from the organization's inception in 1968 through 
mid-1970, was that of a "vanguard" revolutionary group, 
dedicated to striking back at the "pigs."
The rhetoric and posturing which brought the White 
Panthers the attention of the radical left also led to 
increased police surveillance. A lack of proper training, as 
well as an ultra-conservative, "praetorian" ideology, meant 
that local police forces in southeastern Michigan were unable 
(or unwilling) to differentiate between radical posturing and 
actual revolutionary actions. For many Detroit and Michigan 
State police, the White Panthers' rhetoric justified not only 
increased surveillance, but also COINTELPRO-like initiatives 
designed to harass and intimidate. WPP rhetoric also brought 
the group to the attention of Detroit's FBI Field Office by 
the end of 1968. Within a year, John Sinclair was in prison
9The facts concerning the incident raise doubts 
concerning the legitimacy of the charges. Sinclair claims 
that the charge was falsely brought in an attempt to damage 
the band's growing popularity. Fifth Estate. August 1-14, 
1968, 2.
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for ten years. Plamondon, Detroit WPP member Jack Forrest, 
and Sinclair also faced federal indictments for allegedly 
plotting to blow up a clandestine CIA recruiting office in 
Ann Arbor.10 At least one FBI COINTELPRO action, intended 
to promote dissention with other white radical groups in Ann 
Arbor, was also directed against the group during the fall of 
1969. Simultaneously, several other WPP leaders were 
arrested on drug and other offenses, as Federal, State, and 
local authorities cooperated closely to harass the group.
Following the CIA indictments, the White Panthers began 
to take themselves more seriously. Pun Plamondon went 
underground, occasionally sending messages to the Movement, 
urging that the struggle against oppression advance to a more 
violent level. These writings, combined with the nationally- 
organized "Free John Sinclair" movement, gave the White 
Panthers international notoriety. Police and FBI
surveillance and repression —  brought about, in part, by 
Sinclair and Plamondon's outrageous rhetoric and posturing —  
served to reinforce the White Panther myth, seemingly basing 
it in reality. For the White Panthers, every day brought 
increasing evidence that an all-out war with the U.S. 
Government was approaching. Local events, such as the 
repeated arrests and police harassment, were reinforced by 
reports of police violence and pending revolution in other
10The available evidence suggests that the charges in 
both cases were politically motivated.
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areas of the country, which filled the pages of the 
underground press. Popular music also carried the message of 
pending apocalypse. The White Panthers refused to recognize 
that the situation in most areas of the country was decidedly 
non-revolutionary. By the same token, the police and FBI who 
witnessed first-hand the escalation of social disorder on a 
daily basis, became increasingly convinced that the threat of 
armed revolt presented by the "long-hairs" was indeed real. 
The "perception-reality gap" widened, as both sides concluded 
that violence was necessary for survival.
By late 1969, Hoover's FBI had targeted the White 
Panthers for intensive surveillance and COINTELPRO actions. 
However, declassified FBI files make clear that the White 
Panthers were not a top priority for the Bureau until mid- 
1970, when a series of events brought the WPP face-to-face 
with the Mitchell Justice Department over the issue of 
national security wiretapping.
II.
The American Midwest and the FBI have 
traditionally enjoyed a special relationship in 
which each has tacitly exempted the other from 
prevalent suspicions...the FBI implicitly 
recognized that the ideological threats to the 
nation —  Nazi sympathizers of the thirties, 
Communist subversion in the forties and fifties, 
radical war protesters of the sixties —  never 
took root in the rich soil of America's heartland. 
There were stubborn ingrown and imported heresies 
in the East and wild ideological lurches in the 
West, but the geographic center, for the most
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part, held. —  Neil Welch, FBI Special Agent in 
Charge, Detroit Office11
The history and evolution of the White Panthers is, in 
many respects, synonymous with the life of John Alexander 
Sinclair, one of America's lesser-known radical leaders 
during the sixties.12 He was born on October 2, 1941, in 
the small Midwestern town of Flint, Michigan, the birthplace 
of General Motors. His father was a career employee at the 
local Buick plant, starting on the assembly line in 1928 and 
eventually advancing to a mid-level management position; 
Elise, his mother, was a homemaker. John, brother David, and 
sister Kathy enjoyed a comfortable middle-class upbringing in 
Davison, a small town located a few miles from Flint. The
"Neil J. Welch and David W. Marston, Inside Hoover's 
FBI: The Top Field Chief Reports. (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday 
and Company, 1984), 35. Welch was SAC in the Detroit Field 
Office from 1970 through 1976.
12The information concerning John Sinclair's early life 
and the origins of the Artists Workshop comes primarily from 
the following sources: Sinclair, Guitar Armv. 7-9; Bret
Eynon, "John Sinclair: Hipster," unpublished biography,
November, 21, 1977, Hunter College, NY, American Social
History Project, 9-18, located at the Michigan Historical 
Collections, Bentley Historical Library, University of 
Michigan, "Contemporary History Project Papers: John
Sinclair," box 1, topical file: John Sinclair [hereafter 
cited as "ASHP-Sinclair Biography"]; and John Sinclair 
Interview with Bret Eynon, 1977, Hunter College, NY, American 
Social History Project, 1-7, located at the Michigan 
Historical Collections, Bentley Historical Library, 
University of Michigan, "Contemporary History Project Papers: 
Interviews," box 239-J [hereafter cited as "ASHP-Sinclair 
Interview"]. Bret Eynon's work with the American Social 
History Project in Ann Arbor during the late seventies 
resulted in extremely thorough oral history documentation of 
the White Panthers. I am grateful to him for allowing access 
to these documents.
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closest thing to radicalism that John experienced growing up
was drinking beer on Friday nights, listening to rock and
roll on a "black" Detroit radio station, and occasionally 
"crashing" all-black rock and roll shows in Flint with his
friends. He graduated from Davison High with good grades,
and attended Albion College, a small Methodist institution in 
southern Michigan. It was at Albion that he first came into 
contact with the beatnik culture that would define his later 
life:
I was a D.J. My theme song was 'School Days,' by
Chuck Berry. And this guy —  he became a very
close friend —  accosted me with some records, and 
sat me down to listen to them, and he took me to 
his room and made me sit down and listen to Miles 
Davis —  sitting around, listening to [John]
Coltrane, that was in '59. And he was also into
Allen Ginsberg, the City Lights books, [Lawrence] 
Ferlinghetti, Gregory Corso, the whole beatnik 
thing. He was the campus beatnik, he rode a bike. 
He was the only one...He brought colored girls to 
the homecoming dance.13
Motivated by his beatnik friend, John began writing poetry
and consuming "speed" (dexadrine and methadrine) , so that he
could stay up all night immersing himself in decades of
American jazz. He became so enthusiastic about John
Coltrane's music that he earned the nickname "Coltrane."
After two years at Albion College, Sinclair dropped out and
moved back to Flint, where he explored black culture in the
jazz clubs located on the town's North Side ghetto. While
working at various record stores in Flint, he completed a
13ASHP-Sinclair Interview, 3.
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bachelor's degree at the local branch of the University of 
Michigan, in the spring of 1964. It was during this period 
that he discovered marijuana, which had been part of the 
black urban jazz scene in America since the twenties.
When Sinclair moved to Detroit in 1964, it was his drug 
connections in Flint, as well as his beatnik sensibilities, 
that led to rapid acceptance in the city's small and 
exclusive "hipster" community, located near Wayne State 
University (WSU).,4 Here, at beatnik hangouts like the "Red 
Door Gallery," John first came into contact with jazz 
musician Charles Moore, poets George Tysh and Allen Van 
Newkirk, and other hipsters. Their mutual obsessions were 
avant-garde jazz, marijuana, and beatnik poetry. Befriending 
Charles Moore, John moved into an apartment with him in 
September, 1964, in "The Castle," a so-called "medieval" 
structure near WSU, the center for Detroit's expanding 
beatnik community. Here, in 1965, he met his future wife: 
Magdalene "Leni" Arndt.
Born March 8, 1940, in Koenigsberg, East Prussia [today 
part of the former Soviet Union], Leni was the third of six 
children of a father who spent World War II as an engineer on 
the Western Front.15 Following the war, her family lived as
,4Sinclair enrolled in graduate school at Wayne State 
University, but failed to complete a masters degree in 
English.
15The information concerning Leni's upbringing and early 
years with the Artists Workshop is from a personal interview, 
on July 21 and 23, 1992, in Detroit, Michigan.
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refugees, eventually settling in a small village in what 
became East Germany. Her parents worked a local farm 
collective, on the land of a wealthy farmer who had fled to 
the West in 1949. Leni recalls being a good student, as well 
as a "Young Pioneer," East Germany's equivalent of the Girl 
Scouts. In 1951, she was selected as the representative from 
her village to attend the World Youth Festival in Berlin, an 
experience which changed her life. Here she came into 
contact with young people from around the world, and 
developed both a love for different cultures and an obsession 
about geography. At age fourteen she was accepted into a 
teacher training program, from which she graduated in four 
years. She quickly left for West Germany, motivated by 
resentment of the stifling creative environment in the 
East.16 She stayed only long enough to acquire some 
English. After a relative in Detroit offered to sponsor her, 
she crossed the Atlantic in 1959, on the United States. She 
found employment as a live-in maid and housekeeper in the 
affluent, mostly white Detroit suburbs of West Bloomfield and 
Grosse Point, as did many young German girls in the late 
1950s.
iaA primary reason for her decision to leave was the East 
German Government's decree that the young teachers refrain 
from membership in any religious faith. Although she was not 
a practicing member of any church, the decree angered her. 
She and a fellow teacher-trainee refused to sign statements 
regarding the decree. Leni Sinclair personal interview, July 
21, 1992, Detroit, Michigan.
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Leni's entrance into Detroit's beatnik community began 
with her riding the bus into the city on days off. One of 
her favorite haunts was the Detroit Art Institute; she 
recalls meeting a hipster there, who, recognizing the copy of 
Allen Ginsberg's "Howl" clutched in her hand, invited her to 
visit the beatnik community near WSU.17 She was intrigued 
by the campus environment, as well as the easy accessibility 
to a university education that the United States offered. By 
1961, she had saved enough money and learned enough English 
to enroll as an undergraduate, first as a journalism major, 
later switching to geography. She befriended a number of 
beatniks and artists, including Nancy and James Worley, who 
later formed the rock band "Big Brother and the Holding 
Company," best known for its lead vocalist, Janice Joplin. 
In time, she became a member of the inner circle of the 
Detroit's beatnik community, a group which numbered somewhere 
between fifty and 250 individuals, most of whom were 
white.18
In direct contrast with John Sinclair and a majority of 
the Artists Workshop circle, Leni spent several years in the 
New Left, as a member of the early Students for a Democratic
17Recalling her attachment to Ginsberg's tract, she 
stated "I read that like a Bible....so many times." Leni 
Sinclair personal interview, July 21, 1992, Detroit,
Michigan.
18John estimates 200-250; Leni 50-100. See Leni Sinclair 
personal interview, July 21, 1992, Detroit, Michigan and
ASHP-Sinclair Interview, 5.
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Society (SDS). In 1962, she attended the SDS's National 
Convention with future Fifth Estate editor Peter Werbe; at 
the time, the two were the organization's only Detroit 
representatives.19 At the National Student Conference in 
Bloomington, Indiana in 1963, she met Tom Hayden, Stokely 
Carmichael, A1 Haber, and other student leaders. She was 
particularly impressed with Hayden's fundraising speeches and 
Carmichael's radical rhetoric. Attending the civil rights 
"March on Washington" later that summer, she associated with 
a fringe group of ultra-militants who protested the 
censorship of SNCC Chairman John Lewis' speech.20 Her brief 
involvement in the New Left ended soon thereafter, when she 
discovered she was pregnant. With legalized abortion 
unavailable, she travelled to New York City, where a Park 
Avenue doctor performed the operation —  without anesthesia - 
- for $500. The incident left her physically and emotionally 
scarred.21 Needing a change, she embarked on an extended 
trip to Europe, living with a poet friend on Majorca Island 
in the winter of 1963-1964.
19The Fifth Estate was Detroit's first regularly- 
published alternative "underground" newspaper. Under Peter 
Werbe's continuing editorship, the paper is still in 
publication, as a monthly.
20A detailed discussion of censorship incident is located 
in David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther Kina. 
Jr. . and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1986), 281-86.
21 "The worst thing that would ever happen to me," she
recalls; Leni Sinclair personal interview, July 21, 1992, 
Detroit, Michigan.
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Returning to Detroit and WSU the following Spring, she 
met John Sinclair through mutual friend Charles Moore.22 
John would regularly visit Charles to borrow his record 
player, so that he could review albums for Jazz and Downbeat 
magazines. His attraction to Leni was immediate; initially, 
she was more interested in having John escort her to the 
various jazz clubs in Detroit. Yet there was more: "He was 
already the kingpin of the whole crowd....as soon as he 
arrived on campus," Leni recalls.23 Sinclair's eagerness to 
grant favors for friends and associates resulted in his first 
marijuana arrest on October 7, 1964. He and friends Charles 
Moore and Danny Spencer were "set up" in a Detroit Police 
sting operation by a black associate from Flint, who had been 
arrested for marijuana possession a few days earlier, and 
faced prison unless he cooperated.24 Sinclair was fined 
$250 and given two years probation; the hipsters at WSU took 
up a collection for him. The City's "Red Squad" opened files 
on him and his associates, and began to take special interest 
in the beatnik community.25
“Leni became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1964, prior 
to meeting John.
“Leni Sinclair personal interview, July 23, 1992,
Detroit, Michigan.
24Leni recalls the racial dynamics of law enforcement in 
Detroit at the time. Discussing the black informer's 
decision to cooperate with the police, she asserts "John, he 
knew, would not go to jail. No white boys ever went to jail 
[for first-time marijuana offenses]." See Ibid.
25John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files.
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During the fall of 1964, the group with which John and 
Leni associated began discussing the possibility of starting 
an organization of area poets, musicians, and other artists, 
with the overall purpose of providing a meeting place outside 
of the WSU campus. A manifesto ("document of self- 
determination") was drawn up, asserting the virtues of not 
succumbing to the dominant "square" culture. From these 
humble beginnings, the Detroit Artists Workshop was created. 
The group established the Workshop on the ground floor of a 
two-story house on the corner of John Lodge and Warren 
Avenue. The rent was paid by the upstairs apartments, 
occupied by several poets. Every Sunday, the Workshop held 
an open house, with poetry readings, jazz performances, 
exhibitions of photographs and original art, and screenings 
of avant-garde films. John and Charles Moore performed 
together in an experimental jazz band, known as the "DC-4" 
(sometimes "DC-5"), and Leni began experimenting with 
photography and film-making.26
Over the next several years, the Artists Workshop 
flourished. After attending the Berkeley Poetry Conference 
in 1964 with cohorts Charles Moore and Robin Eichele, 
Sinclair realized that the Artists Workshop was as "hip" as 
many of the other beatnik "scenes" in the country. The 
Midwest may have lacked the "stubborn ingrown and imported
26Her enormous collection of photographs documents the 
evolution of Detroit's beatnik and counterculture community 
during the sixties.
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heresies in the East and wild ideological lurches in the 
West," but it did "swing." The Artists Workshop Press, 
started in 1964 when several members "borrowed" a mimeograph 
machine from nearby Monteith College, developed into an 
alternative publishing house, eventually producing first 
books by John Sinclair, George Tysh, Bill Hutton, J.D. 
Whitney, Ron Caplan, and John Kay.27 Members of the Artists 
Workshop collective also published some of the first 
underground newspapers in the Midwest, including Guerilla, a 
journal whose masthead read "A newspaper of cultural 
revolution.1,28 Other Artists Workshop projects included the 
alternative "Free University of Detroit," offering night 
classes in a variety of unusual subjects, and a WSU outreach 
project, "The Friends of the Artists Workshop," which 
coordinated the rental of campus facilities for concerts and 
poetry readings. In addition, Sinclair and the other 
Workshop leaders began managing several area houses, such as 
the "Castle." Through all of this diverse labor, the core 
group developed a number of organizational and managerial 
skills that would characterize their later activities.
The Artists Workshop of 1964-1965 was decidedly pre­
hippie. The stereotypical long-haired freak with wild bell-
^Nationally-known author and National Public Radio 
commentator Andre Codrescu, now a professor at Louisiana 
State University in Baton Rouge, frequented the Artists 
Workshop as a student at WSU in the mid-sixties.
28ASHP-Sinclair Interview, 5.
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bottom blue jeans had not yet invaded the nation's interior.
Most importantly, the ideology of the hipsters during this
early stage reflected an isolation from and utter contempt
for the outside society. As John recalls:
Jazz, its all we did. We used to sit around and 
smoke dope. There wasn't anything else to do. 
You didn't want to go out too much, because, you 
know, people were a drag. They might see you. 
(Laughs) You weren't a pleasant sight to them. 
There weren't too many places you wanted to 
go...Besides, this was what was happening.29
In their belief that they were on the cutting edge of an
ultra-hip cultural phenomenon, Sinclair and the other Detroit
hipsters exhibited elitist tendencies as well. John recalls
passing out flyers to WSU students "that looked hip." He
adds: "We didn't want finger poppers or dilettantes or
suburbanites or any kind of squares to be there."30 While
the Artists Workshop was not necessarily off limits to
"squares," the hipsters did not go out of their way to
recruit them. The idea of turning on the masses of American
youth to a cultural revolt —  the White Panther credo —  was
not yet part of their ideology.
Events of 1966 brought considerable change to the 
Artists Workshop. On February 22, Sinclair was convicted a 
second time for marijuana possession, and sentenced to six 
months in the Detroit House of Corrections (commonly known as
29Ibid., 6.
30Ibid. . 7.
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"DEHOCO") , as well as three years of probation.31 The
Detroit scene underwent a radical transformation. First, a
number of core members of the original Artists Workshop moved
away from the city. The national media coverage of San
Francisco's burgeoning hippie community was a powerful
attraction for many beatniks. Inside DEHOCO, John advised
against abandoning Detroit:
You have it in your power now to create a vital 
living situation here in Detroit —  if you have 
the will and commitment to such a situation. If 
you don't care if Detroit ever gets to be such a 
place, it won't. It will stay just as it is now - 
- a burgeoning police state with isolated groups 
of people fighting each other but never working 
together... we are all going to have to start 
working with each other and take advantage of what 
our local possibilities [are].32
After his release from DEHOCO on August 6th, Sinclair 
renewed his commitment to creating a "new society" in 
Detroit. Having lost a number of original Artists Workshop 
members, he looked to the younger counterculture "hippie" 
types who were making their first appearance in the area. A 
social and ideological transformation was underway in 
Detroit, uniting the corps of alienated young people who 
searched out the well-known Artists Workshop, as well as the 
Workshop's remaining leadership. In addition, other forces 
were at work: (1) the arrival of the high-energy "British
Invasion" music from such groups as the Beatles, Rolling
31Sinclair's second arrest occurred on August 16, 1965.
32ASHP-Sinclair Biography, 18-19.
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Stones, and Kinks; (2) America's increasing involvement in 
the Vietnam conflict; and (3) the expansion of college 
campuses, reflecting the coming of age of the "Baby Boomers."
An additional catalyst for change in 1966 was the 
arrival of LSD-25, usually distributed in sugar cubes. While 
the drug's specific effects differed from person to person, 
many experienced an increased awareness of the world around 
them, a feeling which they often found difficult to describe 
in words. For the beatniks and hipsters, LSD ended pessimism 
concerning the possibility that American society would ever 
break out of its state of cultural stagnation. As Sinclair 
explained:
When beatniks started taking acid, it brought us 
out of the basement —  the dark place, the 
underworld, the fringes of society —  and just 
blew us apart. From being cynical and wanting to 
isolate yourself forever from the squares —  not 
ever have anything to do with them and just hope 
that they'd leave you alone —  one was suddenly 
filled with a messianic feeling of love and 
brotherhood... LSD made you realize that you had 
ties with the rest of humanity... It gave you 
connections.33
Beatnik elitism disappeared. For alienated white kids 
growing up in the suburbs, LSD provided near-instantaneous 
admission to Detroit's "forbidden" inner-city hipster 
community. Wayne State University was transformed from a 
"square" to a "hippie" environment, and many inquisitive 
young people found something new and different at Sinclair's 
Artists Workshop.
33Ibid., 19-20.
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With so many new arrivals to the WSU scene, the number 
and variety of youth and/or student-directed organizations in 
the Warren-Forest area near the Artists Workshop expanded 
rapidly. One such organization, led by Sinclair, was LEMAR, 
the Organization to Legalize Marijuana. Sinclair had been 
one of the first white "Movement" leaders in the U.S. to 
receive a jail sentence for marijuana, and thus had become 
something of an advocate for marijuana reform. Also active 
was the Detroit Committee to End the War in Vietnam (DCEWVN), 
which developed close relations with the Artists Workshop. 
Underground publications such as the Fifth Estate. Warren- 
Forest Sun, and CREEM became profit-making enterprises, with 
paid advertisements from national record companies and local 
vendors of counterculture wares. The Plum Street Book Store 
sold posters, candles, and drug paraphernalia, in addition to 
a wide selection of alternative media. The hippies near WSU 
were creating a culture, as well as an economy, outside of 
mainstream American society.
By the spring of 1967, Detroit's youth community 
featured a wide diversity of hippies, anti-war/New 
Left/student activist types, and hundreds of curious 
onlookers. Sinclair recognized the potential of linking 
these diverse entities. While the national media focused 
upon San Francisco's "flower children" and the "summer of 
Love," he remained dedicated to creating an alternative 
society in Detroit, as well as to preventing the further loss
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of the city's talented young people to Haight Ashbury or New 
York's Greenwich Village.
The creation of Trans-Love Energies during the spring of 
1967 represented an attempt to unify Detroit's student and 
hip community groups into an umbrella organization, or 
"tribal council." Sinclair and Detroit Artist Gary Grimshaw, 
who founded the group, attempted to get representatives from 
all of the area's hip organizations to meet on a regular 
basis, for the purpose of discussing how better to utilize 
their talents and services for the benefit of the hundreds of 
young people converging on the Detroit/WSU area. Some of the 
support services the members provided for the "freak" 
community included free housing, job information services, 
concerts, transportation in and around Detroit, and a 
cooperative booking agency for performers and organizations. 
Because the interests of the organizations, as well as the 
personalities of the leaders were so diverse, Trans-Love 
never became the united model of inter-organizational 
cooperation that Sinclair and Grimshaw desired. However, as 
a corporate, cooperative entity, Trans-Love Energies, 
Unlimited became enormously successful, organizing cultural 
events and continuing the Artists Workshop Press. Through 
their free booking service for nationally-known rock bands 
and poets, Trans-Love brought Allen Ginsberg, the Grateful 
Dead, and the "Fugs" to Detroit, boosting Trans-Love's 
reputation outside the area.
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The period between his release from DEHOCO in August of 
1966 to the Detroit Riots a year later, was one of great 
optimism for Sinclair, despite a third arrest for marijuana 
possession.34 He exhibited endless energy and enthusiasm, 
immersing himself in project after project. He began writing 
a regular column for the Fifth Estate, and also contributed 
to the sporadic issues of the "official" Trans-Love 
newspaper, the Warren-Forest Sun. In addition, he formed a 
close relationship with Rob Tyner, Fred Smith, Wayne Kramer, 
and Michael Davis, members of a local rock and roll band 
called the "MC-5" [Motor City Five]. Under Sinclair's 
management, the band's trademark hard-driving sound made it 
popular locally by the end of 1967.35 MC-5 concerts became 
a regular fixture of Detroit's hip scene after the opening of 
Russ Gibb's "Grande Ballroom," a large rock club modelled 
after the Fillmore West in San Francisco. It was also during 
this period that John and Leni, who had lived together since 
1965, decided to get married. Soon after his release from 
prison in August of 1966, John's probation officer informed
^Sinclair, along with dozens of WSU students and Artists 
Workshop members, was arrested in a huge police raid on 
January 24, 1967. Sinclair was charged with distribution and 
possession of marijuana, after allegedly giving two marijuana 
"joints" to an undercover policewoman the previous month. By 
contesting the legality and severity of Michigan's marijuana 
laws, Sinclair's lawyers Justin "Chuck" Ravitz and Sheldon 
Otis delayed the case for two and a half years.
35An additional local Trans-Love band was the "Stooges," 
featuring the outrageous antics of lead vocalist Iggy Pop. 
Both Iggy and the Stooges are still performing today.
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him that there was some discussion at Detroit Police 
Headquarters about setting John up for another bust, based on 
the state's cohabitation law. Therefore, the couple got 
married in a tongue-in-cheek ceremony behind the "Castle" 
where they lived —  for what Leni describes as "political 
reasons." At the time, Leni was pregnant with Sunny, their 
first child.
The peak of this optimistic period for Sinclair and 
Trans-Love Energies came on June 30, 1967, when they staged 
a "Love-in" at the large metropolitan park on Belle Isle, on 
the Detroit River.36 Trans-Love promoted the event as a 
gathering of "peace and love," where hippies and "straights" 
could come together to celebrate a new vision of society. 
The Detroit News and Detroit Free Press gave the event 
significant coverage, providing tens of thousands of local 
readers with their first exposure to Sinclair and Trans-Love; 
the conservative News proclaimed him Detroit's "King of the 
Hippies." On the day of the event, several thousand hipsters 
were in attendance, smoking marijuana, dropping LSD, singing, 
chanting, and enjoying themselves with minimal disturbances. 
In addition, some 6000 spectators showed up, thanks to such 
good press coverage. Although the police were out in 
significant numbers, they kept a low profile until dusk, when 
the arrest of a motorcyclist encouraged taunting and rock- 
throwing. The result was a full-scale riot, with numerous
36This park was the scene of the 1943 race riots.
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arrests, ostensibly for "damaging police vehicles." 
Approximately fifty people, including three policemen, 
required medical attention. The resulting press coverage was 
almost unanimously on the side of the police, portraying 
Sinclair and Trans-Love as mindless hedonists, more 
interested in picking a fight with police than with "peace 
and love."
The Belle Isle experience had a profound impact upon the 
later development of Trans-Love Energies. The hippie 
philosophy of getting high and waiting for the capitalist 
machine to rust away proved far too simplistic. The degree 
to which the conservative establishment in Detroit opposed 
their ideology and lifestyle was made apparent, and police 
surveillance and harassment of the group increased. The 
bloody Detroit riots of July 24-31, the worst in America's 
history, proved that the days of "peace and love" were over. 
Trans-Love responded to the social disorder in several ways. 
First, they posted a Black Panther banner on the roof of one 
of their buildings that read "Burn Baby Burn." In addition, 
they provided assistance with storage and distribution of 
food that had been "liberated" from city stores. Sinclair 
gave serious consideration to printing fliers, urging rioters 
to storm the Wayne County Jail to free the prisoners 
("Bastille Day in Detroit," he declared), but backed down at 
the last minute. The National Guard responded by raiding the
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Trans-Love houses, claiming they had received reports that
the hippies were harboring "snipers.'*37
The twin blows of the failed "Love-in" and the riots
marked a significant turning point in the ideological
development of Sinclair and the Trans-Love clan. Previously,
they had written off political organizing as useless —  part
of the "straight" world's tactics. Their attack on society
had been strictly cultural. Seeing the U.S. Army and
Michigan National Guard battling blacks in the streets of the
city had a profound impact, as Sinclair recalls:
We had thought there was going to be a cultural 
revolution. We hadn't thought that there was any
reasonable chance of a political revolution. All
of a sudden, after the riots....you started to 
feel like there had to be one, cause this sh_t had 
to stop.38
This recognition of the political characteristics of the 
emerging struggle led to a modification in Trans-Love's 
tactics. Most importantly, Sinclair dedicated himself to a 
propaganda campaign on several fronts. Trans-Love
representatives began distributing printed information at MC- 
5 concerts, warning of police surveillance and hassles. In 
addition, Sinclair and others began making personal 
appearances at local high schools and colleges, urging youth 
to join in a "total assault against the culture." A third 
initiative involved assisting high school students and others
37ASHP-Sinclair Biography, 39-40.
38ASHP-Sinclair Interview, 32.
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with publishing alternative newspapers. Through these 
activities, Trans-Love Energies hoped to boost the number of 
young people willing to join the struggle. The basic 
philosophy underlying the missionary activity was that youth 
everywhere were showing signs of unhappiness with the current 
state of society, but lacked a creative outlet for working 
out their frustrations. By making themselves known, Trans- 
Love members believed they were liberating the "straight" 
youth from the stifling suburban environments in which they 
lived, opening their minds in the process.
As Trans-Love underwent expansion, its core leadership 
changed. John's brother David signed on, having passed up a 
full football scholarship at Dartmouth; his organizational 
skills would prove essential to the White Panthers, 
particularly after John went to prison. Two additional 1967 
arrivals who would later assume leadership positions in the 
White Panthers were Pun and Genie Plamondon. Lawrence Robert 
"Pun" Plamondon was born in Traverse City, Michigan, the 
illegitimate son of a "half-breed Ottawa [Indian] and a long­
distance operator." He was adopted at eighteen months by 
upper middle-class foster parents, who were well respected in 
Traverse City. Despite his comfortable upbringing and 
excellent academic potential, he exhibited a rebellious 
streak from an early age. At sixteen he ran away from home, 
hitchhiking across the country, and eventually working with 
migrant farm workers in California. He came to Detroit in
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1967, was introduced to the Artists Workshop, befriended 
Sinclair, and joined the group just in time to take his first 
LSD trip at the "Love-In." With Trans-Love he found an 
appropriate outlet for his enormous energy and increasing 
social consciousness. He and Sinclair soon became close 
friends, eventually comprising the top two positions in the 
White Panther organization. Yet his radicalism would remain 
one step ahead of Sinclair's throughout the period.39
Genie Parker, the daughter of a Army Colonel with 
Vietnam combat experience, arrived at the Trans-Love house 
shortly after the "Love-in." She was an "army brat," raised 
in Texas, Georgia, and New Jersey. Her attraction to the 
Sinclairs was immediate, and she moved in with the group her 
first day in Detroit. Within a few months, she and Pun 
became inseparable, and the two of them went on to become a 
well known radical couple of the sixties.40
As the Trans-Love clan made its transition from a 
strictly cultural orientation to an increasingly political 
one, the New Left, anti-war, Black Power, and counterculture 
movements across the country influenced its ideological 
development. The overall pattern of increased resistance to
39Stocking, "A Personal Remembrance," 78.
40Genie Parker Interview with Bret Eynon, 1977, Hunter 
College, NY, American Social History Project, 1-5, located at 
the Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical 
Library, University of Michigan, "Contemporary History 
Project Papers: Interviews," box 239-J [hereafter cited as 
"ASHP-Genie Plamondon Interview"].
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the establishment on all levels of the Movement, reflected in 
the Black Panther shoot-outs with police, the campus revolts, 
and a growing anti-war movement, provided Sinclair and the 
Trans-Love people with a larger context in which to view 
Detroit. Sinclair had been aware of the ideas of Malcolm X 
since before his arrival in Detroit, and endorsed the self- 
defense message communicated by Black Panther founders Huey 
Newton and Bobby Seale. Trans-Love members also loved the 
pre-Yippie theatrics of Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman; the 
Yippies' attempt to levitate the Pentagon during "Stop the 
Draft Week" in October of 1967 received front-page coverage 
in the Fifth Estate. As far as the national anti-war 
movement went, Trans-Love had a cooperative relationship with 
the Detroit Committee to End the War in Vietnam (DCEWVN).
Of all the major "Movement" groups undergoing rapid
expansion during the mid-sixties, the New Left had the least
in common with Trans-Love Energies. As Sinclair states:
Our thing wasn't really a protest thing, which was 
the main thrust of the political movement 
nationwide...We weren't interested in taking over 
administration buildings. We were interested in 
blowing people's minds, basically. Making them 
confront the idea that there was a crazy 
alternative to the straight way of life...We were 
coming from the point of view that said 'It 
doesn't do any good to protest against these 
people. They're the ones that made it like 
this'... So the idea was to expose how crazy and 
irrational and repressive they were, and call for 
people who could make it something different.41
41ASHP-Sinclair Interview, 22-23.
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While short-haired student leaders in organizations like SDS 
delivered speeches concerning the ills of society, and 
afterwards returned to their middle-class apartments or dorm 
rooms, the members of Trans-Love Energies believed that they 
were living the struggle, not just talking about it. They 
viewed their everyday counterculture existence as a symbolic 
refusal to conform to societal norms.
III.
None of the law meant anything at all to John 
Sinclair. It became a question of whether he was 
to have impunity over the law or not. He not only 
didn't pay attention to the law himself, but he 
constantly cited himself as an example of how to 
break the law. He would say: 'Look, I don't go to 
jail and I smoke marijuana.' It had finally gone 
on long enough. He begged to be made a martyr of 
and finally we made one of him. —  Wayne County 
Recorders Court Judge Robert J. Colombo.42
Certainly entrapment would not have been unusual 
behavior at that time on the part of the [Detroit] 
authorities. It would have been consistent with 
their general approach to 'long-haired radicals.' 
The authorities believed that both they and the 
entire country were under attack by people 
determined to destroy 'the American Way.' They 
saw those people as so dangerous as to be not 
entitled to the protection of the law. They saw 
themselves as...perhaps the only chance to save 
the country. It was in effect a declaration of 
martial law. —  Former Detroit Public Defender 
Quenda Behler-Story43
42Quoted in Detroit News. January 26, 1970, 32.
43Letter to author, March 22, 1993.
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The Detroit Police Department's surveillance and 
harassment of Trans-Love Energies led to increased militancy, 
as well as the decision to pursue a political agenda 
following the 1967 riots. The tactics which the police 
utilized against the group —  informants, physical 
surveillance, photography, and various forms of intimidation 
—  reflected an overall conservative (or "praetorian”) law 
enforcement ethos, rooted in the city's unigue social, 
economic, and political history. As was the case with Trans- 
Love Energies, the police's collective ideology, shared by 
the majority of Detroit's white citizenry, as well as the 
city's legal system, is partly explained by a combination of 
local and national historical forces. On the national level, 
the search for Communists and other "subversives," beginning 
in the thirties and continuing through the Cold War years, 
resulted in the establishment of the Detroit's Special 
Investigative Bureau (SIB), or "Red Squad," which carried out 
widespread political surveillance of pro-labor, civil rights, 
and other non-conformist groups. In addition, national 
demographic shifts, particularly during the two World Wars, 
resulted in an influx of African American and poor 
Appalachian whites into the city, where they competed for 
employment with "native" groups, creating a strained economic 
and racial environment. Police operations in Detroit were 
also influenced by the enormous expansion of intelligence 
gathering at all levels of government that occurred in
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response to the heightened social disorder of the sixties. 
Several local factors were equally important in contributing 
to the conservative police ideology: (1) the antagonistic
historical relationship between Detroit's elites and 
"reformist" forces, such as trade unions; (2) the devastating 
social, economic, and political effects of "white flight" 
from the inner city; (3) the prevalence of ultra-right-wing 
groups; and (4) the worsening social polarization in the city 
following the 1967 riots.
Much of Detroit's history during this century has been 
synonymous with the automobile industry. Industrial 
expansion brought increased demand for skilled and unskilled 
labor, which attracted large numbers of workers, both from 
overseas and from the South. Beginning in 1914, Henry Ford's 
well-publicized offer of an eight-hour, $5 day, initiated the 
first of two huge waves of demographic influx; World War II 
brought the other.44 By 1920, the total population of 
Detroit had more than doubled, while the number of blacks 
increased seven-fold.45 The largest groups emigrating to 
Detroit during the two waves were Southern whites from the
^Dan Georgakas and Marvin Surkin, Detroit: I Do Mind 
Dying. (New York: St. Martins Press, 1975), 105; Geoffrey
Perrett, Days of Sadness. Years of Triumph: The American 
People. 1939-1945. 312.
45Peter K. Eisinger, The Politics of Displacement: Racial 
and Ethnic Transition in Three American Cities. (New York: 
Academic Press, 1980) 57; James A. Geschwender, Class. Race, 
and Worker Insurgency: The League of Revolutionary Black 
Workers. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 
18, 58-64.
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Appalachian region, Eastern Europeans (especially Poles), and 
Southern blacks. By World War II, the city's social and 
economic development was increasingly characterized by fierce 
competition between the three principal working class groups. 
Often, the competition had racial overtones, with Poles and 
Appalachian whites combining in opposition to black hiring 
and promotion, particularly during recessions. The issue of 
whether this antagonistic situation may have been engineered 
or encouraged by Detroit's power elites, such as Henry Ford, 
in attempt to keep labor costs down and prevent unionization, 
has received attention from several Marxist historians.46 
Whatever the cause of this racially antagonistic situation, 
there is no question that the city's elites benefitted from 
it; the auto industry was among the last in the nation to 
unionize. The 1943 race riots, the worst in the nation's 
history up to that time, were a direct result of what 
Geoffrey Perrett has termed the city's "venomous" racial 
environment.47
An additional local factor which contributed to the 
evolution of Detroit's conservative law enforcement ethos was 
the preponderance of progressive social and political groups. 
During the 1890s, Detroit's "social reform" model of 
municipal management, characterized by improved urban service
“Georgakas, Detroit; I Do Mind Dvina. 186-7; 
Geschwender, Class. Race, and Worker Insurgency. 25.
47Perrett, Days of Sadness. Years of Triumph. 312.
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delivery and heightened City control over utilities and 
public transportation, made Mayor Hazen S. Pingree (1890- 
1897) one of the nation's most popular and imitated 
Progressive municipal reformers.48 The liberal tradition 
continued during World War I, as the city attracted leftist 
organized labor groups such as the International Workers of 
the World (IWW) and the Union of Russian Workers.49 The 
Great Depression and World War II brought another major 
increase in progressive labor organizations, such as the 
United Auto Workers (UAW), Socialist Worker's Party (SWP), 
and Communist Party (CP) . By the end of the war, Socialists 
and Communists held a number of the local UAW's top 
positions.50 By the forties Detroit also had a large number 
of civil rights organizations, the largest and most active of 
which was the NAACP, whose local branch was established 
shortly after World War I. A large minority of Detroit's 
blacks, more so than in other cities of similar size, were 
attracted to left-of-center groups. Within the UAW, 
significant numbers of blacks were attracted to factions of 
the Socialist Workers Party and the Communist Party. The SWP 
and CP were the first (and only) white UAW groups that
48Arthur S. Link and Richard L. McCormick, Prooressivism. 
(Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1983), 29-30.
49Frank Donner, Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and 
Police Repression in Urban America. (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 1990), 42.
S0Geschwender, Class. Race, and Worker Insurgency. 46-49, 
77-84.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
actively recruited blacks. They also broke with tradition by 
placing many blacks in positions of leadership. Thus, the 
frustrations and feelings of powerlessness which 
characterized the city's black working class had the effect 
of splintering the black community, some factions adopting 
leftist philosophies and others following the moderate NAACP 
line. Following the virtual elimination of SWP and CP 
leadership from UAW ranks during the late forties, a majority 
of black workers expressed dissatisfaction with the 
supposedly-liberal UAW. Some black workers continued to 
adhere to a class-based Marxist analysis; for them, the 
capitalist "American Dream" appeared to be unreachable, as 
long as racist whites controlled both the means of production 
and organized labor.51
Evolving simultaneously with the expansion of 
progressive groups in Detroit were a variety of ultra-right- 
wing organizations, dedicated to combating organized labor 
and keeping blacks "in their place." During World War I, a 
pattern was established, whereby right-wing vigilante groups, 
assisted by sympathetic police and local media, succeeded in 
associating organized labor with "foreign radicalism." A 
local chapter of the American Protective League (APL) was 
established by the city's industrial elites, with the overall 
purpose of fighting attempts by the IWW and other unions to 
influence workers. In addition, industrialists such as Henry
51Ibid. . 46-49, 77-84.
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Ford established the precedent of hiring undercover "goon 
squads" to harass and intimidate pro-union workers; by the 
early thirties, similar tactics were regularly employed by 
all of the "big three" auto makers. In the twenties and 
thirties, Detroit experienced a proliferation of organized 
ultra-right activity, highlighted by one of the nation's 
largest Ku Klux Klan chapters. The notorious "Black Legion," 
a KKK spin-off group, committed more than fifty murders in 
five years, beginning in 1931; cross burnings and gang-style 
attacks on civil rights and other progressive groups became 
commonplace. An additional "100 percent American" group was 
the American Legion, which boasted of a membership of "'one 
thousand Bolshevik bouncers.'"52 During this period, 
Detroit's large Polish community, centered in the township of 
Hamtramck (site of "Dodge Main," Chrysler's largest plant), 
acquired a reputation for racism paralleling that of the 
transplanted "red neck" Appalachians.53 During the anti­
communist hysteria of the McCarthy years, the city initiated 
a crack-down on progressive organizations, effectively 
purging Communists and Socialists from the ranks of the UAW. 
Widely-publicized hearings of the House Committee on Un- 
American Activities (HUAC) were held in Detroit in 1951; a
52Quoted in Donner, Protectors of Privilege. 54.
53Geschwender, Class. Race, and Worker Insurgency. 64,
77.
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primary focus was the alleged linkage between the city's 
black civil rights leadership and the Communist Party.54
In a city almost totally dependent upon the automobile 
industry, it is not surprising that the local police usually 
acted in accordance with the wishes of the industrial elites. 
As the "guardians of the establishment," Detroit's police 
were painfully aware of the racial volatility which existed 
just beneath the surface of local society. In the interest 
of preserving "law and order," they became the city's most 
powerful anti-reform institution.
The Detroit "Red Squad," or Special Investigative Bureau 
(SIB), was created in 1930, ostensibly to "work on the 
Bolshevik and Communistic activities in the city." In 1927, 
the nation's leading red-hunter, Jacob Spolanski, went 
undercover in Detroit's auto industry, collecting information 
concerning the activities of leftist individuals and groups; 
his employer was the Metal Trades Association, a national 
industry group which included all automobile manufacturers. 
The "evidence" he collected, much of which was supplied by 
the Detroit Police Department, was presented to the infamous 
"Fish Committee," during their hearings in Detroit in 1930. 
At the hearings, Detroit Police Detective Albert Shapiro 
unveiled the SIB, a special division of the Department that 
would have a variety of duties, including the monitoring of 
radical activities. Progressive Mayor Frank L. Murphy
MIbid.. 41.
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initially supported the SIB, in the interest of curbing 
police abuses through increased professionalism and training. 
However, he soon became disillusioned with his new creation, 
as incident after incident of anti-labor violence, some of it 
perpetuated by the Black Legion, were linked with the SIB. 
Following Murphy's retirement in May 1933, incoming Police 
Commissioner Heinrich Pickert unleashed the Red Squad, making 
it little more than an anti-union arm of the establishment. 
As Frank Donner states, "the SIB became a scourge of picket 
lines of all kinds."55
In 1939 the Red Squad was abolished for a brief period, 
following revelations of high-level police corruption. 
However, following President Franklin Roosevelt's September, 
1939 order for stepped-up surveillance of "subversive" groups 
—  the same carte blanche "national security" authorization 
that J. Edgar Hoover used to justify warrantless domestic 
wiretapping —  the Red Squad was reestablished with a 
somewhat modified mission: hunting Nazis and saboteurs. In 
1947, the SIB returned to its pre-war mission, concentrating 
on rooting out "subversive elements" within organized labor. 
During the forties and early fifties, the nativist-patriotic 
impulses within Detroit's white community led to the 
establishment of a state-level Un-American Activities 
Committee and the "Detroit Loyalty Committee," an
55Ibid., 53-58 [quote 54]. Donner claims that by the
fifties, the UAW had become a "silent partner" in the SIB's 
anti-subversive campaigns.
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organization empowered to conduct its own background 
investigations of all city employees suspected of being 
disloyal. A longer-term ally for the SIB appeared in 1950, 
with the establishment of the Subversive Activities 
Investigation Division, soon renamed the "Security 
Investigation Squad" (SIS) a State Police countersubversive 
unit, whose primary objective was discouraging employers from 
hiring suspected radicals.56 Soon the SIB and the SIS 
established a close collaborative relationship, characterized 
by unprecedented information sharing and joint intelligence 
operations. Another important collaborative endeavor for the 
revitalized SIB was its role as the FBI's primary 
"operational resource" agency in Michigan.57
The decade of the sixties had a profound impact on the 
development of law enforcement attitudes in Detroit. 
Although the administration of reform-minded Mayor Jerome P. 
Cavanagh brought in tens of millions of dollars in federal 
assistance, the city's black majority remained near the 
poverty level. The primary problems facing inner-city blacks 
—  high rates of unemployment, job discrimination, poor 
housing and schools, and terrible police-community relations
56A second Detroit Police Department intelligence 
division, the Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB), was 
created during the early sixties, for the specific purpose of 
monitoring civil rights groups and events. In a glaring 
example of bureaucratic overlap, the SIB and the CIB employed 
separate informers, had separate file systems, and dealt 
independently with outside agencies. See Ibid., 292.
S7Ibid. , 56-59.
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—  were hardly touched by Lyndon Johnson's "War on Poverty." 
In fact, the Liberals' highly-touted "urban renewal" program 
became one of the most hated "reforms" among black city- 
dwellers, thanks to the long delays in construction and 
demolition and the realization that most of those forcibly 
removed were black. One of the primary causes of the 
underlying economic crisis was a disappearing tax base, 
brought about by middle and upper-class "white flight" away 
from the city and into the suburbs. While the city's 
population declined by 100,000 during the sixties, the 
suburbs experienced phenomenal growth, from 2.4 to 4.2 
million total inhabitants.58
According to the city's NAACP leadership, the "single
most important problem," facing Detroit residents during the
sixties was poor police-community relations. Burton Levy,
Director of the Community Relations Division of the Michigan
Civil Rights Commission, summed up the situation in 1968:
[The police department] recruits a significant 
number of bigots, reinforces the bigotry through 
the department's value system and socialization 
with the other officers, and then takes the worst 
of the officers and puts them on duty in the 
ghetto, where the opportunity to act out the 
prejudice is always available.
58Georgakas and Surkin, Detroit: I Do Mind Dvina. 189; 
Sidney Fine, Violence in the Model Citv: The Cavanaoh
Administration. Race Relations, and the Detroit Riot of 1967. 
(Ann Arbor, MI: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1989), 17, 32-3, 39- 
57. Fine's exhaustive study presents a detailed analysis of 
what remains the bloodiest riot in U.S. history.
S9Quoted in Fine, Violence in the Model Citv. 95.
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Blacks comprised less than 5 percent of the police force, but 
35 percent of the city's population. Attempts to increase 
the overall professionalism of Detroit's police and hire 
larger numbers of minorities, financed by both federal and 
state funding programs, were offset by a new assertiveness of 
the city's under class. Two-thirds of the police force were 
from blue-collar families. As Sidney Fine points out, 
"poorly educated for the most part, poorly trained, and 
living in 'relative isolation' from the rest of society, the 
police did not understand and were not prepared to deal with 
the law enforcement problems stemming from the black revolt 
of the 1960s."60
Following the 1967 riots, the attitudes of Detroit 
police moved farther to the right, reflecting the growing 
"siege mentality" prevalent among many whites. The principal 
"lesson" that top-ranking police officials derived from the 
riot was that the department needed more men and equipment, 
so that they would be better prepared for the next clash. 
The primary federal investigative body looking into the 
riots, the so-called "Kerner Commission," commented that the 
police were interested in stockpiling enough weaponry to wage 
"'a moderate-size war.'"61 A 1968 Detroit Free Press survey 
of the police department showed that more than half of the 
white officers believed that housing and job opportunities
“ibid., 96.
61 Ibid. , 96-98, 392-394.
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for both races in the city were equal, and that blacks were 
favored in the public school system; among black officers, 8 
percent believed that job opportunities were equal and 3 
percent thought that housing opportunities were equal.62
Believing that they had been unfairly criticized for
overreaction in the face of a near-revolutionary situation on
the streets, the police became increasingly isolated from the
rest of society —  a phenomenon that further poisoned their
attitude regarding blacks and other non-conformists.
Membership in support groups and organizations such as the
Detroit Police Officers Association (DOPA) increased. In
addition, many police officers actively supported
"Breakthrough," a far-right John Birch Society splinter
group, led by Donald Lopsinger. Sidney Fine comments on a
Breakthrough meeting:
At meetings in Detroit and the suburbs attended by 
'enthusiastic and revivalistic whites,' many of 
them middle-aged, many of them of East European 
extraction, Breakthrough leaders contended that 
the riot had been a 'Communist-inspired 
insurrection,' whose purpose was to 'terrorize' 
blacks to join the 'black power movement,' after 
which the 'entire Negro community' could 'move in 
on the whites.' Breakthrough urged its followers 
to purchase weapons, told them what supplies to 
store in preparation for the next 'much more 
terrifying' riot, and...advised whites to 
establish a 'block-to-block home defense system' 
for protection against 'bands of armed 
terrorists. '63
“Georgakas and Surkin, Detroit: I Do Mind Dvina. 190.
63Fine, Violence in the Model Citv. 383-84.
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The heightened social disorder in Detroit during the 
sixties resulted in a significant expansion of the Red Squad 
(SIB) , as well as a widening of its scope of targets for 
surveillance. Files on suspected radicals expanded 
exponentially, as did the practice of sharing information 
among the SIB, SIS, FBI, Military Intelligence, and a host of 
other federal agencies. Campus police departments and 
security details were quickly allowed access to the 
computerized, on-line subversive information superhighway. 
One of the unique characteristics of Detroit's SIB, as 
compared with the rest of the nation's Red Squads, was the 
routine photographing (and sometimes videotaping) of 
organizations, individuals, and events. A "typical practice" 
involved stationing a police photographer outside of a 
targeted group, where he or she photographed anyone entering 
or leaving. Members of the SIB were also aware, however, of 
the benefits of overt —  as opposed to covert 
surveillance, as an effective form of intimidation.64 Other 
tactics employed by the SIB and the SIS included utilization 
of paid informers, garbage searches, and stealing documents.
A common practice involved jotting down the license plate 
numbers of all vehicles at or near targeted groups, and 
tracing the plate numbers (with the assistance of state 
and/or federal computers). Hundreds of files and
^Donner, Protectors of Privilege. 290-94, 293. See
Figure 3-1 on page 233.
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investigations were opened on "innocent bystanders."65 
Master files were created on each subject, comprised of three 
principal categories of materials: (1) Master Index Cards, 
conventional four-by-six-inch index cards, with personal and 
organizational information on the face card and 
chronologically-arranged entries (press stories, references 
to arrest reports, etc.) on subsequent cards; (2) 
Intelligence Exchange Cards, eight and a half by ten inch 
cards, also indexing a target's history and activities; and 
(3) Dossiers, one or more eight-by-eleven-inch folders, 
possessing an organizational name and/or code number, with: 
newspaper clippings, inter-office memoranda, interviews, 
photographs, criminal histories, completed IRS tax forms, and 
statements of informers.66
The variety and scope of the Detroit (SIB) and Michigan 
State Police (SIS) Red Squads' surveillance practices were 
made public for the first time in Benkert. et. al. v. 
Michigan State Police et. al..67 In 1974, the Michigan
65Ibid. , 295.
“Examples of Master Index and Intelligence Exchange 
Cards, mug shots, and Criminal Record Indexes from John and 
Leni Sinclairs' Red Squad Files are included in the Appendix, 
Figures A-l - A-7.
67No . 74-023-934—AZ (Wayne County Circuit Court,
Michigan). The Benkert case was settled on April 23, 1990, 
when the Detroit City Council agreed to a $750,000 settlement 
—  which was earmarked for the exclusive use in an 
unprecedented "Red Squad Notification and Distribution 
Compliance Program." The plaintiffs in a case involving 
police spying were given some say regarding the disposition
(continued...)
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Association for Consumer Protection, a "modest grass-roots 
consumer group" filed suit against the State Police, charging 
that it had been illegally investigated and monitored. The 
next year, following an admission by the State Police that 
the SIS had indeed broken the law, the case expanded into a 
class action suit, with numerous individuals and 
organizations, including the UAW, joining. The resulting 
litigation, lasting until 1990, unearthed evidence that 
Detroit's SIB had amassed dossiers on between 60,000 and 
110,000 individuals and organizations, from the thirties 
through the early seventies; the SIS had accumulated files on
67(.. .continued)
of the files. On May 10, 1990, Wayne County Circuit Judge 
Lucile Watts approved a court order placing the files under 
the supervision of a three-member Board of Trustees, for a 
period of sixteen months. From May 10, 1990 through
September 10, 1991 the "files disbursement program"
publicized the existence of the surveillance material in the 
local and national media and made the contents of individual 
files available to persons and/or groups who submitted 
written requests. Hundreds responded with file requests. 
During the two years following the program's expiration, 
1991-1993, considerable debate took place within Detroit 
concerning whether the records should be destroyed or placed 
in an archive. It was rumored that Mayor Coleman Young, 
concerned about the economic costs of possible lawsuits, 
wished them destroyed, even though he had been a top target 
of SIB surveillance during the fifties and sixties. However, 
the courts eventually voted for their preservation, placing 
them in the custody of the Detroit Public Library, Burton 
Historical Collection. Access to the files once again became 
available, on a restricted, case by case basis, during the 
summer of 1994. Ironically, as of December 6, 1994, not a 
single person had yet requested a file search from the DPL. 
For a detailed discussion of the history of the files 
disbursement program, see Detroit Free Press Magazine. 
November 4, 1990, 8-10, 16-21; see also Detroit Free Press. 
September 14, 1990, 20.
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approximately 38,000 subjects.68 As Frank Donner finds, the
case also uncovered that the Red Squad units operated without
any restrictions concerning the types of dissident activities
that could be surveilled:
One unit chief testified that investigations were 
conducted against 'any organization or individual 
that would tend to appear a potential police 
problem,' including 'super super liberals' or any 
targets that 'by action, statements or ideology 
present an actual or implied threat to city, state 
or national government, their representatives or 
citizenry.' Another claimed the unit's mission to 
be the investigation of 'militant activity' or, 
for targets falling short of a militant rating, 
'subversive activity.'69
In a detailed study of ten Detroit Red Squad file dossiers,
totalling over 700 pages, Attorney Marc Stickgold found that
a vast majority (86.4 percent) of all surveillance focused on
"constitutionally-protected political activity."70
The various surveillance (and other) tactics utilized by 
the Detroit City and Michigan State Police against the
“Donner, Protectors of Privilege. 294-95. A total of 
over 1.5 million Metro Detroit residents were monitored. See 
"The History of the Detroit Red Squad Files," [four page 
unpublished document] and "They Were Spying On Us: The
Detroit Police Red Squad Surveillance Program, 1945-1974," 
[one-page unpublished pamphlet] Red Squad Notification and 
Distribution and Compliance Program. 1990. Copies in the 
author's possession.
69Donner, Protectors of Privilege. 295.
70Stickgold, "Yesterday's Paranoia is Today's 
Reality...," 921-22. The files used in the study, 
representing ten of the fourteen named plaintiffs, were made 
public during the early stages of the litigation in the 
Benkert case, under a protective order intended to protect 
third parties. Stickgold acknowledges the limitations of 
generalizing with so small a sample.
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Artists Workshop and Trans-Love Energies between 1964 and 
1968 demonstrated the seriousness with which they viewed John 
Sinclair and his group.71 Informers infiltrated the Artists 
Workshop in 1965 and 1966, gathering information that 
resulted in two "dragnet"-style police operations, in which 
many were arrested on drug charges. The sting operations 
also brought about Sinclair's second and third offenses for 
marijuana possession —  eventually earning him a ten year 
prison sentence. The principal informant in both operations 
was the same person: Detroit Police Detective Vahan Kapagian 
of the Narcotics Bureau.
On August 16, 1965 a detail of 25 officers from the
Narcotics Bureau raided the Artists Workshop house at 4825 
John Lodge, arresting seven people, including newlyweds John 
and Leni Sinclair. The operation was the culmination of a 
month-long investigation into allegations that the group was 
regularly using and dispensing illegal drugs. Officer 
Kapagian's infiltration was facilitated by the group's open 
invitations to the public for their Sunday poetry readings. 
As Leni Sinclair recalls, "Anybody who came around was a 
friend. You didn't question anyone."72 When Kapagian first 
started "making the scene," he claimed to be a "friend of a
71The bulk of the primary source material utilized in the 
rest of Section III is from the John and Leni Sinclair Red 
Squad files.
^Leni Sinclair personal interview with author, July 23, 
1992, Detroit, Michigan.
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friend" —  good enough for the trusting individuals in the
Artists Workshop. Calling himself "Eddie," Kapagian
sometimes acted like a "junkie" in order to be convincing in
his role as an out-of-work "street person." Kapagian
repeatedly sought to make "a big score" of marijuana, but
with no luck. According to Leni, the Artists Workshop group
had never used marijuana in public during the Sunday
sessions; their fears concerning police surveillance
increased after John's first pot bust in October, 1964.
However, John eventually relented in the face of Kapagian's
constant pestering, as Leni explains:
John was paranoid. After he got busted he did not 
sell another joint...He took it so hard that he 
did not deal anymore... But this guy was bugging 
John so much....and John got sick and tired of him 
sitting around for two weeks, so he did finally 
relent, in order to get rid of him...[he would] 
try to get him some garbage [low quality 
marijuana]....and then he would never come back.
Sinclair drove Kapagian to a house of a friend, took $25 from
him and went inside to make the "big score." He then
returned to the car, gave the marijuana to Kapagian, and
drove back to the Artists Workshop. Leni explains what
happened next:
John let him out [of the car], went back to the 
house, and two minutes later all hell broke loose. 
The cops came in through the front door, through 
the front window, through the back door, through 
the back window.74
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
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At the police station where she was booked, Leni was visited 
by an officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 
Even after discovering that Leni was a naturalized U.S. 
citizen, as well as married to one, the INS officer 
nevertheless threatened to send Leni back to East Germany if 
she refused to cooperate. After entering a plea of not 
guilty, John Sinclair's only statement to police was "Why are 
you after me? I just did a favor for Eddie."75
Kapagian's second infiltration of the Artists Workshop 
began on October 18, 1966, only two months after Sinclair was 
released from the Detroit House of Corrections (DEHOCO). 
According to official police documents, the Narcotics 
Division had received "numerous complaints of narcotic 
activity" at the Artists Workshop; the police were also 
concerned about reports that Sinclair was "conducting immoral 
readings and showing pornographic films."76 Although 
Sinclair was the primary target, the overall scope of the 
1966 sting operation was wider than the previous year's, 
including the Plum Street Candle Shop, where John and Leni 
worked part-time, and other counterculture businesses and New 
Left organizations located close to the Wayne State
75John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad files, Detroit Police 
Department, Narcotic Division, Interrogation Record, August 
16, 1965, page 2. Although seven people were arrested for 
possession and/or sale of marijuana, the charges were later 
dropped against everyone except John Sinclair.
76John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad files, Detroit Police 
Department, Detective Division, Narcotics Bureau, Arrest 
Report, January 27, 1967.
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University campus. "Disguised" by a beard and beret,
Kapagian, now known as "Louie," and fellow undercover officer
Jane Mumford ("Peg") attended numerous meetings and poetry
readings, eventually gaining the confidence of the Workshop's
membership. Leni recalls how helpful "Louie" was:
This guy was very skillful, a very good 
actor...Nobody recognized him...He hung around 
Plum Street, helping out in the candle shop, 
always trying to get to know everybody...At Sunday 
" p o t - l u c k  d i n n e r s "  he b r o u g h t  a 
girlfriend....beautiful....wearing a miniskirt 
[who was also]... .very helpful.77
As helpful and friendly as "Louie" and "Peg" were, they
remained unable to purchase any marijuana for several months.
They were, however, able to take photographs of the inside
rooms of the Artists Workshop, as well as to construct a
drawing of the floor-plan, identifying the rooms of specific
individuals (see Figure A-7 in the Appendix). Ultimately,
only two marijuana purchases were made, both from Wayne State
University students who were only casually associated with
the Artists Workshop. Even so, as Leni explains, the police
found a way to "get" John:
One time, shortly before Christmas, she [Officer 
Mumford] comes over, just passing through, and 
asked John if he had any more joints. And so John 
rolls her a couple of "jays" and sends her on her 
way.78
^Leni Sinclair interview with author, July 23, 1992,
Detroit, Michigan.
78 Ibid.
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The police "raid" of January 24, 1967 involved 34 officers,
representing a spectrum of local, state, and federal
agencies: the Detroit Police Narcotics Bureau, the Federal
Narcotics Bureau, the Michigan State Police, the U.S. Customs
Bureau, the U.S. Bureau of the Census, and even the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration. Fifty-six persons were arrested,
including thirteen WSU students. Leni recalls being upstairs
in the house when the police came in:
The officer came upstairs, recognized me from a 
John Coltrane concert two days previously...He was 
very friendly...He said 'we're holding your 
husband downstairs....he did something terrible, 
and if you just show us what you've got and give 
it to me, we won't do anything to him'...So.. ..I 
go to the underwear drawer and pick out my little 
film can...my little stash....and give it to him, 
and so [I was arrested for]...possession of 
marijuana [laughs]...The charges were later 
dismissed by Judge Crockett, for illegal search 
and seizure.79
The Arrest Report of January 27 lists John Sinclair's name 
first, while the names of the two WSU students who had 
actually sold marijuana to the undercover cops were listed 
third and eleventh.80 As had been the case with the 1965 
raid, the charges against all but a handful of those arrested 
were later dropped.
On June 1, 1967 Police Officers Kapagian and Mumford 
received "Detroit News Policeman of the Month" awards from
79Ibid.
80John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad files, Detroit Police 
Department, Detective Division, Narcotics Bureau, Arrest 
Report, January 27, 1967.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
228
Police Commissioner Ray Girardin, at a public ceremony held 
at the Detroit Historical Museum. Sinclair and approximately 
100 Artists Workshop members and "hippie" supporters 
protested outside. The Detroit Police arrested Sinclair on 
an old traffic warrant.81
An additional police tactic employed against Trans-Love 
involved intimidating the print shops that the group hired to 
publish the Warren-Forest Sun, the irregularly published 
Trans-Love newspaper. In a May, 1968 article in the Fifth 
Estate. John Sinclair and Gary Grimshaw lamented the fact 
that locating printers was becoming next to impossible in 
Detroit. A similar fate befell the Inner Citv Voice, a 
Marxist, pro-labor publication billed as "Detroit's Black 
Community Newspaper."82 Leni Sinclair recalls having to 
utilize a different printer for each of the seven-odd issues 
of the Warren-Forest Sun, because "sometimes," the printers 
would receive threats; on other occasions the explanation was 
more mundane: not paying the printing bill.83
8IPetroit News. June 2, 1967, 18-A. See Figures 3-2 and 
3-3 on pages 234 and 235.
82Georgakas and Surkin, Detroit: I Do Mind Dvina. 22. 
The authors also state that in the rare instances when a 
press agreed to publish the ICV, the FBI usually convinced 
the typographers' union to call a strike to prevent its 
publication. As a result, the paper "was never printed in 
the same shop more than twice."
83The printing situation for Trans-Love in Ann Arbor did 
not improve appreciably. Editions of the Ann Arbor Sun were 
usually mimeographed.
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Numerous examples of Detroit City and Michigan State 
Police surveillance and harassment of the Artists Workshop 
and Trans-Love Energies are located within the "Red Squad" 
files of John and Leni Sinclair, made available for the first 
time as a result of the Benkert case. Four examples provide 
a glimpse into the types of surveillance. A February 8, 1966 
"Complaint Report" from the Michigan State Police SIS unit, 
investigates the "Free University of Detroit," an Artist 
Workshop creation. Second, an internal Detroit SIB 
memorandum, dated April 26, 1967, details police preparations 
for the Trans-Love "Love-in." The memorandum discusses the 
dozens of units that will take part in the affair, as well as 
the fact that a "prisoner bus" and "Tactical Mobile Unit" 
will be held in reserve. Third, a Detroit Police Criminal 
Intelligence Bureau (CIB) inter-office memorandum of May 22, 
1967, explains the details surrounding the arrest of Trans- 
Love Energies co-founder Gary Grimshaw. Apparently, a squad 
car driving by the Trans-Love house noticed, through an open 
door, a large red, white, and blue kite, bearing the
inscription "F k the United States —  Go Fly a Kite."
Although not in actual possession of the kite, Grimshaw —  
the lone occupant of the house —  was "conveyed" to the 
police station and booked on obscenity charges. Fourth, a 
December 19, 1967, DPD inter-office memorandum with the
heading "INFORMATION RE: HARBORING RUNAWAY JUVENILES"
contains information from an informer, alleging that John
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Sinclair and the Artists Workshop have "harbored many teen­
age runaways, mostly girls," and that Sinclair "sells drugs 
to the teenagers and permits them to engage in sexual 
activities on his premises."84
Some Detroit Recorders Court and Wayne County Circuit 
Court judges "knew" of the threat to society posed by John 
Sinclair. They expressed their agreement with police in a 
number of ways, including tacit support for illegal 
surveillance and harassment practices. On the eve of the 
1967 riots, a task force panel of the President's Commission 
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 
characterized the Detroit's Recorders Courts as "'unseemly, 
disreputable, inadequate and unfair [with] no regard for 
justice.'" "Movement" lawyers commonly spoke of an "unholy 
trio" —  consisting of police, prosecutors, and judges —  
which, they believed, were in collusion with one another for 
the purpose of "railroading" black and white radicals.85 
Typical of Detroit's ultra-right judiciary members was 
Recorders Court Judge Robert J. Colombo, a former attorney 
for the Detroit Police Officers Association. In July of 
1969, he sentenced Sinclair to nine and a half to ten years 
in prison for giving two marijuana "joints" to undercover
“Three of the documents referred to in this paragraph 
are included as Figures A-8 through A-10 in the Appendix.
85Quoted in Sidney Fine, Violence in the Model Citv. 102.
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policewoman June Mumford, actually an obvious instance of 
entrapment.
During the winter and spring of 1968, the situation in
Detroit became unbearable for Trans-Love Energies. Sinclair
summarizes his feelings during the period:
Nothing was happening but the police. They had 
everything covered, and if you moved after dark 
you were snatched up and taken to jail without 
bail. If you stayed inside they came in after 
you, kicking down the doors and ransacking 
everything in sight. Where they knew that the 
occupants were armed for self-defense they moved 
with more caution; police cars would cruise up and 
down the streets outside such houses issuing 
threats over their loudspeakers and shining their 
super-charged spotlights into the windows, 
returning every half hour or so to repeat their 
vicious tricks until you were afraid to go to 
sleep. Detroit was Police City baby, and you 
never forgot it —  not for a minute.86
Right-wing terrorism had also arrived, in the form of a 
series of fire-bombings of Trans-Love houses. The first 
occurred early on the morning of October 29, 1967, setting 
fire to the headquarters of the Detroit Committee to End the 
War In Vietnam, located next door to Trans-Love on 1101 West 
Warren. Files were ransacked and papers were strewn all over 
the floor. Official police documents indicate that the most 
likely suspects in the bombing were members of the ultra­
right group "Breakthrough.1,87 Four months later, on
86ASHP-Sinclair Biography, 48.
87John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad files, Detroit Police 
Department, Detective Division, Special Investigation Bureau, 
"PROGRESS REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF BREAKING AND 
ENTERING AND FIRES SET IN THE OFFICE OF THE DETROIT COMMITTEE 
TO END THE WAR IN VIET NAM (DCEWVN)," November 3, 1967.
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February 6, "unknown persons" threw four fire-bombs at the 
main Trans-Love house on 499 West Forest Avenue; three landed 
on the roof, causing what the police report termed "minor 
damage." The Detroit Board of Zoning Appeals quickly 
condemned the building, refusing to allow the inhabitants to 
continue living there. The attack came as all Trans-Love 
members were attending an MC-5 concert at the Grande 
Ballroom. Finally, in early April, an additional Trans-Love 
house, formerly known as the "candleworks," was also fire- 
bombed.88
The assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. on 
April 4, 1968, provided another occasion for intimidation. 
Detroit's Police, fearing another major riot, established a 
"protective curfew" in the city after dark. Since Trans-Love 
earned most of its operating funds promoting rock concerts 
and related events, most of which took place during the 
evenings, the curfew threatened their very livelihood. 
Therefore, in May, 1968 Trans-Love Energies relocated some 
forty-five miles to the west, to the college town of Ann 
Arbor, moving into a twenty-room house at 1510 Hill Street, 
immediately adjacent to the campus of the University of 
Michigan.
88Fifth Estate. June 4-18, 1968. See Figure A-ll in the 
Appendix.
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(Figure 3-1)
Detroit Police Department, Special Investigation Bureau (SIB) 
Video Surveillance of a Demonstration
Source: Leni Sinclair Personal Photography Archives
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W IEDIT
FOR MASS RAPE OF THE NEW 
SPIRIT OF DETROIT.
OFFICER, DETROIT NARCOTICS SqjUflP.
IMAG INE THIS M A N  WITHOUT THE BEARD. IMAGINE HIM WITH HIS HAIR 
CUT SHORT. IMAG INE HIM  IN  A SUIT AND TIE. THAT'S HOW HE LOOKS 
AT WORK, IN  THE DETROIT NARCOTICS BUREAU, OR IN  RECORDERS COURT : 
TESTIFYING AGAINST IN N O C E N T MARIJUANA SMOKERS. THIS M A N  IS A 
POLICE OFFICER. HE DOESN'T LOOK LIKE THIS N O W . OTHERS D O .
D O N 'T  LET THEIR "HIP" APPEARANCE FOOL YO U —  THEY WANT TO PUT YOU 
______________________________IN  JAIL! BEWARE TH?M(__________________________
REWARD: o n e  p o iin d . u s . TRANS-LOVE ENERGIES
GRASS FOR ANYONE WHO CAN WARNS Y0U= "YOU B fTIfR
DROP 1000 MIGROGRAMS OF ISO f|N D  SOMEBODY ID  LHVF i “  INTO THIS M AN’S UVE BODY. « in L D U U I IU  LU V t.
AtfTBt* WtUUBZK J7VP/0S
(Figure 3-2)
Trans-Love Poster by Gary Grintshaw/Warlock Studios 
Warning of Undercover Policeman Vahan Kapagian
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files.
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^ 1 8 -A -T H E  DETROIT NEWS— Ftid iy, June 2, 1967
-N... NH4
•' ON THE INSIDE—Aftar recaiving their awards as ’.The Petroit News 
Policemen of the Month,- Patrolman Vahan Kapagian (left) and Jane Mum- 
• ford are congratulated by Police Commissioner Ray Girardin at the Detroit 
Historical Museum. While the awards were being presented inside, a 
demonstration was being staged outside by about 100 hippies. The police 
: pair had infiltrated their ranks tp break up a narcotics ring.
Hippies Protest Awards 
to 2 Undercover Police
As a e a r I y  100 hippies 
chanted the Hindu religious 
words MHare Krishna”  outside 
, the Detroit Historical Mu- 
.• aeum, two policemen inside 
were receiving. The .Detroit 
' News Policemen of the Month 
awards.
Tha hippies were, there be? 
causa ths two policemen, Jane 
Mumford, of the'women's divi*. 
aioD, and ' Patrolman Vahan 
Kapagian, of the narcotic bu­
reau, had posed as hippies to 
break up a narcotics ring last 
January.
Their undercover work led 
to the arrejt of 24 persons on 
charges of violating state nar­
cotics laws.
:THE AWARDS and $100 
each were presented by Her- 
• bert M. Boldt, Detroit News po­
lice reporter, as Police Com­
missioner Ray Girardin and 
other top-ranking police offi­
cials looked on.
The hippies began filtering 
into the museum about an
hour b e f o r e  the ceremonies 
yesterday, but they were barred 
from entering the auditorium 
in the basement.
Police explained to them that 
there was room* only for in­
vited guests. • •
Soon they took up the "Hare 
Krishna”  c h a n t  introduced 
mto Detroit last February by 
poet .'Ailsa-ifimshccg—stith its 
meaning deeply embedded in 
the Hindu religion. * - 
Police then ordered them to 
be silent or the museum offi­
cials would -sign a complaint 
against them.
They carried flowers of all 
sorts, including two funeral 
wreaths that one hippie ex­
plained were for “ Louie,”  th £  
name Kapagian used in his_ 
undercover assignment. “
' They went outside to wait for 
Kapagian and Miss Mumford 
and were joined by others car­
rying placards denouncing the 
police as "dull, low IQ types”  
and “ low educated, military 
minded men."
At the Woodward entrance to
the museum, they formed two 
lines, continued their chanting 
and prepared to throw rice on 
Kapagian and Miss Mumford. .
Instead, only a handful of po­
lice officials left by the front 
door. *
KAPAGIAN, Miss Mumford, 
Girardin and several others 
left by a Kirby entrance, but 
before they got away a hand­
ful of hippies rushed over and 
presented a floral wreath to 
Kapagian and a T-shirt bear­
ing the words "Smoke Mari­
juana."
• Later, self • styled hippie 
leader,-John Sinclair, 24. of 
430 John Lodge, was taken t<T~ 
Police Headauarteri on an old 
traffic warrant. '
He was one of those arrested 
fast Januaiy as the result of 
Miss Mumford's-and Kapagi- 
an's undercover work.
Sinclair, a hippie poet with 
long hair festooned with flow­
ers, was arraigned earlier yes­
terday in Recorder's Court on 
another narcotics charge.
(Figure 3-3)
Detroit News Article, June 2, 1967 
Award Ceremony for Undercover Police Officers 
Vahan Kapagian and June Mumford
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files.
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IV.
The pigs hate you, us, yes they do, they hate us 
enough to bash our heads, and they hate us enough 
to shoot us...They hate our Black Brothers who 
want freedom and they hate the White Brother who 
wants freedom. They've been shooting our Black 
Brothers who fight for freedom, and they'll shoot 
our White Brothers who fight for freedom, yes they 
will. But our Black Brothers got a plan. They 
got the Black Panthers... to defend themselves 
against the pigs...So get a gun brother, learn how 
to use it. You'll need it, pretty soon. Pretty 
soon. You're a White Panther, act like one.
Pun Plamondon, White Panther Minister of 
Defense, 196889
When Trans-Love Energies arrived in Ann Arbor late in 
the spring of 1968, the conservative college town was already 
undergoing significant changes. The same forces of 
radicalization in the New Left movement that fueled the 
campus take-over at Columbia University in New York that fall 
were present on the campus of the University of Michigan 
(UM) . The most visible "Movement" presence was the Students 
for a Democratic Society (SDS), which had originated in Ann 
Arbor six years earlier, when Tom Hayden, A1 Haber, and a 
handful of UM students declared their independence from the 
"Old Left" organization, the League for Industrial Democracy. 
In 1968, the local SDS chapter was by far the largest of all 
student organizations. Nationally, SDS had tens of thousands 
of members.
89Fifth Estate. October 31 - November 13, 1968, 9.
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By 1968, the local SDS had little in common with the
"Port Huron" period. University of Michigan student Kathleen
Stocking witnessed the tremendous changes in the local SDS
during the fall and winter of 1968 —  changes which
transformed student protest leaders into radicals advocating
violence against the U.S. war machine. Late that summer, she
moved into a house on Felch Street with future Weathermen
Bill Ayers and Diana Oughton, and future White Panther Milton
"Skip" Taube. During the fall semester their house became a
regular meeting place for "endless streams of SDSers," as
national and local occurrences brought heightened tensions
and excitement to the Movement.90 Bill Ayers became a
national organizer, travelling to colleges across the
country. Diana Oughton went from diligent college student to
would-be Third World revolutionary. Stocking recalls the
changes her roommate underwent that fall:
I watched in uncomprehending horror as Diana 
became more and more radical...she cut her blonde 
hair and started dressing like Che Guevera, 
wearing army fatigues and a rolled red bandanna 
around her forehead and tied in the back.91
By the end of the year, following the violence at Chicago,
Ann Arbor's SDS split into two factions: the "Radical Caucus"
and the "Jesse James Gang." Ayers, Oughton, and Taube were
leaders in the latter group, which would eventually form the
^Stocking, "A Personal Remembrance," 73.
91 Ibid., 74.
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genesis of the Weathermen.92 The splintering of the UM 
chapter of SDS foreshadowed the break-up of the national SDS 
the following year. The post-Chicago New Left was clearly 
moving in the direction of "taking the war to the war- 
makers."
Trans-Love moved into two houses at 1510 and 1520 Hill
Street, in the heart of UM's fraternity row. The group of
twenty-eight people included three children, and the MC-5
rock band.93 Ken Kelley, editor of the local underground
newspaper Argus, recalls the impact that Sinclair and Trans-
Love had on the campus:
John was probably the most exotic thing Ann Arbor 
had ever seen. He came with a pre-fab reputation. 
And he was the weirdest looking thing anybody's 
seen. He brought his whole entourage of weird 
musicians; the [MC] Five were just starting to 
happen.94
The initial focus for Trans-Love in Ann Arbor was music, 
which, by the spring of 1968 had become a local source of 
conflict. Large free concerts had been held in Ann Arbor
mMilton "Skip" Taube Interview with Bret Eynon, 1977, 
Hunter College, NY, American Social History Project, 14, 
located at the Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley 
Historical Library, University of Michigan, "Contemporary 
History Project Papers: Interviews," box 239-J [hereafter 
cited as "ASHP-Taube Interview"].
93Eve Silberman, "The Hill Street Radicals," Ann Arbor 
Observer. May, 1991, 45-53.
^Ken Kelley Interview with Bret Eynon, 1977, Hunter 
College, NY, American Social History Project, 3, located at 
the Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical 
Library, University of Michigan, "Contemporary History 
Project Papers: Interviews," box 239-J [hereafter cited as 
"ASHP-Kelley Interview"].
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since 1966, and the MC-5 had taken part in several of the 
1967 shows. But during the winter of 1967-8 the local City 
Council had passed an ordinance banning amplified music from 
the City's parks. When Sinclair decided to hold a concert in 
defiance of the law, the small local Ann Arbor Police force, 
under Lieutenant Eugene Staudemire, threatened to arrest all 
involved. Sinclair did not back down. Thanks to press 
coverage from the Michigan Daily, the campus community got 
involved. Two weeks later, following an additional attempt 
to hold a concert, the City Council relented, granting Trans- 
Love permission to hold a series of free concerts at Gallup 
Park, on the outskirts of town. This was a turning point. 
Sinclair had stood up to the police and other "forces of 
authority" and won. For the remainder of the summer, and 
over the years that followed, the free concerts became very 
popular with both UM students and local high school-age 
youth. Trans-Love used the events to distribute propaganda 
about their counterculture philosophy and programs.95 
Typical of these programs was a course offered by Sinclair at 
the Trans-Love house, entitled "Total Assault on the 
Culture," which had been advertised in the Michigan Daily.
One of those who decided to attend Sinclair's "free 
university" was 19 year-old Ken Kelley, a UM student from 
Ypsilanti, Michigan. He recalls walking to the Trans-Love
95ASHP-Sinclair Biography, 48-49.
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house with a "hippie" friend, whose curiosity had also been
peaked by the advertisement:
We go traipsing up to Hill Street, when the class 
was supposed to be held, and the door was open. I 
tried knocking. He [Sinclair] said 'Hey, you 
don't knock on the door of a hippie house; you 
just go in.' We go in and there's Sinclair, stark 
naked, with his daughter Sunny, who was then about 
a year old or less...He was the biggest thing I'd 
ever seen, with his hair and all that...He was 
committed to doing this class once a week. He 
would usually start out by passing out the latest 
MC-5 and White Panther pamphlets and see where 
that led us... Everyone from my co-op came to see 
him; they were all squares... [John] was like a 
one-ring circus.96
Ken Kelley came to the University of Michigan in 1967 a
supporter of William F. Buckley and the National Review.
Joining the staff of the campus newspaper Michigan Daily, he
was exposed to the paper's "muckraking" expose style, which
had a big impact on him. Within a year, his left-leaning
articles were refused for publication by the paper's Liberal
editor, so, with the assistance of Fifth Estate editor Peter
Werbe, he started the Argus, which soon became Ann Arbor's
best-known underground newspaper. Contributing to his
radicalization was LSD ("Nothing was ever the same again"),
the overall Liberal/left campus environment, and the violence
at Chicago ("that was the great divider...why all those kids
got too radical"),97 With an interest in journalism, Kelley
joined Trans-Love during the fall of 1968, assisting in the
^ASHP-Kelley Interview, 2.
97Ibid., 4.
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production of their newspaper, the Ann Arbor Sun. Soon 
thereafter, he became an important member of the group.
Completing the Trans-Love leadership that fall was Skip 
Taube, who had become disillusioned by the direction that his 
friends in the SDS Jesse James Gang were moving. A Detroit 
native, Skip arrived at UM on a scholarship in the fall of 
1965, and quickly became involved with the small student 
movement on campus. Although the campus received national 
attention that fall, for its anti-Vietnam War "teach-ins," in 
reality, the vast majority of UM students were conservative, 
considering anti-war protestors "un-American." Dropping out 
of school after a few semesters, he became a volunteer in the 
"Children's Community School," (CCS) an alternative 
institution focusing on "experiential" education. There he 
met Bill Ayers and Diana Oughton. Through them he also 
became involved in the local SDS Voice office, where he came 
into contact with future SDS President Carl Oglesby.
One afternoon in the fall of 1968, Taube, handing out 
anti-war leaflets on the UM campus, met Trans-Love members 
Pun and Genie Plamondon, who invited him to attend one of 
their meetings. He recalls his initial reaction to the 
group:
In Ann Arbor, at that time, you didn't see many 
people with full beard[s] and long hair. It was 
really straight. The Trans-Love people looked 
different...They were the same age, and they were 
by nature sociable people. Music brought people 
together. We started to affiliate on a practical, 
personal basis, producing propaganda. Sit around
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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smoking joints, reading stories and bullsh_t.
They got to be real close friends.98
Joining Trans-Love that fall, Taube became their initial link 
to the larger Ann Arbor community. He did not completely 
dissolve his relationships with Ayers and Oughton until the 
following year, when the SDS Jesse James Gang turned into the 
ultra-radical Weathermen.
The MC-5 best characterized Trans Love Energies' overall 
message that fall. Under the management of John Sinclair, 
the group had become something of a local sensation while 
giving free concerts in Gallup Park. In addition, the group 
began touring nationally, bringing their message of "total 
assault on the culture" to thousands of young people. Trans- 
Love's entire operation, including two communes and several 
dozen people, was financed by the money the band received for 
their tours.
Each MC-5 show was a radical multi-media event, with 
psychedelic lights, rear-screen projection, plus the 
"ravings" of Master of Ceremonies Jesse Crawford. The 
supercharged electric music of the MC-5, considered by rock 
historians to be the precursor to modern "punk rock," was 
underscored by Sinclair's political speeches at the start and 
during breaks. The effect that this combination of high 
energy and "revolution" had on high school-age youth was 
often dramatic. The MC-5 proved an effective recruiting
98ASHP-Taube Interview, 15-16.
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device. On September 26, 1968, Elektra Records took notice, 
signing the band to record a "live" album at the Grande 
Ballroom in Detroit, on the evenings of October 30 and 31. 
Elektra's young Publicity Director, Danny Fields, recognized 
the potential commercial value of youth in revolt.99
The MC-5's growing popularity did not escape the 
attention of the local Ann Arbor police, the Washtenaw County 
Sheriff's Office, or the State Police. Beginning in the 
summer, what Sinclair called "creep scenes" occurred, in 
which police surveillance of MC-5 shows led to arrests, near­
arrests, and a general culture of surveillance. Sinclair's 
biweekly Fifth Estate articles, entitled "Rock and Roll Dope" 
chronicled both the MC-5's growing national following and the 
escalating counterattack from the forces of the conservative 
establishment. Some police responses included marijuana
"Sinclair, Guitar Army. 98-100; 109-11. The MC-5's
debut album, entitled "Kick Out The Jams," as well as a 45- 
rpm single (same title, with reverse "B side" entitled "The 
Motor City is Burning") were released in early 1969, and 
immediately entered the "Billboard Hot 100." The original 
album cover's liner notes, written by Sinclair, applauded the 
togetherness of the White Panthers' official band, and added: 
"The MC-5 is the revolution.. .The music will make you 
strong.... and there is no way it can be stopped now." 
Controversy also surrounded the first single, which began
with the cry "Kick our the jams, motherf ker!" Within weeks
of the record's release, Elektra —  apparently under pressure 
from industry executives -- removed Sinclair's liner notes 
from all future editions of the album and forced the MC-5 to 
re-record the offensive opening section of the single,
replacing "Motherf kers" with "Brothers and Sisters." The
album went to number 20 on the charts; the single to number 
82. See Joel Whitburn, Top Poo Artists and Singles. 1955- 
1978, (Menomonee Falls, WI: Record Research, Inc., 1979), 
277.
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busts in the parking lots; pressure on club owners thanks to 
the MC-5's desecration of American flags on-stage; and a 
steadily increasing police presence. On several occasions, 
the police turned off the electricity at clubs to prevent the 
band from playing; in one bizarre incident, the MC-5 was 
issued a ticket for being "a noisy band." The craziness of 
the summer of 1968 peaked on July 23, when Sinclair and MC-5 
guitarist Fred "Sonic" Smith were arrested by Oakland County 
Sheriffs in Leonard, Michigan, and charged with "assault and 
battery on a police officer." While in prison, the Oakland 
County authorities cut off most of Sinclair's long hair. 
Three days later, the MC-5 were arrested by Ann Arbor Police, 
charged with "disturbing the peace," for playing at a free 
concert in West Park.100
The police response to Sinclair and the MC-5 had . as 
much to do with Sinclair's provocation —  in person, on 
stage, and in the pages of the Fifth Estate —  as with any of 
the band's allegedly criminal activities. Sinclair 
consciously sought "to expose the repressive nature of the 
mother-country system," by encouraging MC-5 lead vocalist Rob 
Tyner to inform the crowds of hyped-up youth about the 
various police (and club owner) hassles the group faced 
before each show. The crowd's reaction often bordered on 
riot. In addition, Sinclair attacked the police in article 
after article of the Fifth Estate. He realized that the
'“Sinclair, Guitar Army. 73-95.
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newspaper was required reading for many local police 
officers, as part of their intelligence gathering. The 
following passage is typical of Sinclair's invective that 
summer:
We matched our magic against the pigs' brute 
tactics and it worked —  any respect any of the 
people there might have had for 'law and order' as 
represented by the Ann Arbor police just 
disappeared, and their futile tricks were exposed 
to the light. All this bullsh_t was totally 
unnecessary —  we just wanted to do our thing and 
let the people do their thing with us, but the 
police just won't let that happen without trying 
to stomp us out one way or the other...People are 
getting hip to all of the old people's lies and 
perversions, and they aren't going to stand for it 
much longer. We sure aren't.101
The explicitly political message of Sinclair's defiance was
intentional. He recognized that "our culture itself
represented a political threat to the established order, and
that any action which has a political consequence is finally
a political action."102
Sinclair hoped his tactics would prove successful. By 
challenging the Ann Arbor authorities over the free concert 
issue, he made the city back down, allowing Trans-Love weekly 
access to Gallup Park. And, on more than one occasion, 
Sinclair's public chastisement of police resulted in their 
backing down in the face of angry crowds. Most importantly, 
Trans-Love and the MC-5 were actually getting away with quite 
a bit: screaming obscenities over an amplified public address
101 Ibid. , 86.
I02Ibid. , 74.
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system in the heart of conservative Ann Arbor, in front of 
hundreds of youths on a weekly basis, and burning and/or 
destroying American flags on stage, to the hysterical cheers 
of the audience. Sinclair's overconfidence in his ability to 
continue "getting away with it" was also bolstered by the 
fact that a national record label was interested enough in 
the revolutionary rock sounds of the MC-5 to sign them to a 
multi-record contract.
The August 7, 1968 edition of the Ann Arbor Sun, the new 
Trans-Love newspaper, announced that Sinclair and the MC-5, 
at the request of Youth International Party (YIP) Music 
Coordinator Ed Sanders, would perform at the "Chicago 
Festival of Life" on August 25.103 Prior to this, Trans- 
Love's relationship with Yippie "non-leaders" Jerry Rubin and 
Abbie Hoffman had been minimal; they had known Ed Sanders and 
the East Greenwich Village counterculture community for 
several years, largely through the poetry and avant-garde 
music scene, as well as the performances of Sanders' group 
"The Fugs" at the Artists Workshop in Detroit. Trans-Love 
and the rest of the Detroit/Ann Arbor radical scene had 
watched with great excitement as the Yippies became notorious 
during the October, 1967, "Stop the Draft Week" action at the 
Pentagon. Their infusion of counterculture youth rebellion 
with tongue-in-cheek "politics of fantasy" was very much in 
synch with Trans-Love's ideology and focus. Both the Artists
'“Quoted in Ibid.. 97.
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Workshop and the early Trans-Love Energies were known for a 
variety of "street theater" antics that resembled those of 
the 1967-1968 Yippies.104 However, by mid-1968, the "street 
actions" of counterculture groups were taking on an 
increasingly radical tone, as the former "flower children" 
came face-to-face with the increasing polarization of 
American society, reflected in an overall darkening mood of 
frustration.
The combination of Trans-Love Energy's youth-culture
orientation and the MC-5's growing national reputation for
"revolutionary" music made them a natural choice to
participate in the Chicago "Festival of Life." To finance
the trip, Sinclair booked the band into a club in southern
Wisconsin, driving them into Chicago during the day on August
25. Although Sanders had attempted to sign a wide variety of
performers for the event, Chicago Mayor Richard Daley's
refusal to grant any permits, as well as his well-publicized
preparations for violence, making the city an "armed camp,"
scared all of them off —  except the MC-5. Sinclair recalls
the band's performance, and the fiasco that followed:
As it turned out, we were the only ones in the 
country who showed up to play...The Fugs wouldn't 
even come...They were terrified!...They didn't 
want to get involved with these crazy
104Examples include the Gary Grimshaw "Go Fly a Kite" 
incident, the hoisting of the "Burn Baby Burn" banner during 
the Detroit Riots, and the sponsorship of a "Bitch-in" on the 
campus of Wayne State University, where students, street 
people, and even undercover police were invited to step up to 
the podium to complain about whatever was bothering them.
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motherf kers who didn't have their sh_t together.
They didn't have a stage. They didn't have a 
permit. They didn't have power...So we set up on 
the grass. We plugged into a hot dog stand. And 
as we were setting up, this police lieutenant 
calls me over and says 'Who's in charge here?' I 
told him that I was just the manager of the band. 
'Well,' he says, 'is that your equipment?' I say 
yeah. 'Well, let me tell you something,' he says. 
'If they use that PA system to stir up the crowd 
in any way, there's no way that I can guarantee 
the safety of your equipment.' In other words, 
we'll smash every bit of it...But finally...We 
played one set on the grass, just like in Ann 
Arbor at the free concerts...And....[afterwards] 
Abbie Hoffman decides that this is the time to 
start the sh_t. He had this big flat bed wagon 
that was going to be used for the stage, but they 
wouldn't let him bring it in. So he decides,
'F k it, I'm going to bring it in .' He knows
that this is going to provoke a confrontation...he 
started to bring this wagon through and that 
attracted thousands of people. Then he comes up 
and takes the mike between sets and starts ranting 
and raving. I was just aghast. 'What is this 
idiot doing?'...the police were already starting 
to advance on the park...So I just got my 
equipment men and started to take down the 
equipment and pack it in the van.. .the police were 
getting closer and closer...When we pulled out, 
the police were swarming all over the area, and 
that's when the sh_t really started. We just 
drove straight back here [Ann Arbor]. We thought 
they were nuts. I felt terrible about the whole 
thing. They had laid down this rap about the 
Festival of Life, but that wasn't what they really 
had in mind. They really wanted a
confrontation.105
Sinclair came away from the Chicago experience convinced of
several things. The police responded vastly out of
proportion to the real threat. This meant that the Movement
—  both the counterculture "freeks" and the New Left —  would
I0SASHP-Sinclair Interview, 41-42. This statement was 
made during a 1977 interview. Sinclair's negativism toward 
Abbie Hoffman and the Yippie organizers was not what he spoke 
about after returning from Chicago.
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have to get organized for self defense. By contrast, the 
Yippies' utter lack of organizational skills made clear to 
him that Trans-Love was more than a group of stoned hippies 
playing music. The result was the creation of the White 
Panther Party as the political wing of Trans-Love Energies, 
formally announced by Sinclair on November 1, 1968, whose 
name reflected an enthusiasm for the Black Panther Party.
The Black Panthers' most ardent supporters in the White 
Panthers were Pun and Genie Plamondon. Pun had spent much of 
the summer of 1968 in Ingham County Jail in Traverse City, 
Michigan, on an old marijuana charge.106 While in jail, he 
read of Black Panther leaders Huey Newton and Eldridge 
Cleaver; the latter was running for President of the United 
States on the "Peace and Freedom Party" ticket in California, 
with SDS alumnus Tom Hayden as his running mate for Vice 
President. At this time the Black Panthers were actively 
seeking alliances with "white mother country radicals" in the 
New Left and counterculture. The response from some whites, 
particularly those in the New Left, was a mixture of 
gratification and paralysis. Many were still stinging from 
their eviction from SNCC in 1966. Others stood in awe of the 
Black Panthers and considered them the "vanguard" of the 
Movement's struggle, because of their willingness to shoot it
‘“Sinclair, in Guitar Armv. [page 73] states that 
Plamondon was charged with giving away a marijuana "roach" 
[partially smoked cigarette] to a police officer during a 
trip to his hometown three months earlier. For this, he was 
held on $20,000 bond, and given eighty days in jail.
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out with the forces of authority. Todd Gitlin refers to this 
experience within the New Left as an ongoing debate over 
"what will whitey do" when the struggle reached the violent 
phase. This debate was one of the central focuses of the 
white youth, student, and counterculture movements 
especially after Chicago.
For Plamondon, the Black Panthers' call for white allies
—  white Black Panthers —  was a revelation. The specific
document was an interview with Huey Newton, in which he
suggested that the best way for whites to support the
struggle would be to form their own groups. Reading this,
Plamondon simply thought: "Wow! Of course!."107 When he
returned to Ann Arbor in September, he immediately urged
Sinclair to form a white support group for the Black
Panthers.108 Sinclair was also thinking a great deal about
the necessity of forming some sort of political wing to
Trans-Love. Sinclair recalls:
Eldridge Cleaver in Soul on Ice, turned the trick. 
He had the whole thing: 'These white mother
country revolutionaries,' and so on. F k, we
thought, 'He's talking about us! We must be all 
of the other stuff too.'...They called for someone
107Quoted in ASHP-Sinclair Biography, 57.
108In fact, Sinclair had also been deeply moved by a 1968 
Huey Newton interview, in which the Black Panther leader 
mentioned that whites should support the BPP by organizing 
their own revolutionary "White Panther" cadres. Genie 
recalls that, on John's recommendation, she took this 
newspaper article to Pun in prison. Nonetheless, it was 
Pun's fervent support for the White Panther idea that 
convinced John to go along with the new title. See ASHP- 
Genie Plamondon Interview, 9.
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to start the White Panthers, and we felt like we 
were the ones who understood all of what they were 
talking about. We guessed that it might as well 
be us.109
Therefore, the Black Panther model was adopted. "Whether you 
know it or not, YOU are the White Panthers," Sinclair related 
in his "Rock and Roll Dope" Fifth Estate column in mid- 
October, within a few weeks of Plamondon's return.110
Despite the alleged influence the Black Panthers had on 
the white movement, Trans-Love Energies in Ann Arbor, 
Michigan, was the only white radical group to act on Newton's 
suggestion. Throughout the evolution of the Artists Workshop 
and Trans-Love Energies, Sinclair and his group rarely 
emphasized the national black struggle. They also ignored 
the leftist labor organizing that was building in Detroit's 
black community during the sixties. However, their worship 
of black music and culture, especially jazz, was one of their 
defining characteristics, and black jazz artists such as 
Charles Moore had been leaders in the Artist Workshop. The 
1966-1967 "flower power" period found the white 
counterculture moving in one direction ("peace and love"), 
while elements of the Black Power movement advanced in 
another ("armed self defense").
Events of the late sixties —  particularly the 
heightened police interest in both white radicals and Black
109ASHP-Sinclair Interview, 44.
110Fifth Estate. October 17-30, 1968, 20.
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nationalists —  created the belief among white leaders that 
their plight was similar to that of the blacks whom they 
envied.111 Thus, the Black Panther model was available at 
a critical moment in the evolution of Trans-Love Energies. 
Chicago convinced it of the need to organize more effectively 
than the Yippies. The Black Panthers had a viable 
revolutionary organizational structure to imitate. Trans- 
Love's adoption of the name "White Panthers" demonstrated the 
group's total support for self defense in the face of 
increased police and establishment harassment.112 "White 
Panthers" gave the group radical certification and, they 
hoped, credibility as a "vanguard" revolutionary 
organization.
At first, the White Panther Party for Self Defense was 
little more than a name. The organization's "Ten Point 
Program," unveiled in Sinclair's "White Panther State/meant" 
of November 1, might have been distributed by a Yippie:
m By mid-1970, Sinclair turned to similarities between 
Third World colonies struggling for freedom from imperialism 
and the "youth colony" in America struggling for self- 
realization alongside of the "black colonies" in U.S. cities. 
See "Report to the Central Committee of the Youth 
International Party (White Panthers), By John Sinclair," 
1970, JLSC/BHL, Box 17, Folder 19, "White Panther Ideology" 
[unpublished series of Sinclair's prison writings].
112For an excellent analysis of how "deference to the 
black left degenerated into White Pantherism," see Michael W. 
Miles, The Radical Probe: The Logic of Student Rebellion. 
(New York: Atheneum, 1971), 258-71. Miles, on page 270,
laments the New Left's essentially bourgeois origins and 
criticizes the youth movement as "not an alternative to 
bureaucratic capitalism, but a symptom of it."
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1. Full endorsement and support for the Black Panther 
Party's 10-point program and platform.
2. Total assault on the culture by any means necessary,
including rock and roll, dope, and f king in the
streets.
3. Free exchange of energy and materials —  we demand the 
end of moneyl
4. Free food, clothes, housing, dope, music, bodies, 
medical care —  everything free for every body!
5. Free access to the information media —  free the 
technology from the greed creeps!
6. Free time and space for all humans —  dissolve all 
unnatural boundaries!
7. Free all schools and all structures from corporate rule 
—  turn the buildings over to the people at once!
8. Free all prisoners everywhere —  they are our comrades!
9. Free all soldiers at once —  no more conscripted armies!
10. Free the people from their phony "leaders" —  everyone 
must be a leader —  freedom means free every one! All 
Power to the People!"3
In fact, the tongue-in-cheek nature of the early White
Panther Party is something that few people —  most
importantly the police and FBI —  realized. The naming of a
"Central Committee" demonstrated Sinclair's penchant for
Yippie-like theatrics, with positions such as "Minister of
Religion" and "Minister of Demolition."114 The White
Panthers wanted to have fun; any analysis must note that the
principals were all in their twenties and viewed much of what
113Sinclair, Guitar Armv. 105.
114In fact, the WPP was originally conceived as "'an arm 
of the Youth International Party.'" See Sinclair, Guitar 
Armv. 101.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
254
was going on around them —  the music, partying, and 
togetherness of "youth rebellion" —  as plain and simple fun. 
As Theodore Roszak states, the counterculture in America 
during the sixties had few historical models of leftist 
rebellion and organizing to draw upon, as their European 
peers did. American counterculture radicals, he claims, 
assumed positions that were "more flexible, more 
experimental, and....more seemingly bizarre" than any of 
their historical predecessors.115 By declaring that rock 
music, marijuana use, and sex in the streets would bring 
about revolution, the White Panthers introduced something new 
in American utopian radicalism. They took a pre-rock and 
roll model of beatnik hedonism, added LSD and high-energy 
electric music, and concluded that the simple act of 
liberating young white people from all of the inhibitions of 
American society would bring about a new society. No 
historical models existed to guide them; while looking for 
something new, they made many mistakes.
Much of the conservative establishment in Ann Arbor, 
including the local police and FBI, ascribed intentions to 
Sinclair and his group that they clearly did not possess. 
The police believed that the White Panthers had united black 
and white revolutionary forces, even though evidence could 
not be found. Police authority took the inflated White
115Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture. 4.
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Panther rhetoric at face value, and equated their advocacy of 
violent acts with the commission of specific crimes."6
In 1970 Sinclair admitted that the WPP "was not an 
organization when it was formed, but a bourgeois paper 
construct or media myth based on the image of the Black 
Panther Party."117 In constructing the White Panther myth, 
Sinclair and Plamondon sought to portray their organization 
as truly revolutionary in character, a workable model for 
organizing the nation's politically ignorant counterculture. 
However, over the next three years, as a result of heightened 
police and FBI interest in the group, as well as the Nixon 
Administration's decision to utilize the White Panther CIA 
Conspiracy Trial as a vehicle through which to test the 
constitutionality of the Mitchell Doctrine, the WPP myth 
acquired a more potent basis in reality.
Central to Sinclair's concept of the White Panther myth 
was his appreciation for the power of the national "straight” 
media to deliver the WPP message to thousands of alienated 
youth. He was impressed with how the Yippies, lacking a 
viable organizational structure, were able to generate 
international media attention for their "Chicago Festival of 
Life." Although he viewed the straight media as part of the 
old "pig death culture" that would someday be replaced by the
116Discussing the initial police reaction to the WPP, 
Sinclair states "They took us a lot more seriously than we 
did ourselves." See Guitar Armv. 205.
117"Report to the Central Committee..."
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"life culture" he espoused, he hoped to "co-opt" the national 
media into spreading WPP propaganda. "We can work within 
those old forms, infusing them with our new content and using 
them to carry out our work," he asserted.118 He understood 
the risks associated with attracting the "straight" media, 
having received exclusively negative coverage from the 
Detroit dailies during 1967's Belle Isle "Love-in." Yet he 
was willing to run the risks of bad publicity and one-sided 
journalism in the interest of turning on the "straight" youth 
of America to the possibilities of the White Panther program. 
He believed that by utilizing the straight media, the White 
Panthers could force their own definition of reality on the 
larger society which the media served. He also believed that 
by exposing the police repression, he could convince others 
of the political nature of the struggle.
Sinclair's vision of the White Panther Party was 
audacious, to say the least. As he explained in a 1970 
interview:
We used to make it a point to smoke joints on 
stage at the Grande every time we played there in 
those days, to show the kids that the pigs weren't 
sh_t, and we constantly pushed the outlaw thing so 
they could understand our culture, this thing we 
were all engaged in, was a political phenomenon 
above all. That's how so many 'non-political' 
kids, like thousands and thousands of them, were 
able to get into the White Panther thing in 1968, 
because we based all our propaganda on rock and
roll, dope, and f king in the streets, and we
said, dig, this is the revolution, people, this is 
what they're attacking us for....but that ain't
118Sinclair, Guitar Armv. 116.
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nothin, we can smoke dope and get high any time we 
wanna, we might have to fight for it but if that's 
what we gotta do then that's what we'll do.119
At first, Sinclair had reason to be optimistic: under his
management, the MC-5 had evolved from an average "garage
band" into a nationally-recognized group with a recording
contract on a major label. In clash after clash with police,
Sinclair and the MC-5 were still on the streets and in the
high schools, and WPP membership grew at a steady pace.
After the inauguration of the WPP in November, 1968, Sinclair
began devoting increasing amounts of his time to cultivating
press coverage of the MC-5 and the White Panthers, issuing
press statements, telephoning radio and television stations,
and utilizing the underground press whenever possible. He
helped found the Underground Press Syndicate (UPS), a
national news-sharing organization intended to be the
equivalent of an underground Associated Press.
Sinclair had learned from the Yippies that there was a 
direct relationship between the level of sensationalism in 
the press/media message and the degree and intensity of 
coverage. Early White Panther press releases and propaganda 
were intentionally overstated. "If you make it outrageous 
enough," Plamondon later recalled, "the networks will pick it 
up."120 The degree to which Sinclair was conscious of the 
impact that his propaganda might have via the "straight"
I19Quoted in Ibid. . 200.
120Quoted in Silberman, "The Hill Street Radicals," 49.
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media is revealed in a July 4, 1969 letter to Leni, in which
he laid out his ideas for a re-statement of the WPP's ten-
point program. In a handwritten note following the proposed
restatement, he wrote:
Try this —  I don't know if it sounds too pompous 
or not, but I tried to cover everything...When 
addressing people this should be read... People 
might not agree with it, but it's there to be 
dealt with...I wanted to cover the questions the 
straight people always ask and still be 
comprehensible to the kids...The whole thing 
should go together in one pamphlet with symbols, 
photos of me, Pun, etc.121
Bret Eynon believes that by adopting the Yippie tactics of
"outrageous sensationalism," the White Panthers reduced their
message to simplistic slogans attacking the police and other
forces of authority, a strategy which, he argues, did not do
justice to the richness of the group's thinking or its
significant cultural accomplishments. Eynon contends that
just as Sinclair's vision of personal liberation was reaching
its "clearest articulation," with the origins of the White
Panthers, his radical posturing invited police repression,
ultimately robbing him of his personal freedom.122 Eynon's
analysis overlooks (or devalues) two important
considerations. The same radical posturing that invited
police surveillance also created a national following, and
gave White Panthers radical certification among other
,2lDraft of revised "White Panther Party 10-Point 
Program; What We Want/What We Believe," July 4, 1969,
JLSC/BHL, box 17, folder 19, "White Panther Ideology."
I22ASHP-Sinclair Biography, 68.
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Movement groups. The MC-5's popularity was rooted in their 
radical message. Also, the overblown White Panther rhetoric 
reflected an incremental radical progression, rather than a 
sudden surge to the left —  an evolution which mirrored 
national trends for the Black Power, anti-war, and New Left 
movements.
During the eight month period following the unveiling of 
the White Panther manifesto, the social polarization of 
American society increased at a rapid pace. The FBI 
initiated a COINTELPRO specifically designed to disrupt and 
destroy the New Left. Following Nixon's election, many 
college campuses saw the use of undercover agents, employed 
by various federal and state law enforcement agencies. In 
the spring of 1969 came the fragmentation of SDS and the 
first incident of National Guardsmen shooting unarmed hippies 
and students: the People's Park riots at the University of 
California, Berkeley. Other campus confrontations paralyzed 
universities across the country. Beatnik poet Allen 
Ginsberg, a favored speaker on the college circuit, claimed 
that the police and National Guard across the country were 
gassing and beating so many students "its like they're 
manufacturing violent radicals by the milliard."123 Todd 
Gitlin sums up the social disorder of period:
In the year after August 1968, it was as if both
official power and movement counterpower, equally
123Michael Schumacher, Pharma Lion: A Critical Biography 
of Allen Ginsberg. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 541.
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and passionately, were committed to stoking up 
'two, three, many Chicagos,' each believing that 
the final showdown of good and evil, order and 
chaos, was looming...All across the country Black 
Panthers shot it out with police, with more police 
dying than Panthers, but the list of martyrs piled 
higher...Cleaver was a folk hero...The Justice 
Department wheeled out conspiracy charges and 
created the Chicago 8...Journalists recognized the 
movement as a running story, like Vietnam...[the] 
underground press recorded arrests, trials, police 
hassles, and brutalities...The once-solid core of 
American life —  the cement of loyalty that people 
tender to institutions, certifying that the 
current order is going to last and deserves to —  
this loyalty, in select sectors, was 
decomposing...underneath [it all] grew a sublime 
faith that the old sturdy-seeming ways [of the 
ancien regime] might be paper-mache and that the 
right trumpet blast —  the correct analysis, the 
current line, the correct tactics —  might bring 
them crashing down.124
The excessive White Panther message of "revolution" was 
undoubtedly influenced by the increased militancy 
characterizing both sides of the struggle on the national 
level —  the Movement and the conservative establishment —  
during the 1968-1969 period. The campus of the University of 
Michigan in Ann Arbor became one of Gitlin's "select 
sectors," in which young people were abandoning old 
institutions at a rapid pace. Working from their two commune 
houses on the outskirts of the university, the White Panthers 
delivered the message that the radical white youth of America 
were a persecuted "colony," not unlike that of America's 
urban blacks or such Third World anti-imperialist movements 
as the Vietcong (National Liberation Front) in South Vietnam.
124Gitlin, The Sixties. 342-45.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
261
"Our culture is a revolutionary culture" Sinclair wrote in 
June of 1969, adding "we have to realize that the long-haired
dope-smoking rock and roll street-f king culture is a whole
thing, a revolutionary international cultural movement which 
is absolutely legitimate and absolutely valid." In 
opposition to a "youth colony" movement, Sinclair saw a "pig 
power structure," reflecting the "low-energy death culture" 
of American capitalist society. Lamenting that the "honkie 
power structure" was cracking down on the youth movement by 
employing such tactics as drug busts, expensive and time- 
consuming court litigation, and wrongful imprisonment, 
Sinclair believed it would even resort to "kill[ing] us if 
they can get away with it." Events of 1968-1969 confirmed 
his suspicions, as police surveillance increased, and the 
White Panthers faced a staggering number of arrests.
The local police and FBI response to the White Panthers 
was directly related to the level of threat which they 
perceived. The escalating social disorder of the period 
affected the police's interpretation of the perceived threat 
from John Sinclair and the White Panthers. Upon leaving 
office in early January, 1969, Attorney General Ramsey Clark 
stated that one of the greatest challenges facing the 
incoming Attorney General, and the law enforcement community 
in general, would be "keeping a sense of balance in law 
enforcement attitudes toward the very great tensions and 
anxieties that exist in the country today....[and]
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maintaining a fair and effective enforcement of the law that
is neither repressive nor permissive."125 State and local
police Departments in the Detroit/Ann Arbor area during the
late sixties struggled with trying to maintain objectivity.
A majority of officers from within the "conservative
establishment" viewed the White Panthers as a genuine threat
to society. These officers were able to act out their
attitudes through surveillance and arrests. Their dislike
for radicals was reinforced when groups like the White
Panthers distributed anti-police rhetoric in the pages of
their underground newspapers, at MC-5 shows, and even in the
"straight" media. Although a minority of police officers
clearly took pleasure in hassling Sinclair and the White
Panthers, the majority probably recognized that their primary
duty in conducting surveillance of individuals and groups
suspected of being radical was to identify those who were
breaking the law, or inciting others to do so. As former
Detroit U.S. Attorney Ralph Guy asserts:
Initially, you can't tell the difference between 
the drug users, the hippies, and the hard-core 
radicals who meet in Canada to plot acts of 
violence. Erring on the side of caution is what 
the Government did...At the time I felt the 
Government was justified in this surveillance.
Guy has a point. But the police often erred in equating the
mere advocacy of violence and "revolution" with actual
criminal acts —  and treating those who engaged in radical
125Quoted in New York Times. January 7, 1969, 18.
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rhetoric as though they were criminals. The Yates and Jencks 
decisions of the late fifties extended the First Amendment's 
free speech protections to include the advocacy of violence, 
absent any overt criminal act(s) .126
The local Detroit and Ann Arbor police might have acted 
with greater restraint if radical rhetoric and posturing had 
been all they were up against in their daily duties. 
However, beginning in the fall of 1968, a wave of violent 
anti-establishment bombings took place across Southeastern 
Michigan, targeting unmanned police cars and other symbols of 
the establishment. David Joseph Valler, an individual with 
a bizarre history, demonstrating that peace-loving hippies 
occasionally turned militant, was responsible for a majority 
of the bombings. Born on August 12, 1944, in a Detroit slum, 
Valler grew up on the concrete streets of the city. Between 
jobs at General Motors and elsewhere, he attended Wayne State 
University for a year and a half, coming into contact with 
the "alternative" crowd along the way; he recalls believing 
that the long-hairs were "noble souls working for the 
abolition of the war."127 By 1966 he was an occasional
126Ralph Guy personal interview with author, July 17, 
1992, Ann Arbor, Michigan. For information regarding the 
Yates decision, see Donner, The Age of Surveillance. 21.
127Quoted in Bio Fat. June, 1970, 20. [Ann Arbor,
Michigan underground newspaper, Davis Papers]. Bob Hippier 
and Bill Benoit's article, based on interviews with several 
former associates and Valler's own writings, outlines 
Valler's transformation from peace-loving hippie to "mad 
bomber."
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member of the local SDS chapter, as well as a regular member 
of the Detroit Committee to End the War in Vietnam (DCEWVN). 
He contributed to the Fifth Estate, and knew several of the 
Artists Workshop members on a casual basis. Dropping out of 
WSU in 1966, he became a full-time drug dealer, usually 
consuming his profits in marijuana, speed, and LSD (200+ 
"trips," he asserts). Over the next two years he consumed 
ever-increasing amounts of drugs, lived in several Detroit 
communes, and acquired a reputation as a "freak" among the 
hippies who were gathering in the WSU area. During one of 
his trips to California during the winter of 1967-1968 he 
decided to return to Detroit and run for President of the 
United States, on a platform of peace, love, and legalized 
LSD. By all accounts, he approached his candidacy with 
evangelistic fervor, printing and distributing thousands of 
fliers in Detroit, New York, and San Francisco. His 
candidacy earned him the title of "President Dave" in 
Detroit's alternative community, and the Detroit News did a 
story concerning his write-in campaign. Editors of the Fifth 
Estate allowed him access to their mimeograph machine, and 
Trans-Love member David Sinclair (John's brother) assisted 
him with preparing and handing out campaign materials. 
During the spring of 1968, two events shattered his 
dedication to peace and love: a motorcycle gang beat up his 
entire commune, allegedly over a drug deal that had gone 
sour, and later fire-bombed the commune building, known as
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the "White House." In addition, he witnessed a riot in 
Berkeley, California, in which the police randomly beat and 
gassed student protestors. He later recounted his turn to 
violence:
On a sleepless night in Frisco I made up my mind 
to buy some dynamite and blow up my draft board. 
I returned to Detroit and saved up enough money to 
buy 50 sticks of dynamite. While most of my 
friends went to Chicago to cause trouble and get 
tear-gassed, I went to Northern Michigan and 
purchased dynamite. . .Thus the bombings began.128
Between August 30 and October 14, eight different "Valler
bombings" took place across Southeastern Michigan, either
perpetuated by Valler himself, usually with a friend or two,
or by close associates who had requested dynamite from him.
The targets included: police cars parked at Detroit's 10th
and 13th Precinct Stations, the McComb County Draft Board,
the South Lake School Administration Building, a U.S. Army
recruiting office in Detroit, a clandestine CIA recruiting
office in Ann Arbor, and the Institute of Science and
Technology Building on the campus of the University of
Michigan.129 Although no individuals were injured in any of
the explosions, Valler reportedly made several aborted
128Ibid. . 21.
129The I.S.T. was targeted due to widely-circulated 
reports that military research utilized in Vietnam (long- 
range aerial reconnaissance) was being conducted there.
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attempts to deliver a large bomb to a restroom in the Federal 
Building on Beaubien Street in downtown Detroit.130
The bombings created an enormous amount of stress within 
the ranks of the Police Department, because of the seemingly 
random nature of the targeting, as well as the fact that 
police cars and stations were hit. During the height of the 
bombings, a task force of some fifty local, state, and FBI 
officials were assigned to the case. Yet, despite this huge 
commitment in resources, as well as numerous anonymous 
"leads," no major arrests were made until November 9, more 
than three weeks after Detroit News reporter Steve Cain wrote 
a front-page article on Valler, complete with a posed 
photograph, in which he all but admitted being the mastermind 
behind the bombings.131 The indictments of November 9 
charged Valler and eighteen others, including two "Jane Does" 
and four "John Does," with "wickedly, maliciously, and
130Press reports in the Detroit News and Detroit Free 
Press concerning the bombings occurred on an almost daily 
basis during September, October, and November. Some of the 
more useful articles are as follows: Detroit News. September 
2, 1-A; September 10, 1-A; September 12, 17-A; September 20, 
1-A; September 30, 1-A; October 15, 3-A; November 12, 1-A and 
18-A; November 20, 2-A; November 22, 4-A; November 24, 2-A; 
and November 27, 3-B.
131See Detroit News. September 20, 1968, 1-A. Cain's
investigative work involved visiting the hippie communities 
in the WSU area and interviewing anyone who would talk to a 
"straight" reporter concerning the bombings. His front-page 
story on Valler, appearing on September 20, was an enormous 
embarrassment to the Detroit Police Department. Cain asserts 
Deputy Inspector Roy Chlopan of the SIB criticized him, 
claiming the article made his office look bad. See personal 
interviews with Stephen Cain, July 22, 1992, and March 29, 
1993. Currently, Cain is a reporter for the Ann Arbor News.
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feloniously" conspiring to blow up the various establishment 
targets.132 Within a few weeks of the indictments, the 
charges were dropped against several of the defendants, and 
only Valler and one other person remained behind bars. 
Valler eventually received a seven to ten year sentence on 
the marijuana charge (his second offense) , and two to five 
years for possession of an explosive device, to be served 
concurrently.133
Relations between Detroit's white radicals and the 
forces of the establishment reached a breaking point during 
the initial Conspiracy Trial proceedings in November of 1968. 
Both the atmosphere surrounding the case, and the day-to-day 
proceedings foreshadowed the Chicago Conspiracy Trial of the 
following year. On the first day of the trial ultra­
132No Trans-Love members were named in the indictment. 
However, one of the alleged co-conspirators was John W. 
Forrest of Detroit, a future White Panther who, at the time, 
knew Sinclair and Plamondon on a casual basis only. See 
Figure A-12 in the Appendix.
133Acting on several anonymous tips, the Detroit Police 
Department's Special Investigative Bureau (SIB), assisted by 
members of the Michigan State Police Special Investigation 
Unit (SIU) , initiated 24-hour physical surveillance of Valler 
on September 6 [see Figure A-13 in the Appendix]. After 
repeated attempts, an undercover police officer purchased 
marijuana from him on September 27, leading to his arrest on 
October 9 for marijuana possession and distribution. At the 
time of the State bombing indictments, November 9, Valler was 
already in Wayne County Jail, held in lieu of a $35,000 bond. 
See State of Michigan Case No. A-149570, People of the State 
of Michigan v. David J. Valler. et. al. Wayne County 
Courthouse Records Division, 3rd Floor, [microfilm files]. 
See also John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad files, Detroit 
Police Department, Special Investigation Bureau, Inter-Office 
Memorandum, "Information on Recent Bombings Occurring in the 
Detroit Area," September 18, 1968, 2-3.
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conservative Judge Thomas J. Poindexter declared that the 
special circumstances surrounding the case meant that he 
would "not be bound by the normal rules of procedure." After 
listening to several of the prosecution's witnesses —  and 
refusing to let the defense cross-examine any of them —  he 
stated: "This court is going to rule at this point that a 
conspiracy exists, that not all members [of the conspiracy] 
are in custody, and Mr. Valler is a member." Nearly all of 
the motions made by the team of defense lawyers, which 
included some of the best-known attorneys in Detroit, were 
denied by Poindexter. At one point during the hearing, a 
police officer assaulted a defendant in clear view of the 
Judge.134
The tensions surrounding the "Valler State Conspiracy 
Bombing Case" reflected the increasing social polarization 
between white radicals and the conservative establishment in 
the Detroit/Ann Arbor area, at precisely the time when the 
White Panther Party was formed. In fact, the agenda for the 
first WPP Central Committee meeting in early December 
included a discussion of the conspiracy trial, as well as a 
threat that the group would not tolerate police harassment of 
"young brothers and sisters" much longer.135 In this 
atmosphere, it is not surprising that the local and state
134Petroit News. November 22, 1968, 4-A.
I35Sinclair, Guitar Army. 107.
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police forces viewed the newly-formed group with great 
seriousness.
There were other problems as well: (1) the MC-5 was
blacklisted by several major east coast clubs following an 
incident in December of 1968 at the Fillmore East in New York 
City;136 (2) controversy surrounding the group, as well as 
bitter disagreement over the censorship issue, caused Elektra 
Records to drop the MC-5 by May; (3) WPP members were 
arrested on a variety of charges, including illegal drug use 
during the free concerts, indecent exposure, and the printing 
and distribution of obscene materials; (4) Sinclair was 
arrested on April 19 at the Canadian border, on route to an 
MC-5 show, for failing to register as a convicted narcotics 
user before entering a foreign country;137 and (5) Sinclair 
was sentenced on June 10 to thirty days in jail for 
assaulting an Oakland County police officer at an MC-5 show
136The incident occurred during an MC-5 performance at 
the Fillmore, when Sinclair allowed an anarchist group known
as the "Motherf kers," to deliver speeches advocating
violence against the show's promoter, Bill Graham. The 
influential rock promoter was so incensed that he had the 
group "blacklisted” at many important east coast clubs. This 
incident, combined with the problems at Elektra Records, 
essentially stalled the sales of their initially-successful 
debut album. In later years, the band members would blame 
Sinclair's radicalism for ruining their one big chance at 
superstardom. See Goldmine. April 17, 1992, 16-22, 106; and 
Rolling Stone. June 11, 1992, 35-36.
137None of the White Panther lawyers had heard of the 
obscure law. Attorney Justin Ravitz called the case "an 
oddity in the annals of jurisprudence." However, in 1967 
Federal authorities had used the same statute against LSD 
guru Timothy Leary, after he attempted to enter Canada from 
Detroit. See Sinclair, Guitar Army. 166.
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the previous year. Despite these incidents, the WPP remained 
viable and largely intact through the fall of 1969, when the 
group's heightened militancy, as well as a series of violent 
local events, brought them to the attention of Hoover's FBI.
The so-called "Ann Arbor Riots" of June 16-18, 1969,
marked a turning point in the relationship between the
college town's radical community and the police. For weeks
prior to the incident, tensions in the town had been
increasing, fueled by the presence of several radical
motorcycle groups —  as well as ever larger numbers of local
and State Police.138 Three days of chaos began when a group
of "freeks" closed off a section of South University Avenue
(adjacent to the campus) to traffic, declaring the area a
"free and liberated zone" for hippies to get together and
party. It was widely reported that one hippie couple engaged
in sexual acts on the street, in full view of passersby.
Nonetheless, this first evening's events were generally
peaceful, as the White Panthers later recalled:
More people gathered, a few more police cars were 
called to the scene...The police then retreated 
entirely from the area, and the people felt that 
they had won a rare victory in the continuous 
'war' with the police. So the people threw a 
spontaneous 'street party' —  dancing in the 
streets, passing wine bottles around, making music 
and generally having a good time for two or three
,38See "The White Panther Report: Youth Culture, the
South University 'Disorders,' and the Community Interaction 
Project in Ann Arbor," November 17, 1969, JLSC/BHL, box 17, 
folder 19, "White Panther Ideology"; see also ASHP-Taube 
Interview, 18.
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hours...and when the people left the area....they
cleaned up the street.139
The following day, Washtenaw County Sheriff Douglas J. 
Harvey, incensed that his men had been forced to "retreat" in 
the face of a "mob," requested reinforcements from the 
surrounding counties, and readied them at the outskirts of 
town.140 Oakland County Sheriffs Department helicopters 
flew across the city during the afternoon, leading many local 
residents to feel "something ominous" was about to occur. 
The stage had been set for confrontation, and a small group 
of "adventuristic youths" created the "spark" by entering 
South University, raising red flags, and yelling threats at 
policemen. What happened next was a full-scale riot. Dozens 
of police, in full riot gear, approached South University 
from one end of town, while an estimated crowd of 1500-2000 
students, professors, and onlookers filled the other end of 
the avenue. One of Sheriff Harvey's officers announced, via 
a bullhorn, that in five minutes the police would arrest 
anyone still standing on the street. Before five minutes had 
passed, a number of students started running, police in full 
pursuit. As had been the case during the Chicago 
demonstrations some ten months before, many innocent
i39"The White Panther Report," 18.
140Responding to rumors of the police build-up, WPP 
leader Leni Sinclair travelled to the Holy Ghost Seminary, 
where several squads were allegedly encamped. Carrying a 
camera, she was quickly chased out of the area by officers, 
several of whom pointed guns at her vehicle. See Ibid., 19.
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bystanders were clubbed and beaten. Horrified by this, angry
youths began hurling rocks and bottles at the police. What
transpired next was predictable: "The police had swung into
their battle formations and started marching down the streets
in a wedge...the effect was terrifying and increased the
people's hostility a hundred fold."141 Dozens of arrests
followed, and the scene was repeated for the next several
days. WPP member Taube recalls one incident during the riots
that had a big impact on him:
There were hundreds and hundreds of state
troopers...Military formations marching in front 
of our house on Hill Street...It was funny —  I 
walked down the line [of police]... .They were
lined on S. University, arm in arm, full battle 
gear. I said 'Why are you out here?' to one guy
and he said 'Well, I don't really care about the
dancing and all the music and even the dope, but
(in an outraged whisper) f king in the streets!'
As a father and a citizen and a decent human 
being, he was so offended by 'sex in the 
streets'...He was willing to get out there, man,
and just —  Pow! —  shoot these motherf kers if
necessary...And that's a contradiction that I 
never understood. People get outraged at your 
form, but their response is so out of shape.14*
The White Panthers often played the role of peacemakers
during the three days —  on several occasions walking through
the streets with university professors, urging people to
refrain from further provocations. Nonetheless, "official"
press accounts of the rioting implicated the WPP as
141 Ibid., 20.
142ASHP-Taube Interview, 19.
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responsible for egging on the crowds.143 Without question, 
this negative press was responsible for bringing them to the 
attention of J. Edgar Hoover.
Prior to the riots, the FBI apparently had very little 
interest in Sinclair and the White Panthers.144 The first 
reports concerning the WPP sent to the Bureau's Washington 
Headquarters, dated December 31, 1968, and January 14 and 28, 
1969, were from the New York field office. They primarily 
dealt with the MC-5's appearance there in late December.145 
The January 28 memorandum referred to the group as a 
"minuscule left-wing organization."146 Hoover's first 
communication to the Detroit field office concerning the
143Petroit News. June 19, 1969, 1-A.
144No Trans-Love members were implicated or charged in 
the "Valler bombings" during the fall of 1968.
145SAC, New York to Hoover, 62-112678-2, 62-112678-3, and 
62-112678-4. The first FBI communication concerning the 
group occurred on December 12, 1968, an "urgent" teletype 
from the Detroit office to New York (62-112678-1). Nearly 
all of this document —  as well as most of the several 
thousand additional pages of White Panther materials the 
author acquired from the FBI via the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) —  has not been released, thanks to two of the 
FBI's widely-used FOIA exemptions under Title 5 of the U.S. 
Code, section 552, subsections (b)-7-c and (b)-7-d: "Records 
or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but 
only to the extent that the production of such law 
enforcement records or information.... could reasonably be 
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy [subsection c]...[and] could reasonably be expected 
to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including 
a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private 
institution which furnished information on a confidential 
basis...[subsection d]." See Figure 3-4 on page 288.
146SAC New York to Hoover, January 28, 1969, 62-112678-4.
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group, dated January 21, 1969, Indicated that he was more
concerned with their possible support for the Black Panther
Party than with the MC-5's revolutionary potential; referring
to a December, 1968, interview with Eldridge Cleaver in the
Los Angeles underground newspaper "Open City," in which the
interviewer mentioned the Detroit-based White Panther Party's
support the Black Panthers, Hoover requested that both the
Detroit and New York offices "obtain information concerning
this organization" and promptly submit it to
Headquarters.147 Detroit's initial report to Hoover, dated
February 25, 1969, was little more than a re-statement of a
Time article of January 3, 1969, which described the MC-5's
concert at New York's Fillmore East in late December.148
And on May 21, 1969, Detroit's SAC made the following highly-
unusual request:
The White Panther Party... lacks a definite 
membership, has no meetings, espouses no specific 
action, does not sponsor any activities and lacks 
concrete form. Due to the inspecific [sic] nature 
of the group, it is felt that continued 
investigation....would be unproductive and 
unwarranted.149
147Hoover to SAC, Detroit, January 21, 1969, 62-112678-5.
148SAC, Detroit to Hoover, February 25, 1969, 62-112678-
7. See Figure A-14 in the Appendix.
149SAC, Detroit to Hoover, May 21, 1969, 62-112678-14. 
See Figure 3-5 on page 289. The memorandum did state that 
several individual members of the WPP would later be 
recommended for inclusion on the FBI's infamous "Security 
Index." Without question, some of the Detroit SAC's 
information regarding the WPP was incorrect: the group was 
definitely holding semi-regular meetings by the early spring,
(continued...)
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Hoover's response, dated June 6, reflected his enthusiasm for 
long-term surveillance, even in the absence of specific 
criminal acts and/or probable cause. Referring to the fact 
the WPP and its "rock and roll" band continued to be in the 
national spotlight, he added "Detroit is instructed to 
contiuned [sic] to follow activities of this group."150 
However, the Ann Arbor riots left no doubt in Hoover's mind 
concerning the dangers to society posed by the White 
Panthers. An "urgent" teletype from Detroit's SAC on June 18 
stated "Apparent leadership to rally and disruption coming 
from WPP, Ann Arbor, and Trans-Love Energies."151 Hoover 
responded by suggesting that there might be some way to 
prosecute the WPP with "conspiracy to commit violence" —  a 
suggestion that the Detroit SAC ultimately deemed impossible. 
For good measure, Hoover also castigated the Detroit SAC for 
trying to discontinue surveillance the previous month; "Your
149(... continued) 
and by this time thousands of WPP buttons and propaganda 
sheets had been distributed to youth through Southeastern 
Michigan, and beyond. Whether the SAC's comments were made 
due to a lack of credible intelligence —  or perhaps 
purposefully understated the group's radicalism —  is a 
matter of conjecture. Evidence exists that several field 
office chiefs were unhappy about Hoover's fixation with the 
New Left and counterculture.
150Hoover to SAC, Detroit, June 6, 1969, 62-112678-17.
151 SAC, Detroit to Hoover, June 18, 1969, 62-112678-78, 
page 9. Interestingly, the same Detroit report includes a 
Detroit Free Press story on the WPP, which states: "By the 
end of the hostilities, it was the White Panther leaders —  
walking alongside U-M faculty members —  who convinced the 
young rowdy crowd to surrender the blockaded street."
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informant coverage of the WPP is obviously 
inadequate...Premature closing of cases will not be 
tolerated." He added: "The importance of vigorously
investigating and developing information on this organization 
can not be overemphasized and the Bureau will be closely 
following this matter.152 From this point forward, the 
Detroit office of the FBI began covering all White Panther 
events, and copies of all memoranda were also circulated to 
"G-TWO" military intelligence offices in Detroit, as well as 
"local agencies."153
During the four months following the Ann Arbor riots, 
the White Panthers were subjected to local, state, and 
federal surveillance at unprecedented levels.154 This led 
to the loss of the WPP's top leadership, as well as a 
dramatic increase in the group's militancy. It also laid the 
foundation for the Nixon Administration's decision to "use" 
the government's case against the group to acquire legal 
sanction for the Mitchell Doctrine. The White Panthers
152Hoover to SAC, Detroit, June 25, 1969, 62-112678-22. 
See Figure 3-6 on page 290.
153Hoover to SAC, Detroit, June 25, 1969, 176-1558; SAC, 
Detroit to Hoover, August 21, 1969, 180-84-2. These
documents were filed separately from the bulk of the WPP 
files, for unknown reason(s). One possibility is their 
strictly legal focus: searching for a valid "federal
prosecutive effort" against the group (e.g. Hoover's 
suggestion of a conspiracy charge for the Ann Arbor riots).
154In fact, local and state police authorities had been 
conducting 24-hour surveillance of Sinclair for several 
months prior to the riots. See Figure A-15 in the Appendix.
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suffered their worst setback on July 28, 1969, when Detroit
Recorder's Court Judge Robert J. Colombo sentenced Sinclair
to nine and a half to ten years in jail for his third
marijuana offense (dating back to January, 1967).155 In
addition to issuing the draconian sentence, Judge Colombo
refused to set bond because, he argued, Sinclair displayed "a
propensity and a willingness to further commit the same type
of offenses while on bond."156 The impact of the loss of
Sinclair on the White Panthers was considerable, a fact of
which the local authorities were undoubtedly aware. "Skip"
Taube later described the effect of Sinclair's imprisonment
on the group:
The judge said it, and everybody just stood up on 
the verge of just lunging right into them [the 
police]...They hustled John out of the room as 
quick as possible.. .The next thing we knew we were 
just sitting on the steps of the court building
155Although Churchill and Vander Wall's The COINTELPRO 
Papers states that "the Bureau provided considerable 
assistance to the local red squad in setting Sinclair up to 
receive an all but unprecedented.... sentence," the evidence 
they rely upon, Charles Goodell's Political Prisoners in 
America, provides no documentary support for the allegation. 
Credible evidence linking the FBI and/or Federal authorities 
to Judge Colombo's sentencing has not been found by the 
author, and none of the released FBI documents obtained via 
the Freedom of Information Act make reference to the July, 
1969 sentencing. In light of the sentence which "anti­
establishment bomber" David Valler received in May of 1969, 
for second-offense marijuana possession, from the same 
Detroit Recorder's Court (7-10 years), Judge Colombo would 
probably not have needed FBI influence to deliver so harsh a 
sentence to Sinclair. See Churchill and Vander Wall, The 
COINTELPRO Papers. 191; and Charles Goodell, Political
Prisoners in America. (New York: Random House, 1973), 199- 
206.
156Quoted in Sinclair, Guitar Army. 169.
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just like we were all alone...It was too heavy to 
sink in somehow.157
Sinclair had been the central creative force behind the group
from the first days of the Artists Workshop, through the
Trans-Love period, and on to the White Panther era. In
addition, despite his penchant for posturing, his age (27)
and experience (twice imprisoned) made him something of a
moderate —  if judged within the boundaries of the
increasingly militant New Left and counterculture movements.
Lacking his day-to-day leadership and guidance, the White
Panthers pursued a course which brought them close to acting
out their radical rhetoric.
One example involved the newly-formed Detroit chapter.
The chapter's leadership included John "Jack" Forrest, a
native of the city who had been indicted in the Valler
Bombings Conspiracy case in November of 1968. During the
fall of 1969, Forrest and several members of the newly-formed
chapter resided in a second-floor apartment above the offices
of the Fifth Estate newspaper. Peter Werbe, the paper's
Editor, recalls that one afternoon Forrest came running into
the ground-floor offices, in near panic:
He told me that the police were all around the 
building. So I locked the reinforced door 
(protection from right-wing groups, who had made 
many threats), and took the rifles off the gun 
racks on the wall. Forrest looked at me with a 
gleam in his eye and said 'Are we gonna shoot it 
out?' I proceeded to lecture him on the suicidal 
nature of the suggestion and hid the guns so that
157ASHP-Taube Interview, 20.
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the police would not charge me for them. After a 
very tense few minutes of waiting for armageddon, 
I opened the door to find that the police had 
disappeared. Later I learned that several 
Panthers had been on the roof posing with guns and 
topless women for photographs... they were 
posturing idiots.158
The situation for the militant White Panthers went from
bad to worse during the summer and fall. Several members
began openly brandishing rifles and other firearms, engaging
in target practice at rural locations on the outskirts of Ann
Arbor. When Michigan State Police (in full riot gear) raided
a WPP-sponsored meeting of the nation's underground press
editors on a nearby farm, Pun Plamondon and others armed
themselves and began guarding the roads leading to the
encampment.159 In his best-selling book Woodstock Nation.
released late that fall, Yippie leader Abbie Hoffman
discussed how the event contributed to the White Panthers'
increased militancy:
When the Pigs left we had a heavy rap session 
about self-defense...there were White Panthers 
guarding the road with shotguns... There were about 
thirty of us on defense patrol ready to put into 
operation Plan B to fight the Pigs if they 
returned. We had about twenty or so
weapons... Skip Taub[e] laid out a heavy rap about 
what was coming down in the Ann Arbor area like 
Pigs shaving longhairs, searching cars at drive- 
ins, hassling young people in a whole lot of ways
158Peter Werbe personal interview, July 19, 1992,
Detroit, Michigan.
159Leni Sinclair's photograph of Genie and Pun holding 
sentry duty at the media conference was later made into a 
White Panther poster. Widely distributed, the poster
reinforced the WPP myth and association with violence. See 
Figure 3-7 on page 291.
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and not allowing rock music in the park. I 
listened to Skip more careful than I had listened 
to anyone in a long time. In Ann Arbor they were 
working out the mixing of revolutionary outlaws 
and cultural nationalists.160
Years later, Taube recalled that during this period the Black
Panther myth of heroic guerrilla warfare against the
establishment was increasingly part of the WPP credo:
I could see my politics altering my basic 
character...Because we were an imitation of the 
Black Panther Party...What they said was right. 
The police are your enemy and they got guns. You 
gotta protect yourself...I never, and I doubt if 
anybody else ever really sat down and thought what 
does this ultimately lead to? What are the 
consequences?161
Before long some of the "consequences" became apparent. 
The group's leadership was targeted for intense surveillance 
on a national level, while the tactics employed by the police 
and FBI bordered on outright repression. In August, while 
driving home from the Woodstock Festival in Bethel, New York, 
Leni Sinclair and Pun and Genie Plamondon were arrested in 
New Jersey for possession of marijuana.162 The next month,
160Abbie Hoffman, Woodstock Nation. (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1969), 56-57.
161ASHP-Taube Interview, 21.
I62Two factors concerning this "bust" merit close 
scrutiny: (1) the fact that this relatively insignificant
arrest, for very small amount of marijuana, made headlines in 
newspapers across Michigan indicates that someone deemed the 
incident worthy of a major press release, and (2) an 
"Interview Report Form" on the arrest, located in Leni 
Sinclair's Detroit Red Squad file, demonstrates that the 
source —  either New Jersey police or (more likely) the FBI - 
- considered the individuals of enormous importance. The 
source recorded the names, addresses, and telephone numbers
(continued...)
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Pun and Ken Kelley were arrested in Chicago for possession of 
a Boy Scout knife.163 Detroit's FBI was now fully 
participating in the no-holds-barrea offensive against the 
WPP. An August 28, 1969 memorandum from Detroit's SAC to 
Hoover mentioned the possibility of initiating a counter­
intelligence action against the "Detroit Coalition 
Committee," a newly-formed local chapter of the National 
Mobilization Committee to Stop the War in Vietnam (or 
"Mobe").
In order to foster division between Detroit and Ann 
Arbor's white and black movements —  a time-tested COINTELPRO 
tactic —  the SAC recommended that a "fraudulent letter" be 
sent from the national offices of the Black United Front, a 
militant black nationalist group, to the Ann Arbor 
headquarters of the White Panthers, "to help the BUF collect 
the just and modest sum of $25,000.00 from the NMC by making 
a direct overture" to an NMC leader in Ann Arbor.164 The
162(... continued) 
of every person who signed a petition in favor of freeing 
John Sinclair; Detroit was urged to "Please index the names 
on these petitions if they are at all readable." The two 
occurrences indicate that federal authorities were interested 
in doing as much damage as possible to the WPP. See Leni 
Sinclair Red Squad File, "Interview Report Form," undated 
document, [incomplete, because Leni Sinclair was only allowed 
access to the two pages in which her name appears], late 
August, 1969.
163Fifth Estate. October 2-15, 1969, 18.
164At the time, the FBI had an informant among the BUF's 
national leadership in Washington, D.C. Sending an anonymous 
letter from the BUF offices would therefore have been 
relatively easy.
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suggested COINTELPRO action was directed primarily at the
local Mobe chapter, because of the organization's involvement
in the planned "Moratorium” against the Vietnam War,
scheduled for Washington, D.C. that fall.165 Nonetheless,
the White Panthers were an important secondary target, as the
following passage from the memorandum made abundantly clear:
Such a letter would also be a disruptive factor to 
the amicable relations between the WPP and Black 
Nationalist supporters and groups in Ann Arbor, 
inasmuch as WPP would be forced to make a choice 
between BUF cause and the position of the white 
liberals in Ann Arbor who have been critical of 
the war and have to this point supported the 
WPP.166
Although it is unknown whether the initiative was ever 
approved by Hoover and/or carried out in Detroit/Ann Arbor,
165The Nixon Administration went to great lengths to 
investigate the leadership of the planned demonstration. The 
President equated anti-war protest with providing aid to the 
enemy, and, as H.R. Haldeman recalled, usually favored "no 
concession to the left." See H.R. Haldeman, The Haldeman 
Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House. (New York: G.P.
Putnam's Sons, 1994), 100; see also Stephen E. Ambrose,
Nixon; The Triumph of a Politician, vol. 2, (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1989), 302-304. Nixon's desire to do damage to 
the Mobe resulted in increased pressure on the FBI and other 
intelligence agencies to demonstrate the group's socialist 
ties; failing to uncover these supposed links, the agencies 
cooperated to inflict as much damage as possible upon the 
Mobe's leadership. See Churchill and Vander Wall, The 
COINTELPRO Papers. 208-11.
166SAC, Detroit to Hoover, August 28, 1969 [unnumbered 
document]. Reproduced in Churchill and Vander Wall, The 
COINTELPRO Papers. 192-93. See Figure 3-8 on pages 292-93. 
This already publicly-available FBI memorandum was not 
provided to the author as a result of a detailed FOIA 
request, which specifically asked for all materials 
pertaining to the WPP.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
283
a September 9, 1969, memorandum from the FBI's Washington,
D.C, field office (WFO) stated:
During a recent meeting of the National 
Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam 
(NMC), the Black United Front (BUF) demanded a sum 
of money from the NMC for allowing the NMC to hold 
a demonstration in WDC on 11/14/69 - 11/15/69. 
BUF warned that if the money was not forthcoming, 
they would prevent the NMC from demonstrating.
The memorandum also contained the following statement:
"Efforts also will be made to further the rive [sic] in the
black-white movements."167
The White Panther leadership also experienced the
negative effects of their self-created myth as
"revolutionaries" while attending the Woodstock Festival.
Leni, Pun, and Genie travelled to Woodstock to raise
awareness of the imprisonment of John Sinclair, and to ask
for support from within the Movement. With the assistance of
Abbie Hoffman, they hoped to utilize the festival as a
platform through which to politically educate the emerging
legions of the youth culture, just as Trans-Love/WPP had been
167SAC, WFO to Hoover, September 9, 1969, [unnumbered 
document], Bret Eynon Collection, American Social History 
Project, Hunter College, NY, located in the Michigan 
Historical Collections, Bentley Historical Library, 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, box 1, topical file: 
"COINTELPRO, 1969-1970" [hereafter "Eynon Collection/BHL"]. 
See Figure A-16 in the Appendix. The short period of time 
separating the issuance of this memorandum from the similar 
one in Detroit indicates that the BUF action in Washington 
might have been the inspiration for Detroit's SAC. Hoover 
required that successful COINTELPRO actions of this variety 
be shared with other field offices, in an effort to provide 
the SACs with innovative ideas for inflicting damage upon 
targeted individuals and groups.
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doing at MC-5 concerts for years. They wanted to make 
Woodstock a gigantic "Free John Sinclair" rally. Instead, 
they were greeted with hostility. Leni recalls being told by 
several Movement "heavies" that they did not want to 
associate with people who advocated violence. The White 
Panthers' degree of visibility in the nation's underground 
press now backfired on them —  among the very people with 
whom they most wanted to associate. Nor did concert promoter 
Michael Lang allow them access to the microphones between 
acts. At one point, Yippie leader Abbie Hoffman, incensed by 
the "hip capitalist," climbed on-stage as the rock band "The 
Who" were about to begin. Seizing the microphone, Hoffman 
stated:
The politics of the event is pot. Dig it! John
Sinclair's in f kin prison ten years for two
f kin joints. We ought to bust John out of
prison or all this place and music don't mean...
Hoffman was not allowed to finish the sentence, as the
promoters turned off the microphone. He waited until the
band came on-stage, and repeated the act, but this time only
was able to get out the words "Free John Sinclair," because
the band's guitarist, Peter Townshend, clubbed him over the
head. There would be no "Free John Sinclair" rally at
Woodstock.168
168Leni Sinclair personal interview, July 23, 1992,
Detroit, Michigan. See also Abbie Hoffman, Woodstock Nation. 
140-43 [quote 142]. Not surprisingly, the Hoffman-Lang 
controversy was omitted from the enormously successful 
documentary motion picture on the Woodstock festival. The
(continued...)
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From his prison cell, Sinclair also witnessed the 
effects of the police/FBI offensive. In September, his first 
bond hearing was denied, and he was transferred from nearby 
Jackson State Prison to a penitentiary on Michigan's upper 
peninsula, in the town of Marquette. Visitors from Detroit 
would have to spend an entire day driving one-way to see him. 
In addition, Sinclair's popularity in prison, as well as his 
attempts to conduct political education classes for inmates, 
earned him time in "isolation," or solitary confinement. 
However, his departure from the local Ann Arbor "scene" did 
not prevent him from continuing to make a contribution. 
Working with radical attorneys from the National Lawyers 
Guild, Sinclair directed the "Free John Sinclair" movement, 
a national media campaign which generated tens of thousands 
of signatures, calling for his immediate release and the 
reform of Michigan's marijuana laws.
For the White Panthers, the cycle of radical militancy 
peaked on October 7, 1969, when a Federal Grand Jury in
Detroit indicted Sinclair, Pun Plamondon, and Jack Forrest on 
conspiracy charges stemming from the September 29, 1968,
bombing of a clandestine CIA recruiting office in Ann Arbor. 
"Count One" of the indictment charged that the three 
individuals, in conjunction with David Valler, "wilfully and
168(.. .continued)
1994 retrospective compact disc history of the Who, entitled 
"The Who, Maximum R & B," contains a recording of the 
Hoffman-Townshend scuffle.
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knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate and agree 
together and with each other... .to wilfully and knowingly and 
by means of dynamite to injure property of the United States 
thereby causing damage in excess of $100.00; in violation of 
Section 1361, Title 18, United States Code." Count Two 
charged Plamondon with the actual bombing. The indictment 
further listed the following "Overt Acts": (1) several
alleged conversations between Sinclair, Valler, and 
Plamondon; (2) an alleged transfer of dynamite from Valler 
and Forrest to Plamondon; and (3) Plamondon's alleged 
carrying out of the bombing.169 The CIA bombing had been 
one of eight listed in the state Conspiracy case the previous 
winter, the so-called "Valler Bombings." Yet of the three 
defendants, only Forrest had been originally charged in the 
State case. The inclusion of David Valler as an unindicted 
co-conspirator in the October 7 indictment against those who 
would become known as the "Ann Arbor Three," demonstrated 
that the former anti-establishment bomber was going to be the 
government's "star witness."170 However, the U.S. Attorney
169U.S. v. John Sinclair. Lawrence Robert "Pun"
Plamondon. and John Waterhouse Forrest. Case No. 71-1105, 
October 7, 1969, National Archives and Records
Administration, Federal Records Center, Chicago, IL,
Accession No. 276-77-0002, Location No. 563-472, box No. 2.
170This was confirmed in a series of interviews between 
the author and former Detroit U.S. Attorney Robert Grace. 
See Robert Grace personal interviews, July 20, 1992 and April 
1, 1993, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Currently in private practice, 
the former U.S. Attorney spoke at length about the "CIA 
Conspiracy case."
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would have to wait more than a year to start the trial; 
Plamondon quickly went "underground" to allude capture. Soon 
after his arrest in July of 1970, the White Panther "CIA 
Conspiracy Case" acquired a new importance for the Justice 
Department: the Nixon Administration decided to use it in a 
legal maneuver designed to revive the Mitchell Doctrine. The 
White Panthers' significance was now to be seen in how the 
government collected its evidence.
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FBI Teletype, SAC Detroit to Hoover and NY Office 
December 27, 1968 (62-112678-1)
First Available FBI Record Concerning White Panthers
Source: Freedom of information Act Files on WPP
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•’V N l^K O  STATES GOV truV M E N T
Memorandum
to : DIRECTOR, FBI
DETROIT (157-3554) (C)
Jll
d a t e :  5/21/69
subjectiQ h jt e PANTHER PARTY
INFORMATION CONCERNING 
(00: Detroit)
....
 r/o
DATE_j/a/fe-BYS4i
ALL!
i
Re Detroit letter and LHM dated 2/25/69.
Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of a LHM 
concerning captioned matter. One copy of the LHM is 
being furnished Houston, Nee York and San Fk-anclsco 
inasmuch as investigation has been conducted by those 
divisions regarding captioned organization.
Enclosed for the information of Houston and 
San Francisco is one copy of referenced Detroit airtel 
and LHM.
/
Investigation into captioned group indicates 
that the White Panther Rirty is a loosely knit conglomera­
tion of white hippies who believe in cultural revolution, 
r As pointed out in the enclosed LHM the group lacks a /  
n  definite membership, has no meetings, espouses no specific 
r action, does not sponsor any activities and lacks concrete 
^3 form.
-J Due to the lnspecific nature of the group, it
is felt that continued investigation of the White Panther 
Party would be unproductive and unwarranted. However, 
cases have been opened on each of the national officers 
oi the White Panthers and immediately upon completion of 
investigation several of .those persons will be recommended 
lor inclusion on the Sedintity Index because of their 
individual
Bureau (Enc. 11) . „.y
1 - Houston (Enc. 2) (Info) (RM) * "3 B w
1 - New York (100-164951) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - San Francisco (157-3975) (Enc. 2) (Info) (52)“
2 - Detroit (157 (KKTi B g w u w w . . .
- 100-33198) ^
*Ou5f]
01TEFOX7:— /
MWfU
v , ■ . — ’ V
o  1963 Buy U.S. Satiny Bondi RtytUrlj an tb t]
X K ,
?orwifr?rn
(Figure 3-5)
FBI Memorandum, SAC Detroit to Hoover 
May 21, 1969 (62-112678-14)
SAC Detroit Requests Discontinuance of WPP Surveillance
Source: Freedom of information Act Files on WPP
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SAC, Detroit (137-3334)
i. -Waeffiityiiwiww
6/33/69
Director, YBI (62-113678)
a
PERSONAL^ ATTENTION
h.■ y  /*
WHITE PANTHER PARTY (WPP)
18 - MISCELLANEOUS
Reurlet dated 6/31/69 and Bulet dated 6/6/69^l>otb 
captioned as above-.
Your letter recoaaended closing Instant utter 
Indicating that captioned organization u s  a loosely knit 
congloseratlon of wbiid hippie* vbo believed In cultural 
revolution; further, that the WPP lacked a definite seabershlp', 
had no Meetings, espoused no specific action; did not. sponsor 
any activities and lacked concrete fora-, BeBulet denied 
authority to close this case-.
Your letter appeared less than completely accurate 
Lnasaucb as according to your office captioned organization i 
Led a recent "hippy happening" In the Ann Arbor, Michigan; area 
luring which nuaerons arrests were ude; police officers and .A—  
Blvlllans Injured and extensive property dauge resulted; \\
Pro suture closing of eases will not be tolerated;
In view of the above; yotr should laaedlately 
Intensify your Investigation of this group to Identify leaders 
m d  activists In accordance with existing Bureau Instructions;
As these Individuals are Identified, you should submit Informa­
tion developed concerning thea under Individual caption in a 
fora suitable for dissemination with appropriate recoaaendatlons 
relative to their Inclusion on the Security Index.
Your lnforaant coverage of the WPP Is obviously 
inadequate. You should review this natter thoroughly and by 
return mall advise what coverage exists and what steps are 
being taken to Improve this situation. It Is extreaely Important 
that we be fully aware of all activities, aeeting places, 
finances and other aspects of the.operations of pantloped group.
You should subai/^tlMlf^letterhead^awmnd^w 
the activities of this organization as they occur; In additfen, 
within 43 days of tbe receipt of this ccoaunlcatlon you should 
subalt a current report and follow with an un-to-date xeaart 
each 90 darn thereafter.
C UNIT
V P ‘
.IS JON 26 1%3 
SEE NOTE PACB-rme—  — —
(Figure 3-6)
FBI Memorandum, Hoover to SAC Detroit 
June 25, 1969 (62-112678-22)
Hoover Orders Expansion of WPP Investigation 
Castigates SAC for Recommending "Premature closing" of Case
Source: Freedom of Information Act Files on WPP
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(Figure 3-7)
"Pun” and Genie Plamondon with Shotgun 
WPP-Sponsored Ann Arbor Media Conference 
Summer, 1969
Source: Leni Sinclair Personal Photography Archives
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UNITED STATES CC (NMCNT
Memorandum
TO DIRECTOR, FDt (100-449C9H)
t*om : SAC, DETROIT (100-35108)
S U IJE ct: COINTELPRO - NET tfcTT
OUUED: 8/29/69
ReOualrtel dated 8/21/G9.
Daie: 8/28/69
:'l ;' ;\h'' 
/ ; /
I.
I
Following tho Rational Anti-War Conference in 
Cleveland, Ohio, 7/4-3/69, a coalition oi anti-war group* 
in the Detroit area began Meting and an ad hoc c o M l U e e "  
called the Detroit Coalition Conwlttee was forncd.' The1‘if. 
Dotroit Coalition Con* it tea ncets on Monday nlcliiw at via*' 
olt. Michigan, and I 
On* of the Iwi
V C
Sl'i'.v, Woodward Avemio.‘!
f;/ei6 i ® 6 N a
  rd ul ttt___
j.rw'.-..--. who realdet In Ann Arlmr 
and who ia believed to bo a aeabnr of the
S f e o f  the Rcw UobllUatton Cdralttee to End fteTar 
...Jin Violnaa (NUC). Detroit fee la that the present conditions
they exist
rt.it
W m
tardgnons t ra I ion t n wawhi ngl on.to pernit the an 
1/1S/69.
* * I ’ 1/
r)
One altuntlon that seca* to lend i'leolf to tho 
suggestions in referenced Bureau alrlel would m m  counter­
intelligence ac t inn d l ^ ^ o d  aga 1 n s t f g ^ ?/P^rSjaaa. who 
resides at Ann Arbor, and who is a *omi-
one of tho of the Dc (roi l coa 1111 on Cowaitlco,
Delroll feels that a t.-nmilcrlnlulligcncc prngraw directed 
against hlw would have a beneficial effect.
' 2 - |<m-can (ini) ||EC"15 .
2 - Washington Field (Rll) ~  ,i# .
2 - Detroit C w ’RlftilSo/
(I - .100-34371) ■ l l ]0l 4 sw a tw
WRn/cfc
Z’?'- "/! ftiiehrtHy ./.) ) j/
*>4  SEP 1 6  1969 ‘
I 1  II r r ■ -  '' Itl 'lfl ~ ~ ~
f-
•>V US. Suriu&t BauJj RtpLrij iS l/r l’!/jri/l iMriir[i Pl,m
(Figure 3-8)
FBI Memorandum/ SAC Detroit to Hoover 
August 28, 1969 
Request for COINTELPRO Action Against WPP
Source: Churchill, et. al. The COINTELPRO Papers, 192-93
(fig. con'd.)
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DC 100-35108
Tho specific suggestion Is that a letter could 
be written from tho BUF at Washington, 0. C. to the White 
Panther Party (WPP). IS 10 Hill Street, Ann Arbor, .and also 
to tho 'Michigan Dally", University of Ulchlgan student news­
paper at Ann Arbor, pleading the BUF cause. The letter which 
could possibly bo initiated by an Informant In the OUF In 
Washington, D. C., or which could be a fraudulent letter could 
ask tho WPP, a white Militant group that strongly supports 
tho Black Panther Party (DPP), to help tho OUF collect the 
Just and aodost sue of S7S.000.00 frow the NUC l>y waking a 
direct overture totTT— M 1 j 1 „S VnJJ5. «n N1IC leader in Ann 
Arbor. Tho letter couTcT"sTa Lb 11131 the DUF realises that a 
substantial part of tills sun could be easily raised by the 
NUC in Ulchlgan becauso of the nany professional and Academician: 
supporting the anti-war demonstration scheduled for Washington,
D. C. The letter could also slato that a copy Is being directed 
to the University of Ulchlgan student newspaper to further 
publicize the very just nature of tho BUF request.
Detroit feels that the "Ulchlgan Dally" would be 
delighted to publish this type of a letter. It in felt that 
such a letter would be of a disruptive nature If presented 
to tho Detroit Coalition Committee ly g S jraJvroJ and could 
develop Into a situation where
Such a lottor would also bo a disruptive factor to 
tho anlcablo rotations'between the WPP and Blank Nationalist 
supporters and groups in Ann Arbor, inasmuch as WPP would be 
forced to'make a choice hotween BUF eauso and tho position 
of the white liberals in Ann Arbor who have been critical 
of the war and have to this point supported the wpp. The 
Issue In tho letter would bo that the BUF knows that the 
while liberals, who arc identified with the NUC, havo un­
limited sums of money available through their contacts and 
the sole Issue Is whether or not they want to give tho 
$23,000.00 to tho DUF.
Comments of WFO arc requested. If the bureau 
approves of this suggestion, a draft of such a let let* will 
be prepared by Detroit.
- f
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(Figure 3-9)
Group Photo: WPP Without Leaders Sinclair and Plamondon 
[Leni Sinclair is Front Left, Next to Daughter "Sunny"]
Circa 1970 or 1971
Source: Leni Sinclair Personal Photography Archives
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Chapter Four 
1970: Year of Convergence
I.
The Nixon Administration/s willingness to break 
the law in its effort to silence the anti-war 
movement rendered entirely reasonable the
otherwise preposterous fear that we were on the 
verge of an out-an-out police state or some
terrible kind of civil war. —  Carl Oglesby1
Nineteen-seventy was a year of convergence for the Nixon 
Administration and the White Panther Party over the issue of 
"inherent Presidential power" to wiretap domestic radicals. 
By the end of the year the White Panther Party's "CIA
Conspiracy Case" had evolved from a relatively insignificant 
New Left bombing trial into a test case for the
Administration's reassertion of the Mitchell Doctrine. On 
December 14, Attorney General Mitchell issued a memorandum in 
U.S. District Judge Damon Keith's Detroit courtroom, 
outlining essentially the same argument as he had presented 
in the "Chicago Conspiracy Trial" before Judge Hoffman 
eighteen months earlier. The Nixon Administration 
specifically selected the White Panther case as most likely 
to bring Supreme Court agreement with the Mitchell Doctrine.
‘Quoted in Schultz, The Chicago Conspiracy Trial, xii.
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Nineteen-seventy was marked by heightened social 
disorder. Near hysteria concerning crime and lawlessness in 
the streets flourished in response to the actions and 
rhetoric of a small number of far-left fringe groups, such as 
the "Weathermen," an SDS splinter organization. Hundreds of 
bombings took place in cities across America, often targeting 
symbols of the establishment, such as police stations, banks, 
and courts. In early May, the wave of campus revolts in 
response to President Nixon's decision to invade Cambodia 
brought about the most intense sustained period of violent 
American protest since the Civil War. The year was also 
characterized by a peak in the conservative establishment's 
counter-reaction against the Movement. Bolstered by a 
President and Vice President who were clearly on the side of 
"law and order," the far right struck back with previously 
unheard of ferocity. The National Guard shootings of unarmed 
student protestors at Kent State University symbolized the 
level of frustration felt by the conservative majority, as 
well as their determination not to remain silent any longer.
Nineteen-seventy was a Congressional election year, and 
partisan politics played an increasingly significant role in 
the worsening polarization of society. Anti-crime hysteria 
provided political advantages for President Nixon, as it had 
during his successful election bid in 1968. He and Vice 
President Spiro Agnew portrayed the Democratic opposition as 
"soft on crime." Unwilling to reach out to such disaffected
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minorities as youth, blacks, and the poor, Nixon's political 
strategy throughout the year centered on appealing to the 
increasingly conservative "silent majority." Nixon knew that 
a clear majority of American voters favored not conciliation 
with anti-war protestors and radicals, but cracking down on 
them. Responding to this call for action, and attempting to 
keep his 1968 "law and order" campaign promises, Nixon 
sponsored a barrage of anti-crime bills in Congress, 
including preventative detention, "no knock" laws, the death 
penalty for bombers, and "Title VII." This last bill boldly 
attempted to overturn the Alderman decision, by providing a 
wide exception to the requirement in Alderman that the 
government turn over to defendants the surveillance logs of 
illegal (warrantless) wiretaps. By mid-September, the GOP 
clearly dominated the crime issue, forcing the Democrats onto 
the defensive, and preventing them from effectively taking 
advantage of the issue with which a majority of Americans 
were most concerned: the worsening economy. Determined to 
prevent the GOP from outflanking them on the crime issue, 
Democrats passed most of the Administration's anti-crime 
package in October, on the eve of the election.
The atmosphere of fear and polarization in American 
society during 1970 influenced the Nixon Administration's 
wiretapping policies, both public and secret, in several 
ways. Bolstered by public opinion polls stating that a clear 
majority favored the curtailment of protestors'
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Constitutional rights, the Administration displayed 
increasing boldness in its public statements regarding 
surveillance practices. By early summer, the Justice 
Department had initiated a public relations campaign aimed at 
increasing support for heightened surveillance of radicals 
and "organized crime," and promoting the benefits of long­
term investigative surveillance as a tool to prevent future 
bombings and violence. With public opposition to wiretapping 
limited to a small minority of liberal organizations and 
newspapers, Attorney General Mitchell was confident enough to 
report in mid-July that court-approved wiretaps had increased 
100 percent over the previous year. However, he continued to 
remain all but silent concerning the Administration's claim 
of legal authority to utilize warrantless "national security" 
wiretaps against suspected domestic radicals.
The Administration's secret surveillance policies 
advanced at a much more rapid pace, best symbolized by the 
establishment of the "Huston Plan," an attempt to centralize 
and expand the domestic surveillance operations of the entire 
U.S. intelligence agency network, under the direction of the 
White House. Including such illegal tactics as break-ins 
("black bag jobs"), political kidnapping, and vastly expanded 
warrantless wiretapping and bugging, the plan demonstrated 
the Nixon Administration's obsession with acquiring 
intelligence about New Left radicals, anti-war protestors, 
and political opponents in general. Since his first days in
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office, Nixon's desire for expanded intelligence had been 
frustrated by a combination of "barriers," including a 
privacy-minded Supreme Court, a powerful bloc of liberal 
Congressman and Senators, and a press corps dedicated to 
exposing governmental surveillance of citizens.
In 1970, Nixon encountered an additional, albeit 
unlikely, obstacle in the person of J. Edgar Hoover. Nearing 
retirement and concerned about his reputation, Hoover shocked 
the intelligence community (and Nixon) by vetoing the Huston 
Plan in late July. The Administration lost no time mending 
fences with the powerful Director, however, and by the fall 
he agreed to vastly expand warrantless wiretapping of student 
radicals and others.2 This expansion of warrantless wiretaps 
signaled a bold shift in FBI surveillance practices, and 
demonstrated both the law enforcement community's concern 
with the high level of social disorder in America, as well as 
Nixon's willingness to gamble that this surveillance would 
ultimately be deemed legal, via the Mitchell Doctrine.
The Administration's reinstitution of the Mitchell 
Doctrine took place gradually. On February 20, 1970, at the 
conclusion of the Chicago Conspiracy Trial, Judge Julius 
Hoffman ruled in favor of the doctrine —  the first such 
decision from a U.S. District Court Judge. Although the 
ruling was precedent-setting, the Administration made no
2One of the domestic radical groups eventually included 
in this expanded web of surveillance was the White Panthers.
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public statements regarding it. The media's response to the 
ruling was also minimal. Only after a series of incidents 
during the fall and early winter did the Administration make 
the decision to support publicly the reintroduction of 
Mitchell's "inherent right" memorandum.
During 1970 the White Panthers became an 
internationally-known radical organization, with leaders 
Sinclair and Plamondon regularly appearing in both the 
underground and "straight" press. The Party also became 
known for the two high-profile legal cases involving its 
leaders, Sinclair's marijuana case and the pending "CIA 
Conspiracy" trial against Sinclair, Plamondon, and Forrest. 
The "Free John Sinclair movement" gained national
recognition, with a number of celebrities pledging their 
support. In addition, the CIA bombing case became something 
of a cause celebre in the Movement, particularly after
Chicago Conspiracy Trial attorneys William Kunstler and 
Leonard Weinglass agreed to represent the defendants.
The White Panther myth that had been created largely for 
media effect during the fall of 1968 —  that the group
possessed genuine revolutionary potential —  came closer to 
realization during the year, as Pun Plamondon remained
"underground," eluding Hoover's FBI. On May 5 he earned the 
distinction of being among the first so-called "white 
revolutionaries" to make the "Ten Most Wanted" list. Other 
White Panthers also displayed a heightened radicalism,
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engaging in armed posturing and continuing virulently to 
attack the forces of authority in underground newspapers. 
Throughout the winter and spring, the WPP published 
Plamondon's "messages from the belly of the beast," which 
boasted of the romantic life of an American underground 
revolutionary, and occasionally advocated violence against 
the State. By late summer, a regular feature of WPP "self- 
defense" training was target practice with rifles and 
handguns. In this manner, the White Panthers' evolution 
mirrored the overall shift toward increasing militancy which 
characterized the radical fringe of the New Left and 
counterculture movements during 1970.
With the increasing polarization of American society and 
the hardening of positions on both extremes of the political 
spectrum, the WPP myth brought the group a level of 
acceptance among radical peers in the Movement that had been 
largely absent in previous years. In addition, the 
organization's ability to survive with its internal structure 
intact, at a time when SDS and many other national groups 
were splintering through factional infighting, gave it a 
degree of radical acceptance. WPP chapters continued to 
spread across the U.S.A. and even to Europe. Throughout the 
spring and summer, YIPPIE leaders Hoffman and Rubin worked 
closely with WPP members in an unsuccessful attempt to merge 
the two organizations. An all-female White Panther-YIP 
delegation, which included Pun's wife Genie Plamondon,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
302
received media coverage in May, when it visited Hanoi and 
Moscow on behalf of America's new radical Movement. WPP 
leaders also talked with the Weathermen, particularly before 
they went "underground" during the late winter.
Local forces of authority responded in kind to the White 
Panthers' heightened militancy and national prominence. By 
this time, the Detroit and Ann Arbor offices of the FBI had 
already demonstrated their desire to inflict as much damage 
as possible on the organization by such tactics as COINTELPRO 
actions; and by convincing former Detroit "Mad Bomber" David 
Valler to implicate John Sinclair in the September 29, 1968, 
bombing of the Ann Arbor CIA office. Valler's allegations 
effectively kept Sinclair in prison by convincing Michigan's 
legal authorities that he was a danger to society and should 
not be granted bond. In May, the FBI's Detroit field office 
received a new "Special Agent in Charge" —  Neil J. Welch, a 
career agent with a reputation for getting results. Although 
Hoover assigned Welch to Detroit primarily for the purpose of 
locating the fugitive Weathermen radicals, the new SAC soon 
set his sights on the White Panthers as well. Within six 
weeks of his arrival, Welch requested (and was denied) 
permission to install a warrantless wiretap on the WPP's 
telephone at 1520 Hill Street in Ann Arbor.
On July 23, the FBI captured Plamondon on Michigan's 
Upper Peninsula, bringing to an end his nine months 
underground. Within two months, the FBI elevated the White
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Panthers to the status of a dangerous second-tier 
"revolutionary anarchist" organization. Materials found in 
the vehicle in which Plamondon was travelling at the time of 
his arrest indicated to the FBI the probable existence of an 
international underground support network for fugitives. 
With the FBI under increased pressure from the Nixon 
Administration to locate and bring to justice members of the 
elusive "Weather Underground," the White Panthers appeared to 
represent an excellent potential lead. On August 10, Welch 
again requested permission for the installation of a 
warrantless wiretap on the WPP's headquarters, and this time 
Hoover consented. Installed on September 9, the White 
Panther wiretap remained in operation through January 26, 
1971, one day after Judge Keith issued his famous rebuttal of 
the Mitchell Doctrine.3
During September and October the White Panthers became 
a prime target for the nation's forces of authority. Timing 
was once again critical: the White Panthers' radicalism
peaked at precisely the time when Hoover's FBI was searching 
hardest for evidence of the violent intentions of the New 
Left and counterculture movements. The FBI prepared a 
detailed 107-page report concerning the capture of fugitive
3It is important to note that the Government 
deliberately hid the existence of this wiretap throughout the 
Keith case, in defiance of a U.S. District Judge's order. In 
fact, the FBI did not disclose its existence until 1978, some 
six years after the Supreme Court decision in the Keith case, 
and five years into Sinclair, Plamondon, and Forrest's 
counter-suit against the Government.
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Plamondon, promptly circulated to other local, state, and 
federal law enforcement agencies. On September 22, 1970, the 
White Panthers were discussed in a White House meeting 
between Nixon, Hoover, Mitchell, and a number of prominent 
GOP Congressmen. Three days later, the WPP was the focus of 
hearings by the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on 
Internal Security, as part of its ongoing investigation of 
"the extent of subversion in the New Left." And on October 
12, in a speech delivered to the editors and writers of 
United Press International, Assistant FBI Director William 
Sullivan singled out the White Panthers as one of a handful 
of the nation's most dangerous radical organizations. The 
White Panthers had arrived, at least according to the FBI.
Despite the FBI's growing interest in the White Panthers 
during the fall of 1970, there is little evidence that the 
organization was a primary concern for the Nixon 
Administration and/or the Justice Department until the late 
fall, as the government's "CIA Conspiracy Case" against the 
WPP entered the final pre-trial phase in Detroit. On October 
5, White Panther defense attorney William Kunstler entered a 
motion for the government to disclose all electronic 
surveillance involving the defendants. Shortly thereafter, 
Judge Keith granted Kunstler's motion. Mitchell responded on 
December 14, formally reintroducing the Mitchell Doctrine.
During the weeks before Mitchell's response, the Justice 
Department made several key decisions. First, it decided to
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admit that several of Plamondon's conversations had 
inadvertently been overheard in their warrantless "national 
security" wiretaps of the California Black Panther Party 
during the spring of 1969. It claimed that the wiretaps were 
investigative in nature and aimed at protecting the nation 
from "internal subversion." Second, Mitchell made the 
conscious decision to conceal the existence of the 
warrantless White Panther wiretaps that had been in operation 
since September 9, although Mitchell himself had originally 
authorized the WPP surveillance on August 19, and had 
regularly approved of its continuance at thirty day intervals 
ever since.
The Nixon Administration chose to fight the legal 
showdown over the Mitchell Doctrine in Judge Keith's Detroit 
courtroom sometime between October and mid-December of 1970. 
The wording of Mitchell's memorandum was purposefully blunt 
and belligerent, shocking not only Keith, but also Detroit 
U.S. Attorney Ralph Guy, who had apparently not been privy to 
the government's last minute maneuvering. Knowing Keith's 
race [black] and overall liberal record, the Justice 
Department gambled that he would reject the Mitchell 
Doctrine, providing the shortest possible route to the 
Federal Appeals Court in Cincinnati, and possibly to the 
Supreme Court, where a final determination on the legality of 
the Mitchell Doctrine would ultimately have to be made.
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Why did the Nixon Administration choose to re-initiate 
the Mitchell Doctrine? Previously secret FBI and Justice 
Department documents make clear that while the Administration 
was publicly silent on the Mitchell Doctrine, it secretly 
instituted internal wiretapping policies which permitted, and 
in some cases encouraged, warrantless wiretaps on domestic 
radical groups —  though such wiretaps could not be admitted 
in court. Initially limited to a few groups, warrantless 
wiretapping eventually was expanded to include a large number 
of New Left and anti-war groups during the fall of 1970, as 
the urgency with which the Nixon Administration sought 
increased surveillance of the anti-war movement increased. 
However, the Alderman and Giordano decisions remained a 
formidable barrier for the Administration, preventing Nixon 
from acquiring the Constitutional power to wiretap domestic 
radicals without warrant and to utilize the fruits of this 
surveillance selectively in criminal proceedings. The two 
decisions dictated that, in any case involving warrantless 
"national security" wiretapping, the government must disclose 
to defendant(s) the transcripts of such surveillance, rather 
than relying upon a judge's in camera determination of the 
surveillance's relevance to the case. They also narrowed the 
definition of "national security" wiretapping to include only 
"foreign intelligence" surveillance. The Administration's 
attempts to circumvent the Supreme Court's wiretapping 
decisions via Title VII legislation were unsuccessful. By
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late fall, there was a substantial difference between the 
Administration's publicly stated wiretapping policies and its 
actual practice.
However, the anti-crime hysteria in American society 
created an excellent atmosphere in which to debate 
wiretapping and internal security. Congress approved much of 
Nixon's anti-crime package, including several provisions of 
questionable constitutionality. Evidence that the Justice 
Department recognized, and was fully prepared to take 
advantage of, the nation's shift toward the security end of 
the rights-security spectrum is contained in a Hoover- 
Mitchell memorandum of August 18, 1970, in which the former 
boldly stated that he anticipated being able to utilize 
evidence obtained from warrantless wiretaps in court. By 
late fall, the Administration clearly was searching for an 
opportunity to re-institute the Mitchell Doctrine.
The decision to use the White Panther CIA conspiracy 
case had more to do with the timing of the trial than with 
any alleged "national security" risk the group posed. The 
WPP case offered the Administration what it most desired: 
speed. Because the defense's motion for disclosure of 
electronic surveillance was entered during the pre-trial 
phase, a mandamus appeal of Keith's order for disclosure 
would immediately send the case to the appeals level. Rather 
than waiting for the conclusion of the trial, which might 
last months, the government would now be able to get an
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immediate determination on the constitutionality of the 
Mitchell Doctrine.
Other factors may have been involved as well. Soon 
after the GOP's lackluster showing in the November elections, 
Nixon formulated much of his campaign strategy for the 
upcoming 1972 Presidential race. A critical component of his 
political strategy was the gradual de-escalation of U.S. 
troop levels in Vietnam, a process known as "Vietnamization." 
This strategy required time, which meant a prolongation of 
the war, and therefore a continuation of the anti-war 
movement. Thus, Nixon's desire to silence New Left radicals 
was stronger than ever. The Mitchell Doctrine, if approved 
by the Supreme Court, would have offered a nearly perfect 
weapon to use against Nixon's opponents. The measure would 
have granted the Executive Branch virtually unlimited
surveillance power, which the Justice Department would 
certainly have utilized against the full spectrum of New Left
organizations. Equally important, the doctrine would have
empowered the FBI to listen in on suspected radicals'
telephones for as long as it liked, without justifying each 
wiretap before federal judges.
The law enforcement feature of the Mitchell Doctrine 
most desired by the Administration was the ability to 
selectively utilize information from warrantless wiretaps in 
court. By the winter of 1970-1971, a large number of cases 
involving "national security" wiretaps were either already in
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the courts, or pending. Supreme Court acceptance of the 
Mitchell Doctrine would have significantly boosted the 
government's chances of obtaining convictions —  and the net 
effect would surely have been a chilling of dissent.
The public's growing concern about the threat of 
individual privacy in the approaching age of computerization 
may have also motivated the Administration to act hastily. 
By late spring, revelations concerning the Army's widespread 
practice of spying on college campuses and its storage of 
intelligence dossiers on tens of thousands of Americans made 
headlines across the country. By the end of the year, 
Senator San Ervin's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights 
focused on the citizen's right of privacy versus the 
government's right to collect, analyze, store, and distribute 
information concerning citizens, in the interest of "national 
security." Additional revelations concerning the degree to 
which law enforcement and other agencies were collecting and 
sharing information on Americans' personal lives appeared in 
the national media on an increasing basis. There can be 
little doubt that increased public concern with privacy, 
combined with revelations of wrongdoing by law enforcement 
officials, did not portend well for the Administration's 
overall anti-crime offensive —  or for the Mitchell Doctrine. 
Nixon, Mitchell, and Hoover may have recognized that the 
crisis atmosphere of September and October, which had allowed
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them to push through Congress nearly their entire anti-crime 
package, would not be long lasting.
II.
It is the executive, not the judiciary that 
possesses the background and expertise to make a 
determination if national security is 
involved...This court does not believe it can 
question the decision of the executive department 
on what does and what does not constitute a 
national threat. —  U.S. District Judge Julius J. 
Hoffman4
During the early months of 1970, the Nixon 
Administration's public position on wiretapping remained low- 
key, as it had been since the introduction of the Mitchell 
Doctrine in Judge Hoffman's Chicago courtroom the previous 
June. On February 20, the Administration scored a major 
victory when Hoffman sentenced five of the original eight 
"Chicago Conspiracy Trial" defendants to five years in 
prison, for conspiracy to cross state lines to incite a riot. 
On the same day, Judge Hoffman shocked the defense lawyers by 
issuing a brief oral opinion, in which he ruled that the 
government's wiretaps were, in his judgement, entirely 
lawful. He then ordered the defense to proceed with a taint 
hearing concerning the small number of wiretap logs which the 
government had released during the course of the trial. 
Completely unprepared for the Judge's surprise order, the
4Quoted in New York Times. February 21, 1970, 50.
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defense requested two days to prepare. Hoffman promptly 
denied the request and sealed all wiretap logs for submission 
to the U.S. Court of Appeals.5 Hoffman's oral opinion was 
wonderful news for Nixon: a federal judge had ruled that the 
Executive Branch possesses an "inherent Constitutional power" 
to engage in unfettered surveillance of U.S. citizens, 
without first getting judicial warrants. The ruling must 
have been particularly pleasing for J. Edgar Hoover, who had 
consistently sought an Executive exception to the limitations 
of the Fourth Amendment regarding "national security" 
wiretapping since the early days of the Cold War —  and who 
was largely responsible for the vague language of section 
2511(3) of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Act of 1968, which 
provided the Nixon Administration with one of the primary 
legal channels by which it sought the Mitchell Doctrine.6
Despite the importance of the ruling, neither the 
Justice Department nor the White House sought publicity 
concerning Hoffman's decision. Several factors mitigated 
against the Administration's seizing the initiative. First,
sKinoy, Schwartz, and Peterson, Conspiracy on Appeal.
302.
6Press coverage of the Hoffman ruling was negligible, 
particularly in comparison with the uproar that had occurred 
over the government's introduction of Mitchell's memo the 
previous June. Tom Wicker's editorial, appearing on February 
22, termed the ruling "of far greater consequence" than the 
guilty verdicts for the five defendants. However, neither he 
nor any other New York Times reporter followed-up on the 
issue for months. See New York Times. February 22, 1970, 
section iv, 13.
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even with a federal judge on record in support of the 
doctrine, the Administration still faced the enormous legal 
challenges posed by the Supreme Court's Alderman and Giordano 
decisions.7 Until these decisions could be overturned, the 
Justice Department would not be able to take full advantage 
of the Hoffman ruling. Second, the Administration was still 
facing a highly publicized ACLU law-suit, which alleged that 
the government's assertion of "inherent right" violated the 
First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments to the Constitution, as 
well as the Federal Communications Act of 1934 and the 
Omnibus Act.8 Following Hoffman's ruling, attorneys for the 
plaintiffs in the ACLU suit filed a request with the U.S. 
District Court of the District of Columbia for an immediate 
hearing on the legality of the wiretaps; they hoped to 
convince the court to grant this separate hearing before the 
Court of Appeals considered their Chicago Conspiracy case 
appeals.9 Therefore, despite Hoffman's ruling in its favor, 
the Nixon Administration undoubtedly recognized that a long
70n two occasions during the Chicago trial, Judge 
Hoffman had recognized the Executive's right to exceptions 
from the Alderman/Giordano rulings: first, by preventing the 
defense from having access to the logs, and second, by 
agreeing to the Mitchell Doctrine. See Eliff, Crime. Dissent 
and the Attorney General. 211.
8Pavid Dellinger, et. al. v. John N. Mitchell, et. al.. 
Civil Action No. 1768-69, U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia, June 26, 1969.
9The court refused their motion, however, stating that 
the legality of the government's wiretapping dictum was one 
of the issues which the Court of Appeals would decide in the 
original Chicago Conspiracy case.
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legal battle over the Mitchell Doctrine —  on at least two 
fronts —  was pending.
An additional factor influencing the Administration's 
reticence regarding electronic surveillance policy was its 
ongoing struggle with Congress over anti-crime legislation.
i
By the spring of 1970, the Nixon Administration had been in 
office for a full year, and not a single piece of its 
promised "law and order" legislation had been passed by 
Congress, despite the continuing increase in social disorder. 
The legislation proposed by the Administration contained 
measures of questionable legality, such as: (1) the right for 
police to detain suspects, without charging them, prior to 
conducting a hearing; (2) a so-called "no knock" law, which 
would allow police to enter the home of a suspected criminal 
without prior notice; and (3) a sweeping wiretapping law for 
the District of Columbia, which would allow the use of court- 
approved electronic surveillance for "virtually the entire 
range of offenses contained in the D.C. criminal code."10 
Additional measures proposed in early 1970 included a bill 
granting the Justice Department the right to appeal U.S. 
District Judges' decisions on motions that terminate cases in 
favor of the defendants; another which would limit the 
immunity of Federal Grand Jury witnesses, and one that would 
grant judges the power to tack-on additional thirty-year 
sentences to "special offenders." There was also a proposal
10Quoted in the Washington Post. December 6, 1969, A-14.
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to give the Secret Service expanded crowd control powers by 
making it a federal crime to "use loud or abusive language or 
to disrupt proceedings" near the President's residences. 
These measures were so offensive that on March 10 
conservative Democratic Senator John L. McClellan, Chairman 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Criminal 
Laws and Procedures, urged Assistant Attorney General Will R. 
Wilson to re-think the Administration's anti-crime strategy. 
Though termed "one of the Senate's most aggressive 
crimebusters," McClellan warned Wilson that even if the more 
draconian measures passed, the Supreme Court would very 
likely strike them down, "and all of our efforts....[would 
be] in vain."11
The Nixon Administration's public silence on the issue 
of "national security" wiretapping during the spring of 1970 
might also have been influenced by its bold attempt to 
reverse the Alderman decision, via Title VII of the Organized 
Crime Control Act. Title VII was the Justice Department's 
most important legislative "law and order" initiative 
concerning electronic surveillance. It required that, in 
court cases involving warrantless electronic surveillance, a 
judge must first conduct an in camera review of the logs, 
prior to disclosing any surveillance to the defense, in order 
to determine if information contained therein is relevant to
“Quoted in New York Times. March 11, 1970, 19. See also 
Eliff, Crime. Dissent and the Attorney General. 73-76.
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the case, and thus if disclosure is "'in the interest of 
justice'." The measure also declared that if the 
government's wiretaps were more than five years old, the 
evidence could not be challenged by the defense.12
According to John Eliff, Title VII "placed the Executive 
Branch firmly on the side of an assertion of Congressional 
power to overrule constitutional decisions by simple 
legislation." The most telling aspect of the Mitchell 
Justice Department's sponsorship of the initiative was the 
fact that the Alderman decision had been accepted by a clear 
majority of the Supreme Court (5-3), and that two of the 
three dissenters, Justices Fortas and Harlan, did not 
challenge the majority's basic ruling, but only urged an 
exception for "sensitive" foreign intelligence information. 
In essence, Title VII represented Mitchell's clear challenge 
to the Supreme Court's role as the final authority on 
constitutional standards for criminal justice. The 
initiative died in the House Judiciary Committee, due to 
constitutional objections similar to those raised by Senator 
McClellan. However, the fact that the Justice Department 
fought hard for its passage demonstrated the position which
12Eliff, Crime. Dissent and the Attorney General. 77. 
Only the latter provision survived in the final bill, which 
passed both houses of Congress in October of 1970.
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warrantless wiretapping had within the Administration's 
larger anti-crime offensive.13
New violence across America in the spring of 1970 
provided the Nixon Administration with an excellent 
opportunity to begin publicly supporting the expanded use of 
wiretaps against "organized crime" and "terrorists." By mid- 
April, the nation was shocked by a series of well-publicized 
anti-establishment bombings, which occurred across the 
country.14 On March 6, several members of the Weathermen 
blew themselves up in a Greenwich Village townhouse, 
allegedly while constructing anti-personnel bombs for use 
against various establishment targets. Five days later, 
bombs exploded at the Manhattan corporate offices of IBM, 
Mobile Oil, and GTE. On April 2 the Justice Department 
handed down highly-publicized indictments against twelve
13Title VII was only one of a series of Mitchell anti­
crime initiatives which either were directly in opposition to 
Supreme Court rulings, or else exploited "gray areas" in the 
law for political advantage. For example, in August of 1969, 
Mitchell ordered all federal prosecutors to ignore the 
Miranda decision by allowing voluntary confessions to be 
admitted as evidence, even when defendants had not been 
informed of their rights. Mitchell later justified the 
initiative as an attempt aimed not at putting more criminals 
in jail, but rather to "demonstrate our support for law 
enforcement." In addition, during the spring of 1969 the 
Justice Department gave serious consideration to lobbying 
Congress for Constitutional amendments to reverse the Miranda 
and Wade decisions. See Ibid.. 73.
I4Substantial documentation of the level of fear and 
anger which characterized American society during 1970 can be 
found in the New York Time Cumulative Index (for 1970), under 
the heading "Bombs and Bomb Plots" (pages 220-225). 
Approximately fourteen and a half eight-inch columns are 
dedicated to this topic.
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"underground" Weathermen fugitives in Chicago, charging them 
with conspiracy and violation of the Federal Anti-riot Act, 
for their violent assault on people and property in the 
streets of Chicago the previous fall (the so-called "Days of 
Rage").
"Weathermen hysteria" also provided the pretext for a 
thinly-veiled pro-wiretapping public relations campaign, 
initiated by "anonymous" White House aides on April 11, in a 
New York Times interview. Referring to the March 6 
Weatherman bombing, one aide asserted that if Justice 
Department officials had acquired advance knowledge of the 
bomb-making operation (presumably via warrantless wiretaps), 
they might have been able to arrest the persons involved 
before they blew themselves up. Another aide stressed the 
need for "broader public awareness" of the potential benefits 
of expanded electronic (and other) surveillance techniques. 
This New York Times article contained several important 
points. First, the Administration was moving toward a public 
position that long-term "investigative" surveillance should 
be legal, on the basis that it would have a preventative role 
in stopping crime before it happens. One aide asserted that 
the President was "less interested in prosecuting individuals 
than he was in gathering information to 'prevent the 
perpetuation of an act of violence.'"15 Prior to the
l5New York Times. April 12, 1970, 1, 69. Commenting on 
this article, Donner states that "The scene was set for basic
(continued...)
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sixties, this position was rarely expressed outside of 
intelligence circles.16 And yet by 1970, the violence and 
polarization characterizing American society convinced even 
members of the Judiciary of the relevancy of "investigative" 
surveillance. A case in point was Anderson v. Sills, a June, 
1970, ruling by the New Jersey Supreme Court, which held that 
because police have both a preventive as well as a 
prosecutorial role, intelligence collection need not be 
limited only to information which constitutes the basis of 
the criminal charge itself.17 Another of the article's 
important implications concerned the types of surveillance 
that the Administration was seeking. Discussing the special 
challenges posed by modern radical organizations, such as the 
fact that they often exist in small and very decentralized
15(.. .continued)
alterations in intelligence structure, coverage, and 
operations under White House control." See Frank J. Donner, 
The Aae of Surveillance. 264. The Administration's 
initiative did not go unanswered by the media: an editorial 
in the New York Times warned of the historic relationship 
between "political terrorism and political repression." See 
New York Times. April 11, 1970, 42.
16An excellent description of the intelligence 
community's traditional belief in an "intelligence exception 
to the Fourth Amendment" is provided by Richard E. Morgan: 
"According to this theory, the Fourth Amendment was 
interpreted as a rule of criminal procedure that prohibited 
searching for and seizing potential evidence in the course of 
criminal investigations. When no prosecutorial purpose —  no 
prospective use of materials as evidence in court —  was 
involved, no Fourth Amendment violation took place." See 
Richard E. Morgan, Domestic Intelligence. 92.
17106 N.J. Super. 545 (Ch. Div., 1969); Supreme Court of 
New Jersey, A-79, September Term, 1969 (June 1, 1970).
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groups, the aides complained about how the FBI's outmoded 
techniques, which had been effective against "Communists" 
over the previous three decades, were now proving woefully 
inadequate. Their message was clear: electronic surveillance 
should be in the forefront of law enforcement. That spring 
Justice Department officials stated that wiretapping was 
proving to be one of the most effective techniques ever used 
against "organized crime."18
By proposing these public initiatives, the 
Administration was undoubtedly aware of the changing tide of 
public opinion regarding surveillance. Public opinion polls 
consistently showed crime and lawlessness to be among the top 
issues on the voters' agenda. In mid-April, CBS News 
released the results of a random telephone survey of 
Americans, concerning the issue of constitutional rights for 
protestors. Some 76 percent of respondents favored 
restricting the First Amendment rights of those who "organize 
protests against the Government," even when there was "no 
clear danger of violence." A majority of respondents also 
supported preventative detention, and favored restrictions on 
freedom of the press for anti-war protestors.19 Yet 
overall, the Administration's public position on wiretapping
18Washinaton Star. April 5, 1970; Human Events. May 16, 
1970, 376. Both of these articles describe Assistant
Attorney Will Wilson's assessment of wiretapping as a law 
enforcement tool.
19New York Times. April 16, 1970, 31.
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remained cautious during the spring and summer. On May 6 a 
Congressional report revealed that policemen in the two 
states of New York and New Jersey had used nearly six times 
as many wiretaps as had the Mitchell Justice Department 
during 1969.20
From its first days in office, the Nixon Administration 
had encountered a number of "barriers" that prevented it from 
fully implementing the full scope of electronic and other 
surveillance it considered necessary to combat crime. 
Federal law regarding court-approved wiretapping, Title III, 
did not allow for the long-term "investigative" surveillance 
desired by the Justice Department and the intelligence 
community. In addition, the Administration was frustrated in 
its attempts to circumvent the Supreme Court's Alderman and 
Giordano decisions. For example, Congress had refused to 
pass Title VII of the Organized Crime Act, which effectively 
would have overturned Alderman. In addition, U.S. v. 
Dellinger, the Administration's attempt to secure a "national 
security" exemption from the warrant requirements of Title 
III for both domestic and foreign targets (the Mitchell 
Doctrine) remained on appeal in the courts. Despite its many 
public statements applauding the effectiveness of court- 
approved wiretapping, the Justice Department was clearly 
unwilling to go along.
20New York Times. May 7, 1970, 48. Fred Graham's article 
did point out that the government's admitted totals did not 
include warrantless "national security" surveillance.
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On April 30, President Nixon announced that U.S. combat 
troops in Vietnam had entered Cambodia, further escalating 
the Indochina War. This pronouncement set off violent 
disturbances at hundreds of college campuses across the 
nation, and effectively brought the anti-war movement out of 
the state of dormancy it had been in since November of 1969. 
Throughout the month of May, the nation remained in shock, as 
the number of anti-war protestors reached the millions.21 
Unlike the protests of previous years, which rarely had 
featured significant levels of violence, the post-Cambodia 
uprisings were unique in their ferocity. The anger came from 
both sides of the barricades. At Ohio's Kent State 
University, four consecutive days of near constant 
confrontations between rock-throwing students and tear-gas 
wielding police climaxed on May 4, when the National Guard 
fired into a crowd of unarmed students, killing four of them. 
For many in the Movement, the incident at Kent State meant 
that the evolution from "protest to resistance to 
revolution," which had characterized the sixties, now had 
come full cycle.22
21Todd Gitlin estimates that "between 50 and 60 percent" 
of American college students actively took part in anti-war 
demonstrations during May, and that "at least a million 
students probably demonstrated for the first times in their 
lives." See Todd Gitlin, The Sixties. 410.
22The contemporary reader who is skeptical about the 
frequency in which the word "revolution" was used by educated 
individuals during 1970 would be well served to read a 
feature story which appeared in The New York Times Magazine
(continued...)
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The prevailing atmosphere in the White House was best 
described by Henry Kissinger: "The very fabric of government 
was falling apart. The Executive Branch was shell­
shocked."23 Nearly paralyzed as a result of the social 
disorder erupting across America, Nixon pursued several 
public relations initiatives, including establishing yet 
another commission to study the attitudes of youth (the so- 
called "Scranton Commission"), inviting representatives of 
academia to the White House, and even walking out to the 
Lincoln Memorial to meet personally with anti-war protestors. 
None of these initiatives had any discernable impact.
While presenting a public persona favoring conciliation, 
Nixon remained steadfast in its determination to punish and 
discredit the leaders of the anti-war movement.24 The 
tremendous surge of opposition in May convinced the 
Administration that the various legislative and judicial 
"barriers" denying the Justice Department full access to 
wiretapping and other surveillance resources would have to be 
circumvented, in the interest of protecting the nation from
22(.. .continued)
two weeks after the Cambodia invasion: "Are We in the Middle 
of the 'Second American Revolution'?" See New York Times. 
May 17, 1970, section vi, 26-27, 112-14.
^Quoted in Gitlin, The Sixties. 410.
24A majority of Americans were clearly in agreement with 
Nixon. A Gallop Poll, released one month after the Kant 
State shootings, revealed that an astounding 82 percent of 
those questioned opposed student strikes as a protest method. 
New York Times. June 4, 1970, 36.
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"internal subversion." The end result of this decision was 
the creation of the so-called "Huston Plan." Tom Charles 
Huston was originally hired by the Nixon Administration in 
early 1969 to assist speech writer Patrick Buchanan. A 
former President of the Young Americans for Freedom, an 
ultra-conservative college student association, Huston was 
hired mainly for his youthful insight into the hopes and 
desires of "patriotic" young Americans —  that is, the ones 
not protesting. Soon thereafter, he was assigned the primary 
responsibility of coordinating a White House effort to 
bolster the intelligence community's surveillance of domestic 
radicals and anti-war groups. In April of 1969, John
Ehrlichman told Huston to locate "foreign" linkages with 
American anti-war groups. Like his predecessor, Nixon was 
convinced that the Communists were somehow behind the 
escalating domestic unrest; it was Huston's job to gather the 
evidence Nixon needed to expose publicly this conspiracy. By 
the time of the post-Cambodia uprisings, Huston had already 
entered into a dialogue with high-ranking representatives of 
the FBI, CIA, NSA, and DIA. He soon discovered their overall 
unhappiness with J. Edgar Hoover, because of the Director's 
restrictions on break-ins, the use of younger informants, and 
other questionable tactics. The intelligence agency 
bureaucrats took advantage of this new White House line of 
communication to complain about Hoover's "obsolete priorities
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and methods." Huston was shocked by the lack of cooperation 
between the FBI and the rest of the intelligence community.
Hoover's unwillingness to engage in the types of 
"aggressive intelligence" tactics which had characterized his 
earlier campaigns against the Communists was rooted in the 
revelations of FBI wrongdoing that had surfaced during the 
late sixties. Nearing the government's mandatory retirement 
age, Hoover had undergone a considerable amount of public 
humiliation and embarrassment concerning the FBI's 
intelligence-gathering methods. As a result, he banned all 
FBI agents from engaging in the more objectional and illegal 
methods. He also curtailed the scope of warrantless 
"national security" wiretaps, and dictated that FBI informers 
must be at least twenty-one years of age. These restrictions 
remained in place after Nixon's election; as a result, they 
served as yet another "barrier" to his desired crack-down on 
domestic radicals.25
Huston was assisted in his role of coordinating 
intelligence activities by William Sullivan, the Director of 
the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division, and the mastermind 
of COINTELPRO. During Sullivan's long career with the FBI, 
he had always remained in the shadow of the omnipotent
25Theoharis, Spying on Americans. 13-21. Theoharis' 1978 
study of the Huston Plan remains unequalled. He was a key 
staff member on the famous "Church Committee," the only 
Congressional probe in U.S. history to acquire significant 
numbers of super-secret documents from the entire spectrum of 
the nation's intelligence community.
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Director, a situation which he increasingly came to dislike 
during the late sixties and early seventies. He was angered 
by Hoover's continuing obsession with the Communist Party, an 
organization that, Sullivan believed, had been all but wiped 
out during the late forties. The "number-two man" in the 
FBI, Sullivan was also critical of Hoover's cautionary 
restrictions on Bureau activities. Sullivan believed the 
threat posed by New Left and Weathermen-type groups more than 
justified a significant expansion of surveillance and 
harassment techniques. Like Huston, Sullivan also recognized 
the potential benefits to be gained by centralizing the 
collection and evaluation of all domestic intelligence 
gathering under White House control. As the weeks passed, 
Sullivan entered into a close relationship with the Nixon 
Administration, via Huston. A large majority of 
Administration officials, including the President himself, 
were soon in complete agreement that the aging Director's 
cautiousness could not have come at a worse time.26
On June 5, amid the post-Cambodia crisis atmosphere, an 
historic meeting took place at the White House, attended by 
the heads of the intelligence agencies, as well as a number 
of Administration officials, including Huston, Haldeman, and 
Nixon. Reading from a "talking paper" drafted by Huston and 
Sullivan, Nixon opened the meeting by stressing the 
"magnitude of the internal security problem" facing the
26Donner, The Age of Surveillance. 262-64.
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United States. He emphasized the pressing need for greater 
knowledge concerning the possible foreign influence on 
organized domestic dissent, and then, as Haldeman later 
recalled, he "ordered them to set up a cooperative system, 
with Tom Huston."27 Thus, Nixon authorized the creation of 
the "Inter-Agency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc)," 
comprised of the heads of the intelligence agencies. The 
committee was chaired by Hoover, while its day-to-day 
operations were directed by Huston.
The first task assigned to the "ICI" was to prepare a 
draft document of recommendations concerning how the 
agencies, working together, might boost the efficiency and 
coverage of domestic surveillance of New Left radicals and 
anti-war groups. In the weeks that followed, most of the 
work was done by Huston and Sullivan. The recommendations of 
the ICI were delivered to Nixon on June 25. They included 
boosting the number of warrantless wiretaps and microphone 
surveillances, broadening the NSA's ability to intercept 
international communications made by American citizens, 
relaxing restrictions on so-called "mail covers" (FBI agents 
opening a target's mail); modifying Hoover's ban on break- 
ins, lifting the minimum age limitations for FBI informants, 
and establishing a White House controlled interagency 
intelligence coordinating unit. Although Nixon formally 
consented to the Huston Plan in mid-July, he refused to sign
^Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries. 172.
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the document —  in order to absolve himself of any possible 
culpability.
Hoover's sabotaging of the Huston Plan in late July can 
be summarized as follows: the Director's unwillingness to 
shoulder the responsibility for initiating the sweeping 
illegal actions led Nixon to abandon a plan that he himself 
had authorized. However, Nixon's desire for increased 
surveillance did not end with the Huston Plan. Nor did the 
breach between Hoover and the Administration last very long. 
By the end of July, the Director personally responded to an 
Administration request for the FBI's surveillance logs of 
foreign embassies operating in the U.S.28
The high level of social disorder continued into the 
summer and fall of 1970, pushing the American electorate 
farther and farther to the right. A "conservative backlash" 
against the reforms and excesses of the sixties continued to 
grow, characterized by "hardhat" vigilante actions against 
anti-war protestors, a right-wing sponsored "Honor America 
Day" on July 4, and a series of anti-protestor/student 
speeches given by Vice President Agnew. Polls showed that 
Americans supported Agnew's unique brand of "positive 
polarization" by a five to three margin.29
Recovering from the post-Cambodia domestic crisis, Nixon 
fought back against his detractors on several fronts. First,
28Theoharis, Spying on Americans. 21-34.
29New York Times. June 21, 1970, 39.
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he initiated a campaign to attack the Democrats in Congress 
for their refusal to pass his "law and order" package. 
Assisting him in this offensive was none other than Hoover. 
At a meeting with the Director on June 2, Nixon pointed out 
that a recent poll had indicated that crime, not the 
Cambodian crisis, was uppermost on the minds of most
Americans. Complaining about congressional foot-dragging on 
his anti-crime bills, Nixon requested that the Director 
supply Vice President Agnew with intelligence information 
concerning the violent intentions of the New Left. Hoover 
agreed to help, adding that in his opinion, the Vice
President "should take a particularly strong position against 
Congress on inaction in this field."30 Nine days later, 
Nixon denounced House Democrats for delaying his thirteen 
anti-crime initiatives; he also issued a stern warning that 
the public might "retaliate at the polls" during the fall 
elections, if immediate action was not taken on the bills.
Claiming that "crime, respect for law, [and] dealing with
crime" were issues that "are above partisan politics," Nixon 
urged Congress to enact the bills quickly, so the Justice 
Department would "have the tools to do the job."31
Anxious to crack down on crime, and frustrated by the 
legislative and other "barriers" preventing it from utilizing 
all of the resources at its disposal, the Administration
30Quoted in Theoharis and Cox, The Boss. 411.
31Quoted in New York Times. June 12, 1970, 23.
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decided to escalate its secret wiretapping operations, by 
mid-summer. A new boldness soon characterized the FBI's 
secret internal policies concerning "national security" 
surveillance. In addition, the Administration convinced 
Hoover to institute unilaterally one of the central 
components of the original Huston Plan: a vast expansion of 
warrantless wiretaps against New Left, counterculture, Black 
Power, and anti-war groups. The FBI's expanded coverage 
would now include individuals and groups that had not 
previously met the requirements or criteria of the "Security 
Index." Hoover boldly justified the institution of 
warrantless surveillance against tens of thousands of 
Americans with an argument that had always been popular in 
intelligence circles: in order to discover whether these
individuals and/or groups have a "propensity for violence," 
a wide net would have to be cast.32
Additional evidence of the FBI's increasing audacity 
concerning its surveillance practices is found in an August 
18, 1970, memorandum from Hoover to Mitchell, in which the 
former requests the installation of a warrantless wiretap on 
an organization suspected of providing support for the 
Weather Underground —  the White Panthers. The memo states: 
"It can be expected that....[targeted] individuals....may
32Donner, The Aae of Surveillance. 267-68; Theoharis, 
Spying on Americans. 36. Donner feels long-term
"investigative" surveillance has self-reinforcing 
characteristics.
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become subjects of either local or Federal criminal
violations." Hoover then asserts:
It is also anticipated, based on the above 
information, that results of a telephone 
surveillance at this address will be introduced as 
evidence in court or that leads to evidence may be 
obtained; therefore, this request is being made 
not only for the purpose of obtaining 
intelligence-type information, but also on the 
basis that evidence will be obtained that will be 
used in court.33
Hoover's statement demonstrated that a dramatic shift 
had taken place in the FBI's internal wiretapping policies 
during the fifteen months which had passed since Mitchell's 
May 6, 1969, memorandum, outlining the Administration's
"official" interpretation of Title III. The original 
Mitchell memo stated the Justice Department's opinion that in 
"most national security cases" in which no prosecution was 
planned, a court order was not necessary. Mitchell added 
that section 2511(3) of Title III required that "the contents 
of any communication intercepted pursuant to the Presidential 
powers may be received in evidence at any trial or other 
proceeding where such interception was reasonable [sic]." He 
then discussed how the issue of "reasonableness" had recently 
been addressed in the Alderman and Giordano decisions, and 
stressed the need for extreme caution, in order to "insure 
that all approvals for permission to intercept private 
conversations rest upon a sound foundation sufficient to
33Hoover to Mitchell, August 18, 1970. Davis Papers. 
This document was withheld from the author by the FBI, 
without explanation.
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enable us to justify such coverage under the terms of the 
Act."34 The implications of Hoover's memo were clear: (1)
field agents need not request court orders for cases in which 
no prosecution is planned (in direct violation of Alderman 
and Giordano); (2) because of Alderman, the courts may not 
allow the introduction of evidence from warrantless wiretaps 
found to be "unreasonable"; and (3) to be safe, agents should 
seek court orders in instances where prosecution is planned.
In contrast to the obvious cautiousness espoused in 
Mitchell's 1969 memo, Hoover's of August, 1970, indicated 
that he expected to be able to utilize in court evidence 
gathered as a result of a warrantless wiretap. His optimism 
was based on the belief that the laws concerning 
admissability of "national security" surveillance would soon 
be changed. And since the Attorney General approved of 
Hoover's request the very next day, the Director's re­
interpretation of U.S. wiretapping policy undoubtedly 
reflected the Nixon Administration's new "go for broke" 
surveillance strategy. This strategy would remain secret 
until events during the fall had convinced the Administration 
that the American public, as well as the Federal Judiciary, 
was ready for the reintroduction of the Mitchell Doctrine.
^Mitchell to Hoover, May 6, 1969. Davis Papers.
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III.
I read the stuff that I wrote and it sounded like 
the ravings of a lunatic. We were under a lot of 
pressure. We got caught up in their game...you 
knew what Nixon was going to do...And that was the 
only facet of politics that we could relate to —  
the sensational facet. Guerilla, fight
back...ultimately you had to fight them. That was 
what revolution was all about, armed struggle...It 
is not a dinner party. —  John Sinclair, 197735
The White Panthers and the Black Panthers both had 
the same problem, they believed the government's 
propaganda, and the government believed theirs. 
You jump out on a god damned corner and shout 
"kill a pig," something's gonna happen. And since 
they got all the guns, likely you gonna lose.
—  White Panther Attorney Hugh M. Davis36
The evolution of the White Panther Party during the 
spring and summer of 1970 put it on a collision course with 
the Nixon Administration. The "White Panther myth" 
concerning the group's revolutionary potential came very 
close to realization —  just as Hoover and Mitchell expanded 
the government's web of surveillance in search of new 
targets. The group's history since the mid-sixties had been 
characterized by a close relationship between heightened 
radicalism and punitive responses from the local police and 
FBI, step-by-step.37 During the late sixties, the two
35ASHP-Sinclair Interview, 43.
36Hugh M. Davis interview with author, November 10, 1991, 
Detroit, Michigan.
37The White Panthers did not arrive at their increased 
militancy due to frustration over the Vietnam War. Anti-war
(continued...)
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phenomena became interdependent: the White Panthers justified 
armed self defense and radical posturing as a response to 
police "repression," while the FBI and local police justified 
increased surveillance as an appropriate response to the 
White Panthers' stated intentions of fomenting disorder. By 
1970, the State of Michigan's continued imprisonment of 
Sinclair, the government's bombing conspiracy indictments 
against Sinclair, Plamondon, and Forrest, and the heightened 
day-to-day police surveillance and harassment all contributed 
to the group's progression toward the fringes of the far- 
left.
Beginning to believe in their own myth, the White 
Panthers openly discussed taking the struggle to the next 
level; which, as they clearly recognized, meant violence 
against the State. The White Panther myth also caught on 
nationally, bringing the Ann Arbor-based leadership a degree 
of radical certification within the larger 
counterculture/anti-war movement. However, the consequences 
of the flowering of the White Panther myth were soon to be 
felt, as Hoover's FBI also started to accept fully the 
organization's revolutionary potential. By fall, the WPP 
became a primary target for the FBI and Justice Department.
"He is a vicious criminal," stated an FBI spokesperson 
on June 5, 1970, in a prepared statement announcing that
37(. . .continued)
protest remained secondary to an overall emphasis upon 
"cultural revolution."
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Lawrence Robert "Pun" Plamondon was being placed on the FBI's 
"Ten Most Wanted List." The fugitive White Panther Minister 
of Defense had been underground since the CIA 
conspiracy/bombing indictments of October, 1969. While 
"underground," Pun travelled extensively, taking on assumed 
names and living in communes, such as the "Up Against the
Wall Motherf ckers" of California. After hiding out on the
West Coast for a few months, he travelled to Canada, Northern 
and Central Europe, and finally to Algeria, North Africa, 
where he met with Eldridge Cleaver, the exiled Black Panther 
leader, whose philosophy of black-white cooperation in the 
Movement had been instrumental in the creation of the White 
Panthers. Returning to the U.S. during the late spring of 
1970, Plamondon hid-out in the woods of northern Michigan, 
collecting weapons and writing inflammatory articles.38
In his voluminous writings from the underground, as well
as his actions, Plamondon saw in himself the White Panther
myth becoming reality. His evolution from cultural to
political revolutionary was apparent by May, when he wrote:
The revolution is about bringing about a political 
consequence, the revolution is about 
power...Political power. And that comes from a 
couple of things...from guns....from dicks....from 
pussies.... from babies...! don't want to make it
38Petroit Free Press. May 5, 1970, 1; Stocking, "A
Personal Remembrance," 81; Sabljak and Greenberg, Most 
Wanted. 180-81. The Detroit Free Press article claimed that 
Plamondon was the 2nd "white revolutionary" to earn Top Ten 
distinction; it alleged that Cameron Bishop, an SDS member 
charged with several Colorado bombings in 1969, was the 
first.
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sound like all you got to do is kill people, kill 
pigs, to bring about revolution... it is up to us 
to educate the people to the fact that it is war, 
and a righteous revolutionary war...its up to the 
vanguard to start taking on activity....to a 
higher stage...these more advanced elements have 
no place to go except to the next stage, they 
can't turn back...The only direction they can move 
is to righteous revolutionary violence...I just 
found out that I was put on the 10 most wanted 
list, which makes this decision all the more 
easier [sic] for me.39
Just how close Plamondon came to committing acts of
"righteous revolutionary violence" remains unclear. Some
evidence exists that he may have had both the tools and the
intent to move from rhetoric to action during the days
immediately preceding his July 23 capture. According to an
FBI report, materials found in his possession at the time of
his arrest included two cases of dynamite, several weapons,
and drawings of the interior of a Traverse City, Michigan
bank. The same report contains a copy of a letter, dated
July 21, 1970, in which Plamondon allegedly wrote:
I think we are going to see a big repression drive 
all across Babylon as soon as school starts in the 
fall...BUT IF WE ARE IN FOR SOME SH_T, WAIT TILL 
THE PIGS SEE WHAT WE GOT WAITING FOR THEM!...The 
Black Colony is moving, but the Youth Colony isn't 
that far advanced yet, but we are trying to push, 
pull & shove everyone along the road to 
revolution.. .you know what I'm sitting on to write 
this letter? A 50 pound box of dynamite!40
39Quoted in (Ann Arbor, Michigan) Argus, vol 2, no. 4, 
May 23, 1970.
40FBI Report, September 3, 1970, "RE: Lawrence Robert 
Plamondon, White Panther Party," John and Leni Sinclair Red 
Squad Files [hereafter "FBI Plamondon Report"], 66-67. This 
107-page report was instrumental in elevating the WPP to the
(continued...)
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Plamondon's advanced revolutionary ideology was shaped 
not only by his background with the White Panthers, but also 
by the months he spent eluding the FBI. Having entered the 
underground several months in advance of the Weathermen, 
Plamondon's experiences were wholly unique to the white 
radical movement. In addition, his travels to West Germany, 
Denmark, Holland, and Algeria provided him with an 
internationalist perspective on the world-wide youth and 
counterculture revolt, a perspective which most American 
radicals lacked. One of the aspects of the Movement in 
Europe and North Africa that most surprised him was the 
degree to which radicals of every description identified with 
the Black Panther struggle in the United States. His title 
as "Minister of Defense" for an organization so obviously 
suggestive of the Black Panthers provided credibility with 
many radicals he met. In Europe, he was frequently asked to 
deliver public addresses concerning the state of "The 
Revolution" in America, and the role which the White Panthers 
were playing in making it happen. In this manner, he 
increasingly came to see himself as a "people's hero," 
explaining, at least in part, his extreme rhetoric in the 
weeks prior to his capture.41
40(.. .continued) 
status of a top radical organization, during the fall of 
1970. Plamondon was never charged with possession or 
transportation of explosives.
4lIbid. : Stocking, "A Personal Remembrance," 81.
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During the spring and summer of 1970, much of the energy 
and resources of the Ann Arbor and Detroit chapters of the 
WPP were used up in the legal effort to secure John 
Sinclair's release from prison. However, by early spring, 
the "Free John" movement became nationally-known, and support 
for Sinclair's release started pouring in to the White 
Panther house on 1520 Hill Street. Over the weekend of 
January 24-25, 1970, Movement organizers in New York, 
Detroit, Chicago, Berkeley, and other cities held "Free John 
Sinclair" rallies, focusing attention not only on Sinclair's 
draconian sentence for marijuana, but also on the need for 
like-minded individuals and groups to support all "political 
prisoners" in America. A press release announcing the
rallies urged supporters to "get together for John Sinclair 
to demonstrate the unity of the cultural revolution to the 
narcotics police," and added that "for every insane act of 
repression and injustice that occurs a thousand people are 
won over to the life culture." It also announced the 
formation of "The International Committee to Free John 
Sinclair," and listed both New York and Detroit addresses.42
An additional "Free John" initiative, held on the eve of 
the Cambodian invasion, demonstrated the White Panther's 
continuing penchant for comedic theatrics. The initiative
42"Free John Sinclair" mimeographed handbill, dated 
January 8, 1970. John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files.
The Detroit Police Department's "Special Investigation 
Bureau" (the so-called "Red Squad") followed the progress of 
the weekend's events very closely.
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had two components. Several dozen White Panthers from across 
Michigan demonstrated for Sinclair's release on the Michigan 
State Capital steps in Lansing on April 30. They also 
entered the Senate Gallery, but were quickly ejected when 
they began cheering a speech that was critical of the 
enormous police presence. The same day, the entire 
membership of the Michigan State Legislature received 
letters, carrying Wayne State University logos. Each letter 
contained a marijuana cigarette with an instruction sheet, 
requesting that in order to help build "a better America," 
the recipient should "smoke at least two of these every day 
for one year." The instruction sheet also carried both the 
White Panther and the "Woodstock Nation" symbols, indicating 
that it was part of a YIPPIE-sponsored national effort to 
bring about marijuana law reform, known as the "First Annual 
Marijuana Mail-In and Cross Country Toke-Down." The stunt 
brought the White Panthers considerable media coverage, 
although not all of it was focused on Sinclair's plight.43
Local support for the "Free John" movement also
increased, with assistance coming from some unlikely
quarters. On the evening of July 24, "several dozen"
University of Michigan faculty members held a cocktail party 
to raise money for Sinclair's legal defense fund, at the home
43Petroit Free Press. May 1, 1970, 1; Detroit News. May 
1, 1970, 3; (Bad Axe) Michigan Huron Tribune. May 1, 1970, 1; 
"Help Build A Better America," mimeographed handbill [and 
associated documents], John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad 
files. See Figure 4-1 on page 374.
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of a Dr. Fred Shure. Invitations, duly filed by the Detroit 
Red Squad, stated that "John Sinclair has little money but 
many friends...Freeing him from the consequences of Gestapo 
'Justice' would be a small step toward the liberation of 
countless other....political prisoners in our country." It 
also warned that "if it can happen to him today, it can 
happen to us tomorrow."44
A fascinating "snapshot" of the White Panther commune 
during the spring of 1970 is contained in a twenty page 
study, conducted by Kenneth L. Wright of the "Merrill-Palmer 
Institute," prepared as part of a larger sociological 
analysis of communal living in the U.S. Wright spent a 
weekend living with the White Panthers, studying their social 
habits and internal relations. Expecting to find only a few 
varieties of "non-traditional living arrangements," he 
identified nine separate and distinct "structural units," 
most of which had more to do with the business and propaganda 
efforts of the WPP than with the interpersonal relations of 
its members. Impressed by the degree of political awareness 
espoused by the WPP membership, Wright noted that "There is 
structure and organization to every facet of the living 
arrangement." Management of financial affairs was placed in 
the capable hands of John's brother, David, who somehow 
always managed to get the rent and utilities paid. Education
^Detroit News. July 25, 1970, 2-A. Invitation, dated 
July 20, 1970, located in John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad 
Files.
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of the membership was an ongoing process, featuring a small 
degree of "traditional” instruction from the Central 
Committee, supported by self-directed study, via the 
commune's diverse library of books, pamphlets, and records. 
The official WPP band, the "Up," was the commune's "main 
source of income," and comprised the "music unit." Drug use, 
particularly marijuana, was noted as a frequent occurrence, 
assisting the members with better "tuning into" the "acid 
rock" music, as well as the overall political message. 
Temporarily lacking the facilities and equipment required to 
publish their own newspaper, the WPP collaborated with the 
Ann Arbor Araus collective, located two blocks away. As the 
"overall focal point of communal energies....[and] the main­
stay of the commune's existence," the political unit remained 
firmly under the direction of John Sinclair, whose voluminous 
correspondence to the commune was required reading. Wright 
was impressed by the remarkable degree of adoration which a 
majority of commune members felt for their imprisoned 
leader.45
For the bulk of the Party's membership in Detroit and 
Ann Arbor, the trend toward violent rhetoric and militant
45Kenneth L. Wright, "A Communal Living Arrangement: 
Exploratory Study of the Trans Love, White Panthers, Youth 
International Party Commune," unpublished paper, dated May 
20, 1970, carrying the inscription: "Family: The Merrill-
Palmer Institute." Located in JLSC/BHL, box 17, folder 19, 
"WPP Ideology." The nine "units" described were as follows: 
household, marriage, unmarried, educational, business 
management, music, light show, photography, and political.
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posturing that had characterized the group since the fall of 
1968, reached new heights during the spring and summer of 
1970. In late June, the inaugural edition of Sun Dance, the 
"White Panther Information Service," was published. 
Featuring articles by Tom Hayden, Eldridge Cleaver, and 
Rennie Davis, as well as Pun and John, the thick multi-color 
newspaper represented the best propaganda the organization 
could offer. Cleaver's article commented that the 
"repression" brought down on the Black Power movement by 
"pigs" may have driven the movement's leaders to "madness," 
but, he promised, "madness is the black man's hydrogen 
bomb...we are in a position to implement head-up murder...We 
can guarantee the total destruction of Babylon." The same 
newspaper also carried Pun Plamondon's latest message from 
the underground, which stated "all I can say about the 
Weathermen, man, is power to 'em, I think they're a great 
inspiration to everyone in the mother country." Published on 
the very day that pro-Nixon cadres were celebrating "Honor 
America Day," the first Sun/Dance remains a testimony to the 
polar extremes which divided American society at mid-year in 
1970.46
46Sun Dance. July 4, 1970 [quotes 12, 20]. This issue 
represented the peak in the artistic creativity of WPP media 
specialists Gary Grimshaw and Ken Kelley. The variety of 
colors, graphics, cartoons, photo-inlays, and other highly- 
technical features make it an excellent example of sixties 
art.
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Rhetoric aside, several White Panthers demonstrated 
their willingness to prepare for —  if not carry out —  armed 
self-defense. Target shooting forays occurred with 
increasing frequency, particularly in the late summer, after 
the arrival of Dennis Marnell, the self-appointed "Deputy 
Minister of Defense," who was probably an FBI or Red Squad 
agent provocateur. Allegedly a Vietnam veteran, Marnell 
assumed his new role with gusto, conducting one-on-one 
sessions on the art of weaponry for the Ann Arbor chapter. 
Members of the new Detroit chapter also regularly conducted 
target practice.47
The impact which the White Panthers' increasingly-
militant rhetoric and posturing had on the youth of southeast
Michigan undoubtedly depended upon the individual(s) in
question. Some, undoubtedly, turned away from the White
Panthers after they had abandoned their strictly "cultural"
approach, or after their leaders were portrayed as violent
criminals via the government's CIA bombing case. However,
Ken Kelley recalls an incident which sheds some light on the
issue of whether militant rhetoric, by itself, can sometimes
lead to incitement:
I remember right after the Chicago Seven got 
convicted, they had a TDA —  The Day After —  a 
big demonstration. It was big on campus... I had a 
show on WCBN then, called the Argaism. Excerpts 
from the Argus. After they got convicted, I 
figured it was my cosmic duty to go on and
47Genie Plamondon personal interview with author, March 
31, 1993, Detroit, Michigan; Sun/Dance. July 4, 1970.
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proclaim, 'take to the streets.' Which I 
did...Anyway, that night I came back to my house 
after doing the show, and everybody is just poised 
for the kill. They were all young kids.. .sixteen, 
seventeen.. .Local radicals from Ann Arbor High.. .1 
walk in and I just know something is going on. I 
go in and sit down at my desk drawer and open the 
drawer.... full of Molotov cocktails. Boy, did I 
freak out. 'You get these babies out of this 
house, immediately!...dump them in the trash'...I 
just couldn't believe it...Molotov cocktails. 
Real professional jobbies...That night they 
trashed everything.48
The White Panthers' rhetoric helps explain the group's 
mounting national and international reputation. Official 
membership in the Party peaked during 1970, with an estimated 
fifteen to twenty fully operational chapters, and up to fifty 
"potential tribes," spread across the U.S.A. and into 
Europe.49 The daunting job of keeping in contact with 
chapters from the Ann Arbor headquarters was handled by Genie 
Plamondon, with some assistance by Skip Taube. Each chapter 
was instructed to organize a Central Committee, along the 
lines of both the Black and White Panthers, as well as to 
make every effort to publish a local newspaper or distribute 
mimeographed handbills. Chapters were asked to submit
48ASHP-Kelley Interview, 10-11.
49This estimate is based on three sources: (1) FBI
Report, dated October 23, 1970, entitled "RE: White Panther 
Party (WPP) National Convention September 23-25, 1970," 22- 
23, John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files; (2) various lists 
of WPP chapters, circa 1970-1971, located in JLSC/BHL, box 
17, folder 31, "Chapters"; and (3) ASHP-Genie Plamondon 
Interview, 20. The "potential tribes" list, located in 
number 2 above, seems to have been little more than a list of 
addresses of individuals who had contacted the national 
headquarters in Ann Arbor, possibly requesting chapter 
information.
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reports concerning their overall progress. Press releases 
concerning the activities of the Detroit and Ann Arbor 
chapters, as well as their continuing legal battles, were 
sporadically mailed to the chapters, in an effort to keep 
them informed. On rare occasions, members from the national 
headquarters in Ann Arbor visited fledgling chapters, 
occasionally providing a written evaluation of their 
successes and failures.
While SDS and several other national New Left and anti­
war organizations were coming apart under the strain of 
factional disputes, the White Panthers enjoyed their greatest 
success in reaching out to like-minded individuals and 
organizations. As Kelley recalls:
SDS had disappeared...But we were always a 
constant thing...We were the only white thing 
around that had any kind of reputation. John was 
a cause...we were being recruited by all the 
left...Lots of people were looking to us.50
Throughout the first half of 1970, a number of serious 
discussions were held between WPP leaders and representatives 
of the Youth International Party (YIPPIES), concerning a 
possible merger of the two organizations. The style and 
antics of Yippies Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman had 
influenced the origins and development of the White Panthers 
since their inception in the fall of 1968. The relationship 
between the two groups improved during 1969, particularly as 
a result of Hoffman's frequent visits to Ann Arbor, as well
soASHP-Kelley Interview, 7.
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as Sinclair's trips to New York with the MC-5. In Woodstock 
Nation. Hoffman described the White Panthers as "the most 
alive force in the whole Midwest."51 As Hoffman would later 
write, "Sinclair had become our Huey Newton —  an imprisoned 
leader. 'Free John Sinclair!' became synonymous with 
militancy.1,52 For several months, the White Panthers 
referred to themselves on their stationery and publications 
as a division of the "Youth International Party."53
During the late spring, Genie Plamondon joined YIP women 
Judy Gumbo and Nancy Kurshan-Rubin in a visit to Stockholm, 
Hanoi, and Moscow, as part of what Genie later described as 
"an all-woman hippie delegation." The visits earned the 
women, and the two organizations, international media 
attention.54 However, a formal YIP-WPP merger was never
51Abbie Hoffman, Woodstock Nation. 62.
52Hoffman, Soon to Be a Major Motion Picture. 176.
Writing from the perspective of the late seventies, Hoffman 
referred to the WPP as "a YIP affiliate."
53See Figure A-17 in the Appendix for a WPP/YIP flyer
from the spring of 1970.
^There were two trips: (1) in April the group visited 
an anti-war conference in Stockholm, where they spent several 
days in the company of North Vietnamese officials —  who were 
very interested in the Yippies, and (2) the trip to Hanoi and 
Moscow took place in late May and early June. An incident 
which took place during the second trip provides another 
example of the YIP/WPP penchant for posturing and "street 
theater." Upon their arrival in Moscow, the three women held 
an impromptu anti-war demonstration and news conference in 
front of the U.S. Embassy. Dressed in Vietcong pajamas and 
conical hats, the group issued a statement claiming that they 
were in Hanoi attempting to seek diplomatic recognition for 
the "Yippie-White Panther 'Americong' coalition." Genie
(continued...)
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attained, and relations between the leadership of the two
organizations varied from close friendship to bitter
hostility. In a letter to John Sinclair, dated February 27,
1970, David Sinclair outlined his view the nature of the
disagreement which separated the two groups:
We had a great CC [WPP Central Committee] 
meeting...A consensus was reached...We will go 
back to operating under the name of White Panther 
Party. We discussed this point for close to three 
hours...there is a fairly large group of people 
who have congregated around the image of 
'Yippie!"....who aren't into what we're into, and 
who resent our use of the name...'merger' is not a 
correct term in the first place, because you can't 
really have a merger between a political party and 
an image...The fact is there are fundamental 
differences between ourselves and our politics and 
those of Abbie and Jerry and their 'followers.'55
Genie Plamondon's assessment was similar:
We had a big contradiction with the Yippies about 
organization versus non-organization...They were 
anarchists, essentially, and they didn't want to 
have to worry about paperwork, actual 
organization, actual community work. They were 
almost strictly media-oriented...It really got to 
be a super-ego fighting type thing...They promised 
that John and Pun could be major parts of the 
thing...but they majorly [sic] wanted more PR for 
Yippies.56
54(.. .continued)
Plamondon personal interview with author, March 31, 1993, 
Detroit, Michigan; ASHP-Genie Plamondon Interview, 21-22; 
Detroit Free Press. June 10, 1970, 11; New York Times. June 
10, 1970, 51.
55|,Report to the Chairman on the Central Committee 
Meeting of 27 February 1970, Prepared by Chief of Staff," 
February 27, 1970, JLSC/BHL, box 17, folder 21, "WPP
Ideology."
56ASHP-Genie Plamondon Interview, 19-2 0.
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In the end, the failure of the YIP-WPP merger was due to the 
Yippies' central philosophy, which abhorred traditional 
organizational structure and "top-down" hierarchy. 
Nonetheless, John Sinclair continued to pursue a closer 
working relationship with Rubin and Hoffman throughout the 
year, as he worked on the concept of a united "Woodstock 
Nation." As late as May 5, Sinclair was still attempting to 
resolve the contradictions in organizational philosophies 
separating the two groups.57 Rubin and Hoffman also 
continued to make public appearances in support of the "Free 
John" movement.
An additional radical group which attempted to recruit 
the White Panthers during the summer of 1970 was the "Red 
Family," a small San Francisco-based ultra-left-wing cadre, 
which included Tom Hayden, the well-known "Chicago Seven" 
defendant who had undergone a significant number of changes 
since his famous "Port Huron Statement" in 1962. Hayden 
entered into discussions with the White Panthers concerning 
the Red Family's desire to forge a national organization, 
united around the principles of Korean-style Marxism. In 
early August, Ken Kelley and Leni Sinclair travelled to the
57Michigan State police, Special Investigation Unit, 
"Confidential Report," dated July 7, 1970, written by
Detective Clifford Murray; John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad 
Files. Murray's report borrows from excerpts of a May 5, 
1970 personal letter, from John Sinclair to his wife Leni. 
Numerous Red Squad documents reveal that the police carefully 
read all of Sinclair's mail, and frequently shared it with 
other law enforcement agencies.
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West Coast, with the dual purpose of meeting Hayden's Red 
Family and witnessing Black Panther Huey Newton's release 
from prison. According to Kelley, discussions with the Red 
Family didn't get very far, because of the group's constant 
bickering and factional disputes. For him, the one positive 
aspect of the trip was finally getting to meet one of the 
Black Panther leaders who had most inspired the White 
Panthers.58
The White Panthers' continuing support for the Black 
Panther struggle during 1970 did not coincide with many of 
their actions. In late June, the Party's revised "Ten Point 
Program" dropped all references to the Black Panthers, and by 
the end of the year, Leni Sinclair publicly stated that the 
White Panthers no longer "go along with all of their 
programs, like 'kill the pigs.'"59 Relations with the 
Detroit chapter of the "National Committee to Combat 
Fascism," an arm of the Black Panthers, were polite, but not 
particularly friendly. As early as December of 1968 the 
Detroit Black Panthers criticized Sinclair and the newly- 
formed White Panthers, calling them "silly, irresponsible,
S8Ken Kelley, "Black Panther/White Lies, A Personal 
Memoir by Ken Kelley," California Magazine [Oakland, CA 
Tribune], volume 15, (August, 1990), 86-93, 122-25. This
article chronicles Kelley's relationship with the BPP leader 
through the seventies and eighties, as Newton drifted into a 
life of drugs and violence.
59Sun/Dance. July 4, 1970, 31; Michigan Daily. January 
6, 1971, 25.
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and an obstacle to the revolution."60 Relations thereafter 
did not improve, as is evident from Ken Kelley's later 
statement:
The Panthers in Detroit were thugs and gangsters. 
Lots of Panthers were thugs and gangsters all over 
the country, which is not to —  I mean, I love 
Huey Newton. I remember going through three 
different transitions with [Black] Panthers in 
Detroit: each time a new group would take over, 
the other ones would come running into our house 
saying 'protect us'...They didn't have any 
reputation in Detroit; they never had a presence 
except when they got busted.61
Skip Taube provides an alternate view:
[Our] relationship with their Detroit 
chapter...got to be weird because they were 
infiltrated with all kinds of pigs and shooting 
each other...Most people were discouraged from 
associating with a black organization for fear of 
their lives.62
Yet the White Panthers did continue to support the Black 
Panthers in limited ways, such as distributing their 
newspaper and mailing to California the funds collected. A 
major breakthrough occurred when the Black Panthers sent the 
editor of their national newspaper, Raymond "Masai" Hewitt, 
to Ann Arbor for the national underground newspaper media 
conference.63 And Pun Plamondon continued to advocate close
^Fifth Estate. December 12-25, 1968. See also the
article by BPP member William Spencer Leach in the following
issue (January 9-22, 1969).
61ASHP-Kelley Interview, 12.
62ASHP-Taube Interview, 24.
63See photograph of Pun Plamondon and "Masai" at the
conference, in Figure 4-2, on page 3 75.
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support for the BPP in his frequent messages from the 
underground.64
White Panther relations with the Weathermen were 
complex, fluctuating from open support for their violent 
actions (Plamondon), to tacit support for their goals (Taube 
and Forrest), to open criticism of their violent 
"adventurism" (John Sinclair). The two organizations 
initially had much in common, including a penchant for 
radical rhetoric and a love for the counterculture forms of 
communal living, open sex, and psychedelic drug use. Skip 
Taube's former friendship with Weathermen leaders Bill Ayers 
and Diana Oughton was also a factor. During the summer and 
fall of 1969, the Detroit Weather Collective, the largest in 
the nation, approached selected members of the White Panther 
leadership, attempting to recruit them. On a few occasions, 
White Panthers and Weathermen appeared at the same local 
political events. Ken Kelley states that the attraction was 
a strange, yet alluring one: "We liked them, some of us did. 
Some of us thought they were crazy. They were crazy. 
Everybody was crazy."65
MThe labor-based "The League of Revolutionary Black 
Workers," the largest black radical organization in Detroit 
during the late sixties, also expressed little support for 
the White Panthers, believing the counterculture to be a 
vastly inferior organizational model. See Georgakas and 
Surkin, Detroit. I Do Mind Dvina. 91, 153-55.
65ASHP-Kelley Interview, 10.
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By the time of the Weathermen's "War Council" in Flint, 
Michigan, held in December of 1969, the White Panthers were 
surprised by the degree of militancy being espoused by Ayers, 
Oughton, and the rest of the Weathermen. The White Panthers 
had suggested bringing the MC-5 to perform, but the 
Weathermen leadership was no longer interested in rock and 
roll as an instrument of revolution; violence against the 
"pigs" was now their sole focus. Shortly thereafter, the 
Weathermen went underground, breaking in to small, elite 
"cells." In their minds, they were completing the 
"inevitable" leap from revolt to revolution. One final 
attempt at attaining conciliation between the two 
organizations was made during the winter of 1970. The local 
Weathermen had criticized the White Panthers for having a 
benefit focused solely on John Sinclair's imprisonment, 
instead of the recent Chicago police murder of BPP leader 
Fred Hampton. Skip Taube invited Ayers and Oughton to a 
meeting, in order to provide them with an opportunity to 
express their views face-to-face, as well as to allow the 
White Panthers an opportunity to explain the reasons behind 
the "Free John" events. As Taube recalls, "It was real 
interesting to see a sincere meeting between people operating 
in the cultural arena who had good politics and people who 
were really 'committed revolutionaries.'"66 The meeting did
“ASHP-Taube Interview, 17. A photograph of this meeting 
appears as Figure 4-3, on page 376.
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not change the overall relationship between the groups: the 
Weathermen were clearly approaching a stage of revolutionary 
violence, while most White Panthers, with the possible 
exception of Pun Plamondon, stood on the sidelines thinking, 
as Kelley recalls, "'they're doing what we want to do, but 
we're too afraid to do it.'"67
The White Panthers, like the Weathermen, believed that
a revolution was pending in America; in fact, they both
believed that a cultural revolution of sorts was already
underway. They differed, however, over what Todd Gitlin
terms the "fundamental problem" facing the New Left and
counterculture during the late sixties:
If morality and eschatology agreed that there had 
to be a revolution, then there had to be someone 
to make it. The New Left's torment —  the torment 
of all radical student movements —  was that 
relatively privileged people were fighting on 
behalf of the oppressed blacks, Vietnamese, the 
working class. Committed to a revolution it did 
not have the power to bring about, the movement 
cast about for a link with forces that might have 
that power.68
Firmly committed to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the Weathermen 
conjured up the fantasy of a working-class proletarian 
revolt. They believed that the workers of America had been 
coopted, by a decent standard of living, into going along 
with corporate capitalism at home and heartless, bloody
67ASHP-Kelley Interview, 13.
68Gitlin, The Sixties. 381.
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imperialism abroad.69 Thus, they concluded that the 
revolution would have to be forced, bringing down the 
government's repression. These excesses, in turn, would 
gradually open the eyes of the working class, exposing the 
deceit of the ruling class, the duplicity of "establishment" 
politicians, and the overall implosion of capitalism. It was 
this core philosophy which motivated the Weathermen's "Days 
of Rage" in Chicago during the fall of 1969, when they 
attempted to convince working class youth and street thugs to 
join in their violent rampage against the oppressive State.
By the time of the Flint War Council, several hundred 
Weathermen true believers had given up on direct face-to-face 
appeals to potential recruits. Retreating underground and 
initiating selected "strikes" against establishment targets, 
such as the March 11, 1970 bombing of IBM and GTE in
Manhattan, the Weathermen believed that they were helping to 
initiate a spontaneous revolt, which would usher in the
larger revolution. With a leadership comprised of many 
experienced Movement people from the mid-sixties, the 
Weathermen were the embodiment of the completed
"revolutionary loop." For individuals like Ayers and 
Oughton, militancy in 1966 had meant protest marches and 
emotional speeches. In 1967 it had meant demonstrating at
the Pentagon, staring down National Guardsmen's bayonets. In 
1968 it had meant battling with police in the streets of
69Carl Oglesby quoted in Ibid. . 384.
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Chicago. By late 1969 it had come to mean armed revolt 
against the machinery of capitalism and the State. As Gitlin 
relates, "On the Movement's breakneck timetable, they could 
claim to have tried everything short of revolutionary 
violence. "70
A majority of Michigan White Panthers interpreted the 
dilemma facing American "revolutionaries" over the issue of 
violence in a somewhat more balanced manner, best epitomized 
by the writing of John Sinclair. From the vantage point of 
his prison cell in Marquette, Michigan, Sinclair struggled to 
interpret the rapidly changing movement, corresponding with 
dozens of participants on the outside, devouring any current 
reading materials he could get his hands on, and producing 
lengthy letters and treatises on an almost daily basis. He 
also acquired an understanding of the works of Mao Tse Tung, 
particularly those pertaining to China's "Cultural 
Revolution." Sinclair's prime focus was the concept of a 
"Woodstock Nation," a coalition of youth movement groups 
which could, in time, bring about a completely new society. 
The starting point for Sinclair's analysis was the enormous 
success Trans Love Energies had experienced in recruiting, 
and subsequently politicizing, Michigan's youth. Unlike the 
Weathermen and other small, elitist revolutionary groups of 
the period, the White Panthers had evolved out of this 
regionally-successful organization, which had attracted
70Ibid. . 387.
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thousands of young fans into politically-charged MC-5 
concerts. This phenomenon had eventually expanded to the 
point where a major recording company recognized that 
"revolutionary rock" enjoyed a national following.
In short, Sinclair had a track record of helping to 
politicize thousands of youth. This experience had taught 
him several things. First, most white youth are decidedly 
apolitical, preferring the cultural forms of rock music, 
drugs, and sex to the "straight" political messages delivered 
by most New Left and anti-war groups. Second, Sinclair was 
convinced that the hundreds of thousands of counterculture 
youth coming of age in America every year remained largely 
unaware of the fact that their lifestyles carried an 
explicitly political message: they were part of an emerging 
"life culture" which, in his view, carried the potential to 
revolutionize society. Third, Sinclair knew better than most 
that there were powerful reactionary forces in America, 
united in their determination to wipe out the new 
counterculture lifestyle, through drug busts, imprisonment, 
intimidation, and a variety of other tactics. Finally, he 
believed that youth could be made to recognize the political 
nature of their lifestyles, via an intensive and varied 
campaign of propaganda, rock music, and other cultural forms 
that had proven successful in Detroit and Ann Arbor: free 
concerts, the underground press, and community radio.
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Sinclair's analysis included an historical review of 
three of the defining events of the era: the Chicago
Democratic Convention, the "People's Park" protest at 
Berkeley, as well as Woodstock. According to his 
explanation, police over-reaction at both Chicago and 
People's Park convinced members of the counterculture of the 
inherently political nature of their lifestyles. It also 
demonstrated to both the counterculture and the New Left that 
they had several important things in common, the most 
important of which was a clear understanding of the 
conservative establishment's intention of destroying their 
movements. Turning his attention to Woodstock, Sinclair saw 
the festival as a powerful and positive expression of his new 
vision of society —  as well as a great "might have been." 
In his view, the festival presented a previously unheard-of 
opportunity to combine music and culture with politics, 
before hundreds of thousands of eager youth. A large part of 
his master plan included holding similar events, with the 
addition of a political component
While the Weathermen believed that the vanguard of the 
revolution would be the working class, Sinclair advanced the 
idea that an awakened "youth colony" could lead the masses to 
a new society. Both theories proceeded from the Marxist 
premise that a only a revolt of the proletariat had any 
chance of success —  and they both took leaps of faith 
concerning the composition of the revolutionary proletariat.
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The Weathermen overlooked or ignored the basic fact that a
vast majority of middle and lower-class workers in America
were inherently conservative, hardly the stuff of revolution.
By the same token, Sinclair's "youth colony" thesis equated
young white people in the U.S. with Third World peasant
revolts, as well the "black colony," from which the Black
Panthers had evolved. Recognizing that "If we are going to
make a revolution here...we have to develop a class
analysis," Sinclair recommended looking at social factors,
rather than economic ones, to gauge "who our friends are and
who our real enemies are." He then outlined his main thesis:
The youth of America....are not members of their 
parents' classes but constitute a new social sub­
class of their own, which is a subclass of the 
proletariat rather than of the bourgeoisie 
[furthermore]...the vast (mis-called) 'Middle 
class' is really just another subclass of the 
proletariat rather than of the bourgeoisie. These 
are important distinctions to make, because if we 
can interpret the objective conditions in America 
in these terms then we can see that revolution is 
possible; if we can't accept these terms, then we 
will have to conclude that revolution is not 
possible.
Sinclair openly admitted that his theory differed from the 
"rigid dogma" of classical Marxist-Leninist thought, but 
asserted that he was merely adapting classical revolutionary 
theory and practice to the "objective conditions" of American 
society.71
71"Report to the Central Committee of the Youth 
International Party (White Panthers), By Chairman John 
Sinclair," unpublished series of prison writings, dated 
January-February, 1970, JLSC/BHL, box 17, folder 21, "WPP
(continued...)
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The proposed merger between the Youth International 
Party and the White Panthers was a reflection of Sinclair's 
"youth colony" thesis, as well as the focus of Abbie 
Hoffman's Woodstock Nation. Aware of the power of symbols, 
the two organizations came up with a design featuring an 
electric guitar, a Native American peace pipe, and a rifle. 
All three components were crossed to form a peace-symbol, and 
were surrounded by a ring of fire, which symbolized the sun. 
Explaining the symbol, Sinclair asserted "We can't have the 
guitar without the gun or we won't survive... .and without the 
sacrament that gives us our vision [marijuana] neither the 
guitar or the gun would amount to anything worthwhile."72
The weapon which figured prominently in the Woodstock 
Nation symbol was itself indicative of the White Panthers' 
internal struggle over what role, if any, "revolutionary 
violence" should play in the organization's tactics. A 
dominant issue in the Movement since at least the fall of 
1968, it became the central dilemma facing the entire left
71 (... continued)
Ideology," 1-24 [quote 24]. This document provides a far 
more detailed exposition of Sinclair's ideas, circa early 
1970, than either Guitar Army or the published pamphlet 
Message to the People of the Woodstock Nation. (Ann Arbor: 
Sun/Dance Publications, 1970). It is important to note that 
when Guitar Armv was being prepared for publication in 1971 
and 1972, John and Leni Sinclair significantly edited and 
revised the more radical writings from 1969 and 1970, 
deleting "a lot of 'Off the Pig' rhetoric and similarly heavy 
'radical' bullsh_t that isn't of much use to anybody" [page 
59 of the "Preview"].
^Sinclair, Guitar Armv. 223.
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during 1970. By disappearing underground, and committing 
specific acts of violence, the Weathermen had proven their 
mettle by becoming the very revolutionaries that the far left 
had been dreaming (and worrying) about ever since Chicago. 
As Gitlin states, the Weathermen "had run off the with the 
cutting edge," leaving the rest of the Movement afflicted 
with "Weatherguilt. "73 Between September, 1969 and May, 
1970, there were more than 250 major bombings in America, 
only a handful of which were committed by the Weathermen. 
Yet the organization/s tactics, as well as its extreme media 
presence, undoubtedly influenced a number of other bombers.
The ongoing national debate over the issue of
"revolutionary violence" as a tactic was also played out
locally within the ranks of the White Panthers' Central
Committee during 1970. The debate generally took place
within a narrow framework, centered upon the relevancy and
desirability of spontaneous acts of violence against such
popular targets as the police stations, banks, draft boards,
induction centers, and ROTC buildings. On one side of the
debate was Sinclair, who remained adamantly opposed to
spontaneous acts of violence, which he termed "adventurism":
There seems to be no one speaking of concrete 
social, political and cultural change except in 
terms of smashing the state, ending racism,
avenging Fred Hampton, freeing all political 
prisoners, ending the war in Vietnam, smashing 
imperialism, etc...the emphasis overwhelmingly 
seems to be on mounting some kind of instant
73Gitlin, The Sixties. 396-98.
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elitist insurrection just like in the movies, with 
people running through the streets smashing 
windows, throwing molotov cocktails, waving 
machine guns in the air, etc.74
While refusing to oppose categorically the use of violence as
a tactic, Sinclair stated that it should only be used as part
of a long-term revolutionary social and cultural program.75
Sinclair's position remained the "official" policy of the
White Panthers.
However, by the spring of 1970, several other White
Panther leaders, including Skip Taube, Jack Forrest, and Pun
Plamondon, entered into an ongoing debate with Sinclair,
through the mail and in the underground press, concerning the
value of "terrorist" tactics. Plamondon's advocacy of
violence peaked during the weeks immediately preceding his
capture on July 23. At the same time, Taube was gradually
moving toward a similar position. In a June 30, 1970 letter
to Sinclair, he stated:
So far you have given us no definition of 
'adventurism'....yet you are constantly using the 
term to define actions and individuals you are 
criticizing. Now I am not in favor of mindless 
adventurism, but I think you must give more 
consideration to the need for revolutionary 
violence at this juncture in history...I don't 
think we ever realize it (as opposed to 
understanding it) until we are put in the position 
of people like Pun or the Weathermen... the outlaw 
cannot go back, she or he is forced by
74Sinclair, "Report to the Central Committee," 22.
75In fact, during the fall and winter of 1969, Sinclair's 
rhetoric was nearly as militant as Plamondon's. His position 
became increasingly moderate over the next year.
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history....to go onward to higher forms of 
struggle.76
Thus, the positions taken by Plamondon and Taube by the 
summer of 1970 closely resembled the standard Weatherman 
credo, which asserted "nothing we could do in the mother 
country could be adventurist."77 For Taube, Forrest, 
Plamondon, and other White Panthers the "White Panther myth" 
was becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The familiar tension between the White Panthers7 
rhetoric and the local police and FBI response reached new 
heights during the year and a half after Sinclair went to 
prison in July, 1969. Surveillance increased, characterized 
by "tailing" of WPP members and their automobiles, frequent 
police harassment, and routine censoring of John Sinclair's 
incoming and outgoing mail at Marquette Prison. The local 
Detroit and Ann Arbor offices of the FBI became increasingly 
involved in targeting the White Panthers for a variety of 
COINTELPRO actions. The arrival of Neil J. Welch as 
Detroit's new Special Agent-In-Charge (SAC) —  combined with 
the Top Ten status of fugitive Plamondon —  resulted in the 
elevation of the White Panthers, in the eyes of Hoover and 
other top-ranking FBI officials, from an obscure Michigan 
radical group to a leading white revolutionary organization.
76Quoted in "FBI Report RE: Plamondon," September 3,
1970, 89-90.
^Gitlin, The Sixties. 392.
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With the establishment of a Detroit chapter of the White 
Panthers during 1969, the local and state police in 
southeastern Michigan expanded their surveillance of both the 
Ann Arbor and the Detroit chapters. On March 6, 1970, the 
same day as the Weathermen's New York City townhouse 
explosion, a very large unexploded bomb was found in a 
women's restroom at Detroit's 13th Precinct Station. Shortly 
thereafter, the Detroit Police Department's "Red Squad," in 
cooperation with a variety of local and State units, 
initiated "Project Eagle," an intensive, round-the-clock 
physical surveillance of local radical groups, including the 
Detroit Chapter of the White Panther Party. One focus of the 
investigation was apparently Jack Forrest, who, along with 
Sinclair and Plamondon, had been charged with conspiracy to 
bomb the Ann Arbor CIA office the previous September. In 
addition, Forrest had been one of the original defendants in 
the so-called "Valler Bombings" during the fall of 1968. 
When "Project Eagle" was initiated, Forrest's attorneys had 
so far been able successfully to delay his trial date in the 
Valler bombings case. They were also able to get his bond 
lowered on the Federal charge, allowing him to remain "on the 
streets." Recently released Red Squad documents provide a 
detailed look at the nuances of the surveillance under 
"Project Eagle," which included "tailing" Forrest throughout 
the day, whether he was on foot or in a vehicle, as well as 
"staking out" his residence at the Detroit White Panther
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house. The officers involved in the surveillance were able 
to utilize Detroit's computerized motor vehicle registration 
system to immediately ascertain the names in which all 
targeted vehicles with Michigan license plates were 
registered.78
While "Project Eagle" may have been part of a larger
FBI-directed effort to locate fugitive Plamondon, an incident
which occurred on March 12 indicates that the primary purpose
of the surveillance was to locate the individual(s) or
group(s) who placed the huge cache of dynamite inside the
13th Precinct on March 6. On the day in question, three
members of the Detroit WPP Chapter —  Charles Booker, David
Gaynes, and Glenn Davis —  were on their way to a target-
shooting "self-defense" class at "a state recreation area,"
when they were pulled over by an unmarked police car and
taken into custody at gun-point, without being charged with
any offense. After arriving at the 13th Precinct station on
Woodward Avenue, they found out the reason that they were
stopped and detained:
One officer said they were going to have to start 
kicking in some white boys' doors...Another
officer stated that the police were going to keep 
arresting members of the community until they 
found out who had planted the bomb in the ladies 
room of the station. We were held for a number of 
hours and interrogated about our political
beliefs, called communists and told to leave the
78John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files, Detroit Police 
Department, Intelligence Bureau, Inter-Office Memoranda, 
March 13-20, 1970. See Figure A-18 in the Appendix.
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country. . .At no time were we informed as to the 
charges against [us].79
The statement makes clear the "siege mentality" that existed
within the 13th Precinct, as well as its consequences for the
local radical establishment. A detailed diagram of the
inside of the White Panther house on John Lodge Avenue,
located in the files of the Red Squad, indicates that the
Detroit Police Department might also have had an informer
inside the local White Panther Chapter. Hand-written
notations on the diagram carefully detail the locations of
all doors, hallways, and corridors; also indicated is the
location of "Jack's Room."80
The arrival of Neil J. Welch as the new SAC indicated 
the importance which the Detroit office now had for Hoover 
and other top FBI officials. Arriving in May of 1970, 
Welch's primary responsibility involved locating the fugitive 
Weathermen and bringing them to justice. Detroit was 
selected as the site for a Federal Grand Jury investigation 
of the Weathermen, due to several factors. First, the 
December, 1969 Flint War Council had been held just north of
79John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files, typed statement 
from Charles J. Booker, David Gaynes, and Glen Davis, March 
16, 1970.
80John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files, hand-written 
diagram of the Detroit Chapter's house, undated [probably 
early 1970]. See Figure 4-4 on page 377. John Waterhouse
Forrest was commonly known as "Jack." Police and FBI
diagrams of radicals' homes and offices were frequently
utilized in raids. See Churchill and Vander Wall, The
COINTELPRO Papers. 139.
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Detroit. Second, during 1969, the southeast Michigan area 
had provided the largest concentration of Weathermen in the 
country, including Bill Ayers and Diana Oughton. By the time 
of Welch's arrival in Detroit, Oughton had been identified as 
one of the Weathermen bombers who had been killed in the New 
York townhouse explosion on March 6. Ayers, however, 
remained underground.81
Welch was sent to Detroit because of his reputation for 
getting results. His background with the FBI dated to the 
early fifties, and he had worked in a wide variety of cities 
across the country, including New Haven, Boston, and Buffalo. 
It was during his four years as SAC of the Buffalo office 
that he gained a reputation within the Bureau for innovative 
tactics that resulted in the arrests of several high-ranking 
mobsters. The Detroit assignment was not an attractive one 
for Welch; referred to as a "career graveyard," the office 
had gone through nine different SACs in less than seven 
years.82 However, the new SAC took charge of the 175-odd 
agents at his disposal, and soon gave Hoover what he wanted. 
Working closely with the Grand Jury, in mid-July Welch rolled 
out a high-profile series of indictments against thirteen
81Taube recalls a secret meeting with his "best friend" 
Ayers shortly after the townhouse explosion had killed their 
mutual friend from the days at the University of Michigan. 
Ayers refused to tell Taube who had been involved. His 
paranoia shocked Taube. See ASHP-Taube Interview, 25-26.
82Welch and Marston, Inside Hoover's FBI. 148; see also 
Sanford J. Ungar, FBI. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1975), 196.
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Weathermen leaders, charging them with conspiracy to commit 
acts of violence against the U.S.A. during their "War 
Council" in Flint.83
Within a month of his arrival in Detroit, Welch had set 
his sights on the White Panthers. On June 22, he requested 
permission from Hoover to install warrantless wiretaps on the 
White Panther house at 1520 Hill Street in Ann Arbor.84 In 
his request, Welch stated that the "specific information 
being sought" was as follows:
1. Advance information concerning proposed acts 
of violence;
2. Assist in identifying leaders and associates;
3. Determine source of financial support;
4. Determine relationship with other YIP-WP
chapters and white and black extremist
organizations on a national and international 
basis;
5. Details concerning YIP-WP activities and 
operation;
6. Information concerning the whereabouts of 
LAWRENCE ROBERT "PUN" PLAMONDON, Bureau Fugitive 
and Top Ten.85
83Welch and Marston's self-serving account of the 
former's adventures with the FBI takes the position that 
although he generally disagreed with "internal security" 
investigations of New Left and other radical groups, Hoover 
and Asst. Director William Sullivan allegedly made it clear 
to him that either he would deliver the radicals or face the 
ruination of his career.
m SAC, Detroit to Hoover, June 22, 1970, 62-112678-61. 
See Figure A-19 in the Appendix.
8SIbid. . 2.
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The focus of Welch's investigation appears to have been the 
Youth International Party, as well as the alleged YIP-WPP 
merger; locating Plamondon appears to have been a secondary 
concern. Also worthy of note is the fact that Welch made no 
reference to the Weathermen in his request. Interestingly, 
Hoover rejected Welch's request on June 30, in a memorandum 
that dressed down the SAC for failing to follow Bureau 
procedures when requesting wiretaps. The Director criticized 
Welch for discrepancies in his request, such as referring to 
an "impending merger" of YIP and WPP in one place and then 
using the caption "YIP-WP" in another, indicating that the 
merger had already taken place. Hoover's concluding 
statement was that the "overall commitments of the Bureau" 
would not permit him to go along with the wiretap.86
The White Panthers would not remain a low priority for 
the FBI Director much longer. On July 23, 1970, the Michigan 
State Police captured Plamondon near Cheboygan, Michigan, in 
the northernmost section of the state. He had been riding in 
a vehicle with Skip Taube and "Jack" Forrest, and one of them 
had carelessly tossed a beer can onto a highway, attracting 
the attention of a highway patrolman. Not recognizing 
Plamondon due to his fake identification, the officer allowed 
the group to continue on its way, after issuing a warning. 
Only after the response to the policeman's radio check on 
Taube and Forrest came in did he realize whom he had just
86Hoover to SAC, Detroit, June 30, 1970, 62-112678-62.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
368
stopped. Within minutes, the three White Panthers were in 
custody, offering no resistance. Press reports at the time 
of the arrests quoted FBI agents as stating that Plamondon 
had a .38 caliber Derringer pistol, a rifle, a shotgun, and 
"two cartons of dynamite" in his possession. Judge Lawrence 
Gubow set Plamondon's bail at $100,000. Taube and Forrest 
were each charged with harboring a fugitive, and held in lieu 
of $25,000 bond. The media focused upon Plamondon's 
appearance, which included short hair and no beard.87
The specific intention(s) of Taube and Forrest's meeting 
with Plamondon in northern Michigan remain unclear. Since 
his return to the U.S. from abroad in late May or early June, 
a very small circle of White Panthers had arranged secret 
meetings with him every two to three weeks, delivering food 
and other materials, and taking possession of his recorded 
and written messages for the media. Genie Plamondon had made 
a majority of the previous trips, but on this occasion was 
visiting WPP chapters in California. Immediately following 
the arrests, rumors circulated in Ann Arbor and Detroit that 
the three may have been plotting to free Sinclair from prison 
in Marquette, located not far from where they were captured. 
The FBI's report of September 3 intimated that the group's 
intended target may have actually been a bank in Traverse
87Petroit Free Press. July 24, 1970, 1; Detroit News.
July 24, 1970, 3-A. See Figure 4-5 on page 378 for a rare 
photograph of Plamondon, Taube, and Forrest while 
underground.
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City.88 In an interview during the late seventies, Skip
Taube stated that at the time of their capture, he and Jack
were merely assisting Pun with moving his camp, because
Plamondon had been living in a tent and "wanted to move
'cause winter was coming." After being asked specifically
about the rumor of the prison break, Taube added:
I can't speak for Pun or Jack, man, no telling 
what thoughts may have crossed their minds 
sometimes. As a group, we had no plans other than 
to take Pun and stash him. Now Pun, all he had 
time to do was to make plans. And, I'm sure, if 
we wouldn't have got busted, it could have only 
gotten worse. 'Cause you don't sit around with a 
bunch of dynamite and a bunch of rifles plotting 
the revolution without getting yourself into some 
trouble.89
The shock of having three additional high-ranking 
officials in jail devastated the White Panthers, as Genie 
recalls:
It was like an eye-opener to where we were at. 
That we had not been as serious as we thought we 
were. That we had not been as on top of the 
situation as we thought we were. It was like this 
sudden shock of what fools we were in a lot of 
ways to have presented ourselves as being 
militant, organized, and serious and then to have 
our Minister of Defense, who was underground on 
this charge of bombing the CIA office, caught for 
throwing a beer can...how stupid...It was 
embarrassing.90
The materials found in the Volkswagen van in which the 
three were travelling would ultimately have much greater
88FBI Report Re: Plamondon, September 3, 1970, 64.
89ASHP-Taube Interview, 28-30 [quote 30].
^ASHP-Genie Plamondon Interview, 28.
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long-term consequences for them. For the FBI, the 
confiscated materials provided valuable information 
concerning Plamondon's time spent underground, as well as 
address books and correspondence. Under Welch's direction, 
the Detroit office of the FBI carefully reviewed each and 
every one of the 700-odd sheets of paper, and prepared a 107- 
page report, completed on September 3. The report was 
clearly intended not only for Hoover and Sullivan at FBI 
Headquarters, but also for local and state-level law 
enforcement agencies. Within three months of the report's 
issuance, Hoover elevated the White Panthers to the status of 
one of the most dangerous militant organizations in America, 
and brought them to the attention of the Nixon Justice 
Department.91
Welch did not wait for the conclusion of the report to 
re-submit his request for a warrantless wiretap on the White 
Panther house. On August 10, 1970, four weeks after
Plamondon's capture, he issued a second request to Hoover, 
this time focusing on the illusive "underground apparatus" to 
which Plamondon's materials had alluded. Welch's request 
stated:
It is believed that coverage of this address may 
produce further pertinent information concerning 
that "underground" system which may lead to the
91FBI Report Re: Plamondon, September 3, 1970.
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location of other wanted Bureau New Left
Fugitives.92
The manner in which Welch completed the required application 
for surveillance indicates the importance of the
Plamondon/Taube/Forrest materials. The "information being 
sought" category was revised, as follows:
(a) Advance information concerning proposed acts 
of violence.
(b) Assistance in identifying leaders and
associates in 'revolutionary violence['] which is 
advocated by WPP leaders.
(c) Assistance in determining source of financial 
support for this group.
(d) Determination of the relationship with other 
YIP-WP Chapters and white and black extremist 
organizations on a national and international 
basis.
(e) Information concerning whereabouts of 
"Underground" Bureau Fugitives.
Item "(b)" of the above demonstrated Welch's close reading of
the correspondence which passed between Sinclair, Plamondon,
and Taube.
Several statements made by Welch merit attention. 
First, he admitted that information used in the request had 
come from "Detroit informants," as well as from the Plamondon 
materials, and concluded that the White Panthers and Youth 
International Party were in fact "working out an alliance." 
Second, his request mentioned, for the first time, Genie 
Plamondon's trips to Hanoi and Moscow, as well as Taube's
^SAC Detroit to Hoover, August 10, 1970, 62-112678-83,
2.
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former relationship with Weathermen Ayers and Oughton. 
Third, Welch stressed the urgency of his request, stating 
that "the need is greatest in the immediate future inasmuch 
as Detroit's vigorous prosecutive efforts against the WPP 
leadership [are ongoing]." Fourth, in anticipation of 
similar procedural complaints, Welch reminded Hoover that the 
"data set forth herein concerning cost and feasibility" were 
similar to a request Detroit had made during the spring of 
1970 for a warrantless wiretap on suspected Weathermen, which 
"was authorized by the Bureau at that time." Finally, he 
boasted that "The YIP-WP in its emerging coalition is 
developing as a leading revolutionary white organization in 
the country."93
The new information provided via Welch's revised request
more than persuaded Hoover that the surveillance was
warranted, and the Director promptly sent a memorandum to
Mitchell, arguing, in somewhat less detail, several of
Welch's main points. However, Hoover's memorandum contained
a few passages referring to information which was not
included in Welch's request, indicating that he had
personally inspected either the materials captured with
Plamondon, or a was given a preliminary report on them:
Plamondon noted in this material that conditions 
in this country must escalate to 'revolutionary 
violence' where battles will not be on police 
level of law and order but on war level which will
93Ibid. . 1-3; SAC Detroit to Hoover, August 10, 1970, 62- 
112678-84, 1-6.
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force the calling out of the Army. Plamondon 
refers to this new level of violence as involving 
'bombs and sabotage.' He further states that 
financial problems are severe and that 'they' are 
going to have to get into 'ripping off banks like 
our brothers in South America.' He also suggested 
that the example of 'the brothers in South 
America' who kidnap American ambassadors to trade 
off for prisoners should be followed.
Hoover's memorandum also claimed that information gathered
from the warrantless wiretap "will be introduced as evidence
in court."94 In fact, both Welch and Hoover had the same
opinion; this signified a major shift in the FBI's internal
surveillance policies.
On August 19, 1970, Attorney General Mitchell approved 
the installation of a warrantless wiretap on the headquarters 
of the White Panther Party in Ann Arbor. Much had changed in 
the two months since Welch's initial unsuccessful request. 
Plamondon, Taube, and Forrest had given the White Panther 
myth an appearance of reality, by means of their rhetoric, as 
well as their actions. The Director of the FBI was now 
referring to the White Panthers as "a leading revolutionary 
white group in the United States."95 However, when Mitchell 
signed Hoover's request, there is no evidence that he had any 
prior knowledge of the group. It would take a sequence of 
events, occurring over the next few months, to ultimately 
lead him to select the White Panthers' CIA conspiracy case 
for the re-institution of the Mitchell Doctrine.
^Hoover to Mitchell, August 18, 1970, 62-112678-82, 1-2.
95Ibid. . 1.
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(Figure 4-1)
WPP Flyer Mailed to Michigan Congressmen and Senators
on April 30, 1970
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files
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(Figure 4-2)
"Pun" Plamondon with Black Panthers, 1969
Source: Leni Sinclair Personal Photography Archives
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(Figure 4-3)
White Panther/Weathermen Meeting, circa 1970: 
"Skip" Taube (striped pants), Bill Ayers (w/cigarette), 
and Diana Oughton (seated in wooden chair next to Taube)
Source: Leni Sinclair Personal Photography Archives
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(Figure 4-4)
Detroit Red Squad Diagram of WPP House 
circa 1970
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red squad Files
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
378
(Figure 4-5)
White Panther Mythmakers:
"Jack" Forrest, "Pun" Plamondon, and "Skip" Taube 
From the "Underground," Spring, 1970
Source: Leni Sinclair Personal Photography Archives
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(Figure 4-6)
National Security Threat?
White Panthers in Front of Commune on 1520 Hill Street,
circa Fall, 1969
Source: Leni Sinclair Personal Photography Archives
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IV.
Title III specified the due process of law 
required to control the use of wiretap[s]...These 
include securing a court order from a judge; 
showing probable cause; particularizing the 
offenses under investigation; [etc.]...Now these 
provisions are vital, for they follow the 
cherished American legal tradition in securing 
warrants... They give us confidence that in using 
the wiretap under these limitations we are 
reaffirming the constitutional safeguards going 
back to the Bill of Rights. —  John N. Mitchell, 
October 5, 19 7 096
The defendant Plamondon has participated in 
conversations which were overheard by Government 
agents who were monitoring wiretaps which were 
being employed to gather intelligence information 
deemed necessary to protect the nation from 
attempts of domestic organizations to attack and 
subvert the existing structure of the Government 
[e.g. warrantless taps]...This affidavit is 
submitted in connection with the Government's 
opposition to the disclosure....of electronic 
surveillances which the Government contends were 
legal. —  John N. Mitchell, December 18, 197097
During the fall of 1970, the public's fears about 
Weathermen bombers, Charles Manson-type radicals, and what
^U.S. Department of Justice, "Address by John N. 
Mitchell, Attorney General of the United States, Before the 
77th Annual Conference of the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police," Atlantic City, New Jersey, October 5, 
1970, located in the Personal Papers of Senator Robert P. 
Griffin, Clarke Historical Library, Central Michigan 
University, Mt. Pleasant, Michigan, box 452, "Griffin on the 
Issues," folder: "Law and Order" [hereafter "Mitchell IACP 
Address"}. The author is grateful to Senator Griffin [now a 
Michigan State Supreme Court Justice] for allowing access to 
these papers.
’’Affidavit from Attorney General John N. Mitchell, dated 
December 18, 1970, submitted to U.S. District Court Judge 
Damon J. Keith, Davis Papers.
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many viewed as an overall breakdown in respect for 
traditional values and institutions were exacerbated by a 
ratings-hungry national media, as well as opportunistic 
politicians. The polarized political environment provided an 
excellent backdrop, and was one of the principal contributing 
factors, to the Nixon Administration's decision to re­
institute the Mitchell Doctrine.
Recovering from the crisis surrounding his fateful 
Cambodia decisions of the late spring, Nixon regained his 
composure during the summer months, aided by higher public 
opinion poll ratings from the "silent majority." By late 
July he indicated that he would assume an unprecedented 
front-line role in the upcoming mid-term elections, in an 
attempt to overcome Democratic majorities in both houses. 
His basic strategy for the campaign was very similar to the 
one he had used in his successful Presidential election bid 
two years earlier: namely, to link the Democrats to crime, 
violence, and student protestors. A focal point for the 
Administration's offensive was Congress, especially the House 
Judiciary Committee, which had delayed consideration on a 
number of anti-crime bills since the early spring. The 
primary warrior in the Administration's offensive was Vice 
President Spiro Agnew, whose speeches blasting the Democrats 
formed the model for the bitter Congressional races that
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followed. On July 10, Agnew claimed that polarization over 
political issues was positive and healthy.98
A few highly publicized events during the summer and 
fall of 1970 kept the crime and lawlessness issue in the 
public eye. On July 23 the Justice Department issued high- 
profile indictments against thirteen suspected Weathermen in 
Detroit. On August 28 a bomb exploded on the campus of the 
University of Wisconsin at Madison, killing a graduate 
student; the act was engineered by a small New Left sect 
known as the "New Year's Gang." On October 8, two separate 
bombings took place on the West Coast, damaging a courtroom 
in San Rafael and an Army Reserve training building in 
Seattle. And finally, the trial of radical murderer Charles 
Manson got underway. As Gitlin states, "For the media, the 
acidhead Charles Manson was readymade as the monster lurking 
in the heart of every longhair."99
By early fall, Nixon and the G.O.P. dominated the 
political environment with their single-issue focus on crime, 
even though a majority of Americans believed inflation and a 
worsening economy were of greater concern. The degree to 
which the Administration fixated upon student protestors and 
New Left radicals is chronicled in amazing detail in H.R. 
Haldeman's recently-published Diaries. The July 25 entry
98New York Times. July 11, 1970, 14. Thereafter, media 
commentators and many Democrats referred to Agnew's position 
as promoting "positive polarization."
"Gitlin, The Sixties. 404.
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states: "Some talk of politics again. [President] Wants to
be sure our candidates tie their opponents into hippies,
kids, Demos."100 By early-September the Administration's
campaign strategy was firmly in focus, supported by speeches
from right-wing ideologues Patrick Buchanan and William
Safire. Haldeman's entry for September 9 states:
Long morning meeting with political operations and 
VP's crew for the campaign. P really in his 
element as he held forth, for Safire and Buchanan, 
on speech content, campaign strategy, etc. Came 
up with some darn good lines and ideas, all the 
stuff he'd like to say but can't. P was delighted 
with Pat's kickoff speech for VP, which really 
hits hard. Really wants to play the conservative 
trend and hang the opponents as left-wing radical 
liberals. Said to say, 'Our opponents are not bad 
men, they are sincere, dedicated, radicals'...And 
force them on the defensive.101
At a campaign stop in San Jose, California, on October 29,
Nixon stood on the roof of his limousine, prodding a small
group of protestors by wildly waving peace signs —  an
incident clearly staged for media effect.102 Two days
later, in a speech in Phoenix, Arizona, Nixon called for an
100Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries. 184.
101Ibid. . 192.
102As Haldeman notes in his diary on October 29: "We
wanted some confrontation and there were no hecklers in the 
hall, so we stalled departure a little so they could zero in 
outside, and they sure did...rather scary as rocks were 
flying, etc...Made a huge incident and we worked hard to 
crank it up, should make a really major story." See Ibid.. 
205.
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end to the "appeasement” of "thugs and hoodlums" in American 
society.103
Finding themselves as vulnerable on the crime issue as 
they had been in 1968, the Democrats acted predictably. 
Former Vice President Hubert Humphrey admonished his fellow 
Democrats to either align themselves firmly on the side of 
"law and order" or face the same fate that befell his 
campaign at the hands of Nixon's "law and order" assault two 
years earlier.104 Congressional Democrats responded in 
September and October, supporting nearly all of the 
Administration's anti-crime bills.105
On October 15, Nixon signed into law the "Organized 
Crime Control Act," an omnibus package containing such 
measures as pre-trial "preventative" detention of suspects,
a so-called "no-knock" law, a significant revision of Federal
Grand Jury witness immunity law (so-called "use immunity'), 
the death penalty for bombers who kill, and a provision 
allowing judges to tack on additional sentences of up to 
thirty years for defendants found to be "special offenders." 
Civil libertarian groups such as the ACLU immediately vowed 
to challenge several of the bill's components. Mitchell's 
comment at a Women's National Press Club reception on
103New York Times. November 1, 1970, 1.
104New York Times. August 12, 1970, 25.
105One notable exception was Title VII, the 
Administration's unsuccessful attempt to overturn the 
Alderman decision.
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September 18 was prophetic: "this country is going so far 
right you are not even going to recognize it."106
The passage of the new Omnibus Crime Act represented the 
high point of the Nixon Administration's attempts to address 
the problems of crime and social disorder with "legislative 
solutions." Having entered office at a time when Congress 
and the Attorney General (Ramsey Clark) had been at odds with 
one another concerning crime policy, the Mitchell Justice 
Department acted forcefully to regain Executive influence 
over the Legislative Branch. Unable to dislodge the many 
unpopular rights-focused Warren court rulings, Mitchell 
sought legislative routes around the Judiciary. Yet, as John 
Eliff points out, legislative solutions are usually 
influenced by partisanship and the "politics of the moment," 
rather than by thoughtful consideration of long-term 
consequences. For all of the Administration's efforts 
securing the passage of the 1970 crime bill, Supreme Court 
decisions such as Miranda remained the law of the land. In 
reality, the legislation merely provided Nixon, Mitchell, and 
the bandwagon in Congress with some temporary political 
benefits.107 The net long-term effect of the legislation 
was to further lessen the Judiciary's credibility and stature 
of the Judiciary. This situation provided Nixon with the
■“Quoted in New York Times. September 19, 1970, 10.
Itr7The outcome of the Congressional election was a draw, 
with the Democrats retaining control of both houses.
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opportunity to reassert the power of his office, through a 
"cult of Executive expertise" in law enforcement matters, 
such as electronic surveillance.108
The Administration displayed a new boldness in its 
surveillance policies. One important example of this was 
support for long-term "investigative" wiretaps, in addition 
to short-term "prosecutive" surveillance. In a rare news 
conference on July 14, Mitchell asserted that "investigative" 
wiretapping against "organized crime" was up 100 percent over 
1969 figures.109 By late July, the Administration's public 
relations campaign to convince the American public of the 
effectiveness of wiretapping as a law enforcement tool was in 
full swing, assisted by a powerful Congressional ally, 
Senator John L. McClellan. As one of the principal drafters 
of Title III, McClellan might have felt a strong need to 
extol its effectiveness during an election year. Whatever 
the motivation, he applauded the Justice Department's success 
in utilizing Title III court-approved wiretapping.110
108Eliff, Crime. Dissent, and the Attorney General. 81, 
226, 251.
109New York Times. July 15, 1970, 16. Significantly,
Mitchell did not directly address the issue of warrantless 
"national security" wiretaps, which the Administration had 
claimed the legal right to conduct against domestic 
organizations [the Mitchell Doctrine]. When pressed on the 
issue, Mitchell merely added that the number of these taps 
"had not changed significantly."
110(Washington, D.C.) Evening Star. August 3, 1970, A-3.
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One of the more significant actions in the 
Administration's pro-wiretapping offensive occurred on 
October 5, when Mitchell expounded the statistical 
effectiveness of court-approved wiretapping before a meeting 
of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. He 
asserted that "in reviewing our use of wiretapping in the 
last year-and-a-half, I think you'll agree that the only 
repression that has resulted is the repression of crime." 
Adding that the Justice Department was rapidly expanding its 
wiretapping operations, he stated that in his view, its use 
by federal authorities was "not only a right, but a 
duty."111 An additional example of the Justice Department's 
bolder public stand on wiretapping was its virtual admission 
in the "Chicago Seven" case that the FBI had wiretapped 
defendant Bobby Seale during the trial.112
The Administration's most significant wiretapping 
initiative was its attempt to overturn the Alderman decision, 
via Title VII of the Organized Crime Control Act. Unhappily 
for Mitchell and the Justice Department, the House Judiciary 
Committee, under the leadership of Representative Emanuel 
Celler, deleted the principal component of the initiative,
ulMitchell IACP Address, 8. See also New York Times. 
October 6, 1970, 1; Washington Post. October 6, 1970, A-l. 
Mitchell's address also made a strong appeal for law 
enforcement officials to work for the passage of wiretapping 
statutes in those states that did not have them.
112New York Times. August 8, 1970, 47; Washington Post. 
July 31, 1970, A-17.
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which would have required that Federal Judges conduct in 
camera inspections of illegally-obtained (warrantless) 
surveillance logs, to determine if information in them was 
relevant to the case and "in the interest of justice" —  
rather than automatically ordering their disclosure to the 
defense, as was proscribed in Alderman.113 Chairman Celler 
referred to the questionable section of Title VII as one of 
the "unconstitutional potholes" which had to be removed from 
the crime package before he and other liberal Democrats would 
support it.114 Consequently, the most the Administration 
was able to get was a futile and non-binding "declaration" 
that "trial judges and not defendants will inspect logs of 
illegal eavesdropping," as well as a binding provision that 
illegal wiretaps conducted five years or more before a 
defendant committed the offense in question were not subject 
to the disclosure provisions of Alderman.115 Thus, for all 
of the Administration's success in the area of anti-crime 
legislation, it failed in its primary attempt to acquire a 
"legislative solution" to the Alderman decision. The ruling 
virtually guaranteed that the gulf separating the 
Administration's public and private wiretapping policies 
would continue to widen.
n3Eliff, Crime. Dissent, and the Attorney General. 77.
I14Quoted in New York Times. September 24, 1970, 56.
ll5Ibid. . October 18, 1970, 9.
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Throughout the late summer and fall the Administration's
secret wiretapping policies also became increasingly bold and
forceful, bolstered by the same twin forces of social
disorder and anti-crime hysteria which had influenced the
passage of the Organized Crime Control Act. Stymied by the
failure of both the Huston Plan and of Title VII, Nixon had
become more convinced than ever of the need to expand vastly
the clandestine intelligence gathering capabilities of the
government, both to prevent bombings and other crimes, and to
expose the violent and subversive intentions of the New Left
and other radical groups. Haldeman's journal entry for
August 25 vividly demonstrates the Administration's mind-set
in the wake of the failed Huston Plan:
San Clemente. Discussed domestic security problem 
(E and I had discussed with Mitchell yesterday).
P said I should take it over because I'm the only 
one J. Edgar Hoover trusts and will take orders 
from. Others, especially Mitchell, want it under 
Domestic Council, with a staff of intelligence 
types to evaluate input and order necessary 
projects, etc. Will do it one way or the other, 
in any event will drop the interagency task force 
approach which we've started and run into a snag 
with FBI and Hoover.116
Throughout September and October, Nixon and his closest
advisors courted Hoover. They invited him to social affairs
and brought him into the inner circle of policy-making, a
position he had enjoyed under several previous Presidents.
ll6Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries. 191.
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Haldeman was ordered by Nixon to have lunch with Hoover twice 
a month, "to keep up close contact."117
Very soon the renewed relationship provided rewards for 
both sides. Over a two month period beginning in early 
September, Hoover gradually removed several of the
restrictions on FBI intelligence gathering techniques and 
tactics that he had previously refused to support. Perhaps 
the most important change in FBI practices was a vast 
expansion of warrantless "national security" wiretaps. These 
were directed against the full spectrum of New Left and other 
radical groups —  including the Michigan White Panthers.118 
In return, Hoover was granted one thousand new agents, as 
well as a blanket authorization to infiltrate college 
campuses, whenever serious disturbances occurred.119 By the 
end of the year, Hoover's "Ten Most Wanted" list had been 
expanded from ten to sixteen, with nine slots reserved for 
New Left radicals.120
117Ibid. . 192.
118Theoharis, Spying on Americans. 36.
119New York Times. September 23, 1970, 1. The
Administration's request for 1000 additional FBI agents was 
delivered to Congress during the period of anti-bombing 
hysteria which followed the New Year's Gang bombing at the 
University of Wisconsin's Math Science Research Center, in 
which one student was killed. Considered in Congress during 
a period of frenzied bi-partisan activity on anti-crime 
measures, the bill was immediately accepted by House 
Democrats, anxious to refute Republican claims that they were 
"soft on crime."
120Ibid. . November 28, 1970, 13.
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During the fall and early winter, the Administration 
continued to consider initiatives designed to centralize 
domestic intelligence gathering under White House control. 
The two new men in charge of the project, John Dean and 
Robert Mardian, pursued different approaches to the problem 
of inadequate intelligence. Dean, a White House counsel, 
outlined his desire for a limited, piecemeal approach on 
September 18, in a memorandum to Mitchell. Dean recommended 
that ’’the most appropriate procedure would be to decide on 
the type of intelligence we need, based on an assessment of 
the recommendations of this unit, and then proceed to remove 
the restraints as necessary to obtain such intelligence.1,121 
The Administration's pressure on Hoover to relax his 
restrictions on warrantless wiretapping can be viewed as an 
example of Dean's strategy.
Mardian, the newly-appointed Assistant Attorney General 
in charge of the Justice Department's Internal Security 
Division, continued to pursue the sweeping intelligence 
gathering authority represented by the Huston Plan. He was 
placed in charge of two White House-directed intelligence 
gathering units, the Inter-divisional Intelligence Unit 
(IDIU), which had been created by former Attorney General 
Ramsey Clark, and a revamped Intelligence Evaluation 
Committee (IEC), originally created by the Nixon 
Administration in May of 1969 to provide "threat assessment"
,21Quoted in Theoharis, Spying on Americans. 36.
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in instances of civil disorder. Both units underscored the 
need for cooperation across the full spectrum of domestic and 
international intelligence gathering agencies. Although 
Mardian's centralized units enjoyed strong support from Nixon 
and Mitchell, Hoover's response was lukewarm.122 Thus, for 
all of the boldness demonstrated by the Administration's 
public and secret surveillance policies during 1970, a number 
of "barriers" remained in place, effectively blocking Nixon's 
desire for Executive control over all domestic intelligence 
gathering.
The politicized anti-crime atmosphere which pervaded 
Washington during the fall of 1970 influenced the manner in 
which law enforcement was carried out in communities across 
the country. Professor Jerome Skolnik, of the National 
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, studied 
police behavior and attitudes closely during this period. He 
concluded that police increasingly viewed themselves as an 
embattled minority, whose hands were tied by liberal Supreme 
Court rulings and leftist civil libertarians.123 According 
to Skolnik, these feelings manifested themselves through 
increased membership in police fraternal organizations and 
the emergence of law enforcement as an influential political 
force in many local communities. Highly politicized police
122Donner, The Age of Surveillance. 282-284. Donner 
describe's the IEC's "ultimate purpose" as the revival of the 
Huston Plan.
123Eliff, Crime. Dissent, and the Attorney General. 73.
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authority predictably reacted very favorably to the anti­
crime focus of Nixon and Mitchell.
Neil J. Welch, the new FBI Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) 
in Detroit, regarded himself as answering to a "higher 
calling" by regularly "bending" Hoover's rules and 
regulations, to say nothing of ignoring the law.124 Welch 
employed a number of techniques which Hoover strongly 
opposed: the use of very young long-haired informers as
agents provocateurs: the acquisition, often through
"irregular" channels, of the latest high-tech video, 
wiretapping, and microphone surveillance equipment; and the 
creation of a super-secret investigative unit, known as the 
"Nine Squad," which focused solely on projects of Welch's 
choosing, and was not assigned to regular Bureau 
business.125
Welch's proclivity for selective adherence to Bureau 
regulations carried over to his wiretapping operations. 
During the spring and summer of 1969, Attorney General 
Mitchell had issued guidelines for the FBI to follow in its
124In his memoir, Welch discusses Senator Sam Ervin's 
investigation of FBI practices during the early seventies. 
After quoting Ervin as saying that "the United States 
Constitution does not require the FBI to be efficient," Welch 
adds "he might have even said that the Constitution does not 
appear to permit efficient law enforcement." See Welch and 
Marston, Inside Hoover's FBI. 278-79.
123The Welch/Marston book accurately portrays the
widening rift between FBI agents, especially the SAC's, and 
Hoover. See Ibid.. 147-61. For additional information
concerning the deteriorating Director/SAC relationship, see 
Sanford J. Ungar, FBI. 196-99.
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Title III and "national security" wiretapping. These 
guidelines were promptly distributed by Hoover to the SAC's 
with specific instructions that they should ensure that all 
agents receive them in writing. One of the more important 
guidelines concerned the sanctity of attorney-client 
conversations; agents were instructed to discontinue 
immediately surveillance whenever defendants in pending 
criminal trials and/or their attorneys were on the line. A 
series of detailed procedures were to be followed in the 
event that such conversations inadvertently were overheard by 
agents.126 Evidence that Welch paid little attention to 
these guidelines is contained in his request for a thirty-day 
continuance of the White Panther wiretap, dated September 14, 
1970. In the section of the memorandum pertaining to 
"information of value" that had been overheard during the 
previous month, Welch stated that "On 9/12/70 it was learned 
that WILLIAM KUNTSLER [sic], ABBIE HOFFMAN, JERRY RUBIN and 
[Leonard} WEINGLASS would be in town for a hearing involving 
PUN PLAMONDON on 9/21/70.",27 Welch not only informed his 
boss about this patently illegal eavesdropping: he also sent
126Mitchell to Hoover, July 14, 1969 [unnumbered document 
in the legal papers of Hugh M. Davis]. This document is 
known as a "minimization memo," because it is intended to 
reduce the possibility that the Government might overhear 
certain constitutionally-protected attorney-client 
conversations, which, if revealed, could severely damage 
prosecutions.
127SAC, Detroit to Hoover, September 14, 1970, 62-112678-
103.
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the information via the FBI's electronic communications 
system ("DEtel") to the SACs in Chicago, New York, and San 
Francisco on September 24, apparently believing that the 
information would be of some use to them in their ongoing 
surveillance of the "Chicago Seven" defendants and attorneys.
Hoover's reaction was immediate. He advised Welch to
re-read "SAC Letter 69-43," ir. which Mitchell's guidelines
had been distributed to the field offices by the Director one
year earlier. He directed Welch to seal all written
materials pertaining to the conversation in question and send
them to the Bureau's Headquarters. Furthermore, he
instructed that all agents who had been exposed to the
information sign sworn statements that they would never
reveal the contents of the conversation, unless specifically
directed by the Attorney General. Within a few days, all
agents in the four FBI offices who had been privy to the
information did sign such statements. Hoover concluded his
memo with the following warning:
Detroit, in its monitoring of the White Panther 
Party in Ann Arbor, must follow the instructions 
set forth in SAC Letter 69-43 and insure [sic] 
that when any conversations between individuals 
who are defendants in Federal criminal cases and 
other individuals are overheard, monitoring should 
immediately cease.128
Welch's response on October 5 stated that "The conversation
involved in this matter was not recorded on tape and all
I28Hoover to SACs Detroit, Chicago, New York, and San 
Francisco, September 25, 1970, 62-112678-112.
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notes made by the monitoring Agents have been destroyed."129 
Evidence suggests that even after this turn of events, Welch 
did not revise his practices. Portions of FBI surveillance 
logs of the White Panthers, released as a result of a 
counter-suit against the government, reveal that on at least 
two occasions in October and December of 1970, the FBI agents 
monitoring the line listened to and duly logged calls from 
John Sinclair to the White Panther house, in which he 
discussed a variety of legal details pertaining to his 
pending cases.130
Welch's tactics against the White Panthers were not 
limited to the round-the-clock warrantless wiretaps that 
commenced on September 9. In fact, the FBI's elevation of 
the White Panthers to the status of "a leading revolutionary 
white organization in the United States" during the fall of 
1970 had as much to do with the aggressiveness of Welch as 
with Plamondon's potential for revolutionary violence.131 
Welch's September third report on Plamondon's capture was 
widely disseminated, both locally, to the Detroit and
129SAC, Detroit to Hoover, October 5, 1970, 62-112678- 
134. On October 28 Hoover admitted Welch's mistake in a 
memorandum to Attorney General Mitchell, and attached the 
signed statements from all of the agents within the four 
field offices who had been exposed to the Rubin conversation. 
See Hoover to Mitchell, October 28, 1970, 62-112678-139.
I30A sample wiretapping log of Sinclair's conversations 
is located in Figure 4-7, on page 431.
131Quoted in SAC, Detroit to Hoover, August 10, 1970, 62- 
112678-84, page 2.
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Michigan State Police Red Squads, as well as to
Headquarters.132 The result of this information sharing was 
that the White Panthers soon became well known to many in 
fpolice and government circles.
An important, albeit bizarre, example of this involved 
an anonymous letter allegedly found among the personal
effects of "Jack” Forrest at the time of his arrest with 
Plamondon and Taube on July 23. Addressed to the Detroit 
chapter of the White Panthers, and bearing a Los Angeles, 
California postmark dated May 27, 1970, the letter states: 
To whomever:
A suggestion for you - and it's the ONLY WAY YOU
WILL EVER FREE JOHN SINCLAIR - it may have
occurred to you, but perhaps not.
Take a leaf from the brothers down in South 
America who keep snatching American Ambassadors to 
trade off for prisoners.
It then advises the reader that "If you got a really big pig,
such as Ford or Griffin, you could probably get Bobby Seale
I32The copy of Welch's September 3, 1970, report on
Plamondon's capture that was later found in the files of the 
Detroit Red Squad contains numerous hand-written comments. 
On page 18, alongside of a detailed breakdown of Plamondon's 
address book, the following comment appears: "THIS LIST COULD 
WELL BE THE NEW LEFT 'UNDERGROUND' . EITHER PARTIAL OR TOTAL." 
A similar comment appears on page 82, alongside of 
information gleaned from Taube's address book: "These are 
people who are the 'underground'???? An additional variety 
of handwritten comment appears on page thirty-four: in the 
margin above a list of telephone numbers found in Plamondon's 
possession, the following appears: "WPP TALKS IN NUMBERS OVER 
PHONE...CODE??? The comment suggests that a various local 
law enforcement agencies were aware of the WPP surveillance, 
and also might have had access to the FBI's transcripts. See 
Figure A-20 in the Appendix.
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& Huey freed as well. Rip off Spiro, and you could name your
own price...." The letter continues:
OK, how do you know this is not a letter, though, 
from some provocateur trying to lure you into some 
action the pigs will be watching for? Nothing's 
100% certain. But: a pig agent would be more 
likely to approach you in person, or thru an 
infiltrator in your Party itself, rather than via 
an anonymous letter...please destroy this letter 
after you read it - because of [sic] there are 
infiltrators in or around you, I don't care to 
have it fall into their hands.133
Anonymous letters of this variety were in fact among the most
common COINTELPRO actions taken by the FBI against the New
Left and counterculture during the era.134
Information from this COINTELPRO letter ultimately found 
its way to a surprising number of officials, thanks to
I33FBI Report on Plamondon, 75-77. A portion of this 
letter appears as Figure 4-8 on page 432.
134Churchill and Vander Wall, The Cointelpro Papers. 184. 
The classic FBI modus operandi with COINTELPRO tactics such 
as anonymous letters involved first studying the rhetoric and 
style of the New left and counterculture, particularly those 
individuals and groups espousing radical tactics. Agents 
would then pick up ideas circulating in the Movement, 
involving the latest tactics and methods. For example, the 
highly-publicized May 24, 1970, Weathermen "Declaration of 
War" announced that the organization was going underground to 
pursue the tactics of the Vietcong and Tupamaros. A third 
step in the process involved drafting anonymous letters to 
targeted individuals and/or groups, advocating —  in language 
as close to "street jargon" as possible —  that they commit 
certain actions for the benefit of the entire "Movement." 
COINTELPRO actions such as these were often submitted to 
Headquarters for Hoover's approval, but not always. See 
Welch and Marston, Inside Hoover's FBI. 156-57. 
Interestingly, the anonymous letter sent to the Detroit White 
Panthers was postmarked May 27, 1970, only three days after 
the Weathermen's "Declaration of War" had mentioned the 
Tupamaros.
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Welch's report. On September 22, J. Edgar Hoover discussed
the White Panthers, as well as the documents found on
Plamondon, Forrest, and Taube, at a White House meeting that
was attended by Nixon, Haldeman, and several leading
Republican Congressmen. Three days later he sent a letter to
Gerald Ford, in response to the ranking Congressman's inquiry
concerning the White Panthers during the White House meeting.
In his letter, Hoover outlined the group's history and
described the materials found in the possession of WPP
leaders at the time of their July 23 arrests. He added:
These papers.... suggested that the White Panther 
Party consider kidnapping United States 
ambassadors and other high Government officials so 
that White Panther members now in prison may be 
set free in return for the release of these 
officials.135
On the same day that Hoover's letter was drafted, Detective 
Sergeant Clifford Murray of the Michigan State Police's Red 
Squad gave testimony concerning the White Panthers before the 
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee's Internal Security
Subcommittee in Washington.136
I35Hoover to Ford, September 25, 1970, 62-112678-102,
located in the Gerald R. Ford Congressional Papers, Ford 
Presidential Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 
Michigan, box D-102, folder "Radicals/White 
Panthers/Protest." See Figure 4-9 on pages 433-34.
,36Assigned to the Detroit branch of the State Police's 
Special Investigative Unit during the late sixties, Murray 
had a long history of investigating the White Panthers, in 
close cooperation with both the local Red Squad and FBI. Red 
Squad documents from September of 1968 demonstrate that he 
was an investigator of the so-called "Valler Bombings." And 
in 1970, Murray handled the task of reading John Sinclair's
(continued...)
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In his testimony, Murray stated:
A confidential source, who has furnished reliable 
information in the past, advised that among a 
variety of courses of action considered by White 
Panther personnel, or recommended to White Panther 
Party officers, was a recommendation concerning an 
action which would result in the release of the 
White Panther Party chairman from custody. The 
recommendation included adopting the style of the 
Tupamaros of South America, involving the 
kidnapping of of [sic] Government officials to be 
traded against the release of "political 
prisoners"...This recommendation included the 
suggestion that Michigan Congressmen could be 
traded for John Sinclair. Prominent national 
figures, such as Senator Robert Griffin and 
Congressman Gerald Ford, might be good for trading 
for Black Panther Party leaders such as Huey 
Newton and Bobby Seale. The recommendation 
included the suggestion that with someone of the 
prominence of the Vice President, Spiro Agnew, one 
'could write his own ticket.'
Murray concluded that "in connection with this idea,"
Plamondon suggested that radicals "snatch Governor Milliken"
or "rip-off banks."137 Finally, the White Panthers were
also tied to political kidnapping, via information acquired
from the anonymous letter, by Assistant FBI Director William
Sullivan on October 12, in an address delivered to the
editors of United Press International (UPI). Entitled "If
136(.. .continued) 
incoming and outgoing mail, often preparing "restricted" 
reports concerning its contents for inter- and intra- 
departmental distribution.
137Quoted in U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the 
Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, 
Extent of Subversion in the "New Left." Testimony of Clifford 
A. Murray and Richard M. Schave, Part 8, September 25, 1970, 
91st Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1971), 1221-2 [hereafter "SISS 
Murray Testimony"].
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Men Were Angels," Sullivan's address outlined the dangers
posed by the Weatherman and other associated New Left
"terrorist" groups, and included the following statement
regarding the White Panthers:
Another....militant group, the White Panther 
Party, which supports the Black Panther Party, has 
called for revolutionary violence, including
bombings and sabotage. The White Panthers have
also suggested the possibility of kidnapping high 
Government officials and United States 
ambassadors, demanding freedom for White Panthers 
now in prison in exchange for release of the
officials.138
The FBI's elevation of the White Panthers' to the top 
ranks of U.S. radical organizations owes a great deal to Neil 
J. Welch, as well as to the author of the COINTELPRO letter 
which was found in Jack Forrest's possession at the time of 
his arrest.139 What role, if any, this anonymous letter had 
in influencing Plamondon, Taube, and Forrest to move towards
138William C. Sullivan, "If Men Were Angels," printed 
text of speech delivered at UPI Conference, Williamsburg, 
Virginia on October 12, 1970, located in the Griffin Papers, 
box 522, folder "Disorders: Radical Terrorism" [hereafter 
"Sullivan UPI Address"]. See New York Times. October 16, 
1970, 20. Although Sullivan's linkage of the White Panthers 
to political kidnapping appeared in the printed text of the 
speech that was distributed to one of the nation's largest 
media associations, the author has been unable to locate a 
single newspaper story which picked up on this bogus "lead."
139An additional likely example of how information from 
this anonymous letter was utilized to the detriment of the 
WPP is found in Hoover's first request to Mitchell for the 
installation of a warrantless wiretap on the White Panthers' 
headquarters on August 18, 1970. Hoover's comment that
Plamondon advocated "ripping off banks" and kidnapping 
American ambassadors probably came directly from materials 
furnished by Welch in advance of the September 3 release date 
of the "official" FBI report. See Hoover to Mitchell, August 
18, 1970, 62-112678-82.
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committing acts of "revolutionary violence" is uncertain. By 
the summer of 1970, the nation's underground press carried 
many laudatory stories about the Tupamaros. In fact, 
references to the South American group's tactics appeared in 
Plamondon's writings on the eve of his capture in mid-July.
An additional COINTELPRO tactic that Welch utilized 
against the White Panthers during the fall and early winter 
of 1970 was the infiltration of the group's Ann Arbor chapter 
by an agent provocateur, who went by the name of "Dennis 
Marnell. ",4° By Welch's own account, "undercover criminal 
surveillance" was his "primary weapon." The fourteen long­
haired, "hippie" agents, Welch's secret "Nine Squad" —  
agents whose assignments were apparently not revealed to 
Hoover —  were "experts" at adopting the street styles and 
language of the groups they infiltrated.141
Marnell arrived at the White Panther commune during the 
late summer, shortly after Pun Plamondon's arrest. Soon, he
140Marnell was clearly not the first FBI informant to 
target the group. The first detailed FBI report on the group 
in September of 1969 stated that several "live [!] 
informants" were covering the group. See Report from SAC, 
Detroit to Hoover, September 17, 1969, 62-112678-29 ["Reports 
Only" binder].
141Welch and Marston, Inside Hoover's FBI. 136-140. 
Welch's memoir does not concede any infiltration of New Left 
or radical extremist groups; it focuses solely on "organized 
crime" cases, such as the Anchor Bar ("ABSCAM") gambling 
sting operation of 1970-1971, which resulted in hundreds of 
arrests. In fact, the authors would have the reader believe 
that Welch was a champion against the COINTELPRO cause, 
fighting off Hoover and Sullivan's repeated orders to 
investigate fruitless "internal security" cases.
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became a confidant of Genie Plamondon, Pun's wife. The two
became lovers; before long, Marnell revealed several
characteristics that closely match the model of a classic
late-sixties COINTELPRO agent provocateur.142 He carried a
weapon, and spent a great deal of time attempting to convince
others of the necessity for "armed self-defense." As Genie
later recalled:
Dennis was a very serious guy...into getting 
people to being more militant, to using weapons... 
what he was trying to teach me [was] how to be 
comfortable with a weapon, and not to be 
intimidated by it, to know how to use it.. .that 
was his main intent.143
Claiming to have had combat experience in Vietnam, Marnell
appointed himself "Deputy Minister of Defense," and conducted
regular "armed self defense" classes with White Panther
members in nearby gravel pits and on rural farms. Not
surprisingly, he refused to be photographed, and would not
allow his name to appear in any WPP publications.
Nonetheless, his name and title appear in a handwritten
comment on page three of the FBI's September 3 report on
Plamondon, alongside of a list of White Panther Central
Committee members. This suggests that the Detroit Red Squad
142For additional information concerning FBI agents 
provocateurs who operated during the late COINTELPRO era, see 
Paul Cowan, et. al., State Secrets: Police Surveillance in 
America. (New York: Holt, Rineholt, and Winston, 1974), 59- 
76; see also Churchill and Vander Wall, Agents of Repression. 
47-48, 65-77.
I43Interview with author, March 31, 1993, Detroit,
Michigan.
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officer who entered the information (on October 26) was aware 
of Welch's infiltration methods.144 Marnell's infiltration 
lasted only through the end of the year, because the rest of 
the Central Committee became increasingly suspicious of his 
actions and rhetoric. Genie recalls that when other members 
of the Committee convinced her to accuse him openly, he acted 
shocked and hurt, but quickly disappeared.145
The most revealing incident concerning Marnell's 
involvement with the White Panthers occurred late in the 
year, at the New Jersey residence of Leonard Weinglass, one 
of the leading attorneys in the White Panther's CIA bombing 
trial. According to Weinglass, Marnell paid a surprise visit 
to his rural farmhouse one winter afternoon. After being 
invited inside, Marnell began questioning Weinglass intensely 
concerning defense strategies, dates of recesses and motions, 
and the like. He then got emotional, and complained
vehemently about the continued imprisonment of John Sinclair.
144See Figure A-21 in the Appendix.
I45Interview with author, March 31, 1993, Detroit
Michigan. Welch's FBI agents who monitored the White Panther 
wiretap became aware that Marnell was in trouble by early
January. In his request for a continuance of the
surveillance on January 8, 1971, Welch stated "Source
indicated that DENNIS MARNELL was under suspicion as a police 
informer and is presently in a semi-purged state."
Interestingly, Hoover's subsequent memorandum to Mitchell in 
support of Welch's request also mentioned that "a current 
White Panther Party leader has been placed in a semi-purged 
state because of suspicion he is a police informant. It 
should be noted that this individual is not an informant." 
See SAC, Detroit to Hoover, January 8, 1971, 62-112678-205; 
Hoover to Mitchell, January 18, 1971, 62-112678-199.
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Pulling out a large revolver, he slammed it on a table in 
front of Weinglass and asked him how "they" might secure 
John's release. The stunned attorney politely but firmly 
requested that Marnell immediately leave.144
The FBI's elevation of the White Panthers to the status 
of a "leading white revolutionary group" coincided with a 
Nixon Administration all-out offensive against the New Left 
and counterculture.147 On September 22, 1970, a deal was
struck between the Administration and Hoover. Under its 
terms, the Director would get one thousand new agents as well 
as the authority to infiltrate college campuses, in return 
for his agreement to vastly expand warrantless electronic 
surveillance of New Left and other radical groups. Three 
days later, the White Panthers' alleged threat to the 
nation's security was outlined in detail to the Senate 
Internal Security Subcommittee. Sergeant Clifford Murray 
concluded that the WPP was "an organization bent on total 
destruction of the present government of the United States 
and detrimental to the welfare of this country."148 Two 
weeks later, FBI electronic surveillance officer R.L. 
Shackelford referred to the White Panthers as "potentially 
the largest and one of the most dangerous of revolutionary
^Telephone interview with author, November 29, 1992.
After the incident, Weinglass never saw Marnell again.
147Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries. 196.
148SISS Murray Testimony, 1223.
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organizations in the United States."149 By the end of 1970, 
the White Panthers were targeted for surveillance by nearly 
the full spectrum of U.S. intelligence agencies, including 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security 
Agency (NSA), U.S. Army Intelligence, and Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA).150
Several other events kept the White Panthers in the 
headlines during the late fall and early winter. Attorneys 
Justin Ravitz and Sheldon Otis, hoping to "Free John," 
prepared a careful appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court
149Shackelford to C.D. Brennan, October 8, 1970, 62-
112678-125.
150The Detroit office of the DIA, known as the "113th 
Military Intelligence Group," (or "MIG") took an early 
interest in the White Panthers, as is indicated on the first 
lengthy FBI report on the group, dated September 17, 1969; 
the report states that MIG "has requested all available 
information regarding captioned organization." See Report 
from SAC, Detroit to Hoover, September 17, 1969, 62-112678- 
29. Evidence of the CIA's interest in the White Panthers was 
provided in a January 31, 1995, letter from John H. Wright, 
the agency's Information and Privacy Coordinator. In 
response to the author's Freedom of Information Act request 
to the FBI, the CIA released a document, dated June 2, 1970, 
demonstrating that the agency closely followed the activities 
of Genie Plamondon during her April, 1970 trip to Denmark. 
See "CIA Memorandum for the FBI Re: White Panther Party," 
June 2, 1970, 62-112678-59. Finally, a June 11, 1970 U.S. 
Department of State document, released to the author on 
August 4, 1993, demonstrates that the Yippie/White Panther 
trip to Hanoi and Moscow by Genie Plamondon, Judy Gumbo, and 
Nancy Kurshan-Rubin, brought the organizations to the 
attention of the following intelligence-gathering entities: 
Airforce, Army, Navy, "OSD," U.S. Information Agency (USIA), 
NSA, CIA, FBI, and the National Security Council. See 
Department of State "Airgram," from American Consul in 
Montreal, Canada to the U.S. Department of State, June 11, 
1970, 62-112678-[unnumbered]. A copy of this document
appears as Figure A-22 in the Appendix.
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concerning the state's draconian marijuana laws. In 
addition, famed "Chicago Seven" attorneys William Kunstler 
and Leonard Weinglass agreed to join Hugh Davis on the White 
Panther's defense team for the upcoming "CIA Conspiracy 
Trial" against the so-called "Ann Arbor Three." The initial 
preliminary hearings began in September, in the Detroit 
courtroom of U.S. District Judge Damon J. Keith. A high 
degree of tension and excitement surrounded the trial, thanks 
in part to the reputations that Kunstler and Weinglass 
brought with them from the contentious Chicago Seven trial, 
which had ended only a few months earlier.151 The defense's 
initial strategy focused on the character of the government's 
star witness, David Valler, who had been known as Detroit's 
"mad bomber" during the fall of 1968, during the period 
immediately preceding the CIA bombing. As the facts 
concerning Valler's involvement in the Justice Department's 
case became known, it appeared that he was cooperating with 
the government in return for a reduced sentence. The most 
damaging FBI-sponsored COINTELPRO initiative utilized against 
the White Panthers, however, was the inclusion of John 
Sinclair in the government's October 7, 1969, conspiracy
151Interview with author, October 21, 1992, Detroit,
Michigan. See also William M. Kunstler, Mv Life as a Radical 
Lawyer. (New York: Birch Lane Press, 1994), 205.
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indictment, intended to keep him in jail by labeling him a 
"violent radical.1,152
The key to understanding David Valler's complicity in 
the government's case against Sinclair lies in comparing the 
statements he made to the FBI, in December, 1968, and June, 
1969. His statements of December 26 and 27 focused on his 
involvement with the various anti-establishment bombings that 
had occurred in and around Detroit during the fall of 1968. 
The FBI questioned him concerning each bombing, including the 
clandestine CIA office in Ann Arbor, which was bombed on 
September 29, some ten days prior to his arrest for marijuana 
possession.153 Valler stated that while Jack Forrest and 
Pun Plamondon exchanged dynamite in preparation for "the Ann 
Arbor jobs," John Sinclair's involvement consisted only of 
telling Valler "that he was more interested in seeing such 
bombings occur than in committing such bombings personally,
152Sinclair had been sentenced to prison for a third 
offense marijuana possession charge on July 23, and was 
denied bond because he "showed a propensity to re-commit the 
crime." The CIA conspiracy charge in early October linked 
Sinclair to a serious act of violence.
'“Detroit's Red Squad had been greatly embarrassed by a 
September 20 front-page article on Valler which appeared in 
the Detroit News. Valler all but admitted to reporter Steve 
Cain that he had been involved in the recent wave of 
bombings. See Official Transcript, People of State of 
Michigan v. David Joseph Valler. Case A-148883, May 27, 1969, 
Wayne County Courthouse Records Division, 3rd Floor, 
[microfilm files].
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inasmuch as he was deeply involved at that time with current 
charges against him."154
Valler's statement to the FBI on June 6, 1969, portrays 
Sinclair as a mastermind of the bombings, outlining the 
following "additional details": (1) Valler states that
Sinclair privately contacted him regarding his earlier offer 
for dynamite, which he had initially refused, but this time 
informed Valler "I want some of the stuff, but I can't handle 
it. I'll have Pun make arrangements to pick it up," and (2) 
Valler alleges that in his rendezvous with Plamondon, the 
latter claimed that "he had been instructed by John Sinclair 
to pick up some explosives."
The June, 1969 FBI interview claims that Valler 
requested the second interview, after reading in the papers 
about the ROTC bombing on the campus of the University of 
Michigan campus, and wanting to be of assistance "in bringing 
to justice persons responsible for this bombing, and for two 
prior Ann Arbor area bombings. "15S A more likely reason for 
Valler's decision to ask for a second interview concerns his 
legal dilemma. Valler had been sentenced to seven-to-ten 
years in prison for second-offense marijuana possession on 
May 27; he now faced an additional fifteen-to-thirty in the
154Transcript of FBI interview with David Valler, dated 
December 26 and 27, 1968, John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad 
Files. See Figure A-23 in the Appendix.
155Transcript of FBI interview with David Valler, dated 
June 6, 1969, John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files. See 
Figure A-24 in the Appendix.
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State bombing case. After cooperating with the FBI, Michigan 
authorities agreed to drop the more severe "conspiracy to 
bomb” charge, and he was found guilty only of "possession of 
explosive devices." On April 17, 1970, he was given a
sentence of two-to-five years, to be served concurrently with 
his existing sentence —  a remarkably lenient sentence since 
both the Detroit Police and the local FBI had amassed 
mountains of evidence proving that Valler had purchased 
dynamite, had personally conducted several of the bombings, 
and had provided both encouragement and explosives for others 
to do the same. During the summer of 1970, Valler began 
writing a regular weekly column in the conservative Detroit 
News, in which he sought forgiveness for his drug-induced 
life in the counterculture and advised area youth not to make 
the same mistakes. His articles were distributed to 
additional newspapers across the country, probably through 
the FBI's network of "friendly" press sources.156
The October 7, 1969, indictment against the "Ann Arbor 
Three" describes the first "overt act" as a Sinclair-Valler 
conversation, followed by Plamondon's follow-up meeting with 
Valler. In order for the FBI to have tied Sinclair into a
156For a discussion of the network of FBI-friendly 
newspapers, see Donner, The Age of Surveillance. 238-240. 
Evidence of the Detroit News' linkages with the Bureau is 
found in Welch and Marston, Inside Hoover's FBI. 162-64. 
Former Detroit News reporter Steve Cain believes that News 
Publisher Peter Clark and Editor Martin Hayden enjoyed a 
"special relationship" with the FBI. See interview with 
author, July 22, 1992, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
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conspiracy, Valler's December, 1968 statements were
insufficient. According to the Scock v. U.S. decision of 
1969, which set the standard for the Nixon Administration's 
use of conspiracy law, the government was required to 
demonstrate "that each individual defendant personally agreed 
to employ the illegal means contemplated by the agreement." 
In order to prove a "defendant's adherence to the illegal 
aims of the conspiracy," evidence had to be provided of one 
or more of the following: "the individual defendant's prior 
or subsequent unambiguous statements; by the individual 
defendant's subsequent commission of the very illegal act
contemplated by the agreement; or by the individual
defendant's subsequent legal act if that act is 'clearly
undertaken for the specific purpose of rendering effective 
the later illegal activity which is advocated.'"157 
Valler's June, 1969 statement certainly met the Spock case's 
standard of "prior or subsequent unambiguous statements," 
alleging that Sinclair said "I want some of the stuff," and 
later directed Plamondon to approach Valler for dynamite. 
Only Valler's second statement allowed the inclusion of 
Sinclair in the CIA indictment.158
157Quoted in Eliff, Crime. Dissent, and the Attorney 
General. 208—9.
138The author has located additional evidence that 
Sinclair was a principal target of the Federal Grand Jury's 
1969 investigation of the CIA bombing. The Grand Jury's 
foreman, a suburban Detroit housewife [who prefers to remain 
anonymous], vividly recalls the extent in which the FBI
(continued...)
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As the Justice Department began its preparations for the 
CIA Conspiracy trial, the FBI and other law enforcement 
agencies assumed an active role in providing information to 
the Detroit prosecutors concerning such things as the 
whereabouts of the White Panthers' attorneys, the location of 
the defense's headquarters, and the individuals who attended 
pre-trial hearings. A Detroit Police Inter-Office 
Memorandum, dated September 4, discussed the fact that 
intelligence had been received indicating that William
158 (... continued) 
focused on Sinclair, even though he was then in prison. 
"Sinclair was the villain," she adds, "they [the FBI] read 
excerpts of his writings to us, which included exploded body 
parts and other violent images" [interview with author, 
October 23, 1992, Detroit, Michigan]. The primary evidence 
presented against Sinclair was a used typewriter ribbon, 
supposedly taken from a machine owned by the White Panthers, 
shortly after the CIA bombing. FBI agents asserted that 
their analysis of the ribbon revealed that it contained a 
letter from Plamondon to a relative or friend in Traverse 
City, in which he confessed to carrying out the crime, with 
the assistance of Forrest, and the knowledge and approval of 
Sinclair. Corroboration regarding the typewriter ribbon was 
provided by former U.S. Attorney Robert Grace, who ultimately 
handed down the indictments against the Ann Arbor Three. 
Grace states that the FBI acquired it by following a White 
Panther member to an Ann Arbor repair shop, and promptly 
gained the "cooperation" of the shop's owner. This 
"evidence" was not presented in court, due to the fact that 
the case never progressed beyond the pre-trial phase. Former 
White Panther attorney Hugh "Buck" Davis has stated that the 
presentation of such evidence by the government would surely 
have been challenged by the defense. "Anyone —  including an 
FBI agent —  could have typed it," he recalls. Nonetheless, 
Grace stands by the ribbon's authenticity, claiming that 
Plamondon's letter related facts which were "entirely 
consistent" with affidavits given by Valler, and therefore, 
"could have been typed only by him." See author's personal 
interviews as follows: Anonymous Grand Jury foreman, October 
23, 1992, Detroit, Michigan; Robert J. Grace, July 20, 1992 
and April 1, 1993, Ann Arbor, Michigan; and Hugh Davis, July 
25, 1992, Detroit, Michigan.
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Kunstler and Leonard Weinglass were due to arrive in Detroit 
that day, and were "destined for 1520 Hill Street, Ann Arbor, 
which is the address of the WHITE PANTHER PARTY." The report 
adds that the FBI had also been alerted concerning the 
attorneys' movements.159 On September 22, the date of the 
first pre-trial hearing in the CIA case, the Detroit Red 
Squad covered a White Panther "demonstration" in front of the 
Federal Building. The report listed the names of several of 
the "60 - 70 persons" in attendance, and commented on several 
of the details of the case, including the fact that "Kuntzler 
[sic] and Wineglass" [sic] were the attorneys of record.160 
A Michigan State Police Red Squad report, dated December 11, 
1970, states that the White Panthers were renting a house in 
inner-city Detroit for the leaders to use for the duration of 
the upcoming trial. The report, by Detective Sergeant W. W. 
Anderson claims "Information is that the telephone was to 
[be] installed this date 12-11-70.1,161
159Detroit Police Department, Intelligence Division, 
Inter-Office Memorandum, September 4, 1970, John and Leni 
Sinclair Red Squad Files.
160Detroit Police Department, Intelligence Division, 
Inter-Office Memorandum, September 22, 1970, "Demonstration 
at the Federal Building...," John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad 
Files.
16lMichigan State Police, Special Investigation Unit, 
Confidential Report, White Panthers, December 11, 1970, John 
and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files. The reference to a 
telephone installation begs the following question: why was 
this State Police officer so interested in the pending 
telephone installation? Under Michigan law, electronic 
eavesdropping by all non-federal law enforcement agencies and 
individuals was illegal. See Figure A-25 in the Appendix.
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The government's prosecution team in the White Panther 
case included U.S. Attorney Ralph B. Guy, Jr., and Assistant 
U.S. Attorneys Kenneth Lowrie and John H. Hausner. Guy, a 
native of the Detroit suburb of Dearborn, was a corporate 
attorney turned prosecutor. Nixon appointed him on August 
21, 1970. The prosecution's strategy during the pre-trial 
phase included fending off defense attacks on the credibility 
of David Valler, opposing a defense motion to include 
eighteen to twenty-one year-olds on the jury, and 
discrediting the defense's "expert witnesses," including poet 
Allen Ginsberg and civil rights leader Julian Bond, who 
testified "that the counterculture represented a separate and 
distinct class," and that the White Panthers were typical 
representatives of an emerging "youth culture" in 
America.162
The White Panther defense team was made up of three 
members: Chicago Conspiracy attorneys William Kunstler and 
Leonard Weinglass and Detroit attorney Hugh "Buck" Davis, the 
local National Lawyers Guild (NLG) representative.163
l62Kunstler, Mv Life as a Radical Lawyer. 206; Michael 
Schumacher's biography of Ginsberg relates how the White 
Panther case "had all the earmarks of the Chicago Conspiracy 
Trial, complete with.... constant interruptions by the 
prosecuting attorney, who questioned Allen's authority to act 
as a spokesman for those under the age of twenty-one, as the 
defense claimed he was." See Schumacher, Pharma Lion. 546.
163Four additional Detroit attorneys provided assistance 
to the WPP defense team: Sheldon Otis (who handled Sinclair's 
representation from the time of the October, 1969 indictment 
until shortly after Plamondon was caught); Justin "Chuck"
(continued...)
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Although all three of the attorneys worked pro bono. most of 
the actual preparation was completed by Weinglass and Davis, 
with assistance from NLG volunteers and the White Panthers. 
Weinglass and Davis pursued a strategy designed to publicize 
and politicize the case by: (1) focusing on the questionable 
credibility of Valler; (2) pointing out what they viewed as 
a conspiracy to imprison Sinclair, and to keep him there; (3) 
noting that the jury rolls in Detroit possessed no persons 
under twenty-one years of age and were generally weighted in 
favor of middle-aged white suburbanites; (4) pointing out the 
CIA's history of "imperialist aggression," as well as the 
fact that the agency's charter forbids it to operate within 
the United States; and (5) challenging the Nixon 
Administration's increasing use of conspiracy trials to chill 
domestic dissent. At Weinglass's insistence, the defense 
team did not discuss trial strategy or potential witnesses 
over the telephone or through the mail; instead, they were 
instructed to send information by "code or hand delivery 
only."164
163(.. .continued)
Ravitz (who was concurrently representing Sinclair in his 
appeals on the marijuana conviction); Marc Stickgold; and 
Richard S. McMillan.
I64Memorandum from Leonard I. Weinglass to Legal Staff, 
November 3-4, 1970; Memorandum from Hugh "Buck" Davis to
Legal Staff, "Preliminary Outline No. 2 for the Defense," 
December 4, 1970, [internal memoranda], JLSC/BHL, box 19,
folder 20, "CIA Conspiracy Case, 1970-1971" (quote p. 10). 
[Hereafter "Davis-Weinglass Legal Strategy Memoranda"]
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The defense's political focus dictated that they make
their case both inside and outside of Judge Keith's
courtroom. Davis' December 4, 1970, memorandum to the "Legal
Staff" states:
We dig the idea of having a release every day of 
the trial passed out around the Federal Building
every day at say noon by about 4, steady persons,
who will seek over the course of the trial to 
befriend persons on their route...Can deal with 
imperialistic crimes— CIA— FBI, etc....(Each 
release should be short— 1 page— we11-documented, 
and bent on honestly opening the minds and 
educating the every day folk on the street) .165
In addition, the defense, in cooperation with the White
Panthers, held a number of rallies and fund-raisers, both to
raise public awareness of the case and to solicit much needed
funds for the "CIA Conspiracy Defense." One celebrity who
gave considerable support to the White Panthers was Hollywood
actress turned political-activist Jane Fonda, who stayed at
the White Panther's commune for extended periods of time.
Her appearances on behalf of the "Ann Arbor Three" on
November 21 at the White Panther house (and later on the U-M
campus) in Ann Arbor and on December 3 on the campus of Wayne
State University in Detroit attracted the attention of the
local and national media, as well as that of the Michigan
State Police Red Squad.166
165Davis-Weinglass Legal Strategy Memoranda, 9-10.
166Red Squad coverage of the events was extensive, and 
included two or three informants, each of whom prepared 
detailed written reports. See Michigan State Police, Special 
Investigation Unit, Confidential Report: "White Panther
(continued...)
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A celebrity in his own right, WPP attorney William 
Kunstler possessed an international reputation for ably 
defending a number of leading anti-war, New Left, Black 
Power, and counterculture figures. During the fall of 1970 
he was extremely busy, defending the Chicago Seven, Phillip 
and Daniel Berrigan, and others, all at the same time. 
Although he made several public appearances in Detroit and 
Ann Arbor on behalf of his clients, his principal 
contribution to the defense team during the pre-trial phase 
was limited to his preparation of a "Motion for the 
disclosure of electronic surveillance, for a pretrial 
hearing, to suppress evidence and to dismiss the indictment,"
166 (... continued)
Party," December 1, 1970 and December 4, 1970; Complaint
Report Re: Hertz Rent-a-Car, December 4, 1970; Intelligence 
Report Re: Hertz Rent-a-Car, December 5, 1970; See also
informant reports, November 30, 1970 and December 3, 1970
[executing agency not listed, probably State Police Red Squad 
and/or FBI]. One incident concerning the Red Squad's 
surveillance of Fonda is worthy of note: the day after her 
December 3 appearance in Detroit she was arrested in Ann 
Arbor, along with four "French Nationalists" she had been 
travelling with, on the charge of stealing a Hertz Rent-a- 
Car. The State Police's "Intelligence Report" on the 
incident states that "an investigator for the Hertz Corp." 
approached the police with the information. Immediately 
thereafter, the police located Fonda and the car at a local 
Holiday Inn and arrested her, confiscating all of her
possessions, including an Avis Rental agreement for the
vehicle. After initially charging Fonda with forging rental 
agreement papers, the police acknowledged that "an apparent 
misunderstanding" had occurred, whereby one of the French 
Nationals who rented a car from Avis, accidently drove off
with a Hertz vehicle. The fact that the key issued by the
Avis agent to the French National worked in the ignition of 
a car alleged to be of Hertz's ownership casts doubt on the 
police's "official" explanation of the incident. Several 
documents concerning the incident are included as Figures A- 
26 and A-27 in the Appendix.
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which was entered on October 5. As lead attorney on the 
Chicago Conspiracy defense team, Kunstler had received the 
government's June 13, 1969, memorandum describing the
Mitchell Doctrine. He had witnessed the Justice Department's 
increasingly bold electronic surveillance initiatives, such 
as the submission of wiretap logs regarding defendant Bobby 
Seale after the trial had ended. Kunstler's motion 
specifically reguested that the government admit any and all 
electronic surveillance that might have intercepted the 
conversations of any of the three WPP defendants, in three 
broad areas: (1) that which had been conducted with court 
approval, as per Title III; (2) that which was "regarded by 
the government as lawful under its so-called 'National 
Security' and 'internal subversion' exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment"; and (3) that which contained the conversations of 
any defense lawyer or persons employed by them. The motion 
also reguested an evidentiary hearing prior to trial, in 
accordance with the Alderman decision, to determine whether 
any of the government's evidence had been tainted by illegal 
surveillance. Finally, Kunstler reguested that, should the 
proposed taint hearing reveal that the government's case was 
"in reliance upon illegally-obtained evidence," the 
indictment be dismissed.167 As it turned out, Judge Keith's
167"MOTION f o r d i s c l o s u r e o f e l e c t r o n i c s u r v e i l l a n c e . . .
U.S. v. Sinclair, et. al.. Indictment No. 44375, October 5, 
1970, JLSC/BHL, box 19, folder 18, "CIA Conspiracy Trial, 
1970-1971."
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approval of Kunstler's electronic surveillance motion was the 
only defense motion he granted.168
Although Kunstler and Guy had many disagreements 
concerning the White Panther case, in later years they were 
in complete agreement on one point: once the issue of
wiretaps was raised, "everything changed."169 On December 
18, Attorney General Mitchell issued a memorandum to Judge 
Keith in response to Kunstler's motion, restating the 
Mitchell Doctrine.170 According to Guy, from the time that
168Weinglass and Davis submitted lengthy motions on a 
wide variety of issues. Keith denied them all. Years later, 
Keith recalls that he acceded to Kunstler's motion because he 
felt so strongly about the issue of the government's 
electronic surveillance powers, versus the citizen's right to 
privacy. See Davis interviews with author, November 10, 1991 
and July 25, 1992, Detroit, Michigan; see also Keith 
interviews with author, October 21 and 27, 1992, Detroit,
Michigan.
169Kunstler, Mv Life as a Radical Lawyer. 206.
170The White Panther case was not the first case in which 
the Mitchell Doctrine was re-instituted by the Nixon 
Administration in 1970. Similar Mitchell affidavits had been 
filed earlier in the year in two cases: U.S. v. Melvin Carl 
Smith (Criminal No. 4277-CD; Appeals No. 71-1378; U.S. 
District Court, Central District of California) and U.S. v. 
Felix Lindsey O'Neal (Criminal No. 1204; Appeals No. 71-1101; 
U.S. District Court, District of Kansas). In the Smith case, 
Mitchell raised the issue following the conviction of a Black 
Panther, as the case was under consideration by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Remanded back to the 
District Court for the Central District of California, the 
issue was heard before Judge Warren J. Ferguson. Ferguson's 
January 11, 1971 decision, which predated Keith's by two
weeks, refuted the Government's claim of "inherent right." 
In the O'Neal case, also involving a Black Panther, Mitchell 
raised the issue during the trial, submitting surveillance 
logs to Judge Arthur J. Stanley, Jr., solely for his in 
camera inspection. Judge Stanley ruled that because the 
surveillance had occurred prior to the incidents in which the
(continued...)
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Judge Keith granted Kunstler's motion for disclosure, "the 
Justice Department in Washington took over the 
argument.... they handled the case." The U.S. Attorney and 
his staff stood idly by —  as a team of Justice Department 
attorneys, flown in from Washington, showed up prepared to 
sell the Mitchell Doctrine. For Guy, the "abstract 
principle" pursued by the Justice Department —  the 
Executive's "inherent right" to keep U.S. dissidents under 
surveillance without court order —  became "the only issue" 
in the case.171
Mitchell insisted that the government was entitled to 
ignore Keith's order to disclose to the defense several 
conversations involving Plamondon, which had been picked up 
in warrantless "national security" wiretaps of two California 
Black Panther Party chapters. As Donner notes, the Mitchell 
Doctrine:
170(.. .continued) 
defendant was charged, it was irrelevant to the prosecution's 
case. But he went further: in a letter to U.S. Attorney 
Robert J. Roth, Stanley expressed his agreement with the 
Mitchell Doctrine. Therefore, going into the U.S. v. 
Sinclair, et. al. case in December of 1970, the Justice 
Department had thus far acquired two positive (albeit weak) 
rulings on the Mitchell Doctrine (Judge Hoffman's in U.S. v. 
Dellinger, as well as Judge Stanley's), while scoring a 
reverse from Judge Ferguson in the Smith case. Because the 
White Panther case involved a disputed issue occurring during 
the pre-trial phase, it provided the Government with a more 
timely Supreme Court ruling concerning the Mitchell Doctrine.
171Interview with author, July 17, 1992, Ann Arbor,
Michigan. Guy adds that "The response to Keith's order for 
disclosure was prepared in Washington...We had nothing to do 
with its preparation."
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insisted that the President, acting through the 
Attorney General, has the inherent constitutional 
power to authorize electronic surveillance without 
judicial warrant in national security cases and to 
determine unilaterally whether a given activity 
threatens the national security. Moreover, 
Mitchell insisted, this power was exclusive. 
Application to a court for a warrant would be 
inappropriate: a court lacked the competence to 
assess national security dangers and, besides, the 
risk was too great of leaks of the sensitive 
matters that would be the subject of warrant 
applications.172
Along with the Mitchell affidavit, the government submitted 
various printed transcripts of Plamondon's conversations to 
Judge Keith for his in camera inspection only. This sealed 
exhibit contained conversations which had taken place during 
the spring and summer of 1969, when Plamondon had made 
several offers of assistance to the Black Panthers.173
I72Donner, The Age of Surveillance. 247.
I73Mitchell's in camera exhibit may have contained the 
logs of Plamondon's February 26 conversation with individuals 
at the Black Panthers' Headquarters in Oakland. Information 
concerning this conversation was promptly relayed by the 
FBI's SAC in San Francisco both to Bureau Headquarters and to 
the Detroit Field Office. The "paper trail" left by these 
communications would surely have entered the FBI's ELSUR 
Index, allowing for rapid access, once the Justice Department 
initiated a search for all conversations concerning the three 
Ann Arbor White Panthers (which was initiated on October 15, 
1970). See SAC, San Francisco to Hoover, February 27, 1969, 
62-112678-9; see also March 1, 1969, 62-112678-10. A copy of 
the February 27 document is included in the Appendix as 
Figure A-28. FBI documents released as a result of 
Sinclair's countersuit against the Government, Sinclair, et. 
al. v. Kleindienst. et. al.. (Civil Action No. 610-73) reveal 
that a total of five of Plamondon conversations were 
overheard by FBI agents monitoring "national security" 
wiretaps on the Oakland and San Francisco offices of the 
Black Panthers, between February 26 and July 6, 1969. See 
Figures A-29 and A-30 in the Appendix.
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Mitchell's memorandum made the same argument that had 
been presented in Judge Julius Hoffman's Chicago courtroom 
eighteen months earlier —  with one important difference. 
While the government in June, 1969 claimed that the wiretaps 
of several Chicago Conspiracy defendants were conducted for 
prosecutorial, as well as investigative purposes, Mitchell's 
revised affidavit was more limited, stating that the Black 
Panther wiretaps had been instituted not for the purpose of 
prosecution, but instead as part of an ongoing domestic 
intelligence investigation.174 In other words, the revised 
Mitchell Doctrine now represented a full-blown argument for 
an intelligence exemption to the Fourth Amendment; this was 
now combined with an assertion of the Executive Branch's 
"inherent powers" in "national security" areas.
In the meantime, the Justice Department made two 
important decisions: (1) to admit only the Plamondon
conversations, containing relatively innocuous information, 
that had been picked up inadvertently on the California Black 
Panther wiretaps, and (2) not to disclose the existence of 
the warrantless wiretap on the White Panthers' Ann Arbor 
Headquarters, even though Mitchell himself had authorized the 
surveillance, and also had approved of its continuation at 
regular thirty-day intervals.175 In response to Keith's
174Donner, The Age of Surveillance. 247.
175William Kunstler's memoirs state that the government's 
in camera submission to Keith contained conversations between
(continued...)
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order granting Kunstler's motion, Assistant Attorney General 
Will Wilson contacted Hoover on October 15, to request that 
the FBI conduct a search of the ELSUR Index to determine if 
any of the three defendants in the CIA Conspiracy case "had 
been monitored by electronic surveillance devices." In the 
event that the FBI did discover the existence of such 
conversations, Wilson instructed Hoover to submit information 
concerning the dates, locations, and letters of authority 
pertaining to the wiretaps. Wilson reminded Hoover to follow 
the instructions contained in his minimization memorandum of 
July 14, 1969: discontinuing surveillance during attorney- 
client conversations, "with respect to this case."176 Four 
days later, Hoover relayed Wilson's request to all FBI field 
offices, giving only one week to respond.177 Hoover's 
November 16 memorandum to Wilson states that "[name deleted] 
and John Sinclair were not the subject of a direct electronic 
surveillance nor were any of their conversations monitored by
175 (.. .continued)
Plamondon and "employees of the Cuban embassy." The author 
has been unable to find any corroborating evidence for this 
statement, although attorney Hugh Davis has intimated that 
the government's sealed exhibit contained surveillance 
carried out by the National Security Agency. See Kunstler, 
Mv Life as a Radical Attorney. 206.
176Wilson to Hoover, October 15, 1970, [unnumbered
document], Davis Papers.
177Hoover to SAC, Detroit, October 19, 1970, [unnumbered 
document], Davis Papers.
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an electronic device of the FBI."178 Wilson responded again 
three days later, this time to remind Hoover of Mitchell's 
minimization guidelines concerning attorney-client 
conversations, and to request that "documents reflecting the 
Attorney General's authorizations and pertinent 
reauthorizations for [information deleted] and [information 
deleted]" be immediately forwarded to the Justice 
Department.179 These documents indicate that the Justice 
Department selected the White Panther case in late October or 
early November.180
178Hoover to Wilson, November 16, 1970, [unnumbered
document], Davis Papers. It is the author's assumption that 
the deleted name is "John Waterhouse Forrest." A comparison 
of the two deleted names listed in the upper left-hand corner 
of the memo —  Plamondon and Forrest —  suggest that they are 
of similar length. The deleted information immediately 
preceding Sinclair's name in paragraph two is almost 
precisely the same length as either of the two deleted names. 
Since the Government admitted that Plamondon had been 
overheard, the deleted name next to Sinclair's was probably
Forrest's. See Figure 4-10 on page 435.
179Wilson to Hoover, November 19, 1970, [unnumbered
document], Davis Papers. All four of the FBI and Justice
Department documents referred to in this paragraph were
withheld in their entirety by the FBI, despite the author's 
Freedom of Information Act requests.
180This conclusion is based on three facts: (1) Wilson's 
November 19 memorandum to Hoover requests all authorizations 
and reauthorizations for Detroit's ongoing surveillance of 
the White Panthers, indicating that the Justice Department 
was planning something big for the WPP; (2) unlike all of the 
other related memorandums, the November 19 memorandum carries 
the heading "SECRET"; and (3) Mitchell requested additional 
time to respond to Keith's order on December 14, four days 
before he issued his affidavit, indicating that the Justice 
Department was scrambling to assemble its response.
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Hoover's November 16 response to Wilson raises important 
questions concerning the integrity of the Bureau. By 
asserting that Sinclair had neither been "the subject of a 
direct electronic surveillance" nor overheard on any 
"electronic device of the FBI," the FBI seemed to be 
intentionally lying, in collusion with the Justice 
Department, in order to prevent the discovery of the 
warrantless wiretap currently in operation on the White 
Panthers' Ann Arbor headquarters. Welch knew better. 
Several of Sinclair's conversations had already been
intercepted by FBI monitors on the WPP house prior to 
Hoover's November 16 response to Wilson. In addition, 
numerous White Panther discussions concerning legal strategy 
continued to be overheard —  and duly logged —  by Welch's 
agents, even after the September incident involving the
intercepts of Chicago Conspiracy defendants Rubin and
Hoffman, which led Hoover to issue Welch a severe 
reprimand.181 Welch seems to have regarded his
intelligence-gathering activities as above both the law and 
the control of his boss, J. Edgar Hoover.
The Mitchell Justice Department's response to Keith's 
order for disclosure was no better. Kunstler had requested 
that the government reveal not only intercepted conversations 
from any of the three defendants, but also conversations by 
defense lawyers and/or persons employed by them. Mitchell
i8iSee Figure A-31 in the Appendix.
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may not have known of the existence of Sinclair's 
conversations in Welch's surveillance net, but he certainly 
was aware that on September 12 Welch's agents monitoring the 
White Panther surveillance had overheard a conversation 
involving William Kunstler and a pending CIA Conspiracy case 
hearing.182 Welch unwisely bragged about this in his 
September 14 memorandum to Hoover. Mitchell knowingly lied 
to Keith by failing to disclose the existence of the White 
Panther wiretaps in his December 18 affidavit.
What was the Administration's motivation? Nixon 
continued his quest for better intelligence concerning 
student radicals, after the failures of both the Huston Plan 
and Title VII of the Organized Crime Control Act. Yet the 
various legislative and judicial barriers to heightened 
domestic surveillance power for the Executive Branch remained 
in force at the end of 1970. Having introduced the Mitchell 
Doctrine in June of 1969, the Administration immediately 
backed away from the initiative, in the face of vehement 
public protest.183 Moreover, the Alderman and Giordano 
decisions stood in the way of the Administration's plans to 
expand "national security" wiretapping against the New Left 
and counterculture. If enacted, the Huston Plan would have
182See SAC, Detroit to Hoover, September 14, 1970, 62- 
112678-103.
183Having asserted its power to wiretap without warrant 
in "national security" cases, the Administration was free to 
initiate such tactics, taking advantage of a "grey area" in 
the law.
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provided the Administration with much of what it desired, 
namely, the expansion and centralization of all domestic 
intelligence gathering under White House control, as well as 
an outlet for official deniability at the top levels of 
government: Huston's signature on the plan. Yet the
Administration was prevented from implementing its secret 
surveillance strategy by the unexpected opposition of an 
aging FBI Director, no longer keen to institute so many 
illegal tactics. Congress' unwillingness to overturn 
Alderman via Title VII meant the failure of the 
Administration's "legislative strategy" concerning the easing 
of barriers to heightened surveillance. By the fall of 1970 
both strategies had failed, and therefore, the option of 
pursuing a judicial strategy —  even one as reckless as the 
Mitchell Doctrine —  began to look attractive for an 
Administration facing the worst year of social disorder in 
more than a century.
The Nixon Administration's desire to create a "chilling 
effect" on dissent also contributed to the reinstitution of 
the Mitchell Doctrine. Nixon recognized that one of the 
prerequisites to a successful reelection bid would be the 
silencing of the anti-war movement. An incident that 
occurred in the wake of the July 23 Detroit Weathermen 
indictments revealed an underlying motive in the anti-crime 
offensive. Mitchell predicted that the indictments would 
push militants further to the left, which would have the
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desired effect of increasing the alienation of the moderates 
and liberals.184 The Weathermen indictments were intended 
to intimidate would-be radicals, a process referred to by 
Gitlin as "Weatherguilt.1,185 The FBI's stepped-up
COINTELPRO—NEW LEFT program also had a clear goal. A 
September 16, 1970, Hoover memorandum recommended intensified 
FBI harassment of New Left members, to "'enhance the paranoia 
endemic in these circles,'" and "'to get the point across 
there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox.'"186
An additional reason why the Administration sought the 
judicial solution of the Mitchell Doctrine was its newly- 
revised intelligence and surveillance strategy. For the 
first time since the onset of the Cold War, the Justice 
Department and FBI came to the conclusion that "the need for
sanctions and publicity takes precedence over the secret
collection of information."187 The Huston Plan might have
offered the Administration a significantly enhanced
intelligence gathering capability, but when compared with the 
Mitchell Doctrine, it possessed two major weaknesses. First, 
continued secrecy in domestic intelligence gathering provided 
no ancillary benefits, such as public awareness that the 
government could be listening in on any private
184New York Times. July 30, 1970, 15.
185Gitlin, The Sixties. 398.
186Quoted in Theoharis, Spying on Americans. 149.
187Quoted in Donner, The Acre of Surveillance. 245.
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communications. Second, the Huston Plan, like the secret 
"national security" wiretapping policy pursued by Hoover from 
the thirties through the sixties, would not allow the Justice 
Department to utilize the fruits of warrantless electronic 
surveillance in litigation against selected targets. In 
fact, continued secret intelligence left open the possibility 
that the illegal operations might be exposed to an angry 
public, as had occurred during the Coplon and Black crises. 
The Mitchell Doctrine would provide the Executive with the 
power to institute whatever "national security" wiretapping 
it desired, as well as the power to selectively utilize the 
fruits of this surveillance in court, without being forced to 
disclose wiretaps it desired to keep secret.
Having come to the decision to re-institute the 
"inherent right" argument, the Administration selected the 
White Panther case in Judge Keith's Detroit court as the 
primary vehicle. Several things made the White Panther case 
attractive to the Justice Department. First, the government 
possessed the ideal type of electronic surveillance logs for 
a high-stakes legal gamble. Plamondon's conversations with 
the Black Panthers were relatively innocuous, to the extent 
that their ultimate release to the defense would not 
seriously damage the government's national security 
apparatus.188 The fact that the government concealed the
I88If White Panther attorney Hugh Davis is correct, and 
the Plamondon intercepts included domestic surveillance by
(continued...)
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existence of the warrantless White Panther wiretap 
altogether, knowingly defying Keith's disclosure order, and 
opted instead to submit only the Plamondon intercepts from 
Black Panther surveillance, demonstrates the degree of 
calculation. The White Panther case offered the quickest 
route to the Supreme Court: a mandamus action during a
trial's pre-trial stage. By raising the mandamus issue prior 
to the start of the trial, the Justice Department was able to 
acquire an immediate hearing in the Court of Appeals, rather 
than having to wait for the outcome of the case. However, a 
mandamus appeal would not have been possible if the presiding 
judge ruled in favor of the Mitchell affidavit. One of only 
a handful of black U.S. District Judges, Keith's liberal 
voting record was well known to the Justice Department. 
This, combined with the blunt language of Mitchell's 
affidavit, indicate that the Justice Department meant for 
Keith to rule against it. He proved happy to oblige.
188 (.. . continued) 
the National Security Agency, never part of its charter, more 
may have been involved in the government's refusal to 
disclose the Plamondon surveillance logs than just a desire 
to test the Mitchell Doctrine.
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EXHIBIT # 4 TO'INTERROGATORIES
(Figure 4-7)
FBI Surveillance Log of the White Panthers 
October 16, 1970 
Featuring a conversation with John Sinclair 
Regarding Legal strategy
Source: Legal Papers of Hugh M. Davis
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C 0 N F I D E N T I A L
Ka: Lawrence Robert Plamondon;
White Panther Party
There must be h dozen rightwing Michigan congressmen, 
say, that you c o m  Id rip off without too much of a security 
hassel - They are mostly listed right in the DC phonebook. Nab 
him at home at 3 a.m., then out with him to someplace safe, 
followed by messages to the press threatening he will be 
offed unless John Sinclair is freed.
If you got a really big pig, such as Ford or Griffin, 
you could probably get Bobby Seale & Huey freed ‘as WSiiV K"£p 
off Spiro, and you could name your own price....
OK, how do you know this is not a letter, though, 
from some provocateur trying to lure you into some action the 
pigs will be watching for? Nothing's 100% certain. But: a
pig agent would be more likely to approach you in person, or 
thru an infiltrator in your Party itself, rather than via 
anonymous letter.
Also: the idea about congressmen, etc. is really Just
a suggestion. I'm sure you are creative enough to come up with 
a variation as to persons, time-and place that would do the Job 
Just as well.
Anyway - I don't recommend you discuss the. idea 
outside of small "affinity groups" - and please destroy this 
letter after you read it - because of there are infiltrators 
in or around you, I don't care to have it fall into their 
hands.
Good Luck.
FREE JOHN SINCLAIR
Yours in Revolution,
Tupac Amaru
C O N F I D E N T I A L
76
(Figure 4-8)
FBI Report on Plamondon's Capture 
September 3, 19 7 0 
Anonymous FBI COINTELPRO Letter to the White Panthers, 
Suggesting that they Kidnap Politicians to Free Sinclair
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files
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Federal Bureau of Investigation 
United States Department of Justice 
Washington, D. C.
September 25, 1970 J / -V -
Honorable Gerald R. Ford, Jr.
Minority Leader
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515
My dear Congressman:
In response to your inquiry concerning the 
White Panther Party which you raised during our confer­
ence with the President on September 22, 1970, I 
thought you would be interested in the following.
The White Panther Party is a relatively 
small New Left group formed in late 1968 by a "Hippie" 
rock and roll musical group named the "Motor City 
Five." The headquarters for this group is located 
at 1520 Hill Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan. This organi­
zation has distributed a leaflet setting forth a 
"ten-point program" which, among other things, calls 
for full support of the Black Panther Party, a self­
described revolutionary organization advocating the 
use of guns to end the oppression of black people.
The program of the White Panther Party calls 
for total assault on the culture by any means neces­
sary, including rock and roll, the use of dope, the 
utilization of obscene acts in public and free exchange 
of energy and materials. This group demands the end 
of the use of money, calling for the turning over of 
everything to the people. The White Panther Party 
states in their program that "they breathe revolution" 
and are "LSD driven."
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
(Figure 4-9)
Hoover Letter to Congressman Gerald R. Ford 
September 25, 1970 
Referring to a White House Meeting on Sept. 22, in which 
Nixon, Ford, and Hoover Discussed the White Panthers
Source: Congressional Papers, Ford Presidential Library
(fig. con'd.)
m
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Honorable Gerald R. Ford, Jr.
The leaders of this organization are 
John Sinclair, Milton Taube and Lawrence Robert 
Plamondon. These individuals have all been convicted 
of drug violations in the past and Plaaondon has 
been indicted for the bombing of a Central 
Intelligence Agency office in Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
in 1968.
Plaaondon was arrested on July 23, 1970, 
and he had in his possession papers belonging to him 
and other members of the White Panther Party indicating 
that conditions in the United States must escalate 
to "revolutionary violence." Plamondon referred to 
the level of violence as "bombings and sabotage."
He also stated "We will see more guerrilla violence" 
as such activity is an excellent tool because it 
is highly organized and highly developed. These 
papers also suggested that the White Panther Party 
consider kidnaping United States ambassadors and 
other high Government officials so that White Panther 
Party members now in prison may be set free in 
return for the release of these officials.
The Department of Justice has been forwarded 
all pertinent information concerning the White Panther 
Party and its leaders. The FBI has this organization 
and its membership under active investigation. Any 
information coming to our -attention' concerning viola­
tions of laws will either be referred to local authorities 
or to the Department of Justice depending on the nature 
of the violation.
Sincerely yours,
-  2 -
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
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• Director, FBI ' ‘ \\ ' ^
November 16, ISflO
. QEC2XQN1C SURVSllLAIICfi
- Reference is ©ada to year memorandum dieted October 15, 
1920, cay tinned "Electronic Surveillance- Information RsTeajt:
ObJin Sinclair; •
you. request electronic' sarveLllvaae 
iKfbraatibn. . .-. .».•
.v, .• '
; • and John Sinclair were not tte
' subject of a direct electronic surveillance nor nera any of -the*/ 
conversations'monitored by an electronic device of the FBI.
‘EXHIBIT # 20 to interrogatories
(Figure 4-10)
FBI Memorandum, Hoover to Asst. A. G. will R. Wilson
November 16, 1970 
Denies Sinclair has been Overheard in FBI Wiretaps
Source: Legal Papers of Hugh M. Davis
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Chapter Five 
The Keith Decision: U.S. v. U.S. District Court
I.
There may have been a time when a valid 
distinction existed between external and internal 
threats. But such a distinction is now largely 
meaningless. The radical left....is plotting 
violence and revolution. Its leaders visit and 
collaborate with foreign Communist enemies. 
Court-authorized wiretapping requires a prior 
showing of probable cause and the ultimate 
disclosure of sources...[which] would seriously 
handicap our counterespionage and counter­
subversive operations. . .Freedom can be lost as 
irrevocably from revolution as from foreign 
attack. —  Lewis F. Powell, August, 19711
On January 25, 1971, U.S. District Judge Damon J. Keith 
issued his now-famous "Keith Decision," in response to the 
Nixon Administration's Mitchell Doctrine affidavit. 
Borrowing heavily from Judge Warren Ferguson's decision in
'Quoted in New York Times. November 3, 1971, 47.
Powell's article was originally written in July of 1971. His 
views concerning the subject of warrantless wiretapping 
underwent significant revision during the subsequent year, as 
the following passage from the Keith decision demonstrates: 
"Though the investigative duty of the executive may be 
stronger in such [national security] cases, so also is there 
greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech. 
History abundantly documents the tendency of Government... .to 
view with suspicion those who most fervently dispute its 
policies. Fourth Amendment protections become the more 
necessary when the targets of official surveillance may be 
those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political beliefs. 
U.S. v. U.S. District Court. June 19, 1972, 407 U.S. 297, 15- 
16.
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U.S. v Smith, delivered just two weeks earlier, Keith refuted 
Mitchell's claim of "inherent right," and ordered the 
government to disclose to the defense all electronic 
surveillance transcripts pertaining to defendant Lawrence R. 
Plamondon. Within days, the Justice Department sought an 
immediate review of Keith's order from the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Cincinnati, via a "mandamus" appeal. 
Overnight, the White Panther "CIA Conspiracy Case" became a 
cause celebre for the Justice Department's Internal Security 
Division. During the next eighteen months, the Mitchell 
Doctrine underwent the scrutiny of the upper levels of the 
U.S. Judiciary. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld 
Keith in a two-to-one decision on April 8, 1971; the Supreme 
Court ruled on June 19, 1972, in a unanimous 8-0 decision.2
During the interim, the Justice Department's position on 
the Mitchell Doctrine underwent significant revision. At 
both the district court and appellate levels, the 
government's principal attorneys on the case, Solicitor 
General Erwin N. Griswold and Assistant Attorney General 
Robert C. Mardian, argued the following: (1) the President
(and his representative, the Attorney General), possess the 
"inherent constitutional power" to initiate "national 
security" wiretapping against suspected "domestic 
subversives," without seeking prior judicial approval; (2)
2Newly-appointed Justice William H. Rehnquist took no 
part in the deliberations or decision.
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Congress specifically recognized this power in section 
2511(3) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968; (3) the Supreme Court indicated support for "national 
security" wiretapping in selected passages of the Katz and 
Giordano decisions, recognizing the "inherent power" of the 
Executive in numerous cases involving foreign relations and 
internal security matters; (4) in view of the high levels of 
social disorder present in America, threats posed by domestic 
groups seeking to "subvert the existing political order" 
parallel those of any strictly "foreign" entity; and (5) the 
Court should therefore recognize the Executive's powers to 
wiretap without warrant.3
After Chief Judge George C. Edwards ruled against the 
government, Mardian and Griswold revised their brief, arguing 
instead: (1) the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all
searches and seizures, only those that are "unreasonable"; 
(2) "national security" surveillance conducted by the 
Executive without prior judicial approval is not an 
unreasonable search; and (3) the various requirements 
associated with judicial review in "national security" 
wiretapping cases —  obtaining probable cause, disclosing 
"sensitive" and secret information, and relying on judges to 
make decisions "outside the traditional judicial 
responsibilities" —  would "frustrate the governmental
3United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
Case No. 71-1105, U.S. v. U.S. District Court. 444 F.2d, 651- 
77.
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purpose behind surveillance" and "significantly reduce the 
chances of the surveillance being effective."4
Opposing the government's position were two separate 
teams of defense attorneys. William Kunstler, Leonard 
Weinglass, and Hugh M. Davis, who had represented the "Ann 
Arbor Three" (Sinclair, Plamondon, and Forrest) in the White 
Panther "CIA Conspiracy" case in Detroit, argued at the 
appeals level, while corporate attorney William J. Gossett 
and "people's lawyer" Arthur Kinoy represented the
respondents (Judge Keith and the three White Panthers) before 
the Supreme Court. The defense's argument remained virtually 
unchanged and focused primarily on the Constitution; it
argued that the Executive is not immune from the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, and that the "checks and 
balances" inherent in the U.S. system of government require 
that an independent Judiciary insert its "impartial
judgement," in this case a court order, between the Executive 
Branch and the citizen. An important secondary focus for the 
defense was the assertion that the government was reading far 
too much into section 2511(3) of the Omnibus Act. It found
4"Brief for the United States," [dated September, 1971], 
filed October 1, 1971, U.S. v. U.S. District Court. No. 70- 
153, 5-7; bound case files located in the U.S. Supreme Court 
Building, Washington, D.C., 3rd Floor, "Technical Services," 
"Records and Briefs" [hereafter "SCR/B"].
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the passage "neutral on the issue of whether the President 
does have power to eavesdrop on domestic activities."5
The Supreme Court's majority decision, written by newly- 
appointed Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., squarely rejected the 
Mitchell Doctrine. Acknowledging that the period was one of 
"civil disorders" and "worldwide ferment," Powell nonetheless 
ruled:
The circumstances described do not justify 
complete exemption of domestic security from prior 
judicial scrutiny. Official surveillance, whether 
its purpose be criminal investigation or on-going 
intelligence gathering, risks infringement of 
constitutionally-protected privacy of speech. 
Security surveillances are especially sensitive 
because of the inherent vagueness of the domestic 
security concept, the necessarily broad and 
continuing nature of intelligence gathering, and 
the temptation to utilize such surveillances to 
oversee political dissent.6
Powell's decision upheld Keith's order for the government to
disclose its wiretap logs of Plamondon's intercepted
conversations. As a result, the Justice Department soon
abandoned its case against all three defendants, claiming
that disclosure would "damage national security." The
decision had a tremendous impact upon a number of the
government's other high-profile cases against the anti-war
movement and the Black Panthers; many of them were abandoned
as a result of the Keith ruling.
5"Brief for the District Court and the Honorable Damon 
J. Keith," filed December 15, 1971, 4-7, SCR/B.
6U.S. v. U.S. District Court. 407 U.S. 297, 21-22.
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The Nixon Administration's inability to secure the 
support of even a single Justice in the Keith case was rooted 
in the social and political changes which took place in 
American society during 1971 and the first half of 1972. The 
Administration's offensive against the anti-war, New Left, 
counterculture, and Black Power movements reached new 
heights, characterized by such highly-publicized measures as 
a legal action against major newspapers during the "Pentagon 
Papers" crisis, mass arrests and internment of thousands of 
anti-war demonstrators during the demonstrations of May, 
1971, the expansion of highly-political conspiracy trials, 
and an attempt to re-activate political inquisitions, through 
a rejuvenated Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB).
A similar boldness also characterized the Justice 
Department's revised wiretapping policies. Having been 
largely silent on the subject of "national security" 
surveillance during the latter half of 1969 and throughout 
1970, the Nixon Administration, within weeks of Keith's 
January, 1971, decision, conducted a forceful public 
relations campaign designed to bolster public support for the 
Mitchell Doctrine. For the first time in almost two years, 
the divergence between the Administration's publicly-stated 
wiretapping policies and its actual practices narrowed, as 
the Justice Department admitted the FBI was tapping more and 
more telephones. As the Keith case moved through the 
appellate level and on to the Supreme Court, Nixon, Mitchell,
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Richard Kleindienst, Robert Mardian, and William Rehnquist 
(while still Assistant Attorney General) delivered a number 
of public addresses extolling the benefits of expanded 
surveillance power to investigate suspected domestic, as well 
as "foreign" threats to the nation. The Mitchell Doctrine 
became an important part of a renewed "law and order" 
campaign being waged by the Nixon Administration.
The Administration's public relations campaign backfired 
on a grand scale. The reasons for the Mitchell Doctrine's 
demise were closely related to the audacity which 
characterized the initiative, as well as to bad timing. A 
combination of reduced social disorder, increasing media 
revelations of Army, FBI, and governmental surveillance 
abuses, a revitalized Democratic opposition, and the Justice 
Department's callous "law and order" actions against 
dissenters, created an atmosphere inimical to Nixon's hope 
for expanded wiretapping. Throughout 1971, the national 
media reported numerous revelations of Army spying, FBI 
covert operations, and the increasing practice among 
government agencies of collecting and computerizing personal 
information concerning millions of Americans. Revelations of 
suspected Army surveillance, made public in hearings 
conducted by Senator Sam Ervin's Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Rights, became an ongoing "story" throughout 
the spring and summer. One major revelation of Ervin's 
Subcommittee was the Army's "CONUS" program, in which tens of
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thousands of dossiers had been opened on civilian politicians 
and members of anti-war/peace movement groups since the onset 
of the Cold War. Ervin's Army hearings led to media 
inquiries into other, heretofore secret, government 
intelligence/surveillance practices. Also damaging to the 
Administration was the public release of documents which 
exposed the FBI's COINTELPRO program, as well as the so- 
called "Pentagon Papers."
Media reaction to the Justice Department's bold campaign 
to secure judicial sanction for the Mitchell Doctrine only 
increased public apprehension. Newspaper articles and 
editorials from such journalists as Fred Graham and Tom 
Wicker of the New York Times and Sanford Ungar and Alan Barth 
of the Washington Post, strongly opposed the Mitchell 
Doctrine. The media also followed closely the Keith case, as 
it moved through the courts. Within a week of Powell's 
decision, Fred Graham commented that the Administration's 
position in the case contributed to "a very real sense of 
near-paranoia" existing in America, concerning the 
government's wiretapping policies.7
Ervin's hearings, the Mitchell Doctrine, and other 
public disclosures concerning governmental surveillance, 
provided the Democratic opposition with a potent political 
issue. Throughout 1971, Democrats charged Nixon with 
conducting a widespread campaign of political spying. In
7New York Times. June 25, 1972, section IV, 4.
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April, Presidential aspirant Edmund Muskie made public an FBI 
report documenting that the Bureau had conducted sweeping 
physical and electronic surveillance of 1970's "Earth Day" 
celebrations; the rallies had included speeches from 
prominent politicians, including Muskie himself. Democrats 
also charged that the FBI was bugging and wiretapping their 
Congressional offices and private residences. Several called 
for Hoover's resignation. Nothing signalled the end of an 
era of unquestioned Congressional acquiescence in executive 
policy-making on surveillance and "national security" issues 
more than the aging Director's inability to "deflect" the 
Democrats' unrelenting criticism, as he had successfully done 
over the previous four decades.
There is no small irony in the fact that "law and order" 
—  the issue which had contributed greatly to Nixon's 
election in 1968, and which had allowed the Administration to 
push a huge anti-crime package through Congress the previous 
fall —  backfired on Nixon, with the failure of the Mitchell 
Doctrine. One of the keys to its failure was the reduction 
in social disorder during 1971 and 1972. Like many of the 
Administration's other anti-crime initiatives, the Mitchell 
Doctrine depended upon fear.8 A central premise of the 
government's argument in Keith was that the threat posed by 
"domestic" individuals and groups paralleled that of "foreign 
nations and their agents." To support their claim, the
8New York Times. January 14, 1971, 37.
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government quoted statistics of recent anti-establishment
bombings, asserting "the President must protect the
government." It implied that without unchecked wiretapping
powers he would be unable to do so effectively.9 Mitchell's
June 11, 1971, address to the Virginia Bar Association also
addressed this theme:
Never in our history has this country been 
confronted with so many revolutionary elements 
determined to destroy by force the government and 
the society it stands for...the threat to our
society from so-called 'domestic subversion' is as 
serious as any threat from abroad...The 
Constitution.... is the charter for a viable
government system, not a suicide pact.10
The Nixon Administration's Keith initiative depended 
upon high levels of social disorder, yet, the turbulence and 
polarization that had largely defined America during the late 
sixties was winding down. "Terrorist" bombings continued at 
or near 1970 levels, but the number and ferocity of large 
confrontations in the struggle between the Movement and the 
conservative establishment underwent a steady decline. The 
anti-war demonstration in Washington, D.C. in early May was
one of the last major flashpoints of the sixties.11 A
9"Brief for the United States," filed October 1, 1971, 
SCR/B.
I0Quoted in New York Times. June 12, 1971, 12. See also 
Washington Post. June 12, 1971, A-l, and June 27, 1971, B-6.
nThe historical era known as the "sixties" does not 
neatly fit within a standard decade-by-decade categorization 
(commonly debated in U.S. historiography). The social and 
political dynamics of the "sixties" actually lasted well into 
the early seventies. A better demarcation might be 1963
(continued...)
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Gallop Poll conducted in August of 1971 indicated that only 
12 percent of Americans viewed "crime and lawlessness" as the 
nation's top problem; by mid-December the figure had fallen 
to 6 percent, as the Vietnam War and a worsening economy 
eclipsed all other concerns.12
During the same period, the White Panther Party evolved 
along a path similar to the rest of the Movement. No longer 
satisfied with the radical connotations of the title "White 
Panthers," the Ann Arbor chapter adopted the name "Rainbow 
People's Party," (RPP) and re-focused their energies on local 
organizing. The government portrayed the White Panthers in 
its Keith briefs as a dangerous terrorist organization and a 
threat to the internal security of the nation at precisely 
the time when the group was adopting a moderate position and 
increasingly working within the local political "system." By 
1972, the Rainbow People joined forces with the local "Human 
Rights Party," successfully elected several local officials, 
and even supported Democratic Presidential candidate George 
McGovern.
The moderation of the group's politics and name change, 
however, made little difference to the authorities. Although 
the FBI's warrantless wiretaps on the Ann Arbor chapter were
11 (.. .continued)
(Birmingham riots and John F. Kennedy's assassination) 
through 1973/4 (Watergate, the Arab oil embargo, and Nixon's 
resignation).
12New York Times. December 19, 1971, 54.
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turned off the day after Keith's ruling, other forms of FBI 
and local law enforcement surveillance continued. In 
addition, counterintelligence actions targeting the Rainbow 
People reached new heights. A highly-coordinated COINTELPRO 
initiative aimed at the group occurred in March of 1971, when 
the Nixon Administration issued a press release charging that 
the White Panther leadership had considered kidnapping Vice 
President Agnew and other high-ranking politicians, to gain 
the release of John Sinclair. The timing —  just as the 
Appeals Court was deliberating over the Keith case —  
suggested top-level government coordination. Several White 
Panthers were also implicated in the Weathermen bombing of 
the U.S. Capital in early March. All told, between 1966 and 
1972, the number and variety of COINTELPRO-like initiatives 
utilized against Sinclair and his associates by local, 
county, state, and federal officials rivalled that of the 
Black Panthers.
With most of its leadership in prison, the Rainbow 
People nevertheless displayed a remarkable resourcefulness. 
The "Free John” and "CIA Conspiracy" campaigns continued to 
attract local and national support. Benefit concerts, 
featuring the likes of Bob Seger, Dr. John, Commander Cody, 
Ted Nugent and the Amboy Dukes, and Mitch Ryder, generated 
the money required to continue the legal defense funds for 
Sinclair, Plamondon, Taube, and Forrest. Celebrity support 
also increased, with Donald Sutherland, Jane Fonda, Allen
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Ginsberg, and others appearing at Rainbow People rallies. On 
December 10, 1971, the "John Sinclair Freedom Rally" was held 
in Ann Arbor's Crisler arena, featuring performances by 
Stevie Wonder, Phil Ochs, Bob Seger, and Commander Cody; also 
appearing were four of the "Chicago Eight": Bobby Seale, 
David Dellinger, Jerry Rubin, and Rennie Davis. The 
highlight of the evening, however, was a performance by John 
Lennon and Yoko Ono, which featured a Lennon composition 
entitled "John Sinclair."
The high visibility of the "Free John" movement, as well 
as the tenacious legal battle fought by White Panther 
attorney Justin Ravitz, had a cumulative effect on Michigan's 
population, as many began to reassess the harshness of the 
state's marijuana laws. By the fall of 1971 the same 
Michigan Supreme Court that had repeatedly denied appeals for 
Sinclair's release on bond was giving serious consideration 
to Ravitz's position that a felony charge for possession of 
small amounts of marijuana was "cruel and unusual 
punishment." On December 13, 1971, just three days after 
John Lennon's appearance at the Freedom Rally, the Court 
ruled as Ravitz had requested, freeing John Sinclair on bond. 
The Sinclair case soon became a model in a nation-wide 
initiative to decriminalize marijuana.
Overkill also damaged the Nixon Administration's attempt 
to reverse the decisions of the Warren Court. The retirement 
of Justices Harlan and Black in September of 1971 provided an
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
449
excellent opportunity for Nixon to remake the Court in his 
image. Although his selection of Lewis Powell and William 
Rehnquist was probably due to a number of factors, including 
their overall pro-law and order "judicial philosophies," he 
could scarcely have found two individuals more adamant in 
their public support for expanded FBI wiretapping of domestic 
radicals. Rehnquist, during his tenure with the Justice 
Department, had been one of the principal framers of the 
Mitchell Doctrine; by mid-1971 he had also acquired a 
reputation as the Department's most enthusiastic supporter of 
harsh measures against anti-war protestors, such as mass 
arrests and internment. Lewis Powell, a well-known former 
American Bar Association President, had been a member of the 
President's Task Force on Crime and Violence in 1968 —  the 
same task force that parted ways with President Johnson and 
Attorney General Clark by supporting Title III wiretapping. 
He had also headed up the controversial ABA Committee on 
Police Standards, which drafted guidelines for states to use 
in establishing wiretapping statutes.
For Rehnquist, the "backfire effect" occurred during his 
confirmation hearings, as Senator Kennedy and other liberals 
on the Judiciary Committee grilled him concerning his 
involvement in several of the Justice Department's more 
questionable initiatives, including the Mitchell Doctrine. 
Under intense questioning, Rehnquist made two unwise 
admissions: (1) he had assisted in the drafting of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
450
government's Keith briefs, and (2) he avowed that if 
confirmed, he would not take part in the pending Keith case. 
Thus, the bluntness of the Nixon Administration's public 
relations campaign in favor of expanded wiretapping power 
(and other initiatives) ultimately cost Nixon a key vote on 
the Keith case, even before it came up for consideration in 
the Supreme Court.
The backlash affected Powell in a very different manner.
During the confirmation hearings, he was questioned at length
concerning a newspaper article he had recently written, in
which he referred to the current furor over wiretapping as "a
tempest in a teapot." In the same article he asserted that
the distinction between "domestic" and "foreign" threats to
the nation's security had become "meaningless."13 Powell
stood his ground in the hearings, stating that he had not yet
made up his mind on the issue of "national security"
surveillance. By the following spring, when, as a member of
the Supreme Court, he heard oral arguments in the Keith case
and (ironically) assumed the duty of writing the decision, he
had undergone a dramatic shift in his thinking concerning
surveillance issues. The text of his decision left no doubt
concerning the enormous impact which the public's increasing
concern about surveillance had on his thinking:
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a 
dread of subjection to an unchecked surveillance 
power. Nor must the fear of unauthorized official
I3Quoted in New York Times. November 3, 1971, 47.
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eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen dissent...By 
no means the least importance [of this decision] 
will be the reassurance of the public generally 
that indiscriminate wiretapping and bugging of 
law-abiding citizens cannot occur.14
The Court's unanimous decision in Keith, as well as its 
focus on the Fourth Amendment, indicated that the Justices 
were cognizant that more was involved in the case than merely 
a request for heightened wiretap power. In constitutional 
terms, the Executive sought to acquire additional search and 
seizure powers from the Judiciary, by capitalizing on social 
disorder and public fears of crime and lawlessness. However, 
the Mitchell Doctrine was also a challenge to the 
Constitution's checks and balances. The Executive was 
essentially asking the Judiciary to cede a portion of its 
powers, in the interest of "national security." Such 
requests are not unique in the history of the Republic; as 
recently as the Korean War, President Truman had used the 
"inherent power" argument in an unsuccessful attempt to seize 
and operate the nation's steel mills.
What made Nixon's constitutional challenge in the 
Mitchell Doctrine unique was the fact that it was just one of 
a series of Administration attacks on the Judiciary, which 
had started even before Nixon took office, and which would 
continue through the Watergate crisis. In many ways, Nixon's 
election had been a repudiation of not only the Liberals, but 
also the Warren Court. Its decisions protecting the rights
14U.S. v. U.S. District Court. 407 U.S. 297, 16, 23.
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of the accused, such as Miranda and Escobedo, remained a 
focus for the Administration's invective throughout its first 
years in office. John Eliff's study of the Mitchell Justice 
Department during the years 1969-1971 finds that it followed 
a policy of selective enforcement of Miranda and other Warren 
Court rulings, while simultaneously exploiting "grey areas" 
in the law to "crack down" on criminals. The
Administration's policies regarding "national security" 
wiretapping evolved along similar lines, but with one 
important difference: the Mitchell Doctrine attacked not only 
the rulings of the Judiciary (e.g. Katz and Alderman). but 
also the independence of U.S. District Court judges. By 
arguing that federal judges lacked the expertise and 
knowledge required to make "informed judgements" concerning 
national security issues, the Administration displayed a deep 
distrust of the Judiciary, which paralleled Hoover's position 
dating back to the Coplon case.15 While Hoover's statements 
were made in private, Nixon and Mitchell did not hesitate to 
attack the courts in public.
The Court's decision in U.S. v. U.S. District Court did 
not forestall the coming of the "Nixon Court." In fact, 
during the very term in which Keith was decided (1971-72),
15In a 1954 letter to Congressman Kenneth Keating, Hoover 
outlined the reasons for his opposition to judicial review of 
"national security" wiretapping. He focused primarily on the 
character of federal judges, stating: "no one Federal judge 
possesses sufficient information on the nation's security 
upon which he can base a decision." Quoted in Charns, Cloak 
and Gavel. 33.
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the Court handed down several five-to-four rulings which 
signaled a shift to Nixon's "law and order" philosophy. One 
of these cases, Laird v. Tatum, erected nearly insurmountable 
legal obstacles preventing aggrieved parties from acquiring 
justice in cases involving government surveillance. As a 
result of this decision, the burden of proof was shifted to 
the plaintiffs in such cases: individuals and/or
organizations seeking damages against the government now had 
to demonstrate that "actual damage" had been inflicted upon 
them as a result of the surveillance and/or dossier 
collection —  which proved almost impossible to accomplish. 
In addition, Keith may not have ended the FBI's time-honored 
practice of instituting warrantless wiretaps against 
suspected "domestic subversives"; it may have merely driven 
the practice back "underground."
These facts, however, do not detract from the historical 
and constitutional significance of the Keith decision. The 
ruling established the absolute necessity of prior court 
orders in law enforcement situations involving the use of 
electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens. It halted a 
potentially dangerous Executive Branch encroachment into a 
realm properly reserved for the Judiciary —  reaffirming both 
Marburv v. Madison and the Constitution's system of "checks 
and balances." Keith also sent a strong message to Congress, 
urging it to enact the ruling's provisions into statute.
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(Figure 5-1)
Contemporary Photograph of the Honorable 
Judge Damon J. Keith
Source: Mayhew and Peper, Cincinnati, Ohio
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II.
The government states that the decision to 
initiate surveillance in this type of case must be 
'based on a wide variety of considerations and on 
many pieces of information which cannot readily be 
presented to a magistrate'...In cases involving 
foreign affairs this argument might very well 
prevail. In that situation, numerous non-judicial 
factors are relevant and the decision would 
probably be far removed from the consideration of 
probable cause. However, this argument is totally 
inapplicable in a criminal proceeding in a federal 
court involving a domestic situation. —  Judge 
Warren J. Ferguson16
An idea which seems to permeate much of the 
Government's argument is that a dissident domestic 
organization is akin to an unfriendly power and 
must be dealt with in the same fashion. There is 
great danger in an argument of this nature for it 
strikes at the very constitutional privileges and 
immunities that are inherent in United States 
citizenship. —  Judge Damon J. Keith17
"Life is a game of inches" recalls U.S. Appeals Judge 
Damon J. Keith, reminiscing about the unusual events which 
led to his handling the U.S. v. Sinclair. Plamondon. and 
Forrest case, which became U.S. v. U.S. District Court. 
Originally, it was not Keith's case. The "blind draw" system 
utilized by the District Courts for the Eastern District of
Memorandum Opinion, U.S. v Melvin Carl Smith. January 
8, 1971, Crim. No. 4277-CD, located in the Papers of Justice 
William 0. Douglas, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress 
[hereafter "Douglas Papers"], container 672, Subject File: 
"Wiretapping, 1954-70," 10.
17"Memorandum Opinion...," U.S. v Sinclair. Plamondon. 
and Forrest. January 25, 1971, Crim. No. 44375, JLSC/BHL, box 
19, folder 21, 9 [hereafter "Keith Decision"].
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
456
Michigan had originally assigned the Sinclair case to Judge 
Talbot Smith, who resided in Ann Arbor. Because of the White 
Panthers' reputation as committed "revolutionaries," Judge 
Smith was not at all happy with the draw. His first concern 
was the safety of his wife, but he also worried that 
attorneys William Kunstler and Leonard Weinglass might 
attempt to make the case a cause celebre for the Movement, as 
they had done with the "Chicago Seven" trial in Chicago. 
Smith related his concerns to Chief Judge Ralph Freeman and 
the other judges of the Eastern District during a regularly- 
scheduled "Judge's Meeting" in the summer of 1970. Smith 
suggested that Freeman contact the Chief Judge for the Sixth 
Circuit in Cincinnati, to request an out-of-state judge to 
try the case. Keith, one of the youngest judges on the 
court, objected, stating that this would set a bad precedent. 
He acknowledged the validity of Smith's concerns, but 
believed the case should be kept within the Eastern District. 
Judge Freeman agreed, which meant the case had to be re­
assigned. Under normal circumstances, it would have been 
sent back to the Clerk of Court's office for a new "blind 
draw." However, one of the other judges present suggested 
that all of the judges (except Smith) place their names in a 
hat and draw for the case in the Judge's Meeting. Freeman
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accepted: in this unlikely manner, Judge Keith was assigned 
the case.18
Damon Jerome Keith was born in Detroit in 1922, the 
seventh and last child of lower-middle class factory worker. 
Growing up on the streets of Detroit's west side, he recalls 
being exposed to "pimps, hustlers, and foundry workers at the 
automobile factories." "Most kids," Keith adds, "did not go 
to college —  most went to Jackson Prison." Against 
considerable odds, he distinguished himself at Northwestern 
High School, where he received three varsity letters in track 
and field. Perry Keith, Damon's father, was determined that 
one of his children would receive a college education, and 
somehow the family raised the necessary funds to send Damon 
to the all-black West Virginia State College in Morgantown, 
where he earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in 1943. Upon 
graduation, he was immediately drafted, and spent the next 
three years driving trucks for the Quartermaster Corps, a 
member of an all-black unit. After the war, he enrolled at 
Howard University Law School in Washington, D.C., where he 
came to know Thurgood Marshall, Spottswood Robinson, and 
James Nabrit. At the time, they were plotting various legal 
strategies to attack school segregation nationwide, and Jim 
Crow laws in the South —  a strategy which culminated in the 
landmark Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka case in 1954.
18Personal interview with Judge Damon J. Keith, October 
21, 1992, Detroit, Michigan.
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The "moot" Supreme Court sessions at Howard, featuring the 
best African-American legal minds in the country, had a 
profound impact on Keith.19 After receiving his LLB degree 
in 1949, he returned to Detroit, and was admitted to the 
Michigan Bar the following year. He soon joined a local law 
firm and became a trial attorney. In 1953, he married 
Rachael Boone, a Liberia-born medical resident. By the mid­
sixties, Keith had become a civic leader in Detroit, led the 
most successful black law firm in the city, and chaired the 
Michigan Civil Rights Commission. His growing reputation, as 
well as his personal friendship with Michigan Senator Philip 
Hart, earned him a nomination for a U.S. District Judgeship 
in 1967. Congress promptly confirmed Keith, and President 
Johnson appointed him on October 18, 1967.
Within three years of his appointment to the Federal 
Bench, Keith handled one of the nation's most contentious 
desegregation cases: Davis v. School Board of Pontiac. Inc.. 
Despite death threats and frequent incidents of violence, 
Keith presided over the forced desegregation of the city's 
public schools. Davis was the first case in U.S. history to 
extend federal court-ordered school integration to the North.
19For an analysis of the impact which these Howard 
University attorneys had upon the "modern" civil rights 
movement, see Juan Williams, Eves on the Prize: America's 
Civil Rights Years. 1954-1965. (New York: Penguin Books,
1988), 2-35.
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It would not be the last time that Keith went with his "gut 
instincts" and ruled in a controversial manner.20
From the moment that he presented Mitchell's "inherent 
right" affidavit in Judge Keith's Detroit courtroom on 
December 18, 1970, U.S. Attorney Ralph B. Guy was no longer 
in charge of the government's case against the "Ann Arbor 
Three." As Guy recalls: "the Justice Department in
Washington took over the argument, and from this point on 
they handled the case."21 By this time, Mitchell had 
already acquired legal decisions on the doctrine from three 
separate U.S. District Courts. He first presented the issue 
in June of 1969, before Judge Julius J. Hoffman in Chicago, 
who affirmed it the following February.22 An additional 
affirmation was acquired in Kansas during the fall of 1970, 
from Judge Arthur J. Stanley.23 And on January 8, 1971,
Judge Warren J. Ferguson ruled against Mitchell in 
California.24 Therefore, going into the U.S. v. Sinclair
20Petroit Free Press. (Detroit Magazine), June 10, 1984, 
1.; "Resolution Honoring the Honorable Damon J. Keith," State 
Bar of Michigan, February 17, 1978, [unpublished resolution]; 
Personal Vita of Damon J. Keith. The author is grateful to 
Judge Keith for furnishing copies of these materials.
21Personal interview with author, July 17, 1992, Ann
Arbor, Michigan.
22U .S . v. Dellinger, et. al.. (N.D. Ill), Crim. No. 69- 
180, February 20, 1970.
^U.S. v Felix Lindsey O'Neal. Crim. No. KC-CR-1204, 
(Dist. of KS), September 3, 1970.
^U.S. v. Melvin Carl Smith. Crim. No. 4277-CD, (C.D.
CA), January 8, 1971.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
460
case, the government was "two for three" on the Mitchell 
Doctrine in the district courts, but had not yet received an 
appellate court ruling, or —  the real prize —  a Supreme 
Court decision.
The affidavit Mitchell brought before Judge Keith 
contained essentially the same argument he had presented in 
the previous three cases: (1) one of the defendants
[Plamondon] had been overheard in "national security" 
investigative wiretaps, conducted for the purpose of 
protecting the nation's internal security from "domestic" 
revolutionary organizations; (2) a sealed exhibit, containing 
the surveillance transcripts, was presented to the judge, 
strictly for his in camera inspection; and (3) Mitchell 
asserted that it would "prejudice the national interest" to 
disclose the contents of the exhibit to the defense.
Mitchell's affidavit presented Keith with several 
options. Ostensibly, it appeared that the government was 
asking him to review the contents of the logs and rule that 
the information contained in them was inconsequential to the 
prosecution's case, which would effectively end the 
electronic surveillance issue, and allow the trial to go 
forward as planned, with the defense never having access to 
the transcripts. In fact, Judge Stanley had ruled precisely 
in this manner the previous September, in a Kansas case 
involving a Black Panther. Another option Keith could have 
pursued would have involved holding a "taint hearing"
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concerning the wiretaps prior to the trial, in accordance 
with the Alderman decision, which would have required 
disclosing the transcripts to the defense, in direct 
opposition to Mitchell's wishes. Instead, Keith chose a 
middle road: he ordered immediate disclosure, but, in a
highly unusual move, directed that the taint hearing would 
occur at the conclusion of the trial.25
Keith's decision, handed down January 25, 1971, was a 
strong rebuke to Mitchell's doctrine. Keith began with a 
discussion of the Alderman decision, which empowers federal 
judges to force disclosure of illegal surveillance. He then 
shifted to an analysis of the government's position, as 
outlined in the Mitchell affidavit and supporting brief, and 
summarized the three court cases which had already dealt with 
the matter. Of particular interest to Keith was Judge Warren 
Ferguson's recent decision in the Central District of 
California, which he termed "exceptionally well-reasoned and 
thorough."26 Conceding that he was "compelled to adopt the
“Although Keith declared the government's position 
inimical to the Constitution, he was nonetheless prepared to 
delay ruling on the issue of the surveillance's relevance to 
the government's case until after the trial. In this manner 
(and only this manner) , his ruling was similar to that of 
Judge Hoffman, who was asked for a decision on the doctrine 
in June of 1969, but put off ruling on it until the 
conclusion of the trial, in February of 1970.
“Keith had learned of Ferguson's decision during the 
pre-trial arguments in his court in mid-January. During the 
proceedings, he stated that he would not rule on the 
electronic surveillance issue until he had a chance to 
examine Ferguson's ruling. See Detroit News. January 17, 
1971, l-A.
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rule and rationale" of Ferguson's decision, Keith then 
outlined the heart of his argument: the history and
significance of the Fourth Amendment. He reviewed the key 
cases which had established the modern legal interpretation 
of the Amendment, beginning with Weeks v. U.S. (1914), which 
set the precedent that evidence secured in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment is inadmissable in a court of law. He then 
addressed Silverthorn Lumber Co. v. U.S. (1920), the well 
known "fruit of the poisonous tree" ruling, and Mapp v. Ohio 
(1961), the Warren Court ruling which expanded the 
exclusionary rule to prohibit the introduction in court of 
any information derived from illegally obtained evidence. 
Keith also cited the landmark electronic surveillance cases 
Silverman v. U.S. (1961) and Katz v. U.S. (1967), which he 
referred to as "the final buttress to this canopy of Fourth 
Amendment protection." Charging that the government, in its 
Mitchell Doctrine brief, "apparently ignores the overwhelming 
precedent of these cases," Keith asserted: "the Court is
unable to accept this proposition. We are a country of laws 
and not men."27
Keith next addressed the government's assertion that 
section 2511(3) of the Omnibus Act of 1968 demonstrated 
Congressional sanction for the President's "national 
security" wiretapping authority. Again, he deferred to 
Ferguson's decision, quoting him as follows: "'Regardless of
^Keith Decision, 2-5.
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these exceptions in the criminal statute, the President is,
of course, still subject to.... Constitutional limitations.'"
Keith then returned to the Fourth Amendment, delivering a
detailed defense of the exclusionary rule:
It is to be remembered that the protective sword 
which is sheathed in the scabbard of Fourth 
Amendment rights, and which insures that these 
fundamental rights will remain inviolate, is the 
well-defined rule of exclusion...[and] the cutting 
edge of the exclusionary rule is the requirement 
that the Government obtain a search warrant before 
it can conduct a lawful search and seizure. It is 
this procedure of obtaining a warrant that inserts 
the impartial judgement of the Court between the 
citizen and the Government.
Stressing the importance of probable cause to the warrant
requirement, Keith asserted that "Absent such a requirement,"
law enforcement would be able to make "their own evaluation
as to the reasonableness, the scope and the evidence of
probable cause of such a condition" —  a situation which he
was "loath to tolerate."28
Addressing the government's position equating domestic 
threats with foreign ones, Keith termed the argument 
"untenable," and opined that the Executive Branch must not be 
granted wholly new powers simply because "certain accused 
persons espouse views which are inconsistent with our present 
form of government." He cautioned that in a "turbulent time 
of unrest," in which "contented and established members 
of.... society" increasingly display their unwillingness to 
understand the purposes and rhetoric of radical groups such
28Ibid. , 5-8.
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as the White Panthers, it is doubly important for the
Judiciary to stand vigilant against the tide of public
hostility, to ensure that these individuals and groups are
not persecuted merely for their beliefs. He continued:
If democracy as we know it, and as our forefathers 
established it, is to stand, then 'attempts of 
domestic organizations to attack and subvert the 
existing structure of the G o v e r n m e n t c a n n o t  
be, in and of themselves, a crime. Such attempts 
become criminal only where it can be shown that 
the activity was/is carried on through unlawful 
means.
Keith expressed doubt concerning whether the government had 
probable cause to wiretap Plamondon in the first place, 
adding "if such probable cause did exist, a warrant to search 
may have properly been issued." He concluded his ruling with 
an order that the government make full disclosure of the 
wiretap logs to the defense within forty-eight hours.29
Like Ferguson, Keith ruled against the Mitchell Doctrine 
and ordered disclosure. Although his ruling borrowed heavily 
from Ferguson, there are important differences. Ferguson 
granted the government a full month to "perfect an appeal," 
while Keith granted only forty-eight hours. He later 
acknowledged that his curtness with the government was rooted 
in his anger and suspicions concerning the Mitchell Doctrine 
itself, as well as the manner in which Mitchell had presented 
it. In a 1992 interview with the author, he recalled his
29Ibid.. 8-14. The Keith Decision was covered
extensively by the national media; see New York Times, 
January 26, 1971, 15; and Washington Post. January 27, 1971, 
A-3.
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reaction to the Mitchell affidavit: "It was a complete shock
to me. I had not heard of it before. I thought it was
absolutely absurd...it was such an obnoxious claim that the
chief law enforcement officer of the country could be making.
It was so provocative." The contents of the sealed exhibit,
wiretap logs of five Plamondon conversations with the
California Black Panthers in 1969, raised Keith's suspicions,
and contributed to his anger. He recalls:
The Government was playing games...there was 
nothing in the sealed exhibit to indicate it was a 
domestic organization seeking to subvert the 
structure of the U.S.A., and the Government knew 
that the conversations had nothing to do with 
this.
Keith inferred that Mitchell's unwillingness to disclose a 
sealed exhibit containing a handful of inoffensive 
conversations —  which took place subsequent to the CIA 
bombing, which the White Panthers had been charged with in 
the case —  masked his hidden agenda, which was to acquire 
exemption from the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement 
concerning electronic surveillance of any domestic target 
which the Executive unilaterally deemed a "national security" 
threat.
Keith's statement regarding the "provocative" nature of 
Mitchell's affidavit, as well as his angry response to it, 
raises the possibility that Mitchell may have actually wanted 
an adverse ruling, in the interest of acquiring an appellate 
court ruling on the Mitchell Doctrine. When questioned about 
this possibility, Keith responded:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
466
I have never given thought to this issue before, 
but...this could have been concocted and 
orchestrated...It was clear to anybody's eyes that 
nothing in the exhibits....would suggest that the 
national security of the Government was in 
jeopardy...They, I'm sure, had checked my entire 
background, and knew what type of judge I was. 
I'm sure they had a reading on me...So this may 
have been a test case to accelerate and put in 
concrete this new theory that Mitchell had 
concocted.30
The sequence of events following Keith's decision 
quickly brought the issue of the Mitchell Doctrine's 
constitutionality to the attention of the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Cincinnati.31 For Keith and the other
30Personal interview with the author, October 21, 1992, 
Detroit, Michigan. White Panther attorney Hugh M. Davis is 
in overall agreement with this thesis. He also believes that 
the government's primary motive in selecting the White 
Panther trial was speed: a mandamus appeal issued during the 
pre-trial phase of a criminal case offered the fastest 
possible route to an appellate court ruling. Personal 
interview with author, July 25, 1992, Detroit, Michigan.
31 Judge Warren Ferguson had ruled against Mitchell more 
than two weeks prior to Keith in U.S. v. Smith, a case that 
was very similar to U.S. v. Sinclair, et. al. in two 
important respects: (1) it also involved an in camera exhibit 
containing a small amount of innocuous Black Panther 
wiretaps, which the government conceded had nothing to do 
with "foreign powers or their agents," and (2) Ferguson, like 
Keith, had a very liberal voting record, and responded 
vigorously to the provocative nature of Mitchell's affidavit. 
The government also sought mandamus in Smith. which begs the 
(as yet unanswered) question: why did Keith reach the
appellate level first? One possible explanation is that 
Keith offered only forty-eight hours for the government to 
initiate an appeal (later extended an additional ten days), 
while Ferguson offered a full thirty days. However, 
accounting for the earlier date of Ferguson's ruling (January 
8), as well as Keith's ten day extension (12 total days from 
his January 25 decision), the deadline in both cases was 
approximately February 8. Perhaps the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals was able to hear the case first. The government did 
go forward with mandamus in California, but by late spring,
(continued...)
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principals involved, events affecting the case unfolded at an 
amazing pace. Using the English common law device of 
"mandamus," the government, within a week of Keith's 
decision, appealed his ruling to the court responsible for 
supervising his decisions and rulings: the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.32 The court agreed to hear the case on 
February 8, and oral arguments were set for February 15. In 
effect, mandamus meant that the Nixon Administration was 
taking Judge Keith to court for his adverse ruling on a pre­
trial motion. The U.S. v. Sinclair, et. al. case now became 
known as U.S. v. U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of Michigan. Southern Division, and Hon. Damon J. Keith. 
Presiding; and John Sinclair. Lawrence "Pun" Plamondon. and 
John Waterhouse Forrest. The three circuit court judges
empaneled to hear the appeal were George C. Edwards (Chief 
Judge), Harry Phillips, and Paul C. Weick.
The speed with which the case went before the Sixth 
Circuit did not allow either side much time to revise 
positions. From Detroit, Hugh M. Davis prepared the 
defense's brief in opposition to the writ of mandamus, while
31 (... continued)
the Keith case was headed to the Supreme Court, so the Ninth 
Circuit awaited its ruling.
32New York Times. January 28, 1971, 18; Washington Post. 
January 28, 1971, A-3; (Washington, D.C.) Evening Star. 
January 28, 1971, A-l and January 29, 1971, A-6. Mandamus is 
a highly irregular tactic, usually granted only when the 
appellate court is convinced of the urgency of a contentious 
issue. Under normal circumstances, the government must wait 
until the conclusion of a trial to initiate an appeal.
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William Kunstler, working in New York, prepared the brief on 
behalf of Keith, reiterating and refining his opposition to 
the Mitchell Doctrine. The Justice Department also submitted 
a somewhat expanded brief, very similar to the one presented 
in Keith's courtroom. By this time, the case was being 
handled at the upper echelons of the Justice Department's 
Internal Security Division, under the personal direction of 
Robert Mardian.33 The only unusual aspect of the oral 
arguments on February 15 was Hugh Davis' automobile crash en 
route to Cincinnati from Detroit.34
On April 8, 1971, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld Keith in a two-to-one decision, Judges Edwards and 
Phillips in the majority, Judge Weick dissenting.35 The 
decision, written by Edwards, began provocatively: "This case 
has importance far beyond its facts or the litigants
33Washinqton Post. January 28, 1971, A-3. Ken W.
Clawson's article states: "Before the government decided to 
appeal to the circuit court, and possibly to the Supreme 
Court, Attorney General Mitchell held extensive meetings with 
Robert C. Mardian, newly-appointed chief of Justice's 
Internal Security Division, which is handling the White 
Panther case."
^Davis lost control of his car on icy roads, and ended
up in a terrible accident (part of his ear had to be
removed). Requiring Davis' brief, Kunstler rented a car in 
Cincinnati, drove to the crash site, and retrieved it from 
the snow near the wreckage. Upon returning to Cincinnati, 
Kunstler had the pages of the brief dried and pressed at a 
local dry cleaners, and delivered it on time. Hugh M. Davis 
personal interview with author, July 25, 1992, Detroit,
Michigan. For Kunstler's angle on the incident see Mv Life 
as a Radical Lawyer. 207-208.
35Crim. No. 71-1105, 444 F.2d, 651, April 8, 1971
[hereafter "Edwards Decision"].
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involved."36 The decision attacked the government's 
assertion of "inherent right" to monitor domestic groups, in 
much the same manner that both Keith and Ferguson had ruled. 
The court also deemed "totally inapplicable" the Justice 
Department's use of "war powers or foreign relations" cases 
as precedents for granting the Executive Branch additional 
powers in the domestic field. Further, it agreed with Keith 
that the surveillance in question involved strictly domestic 
matters.
The boldness of some of Mardian's assertions shocked 
Edwards and Phillips, just as they had Ferguson and Keith. 
The appellate judges thought it ironic that the government 
would cite Marburv v. Madison —  which they referred to as 
"Chief Justice Marshall's ringing affirmation of the 
supremacy of the Constitution over all three branches of 
government" —  in support of its position. In addition, the 
ruling asserted that it was "strange, indeed" that the 
government would invoke "the traditional power of sovereigns 
like King George III. .. .on behalf of an American President to 
defeat one of the fundamental freedoms for which the founders 
of this country overthrew King George's reign."37
36The national media also acknowledged the enormous 
importance of the decision. Front-page stories appeared in 
both the New York Times and Washington Post on April 9, 1971.
A flurry of editorials also appeared during the following 
weeks.
37Edwards Decision, 1-25. In fact, Mitchell and his 
"Arizona Mafia" associates at the Justice Department —
(continued...)
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One of Justice Department's principal arguments in 
support of its "inherent right" thesis focused upon 
precedent-setting cases in which the Supreme Court had 
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement for law 
enforcement, such as the well-known "stop and frisk" and "no­
knock" decisions. Edwards' decision disputed this as well, 
asserting that all of cases cited by the government "involved 
emergency situations which were held to prevent obtaining or 
absence of a prior warrant," and none of them involved 
wiretapping.38
The case most frequently cited by Edwards was Youngstown 
Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the well-known steel seizure 
case involving President Truman. He quoted Justice Black's 
decision at length, concluding that it was the most potent 
rejection of the "inherent power" thesis ever handed down in 
a case involving strictly domestic issues.39
37(.. .continued)
Mardian, Rehnquist, and Kleindienst —  were all admirers of 
British legal history, who frequently cited English common 
law precedents in their legal briefs (often to get around the 
Bill of Rights). An additional instance of this occurred 
during the battle over the "Pentagon Papers." The 
government's brief for the Supreme Court, prepared by 
Mitchell and Mardian, relied upon English common law rights 
of property, as well as "crown copyrights" over the 
publication of government documents; Sanford Ungar describes 
these precedents as "utterly inapplicable in the United 
States." See Sanford J. Ungar, The Papers & The Papers: An 
Account of the Legal and Political Battle Over The Pentagon 
Papers. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989) 229.
38Ibid. . 13-14.
39Ibid. . 14-16.
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The appellate court's decision reviewed the history of 
wiretapping law and practice in the United States, and 
outlined four major positions concerning "the legality of 
wiretapping or the admissibility of evidence derived
therefrom" which had been offered since the invention of the 
telephone: (1) the Olmstead ruling, which held that
wiretapping was not a search subject to the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment; (2) Justice Brandeis' dissent in 
Olmstead. which held that wiretapping was an unfair invasion 
of privacy, and ought to be banned; (3) the Katz ruling,
which held that wiretapping was indeed "governed by the
restrictions of the Fourth Amendment"; and (4) the Mitchell 
Doctrine position, which the government traced to 
Presidential directives dating back to 1940, as well as to 
articles written by Attorneys General Herbert Brownell and 
William P. Rogers during the early fifties. Edwards 
suggested that the fourth position "could (and perhaps 
should)" be subdivided into "foreign" and "domestic" 
applications, a position which the ABA had recently adopted 
in its guidelines for state wiretapping statutes. The court 
also reviewed the history of Congressional consideration of 
wiretapping, paying particular attention to Title III of the 
1968 Omnibus Act. Rather than looking only at section 
2511(3), as the government's brief had, the court reviewed 
the entirety of the statute, quoting lengthy passages, in an 
effort to demonstrate that, on the whole, the legislation
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represents "a general recognition by Congress that the Fourth 
Amendment does mandate judicial review of proposed searches 
and seizures of oral communications by wire." Further, the 
court declared the language of section 2511(3) "completely 
neutral" with respect to the constitutional powers of the 
President.40
The government's brief argued that Keith had ruled 
improperly by refusing to conduct an in camera review of the 
surveillance transcripts. It contended that even if Keith 
believed the wiretaps illegal, "he should have determined in 
camera that they were not relevant to this case, and hence, 
not subject to disclosure." Aware of Keith's reliance upon 
the Alderman decision —  and committed to overturning it —  
the government asserted that Justice Stewart's opinion in 
Giordano indicated there is no "absolute constitutional rule 
of disclosure" binding judges to automatically disclose all 
such surveillance.
The circuit court disputed the government's 
interpretation of Stewart's opinion, asserting that the "full 
text" of it actually supported Alderman. It also claimed 
that, having examined the sealed exhibit, "we cannot (and we 
do not believe the District Judge could) ascertain with any 
certainty whether or not the government had derived 
prosecutorial benefits from this illegal search." Edwards 
therefore concluded that a defendant is entitled to any and
40Ibid. , 16-22.
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all personal conversations illegally seized by the 
government, "without regard to whether a judge on inspection 
in camera might or might not be able to find relevancy."41
In its "Holding," the court returned to the Fourth 
Amendment:
The government has not pointed to, and we do not 
find, one written phrase in the Constitution which 
exempts the President, the Attorney General, or 
federal law enforcement from the restrictions of 
the Fourth Amendment in the case at hand... That 
which has distinguished the United States of 
America in the history of the world has been its 
constitutional protection of individual liberty. 
Beyond doubt the First Amendment is the 
cornerstone of American freedom. The Fourth 
Amendment stands as guardian of the First.
The circuit court's decision concluded that the Executive
Branch "is subject to the limitations of the Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution when undertaking searches and seizures
for oral communications by wire." It refused to rule on
several related issues, such as what measures the President,
as Commander-in-Chief, can and cannot take to protect
internal security, and whether Mitchell could have acquired
a warrant prior to initiating the Black Panther wiretaps
which intercepted Plamondon's conversations.42
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Weick charged that 
Keith had made an "erroneous" interpretation of the Alderman 
decision. Weick agreed with several of the government's 
positions concerning Giordano and Taolianetti. particularly
41 Ibid. , 28-31.
42Ibid. , 27-32.
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a passage in the latter case which held that nothing in 
Alderman "requires full disclosure for resolution of every 
issue raised by an electronic surveillance." He added that 
by ordering an evidentiary hearing at the conclusion of the 
trial, Keith intimated he knew the logs contained "no useful 
information relative to the conspiracy or bombing." 
Therefore, Weick argued, Keith should not have ordered 
disclosure.43
Addressing the "inherent right" issue, Weick agreed with 
the government's contention that section 2511(3) of Title III 
"constitutes clear congressional recognition of the 
President's power to order electronic surveillance in 
national security cases." He also regarded as
"inappropriate" the Youngstown case, asserting that "the 
protection of the government against attacks designed to 
overthrow it by force and violence involves an entirely 
different matter."44
Weick's dissent most fervently took issue with Keith
over the issue of social disorder in American society and the
right of the Executive to act in the defense of national
security. His statements regarding the threats posed by
"domestic subversives" mirrored those of Mitchell's:
At a time when our soldiers are fighting on 
foreign soil and there is turbulence at home, 
thereby confronting the President on two fronts,
43Ibid., 37-39.
‘“ibid. . 46-47.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
475
with many serious, perplexing and complex 
problems, there rests on his shoulders a heavy 
responsibility to protect, not only the fighting 
men abroad, but also the people at home, from 
destruction of their Government by domestic 
subversives...The risk of injury to the Government 
is just as great whether the attacks are from 
within or without...Attacks by domestic 
subversives and saboteurs may be even more 
dangerous than those of foreign sources.
Weick also agreed with the government's contention that
neither Congress nor the Judiciary "have the facilities to
cope with the destruction of public buildings by saboteurs."
Most surprising of all, Weick was prepared to cede the
Judiciary's constitutionally-established supervisory power
over the Executive in domestic, as well as foreign "national
security" areas, in the interest of social stability:
When the Chief Executive deems it necessary to 
gather intelligence for this purpose he ought not 
to be required first to make detailed explanations 
of classified information to a magistrate and 
secure his consent as a condition precedent to the 
exercise of his constitutional powers.
Responding directly to Keith's statement regarding the
"established and contented members of our society," Weick
avowed that although citizens may be "required to tolerate
peaceful dissent," they are nonetheless "not required to
tolerate, much less understand, plots of discontented members
to overthrow the Government by force." He also took issue
with Keith's position that the government cannot act against
suspected revolutionaries until they cross-over from mere
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advocacy to the commission of illegal acts, charging: "It is 
too late to act after there has been a fait accompli."45
The manner in which the majority decision addressed
social disorder and the government's powers to act in
response to it displayed a mind-set fundamentally at odds
with Weick's conservative philosophy. Echoing Keith,
Edwards' decision attested that "It is the historic role of
the Judiciary to see that in periods of crisis, when the
challenge to constitutional freedoms is the greatest, the
Constitution of the United States remains the supreme law of
the land." Edwards also suspected that under the guise of
"national security," the Nixon Administration was attempting
to exploit the public's fears of crime and lawlessness, for
its own political benefit:
The argument for unrestricted employment of 
Presidential power to wiretap is basically an 
argument in terrorem [emphasis in original]. It 
suggests that constitutional government is too 
weak to survive in a difficult world and urges
worried judges and worried citizens to return to
acceptance of the security of 'sovereign' power.
Edwards added a prophetic quote from Benjamin Franklin: "They
that give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary
safety deserve neither liberty nor safety."46
The Court of Appeals' decision opposing the Mitchell 
Doctrine laid the groundwork for a government appeal to the 
Supreme Court, via a petition for a writ of certiorari. Few
45Ibid. , 43-47.
46Ibid. . 23-25.
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doubted that the Nixon Administration would hesitate over so 
important an issue. On April 27 the Justice Department 
requested a "stay of mandate" until May 29, so that it could 
prepare its appeal, and Edwards granted the stay on May 10. 
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case on June 21.
III.
We are earnestly asked to believe that the awesome 
power sought for the Attorney General will be used 
with discretion. Obviously, even in very recent 
days....this has not always been the case.
—  Judge George C. Edwards47
One of the principal factors contributing to Edwards' 
rejection of the Mitchell Doctrine is revealed in his 
reference to "in very recent days." Throughout 1971, and 
continuing through the Supreme Court's June, 1972, decision 
in U.S. v. U.S. District Court, a powerful debate took place 
in American society, concerning the proper role, purpose, and 
scope of domestic surveillance by government and law 
enforcement officials. The Mitchell Doctrine influenced this 
debate, becoming a focus both for "law and order" advocates, 
such as the Justice Department and FBI, and an increasing 
number of Americans who were opposed to such surveillance. 
In time, this domestic surveillance debate also influenced 
the Judiciary, as Judge Edwards' statement demonstrates.
47Ibid. , 25.
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The Nixon Administration stood little chance of 
acquiring judicial sanction for the Mitchell Doctrine unless 
public fear of crime and "domestic subversion" was stronger 
than its fear of government and law enforcement surveillance. 
Throughout 1971, however, many social observers recognized a 
dramatic easing of tensions in American society, particularly 
on college campuses. In February, the New York Times 
reported that less than ten percent of college students gave 
favorable ratings to either the Black Panthers or SDS.48 By 
fall, the national media was regularly reporting that the 
"youth rebellion" of the sixties was coming to a close, 
explained by the passage of the 26th Amendment (eighteen 
year-old vote), a worsening economy, and an overall 
moderation in the student movement.49 Yet the passions of 
the sixties did not disappear overnight.50 Although fewer 
large confrontations took place, smaller incidents of 
political violence continued unabated, as the tensions which 
had been centered in urban areas and on college campuses 
during the sixties were disseminated into the larger society. 
Newer modes of radical political expression, such as prison 
uprisings (e.g., Attica State), ambushes of police, and
48New York Times. February 7, 1971, 54.
49New York Times. October 24, 1971, 1.
50Todd Gitlin, in The Sixties (page 417], states that 
after 1970, "There was a long sputtering," as "the anti-war 
initiative passed into new hands."
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"terrorist bombings," also continued to make headlines.51 
On July 13th, the New York Times reported a relatively minor 
incident, which nonetheless symbolized the thousands of 
similar ideological clashes taking place across America. A 
New Jersey Appellate Court ruled that State Police did not 
have the right to stop and search a car, simply because its 
driver and/or occupants had long hair.52
After several months of quietly remaining "underground, " 
the Weathermen surfaced on March 1, claiming responsibility 
for setting off a small bomb in a Senate bathroom, located in 
the Capitol building complex. They considered the bombing 
retaliation for the Nixon Administration's recent decision to 
expand the war into the formerly neutral country of Laos. 
There were no injuries in the blast, which went off at 1:32 
a.m. The Administration's response was immediate and harsh: 
Justice Department attorneys from Robert Mardian's Internal 
Security Division, led by firebrand Guy M. Goodwin, fanned 
out across the country, establishing federal grand juries to
5lNew York Times. September 21, 1971, 1. One additional 
interesting statistic: a survey released in early September 
revealed that over 50 percent of American men believed that 
the police should "shoot, but not to kill, in controlling 
'hoodlums, student protests and ghetto riots'." New York 
Times. September 6, 1971, 23.
52New York Times. July 13, 1971, 29. The New Jersey
State Trooper testified "It was a combination of the 
appearance of the defendants and the otherwise unobtrusive 
[aspirin] bottle that led....[me] to believe a violation of 
the law might be occurring."
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investigate the incident, as part of an overall dragnet-style 
hunt for the elusive Weather underground.
Goodwin's specialty involved utilizing a new "use 
immunity" law, part of the Omnibus Crime Act of 1970, which 
limited a grand jury witness's immunity from self- 
incrimination. Frank Donner asserts that, as an intelligence 
gathering instrument, the new grand jury system effectively 
terrorized the entire Movement, through the use of "subpoena 
power, the power to compel testimony and the production of 
documents on pain of contempt."53
However, grand juries were only one of a wide variety of 
tactics utilized by the Administration against the Movement 
during 1971. When tens of thousands of anti-war and 
counterculture protestors converged on the nation's capital 
in late April and early May, as part of the planned "May Day" 
demonstration, the Justice Department responded by arresting 
13,500, jamming them together in a makeshift "stockade" at 
Kennedy stadium. Newly-arrived White House aide John Dean 
was assigned to assist with the coordination of the White 
House's response. He recalls that a "war room" was set up in 
the basement of the White House, where commanders Haldeman 
and Kleindienst received minute-by-minute "situation 
reports," gave orders to the police, National Guard, and Army
53Donner estimates that over 100 grand juries were 
empaneled in eighty-four cities in thirty-six states between 
1970 and 1973, and that the "conviction and plea rate" was 
never higher than 15 percent. See The Ace of Surveillance. 
354-56.
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personnel deployed against the demonstrators, and reported to 
Nixon every half-hour.54 According to Haldeman, Nixon 
became obsessed with the approaching demonstration during 
late April, coming up with slogans to be sent out to the 
various "troops" in the field for motivation.55
The domestic incident which most upset the Nixon 
Administration during 1971 was the release and subsequent 
publication of the "Pentagon Papers," a mammoth Defense 
Department study of U.S. involvement in Indochina since World 
War II.56 The person responsible for this "leak" of 
classified documents was Daniel Ellsberg, a former employee 
of the Rand Corporation. Acquiring and duplicating a copy of 
the 7000-plus page Rand study, which had been entrusted to 
him as a contributor and courier, Ellsberg gave it to the New 
York Times for editing and eventual publication. The first 
installment, on June 13, 1971, shocked the entire U.S.
defense and foreign relations establishment. Within a week, 
Attorney General Mitchell issued a restraining order against 
the Times, essentially challenging the newspaper's First 
Amendment right to publish, on the grounds that further 
revelations would damage "national security." The Washington 
Post and Los Angeles Times simultaneously published portions
^Dean, Blind Ambition. 28-29; see also Lukas, Nightmare.
9-11.
55Haldeman, Diaries, 281-83.
56Ungar, The Papers & The Papers. 13.
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of the papers as well, prompting other Justice Department 
orders. By all accounts, the person within the
Administration who was the most upset over the incident was 
Kissinger, who believed publication of the highly sensitive 
material would undermine his negotiation stances with both 
North Vietnam and China; some of his anger was undoubtedly 
due to having known and trusted Ellsberg.57
In its response to the Pentagon Papers crisis, the Nixon 
Administration increased its willingness to utilize 
questionable legal tactics. Objective number one, stopping 
further publication, led the Justice Department to coordinate 
a reckless legal challenge against the New York Times, which 
it lost by a six-to-three vote in the Supreme Court on June 
30.58 Unable to prevent publication, the Administration 
shifted its focus to discrediting Ellsberg. A variety of 
tactics were used, including "leaking" false and derogatory 
information to the media, ordering a break-in of the office 
of Ellsberg's psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding, and plotting 
to steal documents from the Brookings Institution in 
Washington, D.C. In addition, the Administration's obsession 
with damaging Ellsberg led to the creation of the infamous
57During the peak of the crisis, Kissinger said of 
Ellsberg "[he is] the most dangerous man in America.... who 
must be stopped at all costs." Quoted in Ambrose, Nixon, 
(vol. 2), 447.
580ne little-known fact concerning the legal case against 
the New York Times is that the newspaper's owners were 
prepared to go forward with publication, regardless of the 
Supreme Court's decision.
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"Plumbers": a clandestine "special projects" team of former 
CIA and FBI officials, funded through an illegal "slush fund" 
of unused Nixon campaign monies, which specialized in all 
types of espionage and political "dirty tricks."59
Against the advice of Solicitor General Erwin Griswold, 
Mitchell initiated criminal charges against Ellsberg during 
the summer. The Administration also sought information and 
warrantless wiretaps against Ellsberg and his known 
associates from a reluctant Hoover, who recognized the 
political nature of the requests. The ensuing confrontation 
had long-lasting consequences, as Nixon and his aides 
increasingly spoke of the need to retire Hoover. The 
Administration courted Assistant FBI Director William 
Sullivan, a close associate of Assistant Attorney General 
Mardian, who was eager to be of assistance to Nixon because 
he hoped to be named Hoover's successor.
Large conspiracy trials continued to dominate the 
headlines throughout 1971, as the Justice Department engaged 
in far-flung prosecutions of Black Power and anti-war 
movement organizations and groups. On May 13th, a jury in 
New York City acquitted all of the so-called "[Black] Panther 
13," who had been charged with conspiring to bomb a number of 
urban targets. The trial lasted eight months and cost over 
$750,000. Meanwhile, in New Haven, Connecticut, a highly-
59Haldeman, Diaries. 299-303; Lukas, Nightmare. 71-77; 
Dean, Blind Ambition. 44-47; Kutler, The Wars of Watergate. 
110-11; and Ambrose, Nixon, (vol. 2), 446-50.
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publicized murder trial involving Black Panther leaders Bobby 
Seale and John Huggins ended on May 25 in a mistrial, as the 
"deadlocked" jury proved unable to reach a verdict. By the 
end of the year, the third trial of Huey Newton, in 
connection with a 1967 Oakland, California shooting incident 
(in which a police officer was killed), also ended in a 
mistrial. Other Black Panther trials took place in cities 
across the country.60 Facing the largest and most 
coordinated COINTELPRO attacks from the FBI and a variety of 
other intelligence agencies, the Party's internal structure 
was approaching collapse.61
The best-known conspiracy trial of 1971 involved the so- 
called "East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives" (ECCSL) , a small 
group of activist Catholic priests and supporters, led by 
brothers Philip and Daniel Berrigan. On January 12th the 
Berrigans and four other ECCSL members were charged with 
plotting to kidnap Henry Kissinger, as well as with 
conspiring to blow up the heating system of the Federal 
buildings in Washington, D.C. Hoover himself had instituted
^New York Times. May 14, 1971, 1; May 25, 1971, 1;
December 14, 1971, 44.
6I0'Reilly, Racial Matters. 293-324. The breakdown in 
Party structure is also described in David Hilliard and Lewis 
Cole, This Side of Glorv: An Autobiography of David Hilliard 
and the Storv of the Black Panther Party. (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1993), 295-332.
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the charges the previous November, accusing the Berrigans of 
being Communist sympathizers.62
The trial came to symbolize the ongoing struggle between 
the anti-war movement and the conservative establishment in 
America. The Justice Department dedicated dozens of agents 
and officials to aid Guy Goodwin and the Internal Security 
Division in their grand jury investigation, centered in 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. In late April, a second round of 
indictments were handed down, creating the so-called 
"Harrisburg Eight." Media attention increased when former 
Attorney General Ramsey Clark offered his services to the 
defense. In the end, the government was unable to prove 
conspiracy, beyond the mere exchange of letters between Rev. 
Philip Berrigan and Sister E. McAlister, in which she 
allegedly raised the idea to "kidnap someone like 
Kissinger. "63
The Nixon Administration's audacity in its "law and 
order" offensive also extended into the area of electronic 
surveillance. After reinstituting the Mitchell Doctrine in 
Ferguson and Keith's courtrooms in January, the Justice
62Some of the tactics utilized by the ECCSL included 
raiding draft board offices and destroying conscription 
records (pouring red paint on them to simulate the blood on 
the government's hands in Vietnam). At the time of the 
federal indictment, both Berrigans were already in prison, 
serving sentences for destroying draft records.
63Donner, Age of Surveillance. 381-82; New York Times. 
January 13, 1971, 1; February 21, 1971, 1; March 9, 1971, 1; 
May 1, 1971, 1.
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Department initiated a public relations campaign designed to 
generate support for its "inherent right" thesis concerning 
"national security" wiretapping of domestic radicals. Within 
a week of the government's oral argument before the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in the Keith case (February 15) , 
Assistant Attorney General Kleindienst delivered the first 
public statement in support of the Mitchell Doctrine since 
the Justice Department had backed away from the initiative in 
July, 1969. Responding to reporters' questions, Kleindienst 
reiterated one of the government's principal arguments in its 
Keith brief:
It would be silly to say that an American citizen, 
because he is an American, could subvert the 
Government by actions of violence and revolution 
and be immune from, first, identification, and 
second, prosecution...the whole question of 
internal security is not a divisible subject 
matter...You can't divide subversion into two 
parts —  domestic and foreign.
Kleindienst added "I don't think we're going to lose...We're
dealing with a direct constitutional power vested in the
President of the United States." The overall importance of
the issue was not overlooked by the UPI reporter, who stated
that because the government was now faced with conflicting
positions on the issue from federal judges, "the case will
ultimately reach the Supreme Court."64
MNew York Times. February 22, 1971, 34; Washington Post. 
February 22, 1971, A-3; New York Daily News. February 22, 
1971, 4; (Washington, D.C.) Evening Star. February 22, 1971, 
A-12.
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Kleindienst followed with a letter to the Washington 
Post, providing an overview of Presidential directives 
relating to "national security" wiretapping, dating back to 
Roosevelt's 1940 memorandum. The letter also stated that the 
concept of a national security exception to the warrant 
requirement in wiretapping cases "did not spring like Minerva 
from the head of John Mitchell." Kleindienst then quoted 
Justice Charles Evans Hughes's statement that civil liberties 
require the existence of "an organized society maintaining 
public order without which liberty itself would be lost." In 
response, the Post recited the Youngstown decision and 
stated:
The Fourth Amendment does not impose impossible 
restraints upon the President. It requires no 
more than that he obtain, in advance....a court 
order or warrant....[from] an impartial judicial 
officer...Neither Mr. Mitchell nor Mr. Kleindienst 
has explained why the obtaining of such a court 
order seems to them an unbearable burden.65
The debate intensified in March, as a result of comments 
made by Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist before 
Senator Sam Ervin's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. 
In two days of testimony, Rehnquist asserted that the Justice 
Department had the "inherent constitutional power" to 
initiate surveillance of any American, including U.S. 
Senators, and warned that the government "will vigorously 
oppose any legislation" that would limit its surveillance 
powers by imposing "unnecessary and unmanageable judicial
65Quoted in Washington Post. February 24, 1971, A-19.
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supervision" over the its intelligence operations. Rehnquist 
further stated that recent revelations of "isolated 
imperfections" regarding the Army's surveillance programs 
should not be permitted "to obscure the fundamental necessity 
of Federal information gathering." Ervin, one of several 
Senators taking issue with Rehnquist, asserted "there is not 
a syllable in there [the Constitution] that gives the Federal 
Government the right to spy on civilians." Republican 
Senator Charles Mathias responded angrily to Rehnquist's 
assertion that "self-discipline on the part of the executive 
branch" would provide adequate protection against further 
abuses; Mathias replied "it is not only proper but essential" 
for Congress to act in this area.66
Following the Court of Appeals' decision in Keith. 
Mitchell entered the debate. In an address to the Kentucky 
Bar Association on April 23, he unveiled several of the 
Justice Department's newly-revised arguments in the case. 
Abandoning "inherent right," Mitchell instead focused on the 
"reasonableness" issue —  the government's contention that 
the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and 
seizures. He also stressed that the Fourth Amendment's 
protections "must be balanced against 'the right of the 
public to protect itself,' which he said was implicit in the 
Constitution." Criticizing the notion of probable cause in
“Quoted in New York Times. March 10, 1971, 1; March 18, 
1971, 19.
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long-term investigative "national security" surveillance, 
Mitchell asserted "if the Government waited until it had 
enough evidence to get a wiretap warrant in such cases [under 
Title III guidelines], it might be too late." He also 
reiterated that domestic radicals pose as great a threat to 
the nation's security as any "foreign" threats. Turning his 
attention to the recent uproar concerning governmental 
surveillance, he announced his diagnosis of "a new type of 
paranoia —  called Tappanoia.1,67
In mid-June, just ten days prior to the Supreme Court's 
granting of a writ of certiorari in the Keith case, Mitchell 
presented an even more detailed outline of the government's 
position, in a speech to the Virginia Bar Association. 
Revising his "reasonableness" argument, he stated "the 
distinction to be drawn is not whether the subjects are 
foreign or domestic, but instead whether the wiretaps are 
used for 'intelligence' or prosecution purposes." When the 
purpose behind a wiretap is strictly investigative, the 
President and "his officials," Mitchell insisted, are in a 
much better position than a federal judge to decide whether 
the installation of a listening device is reasonable. 
Commenting on the foreign/domestic dichotomy, Mitchell added
67Quoted in New York Times. April 24, 1971, 1.
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that "history has shown greater danger from the domestic 
variety.1,68
Nixon added his support for the Mitchell Doctrine in 
comments made during a press conference on May 1. He 
asserted that the number of "national security" wiretaps had 
been greater during the early sixties than at any time during 
his administration. Responding to the suggestion that 
America was becoming a repressive police state, he stated 
"I've been to police states. I know what they are. . .this 
isn't a police state and it isn't going to become one." 
Nixon added that "all of this hysteria" concerning political 
and Army surveillance "simply doesn't serve the public 
purpose. "69
By admitting openly that it was engaging in warrantless 
wiretaps of suspected "domestic terrorists," without 
providing any information as to the guidelines it used for 
determining which individuals and/or groups qualified as 
targets, the Nixon Administration was presenting its boldest 
surveillance strategy to date. However, the Administration 
displayed its audaciousness regarding electronic surveillance
“Quoted in New York Times. June 12, 1971, 12. Fred
Graham's article also pointed out that Mitchell was breaking 
with tradition by commenting on a case pending before the 
Supreme Court. "In the past," Graham stated, "when matters 
have been pending before the Supreme Court, Justice 
Department officials have avoided making statements that 
might be regarded as exerting pressure upon the justices." 
Obviously, Mitchell believed the Keith case worthy of 
breaking with tradition.
“Quoted in New York Times. May 2, 1971, 66.
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in other ways as well. On February 27, the Justice
Department announced it was discontinuing its policy of
automatically disclosing the existence of illegal wiretap
information concerning defendants in criminal cases.70 The
Attorney General also revised the rhetoric of his new
Mitchell Doctrine affidavits, at two separate Weathermen
trials. The new affidavits stated:
The wiretapping has been installed on the basis of 
a request from J. Edgar Hoover, director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 'which was
considered in conjunction with the entire range of 
foreign and domestic intelligence available to the 
executive branch of the Government.'71
Press releases throughout 1971 and 1972 announced that court-
approved Title III wiretaps were also increasing rapidly.72
70New York Times. February 27, 1971, 3; Washington Daily 
News. February 27, 1971, 2; and Washington Post. February 27, 
1971, A-2. Solicitor General Erwin Griswold issued the new 
policy statement, claiming it was necessary because of the 
"considerable administrative burden" involved in conducting 
electronic surveillance reviews. He added that the 
government would now search its records only in response to 
specific motions for disclosure of electronic surveillance, 
which, he asserted, were becoming "routine" in criminal 
cases. What made the new policy particularly puzzling is the 
well-known fact that the FBI, from the thirties forward, had 
rarely admitted the existence of warrantless wiretaps in 
criminal proceedings, even after motions for disclosure were 
filed. An excellent case in point was the FBI's "national 
security" surveillance of White Panthers' Ann Arbor chapter, 
which Mitchell knowingly hid from Judge Keith in late 1970.
71Quoted in New York Times. March 27, 1971, 43; September 
28, 1971, 42. The affidavit's reference to "foreign and
domestic intelligence," indicates that it may have been part 
of a larger Justice Department strategy to encourage judicial 
acceptance of the Mitchell Doctrine.
^New York Times. February 9, 1971, 7; May 3, 1971, 1; 
May 6, 1972, 1.
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The national media's coverage of the Administration's 
renewed Mitchell Doctrine campaign was extensive. In marked 
contrast with the previous two years' coverage, articles and 
editorials appearing in the New York Times and Washington 
Post displayed a comprehensive understanding of the key 
issues. When the Mitchell Doctrine was introduced in June of 
1969, and for months thereafter, journalists commonly equated 
"national security" wiretapping with court-approved, Title 
III surveillance. This led to the frequent mistake of taking 
the Justice Department at its word when it asserted that to 
deprive the FBI of the power to conduct "national security" 
wiretapping would prevent it from conducting any and all 
electronic surveillance (e.g. ignoring that Title III allowed 
the extensive use of court-approved wiretaps, in nearly every 
major category of crime). However, when Kleindienst 
attempted a similarly deceptive maneuver in his February, 
1971 statements —  intimating that depriving the government 
of "national security" surveillance would make domestic 
revolutionaries "immune" from both identification and 
prosecution —  veteran journalists Fred Graham and Tom Wicker 
of the New York Times and Sanford Ungar and Alan Barth of the 
Washington Post effectively refuted his statement. Their 
articles pointed out that under existing law, all the 
government had to do to secure a court-order for surveillance 
was go before a magistrate with probable cause.
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Wicker, in particular, exhibited an unusually keen
interest in (and knowledge of) the subject. His response to
Nixon's "police state" comment was a case in point:
It may well be true, as he claimed, that there are 
only half as many telephone taps today 'as there 
were in 1961, '62 and '63,' although this is an
assertion by the FBI...Nevertheless, it is the 
Nixon Administration —  unlike any before it —  
that has claimed the unchecked right to tap the 
phones of persons it suspects as subversives, 
without any form of court authority and with no 
necessity ever to admit, or to inform the target 
of the eavesdropping, even if a trial should 
result.
As for Nixon's assertion that warrantless taps would be
limited to those instances where the "national security" was
in peril, Wicker retorted:
Mr. Nixon missed the point entirely...the point is 
that if Mr. Mitchell has sufficient reason to 
consider, say, Rennie Davis or the Black Panthers 
a threat to the Government, he would have 
sufficient evidence to get a wiretap order from a 
court; if he does not have sufficient reason —  
only his own suspicions —  he has and should have 
no right to act on his own, without accountability 
to anyone.73
In his Memoirs. Nixon states that when John Dean 
revealed the existence of the Huston Plan and the 
Administration's so-called "17 wiretaps" in 1973, causing 
widespread shock and anger, the public's response was 
overblown, largely because "there was no cushion of 
preparation, no context of public awareness and acceptance" 
for such politically-motivated surveillance. He adds that if 
the public had been aware of the precedents in these areas
73New York Times. May 4, 1971, 47.
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set by previous Chief Executives, its reaction would have 
been decidedly less negative.74 The historical record does 
not support Nixon's claim. Long before Dean's admissions, 
the American public had been exposed to numerous revelations 
of Army, FBI, CIA, and law enforcement surveillance abuses 
within the United States; it was also becoming aware that 
much of this surveillance was politically motivated. One of 
the reasons why Tom Wicker and other journalists so 
thoroughly analyzed the Mitchell Doctrine was due to the fact 
that it was only part of an ongoing, and much larger "story" 
concerning improper government surveillance practices. As 
the "cult of secrecy" that had shielded U.S. intelligence 
operations since the onset of the Cold War began to crumble, 
it made for good copy.
Without question, the incidents most responsible for the 
media's initial focus on domestic surveillance abuses were 
the hearings conducted by Senator Sam Ervin's Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Rights, which revealed, among other things, 
that the U.S. Army had conducted widespread surveillance and 
intelligence gathering on the political activities of
74Quoted in Nixon, Memoirs. 871. In Nixon (vol. 2), 
historian Stephen Ambrose agrees on this point, adding [on 
page 273] that the President was hesitant to institute the 
original so-called "17 taps" (against reporters and National 
Security Council aides), because he realized that, should the 
surveillance ever be revealed in public, "it would matter 
little" that previous Presidents had conducted similar 
illegal wiretaps. This is one of several instances where 
Ambrose repeats essentially word-for-word passages from 
Nixon's Memoirs.
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thousands of Americans, over the course of three decades. 
Put on hold during the politically charged 1970 fall 
congressional term, Ervin's hearings resumed late in the 
year.
The first major "bombshell" fell on December 16 and 17, 
when Ervin disclosed that the Army's 113th Military 
Intelligence Group, based in Illinois, had spied on high- 
ranking politicians, as well as hundreds of civilians. The 
incident set off a firestorm of debate in Congress, and a 
panic in the Nixon White House.75 According to Haldeman, 
for the next two days Nixon fumed about the affair, charging 
that "the whole episode poses a major problem for us in the 
area of repression; which our enemies are trying to build up 
in that this implies we're using the Army to spy on political 
people." Characteristically, Nixon opted to strike back, as 
Haldeman relates: "He [Nixon] wants to launch an all-out
assault to make a bigger story out of our denial than the 
original story. We've got to attack the attackers on this 
one."76
Over the next several months, Ervin's subcommittee heard 
testimony from a number of former Army intelligence officers, 
who exposed "CONUS," a widespread surveillance and 
intelligence gathering operation, which focused entirely on
7iNew York Times. December 17, 1970, 1; December 18,
1970, 1.
76Quoted in Haldeman, Diaries, 221-22.
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Americans. One former officer who testified on several 
occasions was Christopher H. Pyle, a former Army Captain. In 
February, Pyle revealed that in the wake of Secretary of 
Defense Melvin R. Laird's recent directives to discontinue 
domestic surveillance, the Justice Department's Inter- 
Divisional Intelligence Unit (IDIU) "supplanted" CONUS as the 
government's "principal watchdog on political protest." 
Front-page headlines revealing the extent of Army 
surveillance continued through early March, when the 
Department of Defense formally announced a ban on most forms 
of political surveillance and intelligence gathering within 
the U.S.77 Therefore, when Rehnquist and Mardian appeared 
before Ervin's subcommittee in March, they were forced to 
defend much more than just the Mitchell Doctrine.
As the media's interest in the Ervin hearings peaked, 
the so-called "Media Papers" incident occurred, which also 
received public attention. On March 8, a group calling 
itself "The Citizen's Committee to Investigate the FBI" broke 
into the Bureau's Media, Pennsylvania, field office, removing 
a large cache of documents, which revealed for the first time 
the scope and variety of the Hoover's COINTELPRO programs. 
Within two weeks, the Washington Post published excerpts, in
^New York Times. January 3, 1971, 26; January 18, 1971,
1; February 25, 1971, 15; March 4, 1971, 22. Pyle's Military 
Surveillance of Civilian Politics, an extensive study of the 
history and expansion of CONUS during the late sixties, 
remains unparalleled as an historical source. Particularly 
useful is Pyle's analysis of the conservative, "Cold Warrior" 
mind-set which characterized nearly all of his commanders.
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bold defiance of appeals from Mitchell and Hoover. In 
addition to exposing the various COINTELPRO tactics, such as 
anonymous letters, infiltration, and electronic surveillance, 
the Media Papers provided irrefutable evidence of the 
Bureau's intense political surveillance of Movement 
groups.78
Sensing the public's growing concerns about governmental 
surveillance issues, the Democratic leadership in both houses 
of Congress initiated a sustained attack on the Nixon 
Administration and J. Edgar Hoover. On March 17 Rehnquist 
informed Ervin's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights that, 
in his opinion, the Justice Department possesses the 
constitutional power to initiate surveillance of high-ranking 
politicians. Senator Montoya, three days later, charged that 
"more than a few" members of Congress believed that their 
communications were being monitored by the Justice Department 
and/or FBI.79 On April 5, House Majority Leader Hale Boggs 
delivered a speech on the floor of Congress, demanding the
78New York Times. March 10, 1971, 7; March 24, 1971, 24; 
March 25, 1971, 1. See also Donner, Age of Surveillance. 
157-59. Throughout the spring and summer, Senator Ervin made 
several unsuccessful appeals to Mitchell, requesting FBI and 
Justice Department documents pertaining to their domestic 
surveillance practices. Surprisingly, the Media Papers 
incident disappeared from the headlines of the "straight" 
media by the end of March. However, the "underground" press 
carried the story for months. The complete collection of 
Media Papers appeared in the March, 1972 issue of WIN 
magazine, a publication of the War Resister's League (Rifton, 
NY, vol. VIII, nos. 4 and 5, March 1 and 15, 1972).
79New York Times. March 21, 1971, 60.
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resignation of Hoover, and charging that the FBI had his 
public and private telephones wiretapped.80 In response, 
the G.O.P. leadership demanded he produce proof of his 
allegations.81
Even more damaging were the allegations made by Senator 
Edmund Muskie on April 15, when he released FBI documents 
demonstrating that the Bureau had conducted widespread 
surveillance of "Earth Day" activities across the nation in 
1970. Himself a target of the surveillance report, Muskie 
stated:
If there was widespread surveillance over Earth 
Day last year, is there any political activity in 
the country which the FBI does not consider a 
legitimate subject for watching? If antipollution 
rallies are a subject of intelligence concern, is 
anything immune? Is there any citizen involved in
politics who is not a potential subject for an FBI 
dossier?
When questioned about the incident by reporters, White House 
Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler stated that the President 
considered surveillance of this variety "totally repugnant," 
and added "there is an impression that is creating a feeling 
of fear among the people that they are being spied upon."
The New York Times intimated that Ziegler "seemed to be
80New York Times. April 6, 1971, 1.
8lNew York Times. April 6, 1971, 27; see also Haldeman, 
Diaries. 267, 270.
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drawing a distinction between Administration policy on 
surveillance and F.B.I. activities.1,82
Over the following months, the Democrats continued to 
emphasize the issue. On April 25, Representative Emanuel 
Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, warned 
that the Nixon Administration's wiretapping policies might be 
heading the nation toward a "police state." The next day, 
the New York Times printed excerpts of Celler and Hale 
Boggs's recent appearance on CBS's "Face the Nation." 
Addressing the issue of the Mitchell Doctrine, Celler stated 
"Who is to be the judge of national security?...He [Mitchell] 
is to be the judge? That's not government by law, that's 
government by personality." Boggs added "Mitchell is 
obsessed with tapping wires."83 Senator Ervin soon joined 
in the Democratic chorus, charging that the Army's widespread 
surveillance of Americans was having a "chilling effect" on 
their exercise of First Amendment freedoms. He also warned 
of the dangers inherent in the government's increasing 
practice of collecting and storing masses of financial and 
political data concerning the private lives of Americans.84
Not to be outdone, Senator Edward Kennedy attacked the 
Nixon Administration's overall record on privacy and
82Quoted in New York Times. April 15, 1971, 1; April 19, 
1971, 29.
“Quoted in New York Times. April 26, 1971, 27.
MNew York Times. June 27, 1971, 14.
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constitutional issues, in an October address entitled "The 
'Burden' of the Constitution." Kennedy asserted that Nixon, 
Mitchell, Hoover, and their lieutenants "see the Constitution 
as a burden, an obstruction to be overcome[;] as a technical 
barrier to be avoided when inconvenient, evaded where 
possible, and ignored if necessary." He then outlined a list 
of examples of the Administration's heavy-handedness in its 
"law and order" offensive, including the legal injunctions 
against the press during the "Pentagon Papers" crisis, the 
mass arrests during the May Day demonstrations, and Nixon's 
attempt, through Executive Order, to re-institute the 
Subversive Activities Control Board. Kennedy issued a 
warning that "only strong, independent courts can call the 
executive to task...An appeals court said flatly that 
domestic wiretapping without court order violated the 
Constitution, and the high court has the case."85
Some found humor in the degree to which the Washington,
D.C. political environment had become overwhelmed by the
whole surveillance debate. Russell Baker's satiric New York
Times article, entitled "Third Ear Envy" was a case in point:
Since Congressman Hale Boggs accused the F.B.I. of 
tapping his telephone, it has become a mark of 
distinction in Washington to have your telephone 
tapped...If the F.B.I. is tapping big men, 
everybody who wants to be thought a big man 
desperately needs to have his phone tapped. In 
short, the only thing worse than having the F.B.I. 
tap your phone is not having the F.B.I. tap your 
phone...No one in his right mind, of course, would
85Quoted in New York Times. October 22, 1971, 39.
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openly admit any longer that his telephone is not 
being tapped.86
It is safe to assume that Nixon was not amused. 
Heightened criticism of governmental surveillance and other 
allegedly "repressive" tactics left his administration eager 
to strike back. In doing so, Nixon and Mitchell increasingly 
justified their actions with statements referring to 
"inherent executive power" and "national security." When 
Mitchell asked the Supreme Court to uphold his injunction 
preventing the New York Times from further publishing the 
"Pentagon Papers," —  and also when he requested that the 
Court grant him vastly expanded wiretapping powers —  he 
claimed that he was acting solely in the interest of 
"national security."
However, revelations of illegality exposed during the 
Watergate era, Mitchell's so-called "White House Horrors," 
demonstrated conclusively that while the Administration's 
actions might have been based in part on genuine national 
security considerations, their actions demonstrated more than 
a concern for the nation's security. Discussing the frame of 
mind which characterized the Administration during the 
Ellsberg crisis, J. Anthony Lukas states "many men in the 
White House apparently felt events closing in, as if somehow 
all the people on their 'enemies list' had joined hands to 
destroy them." Nixon's own Memoirs paint a similar portrait
86Quoted in New York Times. May 2, 1971, section IV, 15.
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of the Ellsberg crisis. Referring to the "plumbers'" break-
in of Dr. Fielding's office that September, he asserts:
It is clear that it was at least in part an 
outgrowth of my sense of urgency...Given the 
temper of those tense and bitter times and the 
peril I perceived.. .Kissinger said that we were in 
a 'revolutionary' situation...I did not care about 
any reasons or excuses...I wanted the full 
resources of the Government brought to bear. If 
the FBI was not going to pursue the case, then we 
would have to do it ourselves...Ellsberg[ 's] views 
had to be discredited.. .We were going into an 
election year, and I wanted ammunition against the 
antiwar critics.87
This admission supports Lukas' contention that although Nixon
and Mitchell claimed to be acting out of a concern for
national security, "they felt another kind of security was at
stake too —  Nixon's political security."88
By the spring of 1971, the Administration had embarked 
upon a path of lawbreaking for political purposes that 
continued through Nixon's resignation in August of 1974. The 
pattern was forged shortly after Nixon's inauguration, when 
a series of seventeen secret (warrantless) wiretaps was 
instituted against journalists and members of the National 
Security Council, State Department, and White House staffs. 
The surveillance was intended to root out the source of 
"leaks" concerning the Administration's foreign policy 
strategies. However, some of the wiretaps were clearly 
utilized for political purposes. One notable example
87Quoted in Nixon, Memoirs. 513-14.
88Lukas, Nightmare. 11.
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involved the surveillance of NSC staff members Morton 
Halperin and Anthony Lake. The FBI installed wiretaps on 
them during 1969, when they were with the NSC. However, the 
taps were left on for nearly a year after they left the NSC, 
to become foreign policy advisors for Edmund Muskie.89 The 
wiretapping program ended on February 10, 1971, when the
transcripts and summaries were placed in Assistant FBI 
Director William Sullivan's safe.90 By this time, however, 
wiretapping had become institutionalized in the Nixon White 
House. During the spring of 1971 the infamous White House 
taping system was installed.91
89Ibid. . 58-60. FBI documents uncovered by Athan
Theoharis demonstrate that on several occasions, Hoover 
utilized the Halperin/Lake wiretaps as a source of political 
intelligence on the Muskie campaign; Hoover then provided the 
information to Nixon. See Theoharis and Cox, The Boss. 415.
^At the height of the Ellsberg crisis in early July, 
Sullivan removed the transcripts from his FBI office and 
delivered them to Nixon aide John Ehrlichman (an act which 
probably lost him his job) . He did so because of the growing 
feud between the Administration and Hoover, over who had 
authorized the original seventeen wiretaps. The Nixon 
Administration was also angered by Hoover's refusal to pursue 
with vigor its proposed wiretaps and break-ins targeting 
Daniel Ellsberg. Hoover saw the writing on the wall as early 
as mid-April; Haldeman's Diaries entry for April 13 (page 
272) state that Mitchell telephoned the White House to report 
that Hoover was circulating memoranda among the top FBI 
officials, intimating that the Bureau had conducted some 
secret wiretaps at the specific request of the President. 
Nixon's inability to force Hoover's retirement may have been 
due to the Director's intimate knowledge of the 17 wiretaps. 
See Kutler, The Wars of Watergate. 116-121.
91Nixon states that he made the decision to install the 
taping system after speaking with Lyndon Johnson, who claimed 
his tapes were proving invaluable in the writing of his 
memoirs. Unlike Johnson's system, which was switched on
(continued...)
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Another type of political lawbreaking committed by the 
Administration involved the so-called "dirty tricks" campaign 
against selected targets, usually leading Democrats. The 
White House official most often utilized for this service was 
Charles Colson, a special counsel who had risen rapidly in 
the staff ranks, to become one of Nixon's most favored 
strategists. Colson's specialty involved compiling lists of 
the Administration's political enemies, and devising creative 
ways to inflict damage upon them. His prime targets were 
Senators Kennedy, Muskie, and McGovern, as well as 
journalists Daniel Schorr and Jack Anderson. However, 
Colson's "enemies list" eventually grew to include liberal 
politicians, radical groups, and even Hollywood celebrities. 
The tactic most often utilized by Colson and his staff was 
"controlled" leaks of derogatory information concerning 
targeted individuals and/or groups. An extensive list of 
"friendly" contacts in the national media were called upon to 
disseminate the information. Haldeman referred to Colson and 
his staff as "the nutcutters...[who specialized in] forcing 
our news....in a brutal vicious attack on the opposition."92
91 (... continued)
manually, Nixon's worked automatically, recording all 
incoming and outgoing communications. Many White House 
offices were also bugged. See Nixon, Memoirs. 501-2.
^Haldeman, Diaries. 443; Lukas, Nightmare. 11-18, 43-55; 
Kutler, The Wars of Watergate. 116-25. Jack Anderson claims 
to have evidence that Colson actually concocted a plan to 
have him murdered, but that Mitchell vetoed the plan.
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(Figure 5-2)
Rainbow People's Party, Summer 1971
Source: Leni Sinclair Personal Photography Archives
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IV.
A source has advised that, in terms of radical and 
violent activity to meet its goal, the White 
Panther Party should be rated 2nd only to the 
Weathermen and to the Black Panther Party.
—  Michigan State Police Report, February, 197193
The Government... .should have been paving us for 
what we were doing. —  John Sinclair, July, 197194
The convoluted history of the origins and evolution of 
the Mitchell Doctrine contains many ironies. One, however, 
is particularly ironic: a principal argument utilized in the 
Nixon Justice Department's Keith brief was that "domestic 
subversive" organizations posed as great a threat to the 
nation's security as do "foreign" groups. Yet by mid-1971, 
as the Keith case moved to the Supreme Court, the 
organization the Administration selected as exemplifying this 
domestic threat —  the Michigan White Panthers —  had changed 
its name to the "Rainbow People's Party," significantly 
moderated its position, and committed itself to working for 
political change "within the system."
"Things aren't very Woodstocky out here" David Sinclair 
told his brother during a prison visit in February of 1971.
93Michigan State Police, Special Investigation Unit, 
"Confidential Report" on the White Panthers, [date illegible, 
probably early February, 1971], John and Leni Sinclair Red 
Squad Files.
^Quoted in Sinclair, Guitar Armv. 349 [emphasis in 
original].
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The White Panther Chief of Staff was referring to the 
darkening mood which prevailed in the Movement as a whole, 
since the "aura" surrounding the huge Woodstock youth 
festival of August, 1969 had long since faded. As recently 
as the fall of 1970, Sinclair and other White Panthers had 
debated changing the organization's name to the "Woodstock 
People's Party," which Sinclair hoped would place the group 
in the vanguard of an emerging youth culture revolution. By 
the spring of the following year, the White Panthers were 
still debating changing names, but Woodstock no longer 
sounded appealing. Infighting during the Winter of 1970-1971 
had been the worst in the WPP's history. The organization's 
top leadership remained in jail awaiting a trial that was 
being held up indefinitely.95 Lacking leadership, the 
remaining members often quarrelled over the rent and 
telephone bills, which remained perennially in arrears. The
95The White Panther leadership was scattered in prisons 
across the country. Sinclair rotated between Jackson State 
Penitentiary and Wayne County Jail. Plamondon spent fifteen 
months in various county jails in Michigan prior to pleading 
guilty to possession of a bogus Selective Service card. He 
was then sentenced to twenty-eight months in the Federal 
Correctional Institution in Terre Haute, Indiana. Forrest 
received a one-to-three year sentence for harboring a 
fugitive, which he served at the Federal Correctional 
Institution in El Reno, Oklahoma. For the same offense, 
Taube received one-to-five years, and served time at Terre 
Haute, Indiana, Sandstone, Minnesota, and Milan, Michigan.
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Ann Arbor chapter, the so-called National Headquarters, all 
but lost contact with other chapters across the country.96
Writing from his prison cell in Wayne County Jail in
late February, Chairman John summarized the organization's
plight and offered his insight into the "wrong turns" he had
taken since the creation of the White Panther Party.97 He
began with a candid admission about the Black Panthers, the
organization that had once had a tremendous influence on him
and the other White Panthers:
In the past, because of our name, we were 
identified (and identified ourselves of course) 
primarily with the Black Panther Party, even 
though we received little or no positive 
recognition from the BPP. In fact, I would have 
to say that that particular aspect of our approach 
has been an almost total failure: the BPP never 
really gave us any recognition, and the other 
black organizations who were antagonistic toward 
the BPP gave us no consideration at all due to our 
name...I think we all recognize this fact in our 
eagerness to get rid of the name 'White Panther 
Party.'
Sinclair then offered his support for Pun and Genie 
Plamondons' suggestion that the group adopt the name "Rainbow 
People's Party." "Rainbow" suggested a multi-cultural focus,
^A discussion of the inter-group rivalries and 
personality clashes within the Rainbow People's ranks during 
1971 is contained in an unpublished paper by former Wayne 
State University history graduate student Robert Buchta. 
Entitled "The Rise and Fall of the White Panthers, 1968- 
1971," Buchta's study utilizes numerous correspondence and 
other primary sources from the voluminous "John and Leni 
Sinclair Collection" (Bentley Historical Library, University 
of Michigan).
^Sinclair had been transferred from Marquette to Wayne 
County Jail at the start of the new year, because of his 
attempts to organize prisoners.
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which, he hoped, would appeal not only to young, white 
counterculture types, but also to the widest possible variety 
of Movement groups. He added "Woodstock is terribly limited 
as an effective image around which to carry out work and 
organize our people into a revolutionary force."98
The name change was "officially" announced in the May 1,
1971 issue of the new Ann Arbor Sun, which stated:
The White Panther Party has been dissolved...We 
changed our name to the Rainbow People's Party 
because we feel that it's a lot more expressive of 
what we really are and what we want to be than 
'White Panther Party' could ever be...we realized 
we weren't really 'white panthers'....we're 
freeks. Rainbow People, rock and roll maniacs who 
want to create a whole new way of life....and the 
way we'll do it isn't by spouting a lot of slogans 
and trying to be 'more revolutionary' than anybody 
else, but by getting down with our own people and 
working with you to build up an alternative social 
order.
The communique attested that the new organization's focus 
would be local organizing in Ann Arbor, as opposed to 
"setting up 'chapters' all over the country without carrying 
out any actual community programs."99
98Sinclair, "To the Central Committee," unpublished 
series of typed letters, February 26-28, 1971, JLSC/BHL, box 
17, folder 21, "WPP Ideology" [hereafter: "Sinclair 1971
Central Committee Report"]. The "Rainbow" symbol had become 
increasingly popular in the Movement during 1970 and 1971, 
even appearing on communiques from the Weather Underground. 
The Rev. Jesse Jackson's "Rainbow Coalition" was just one of 
several organizations that adopted this symbolism during the 
early seventies.
"Quoted in Guitar Army. 325-26 [emphasis in original]. 
The message was signed by the entire "Central Committee," 
instead of just Sinclair and/or Plamondon. The Committee 
included: John and Leni Sinclair, Pun and Genie Plamondon,
(continued...)
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Despite the appearance of unity in the Rainbow 
statement, a fundamental debate remained unresolved. While 
the majority of the Central Committee wished to give up on 
national organizing altogether, so that they could focus all 
of the organization's energies on local programs, Sinclair 
was unwilling to abandon the national focus. Sinclair argued 
that the group was "already recognized [nationally], even if 
we don't want to be," and advocated that the "principal 
secondary task" be "the laying of the groundwork for the 
national Movement." He complained of the organization's lack 
of a person capable of "pushing our images and symbols" to 
the national Movement, as he had done so effectively in 
1968.100
Sinclair's desire for the Rainbow People to retain the 
national focus which had characterized the White Panthers 
stemmed from a number of factors, undoubtedly including pride 
and ego. Throughout 1971, he worked on the manuscript for 
Guitar Army, a detailed chronicle of the organization's 
history, in which Random House had expressed strong interest. 
He also continued to believe that the Rainbow People were 
uniquely qualified to provide leadership to the nation's 
fragmented and quarrelling anti-war, New Left, and 
counterculture movements. However, Sinclair was correct in
99(.. .continued)
Gary Grimshaw, Frank Bach, Peggy Taube, David Fenton, and 
David Sinclair.
‘“Sinclair 1971 Central Committee Report.
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his assessment that the White Panthers were already well 
known, thanks to the "Free John" and "CIA Conspiracy" 
initiatives. National attention over Sinclair's
imprisonment, as well as the CIA conspiracy indictment, 
required a more concerted national effort. His appeal of the 
ten-year marijuana sentence had been rejected 3-0 by the 
Michigan State Court of Appeals in mid-February, but 
Sinclair's attorney, Justin Ravitz, appealed to the State 
Supreme Court, and was granted a writ of certiorari.101 In 
addition, the Michigan State Legislature began debating 
legislation that would reclassify marijuana from a "narcotic" 
to a "controlled substance," which would lower the penalty 
for possession of small amounts from a felony to a 
misdemeanor.102
The "Free John" movement continued to grow, both as a 
national symbol for the movement to decriminalize marijuana 
laws and as a local fund-raising effort for the Rainbow 
People. With its more moderate name and focus, the Rainbow 
People attracted a number of friends and supporters in the 
emerging rock business, so-called "hip capitalists." 
Responding to pressure from the Movement, many rock
101 (Washington, D.C.) Evening Star. February 18, 1971, A-
2.
‘“Sinclair, "Musical Memoirs," 1-2, unpublished 1991 
article, solicited for inclusion in the program guide for 
"Beatle-Con 1991," a conference focusing on the music and 
historical/cultural significance of the Beatles, held in 
Plymouth, Michigan, Summer 1991.
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performers and promoters began playing benefit concerts for 
political "causes." "Free John" benefits attracted several 
of the better known Michigan acts, such as Mitch Ryder and 
Bob Seger, as well as a few nationally-known performers, 
including Commander Cody and his Lost Planet Airmen, Dr. 
John, and Ted Nugent and the Amboy Dukes. Celebrities and 
pseudo-celebrities such as Jane Fonda, Donald Sutherland, 
Allen Ginsberg, and William Kunstler commonly spoke at 
rallies in support of the imprisoned Rainbow People leaders.
Through the experience of organizing larger and larger 
rallies and benefits, the Rainbow People refined their 
organizational skills. Security was provided by the 
"Psychedelic Rangers," consisting of the group's membership, 
who patrolled the events and took care of problems such as 
stage security, drug overdoses, and fist fights. Event 
coordination and logistics were increasingly handled "in 
house" as well, with assistance from local "hip capitalists," 
such as Peter Andrews.103
The greatest challenge to the Rainbow Peoples' 
organizational skills came during November and December of 
1971, when they planned their largest event to date: the John 
Sinclair Freedom Rally. Scheduled for December 10 at the
103Andrews had known Sinclair since the mid-sixties, 
through his management of the local rock act "SRC." The MC-5 
and SRC had played many events together prior to Sinclair's 
imprisonment in July of 1969. By 1971, Andrews had become 
the "official" in-house promoter for the University of 
Michigan. See Ibid.. 3-4.
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University of Michigan's 14,000-seat Crisler arena, the event 
was intended to raise public awareness of the "Free John" 
movement, as well as to raise badly needed legal defense 
funds. The Rainbow People hoped also to "put irrepressible 
pressure on the legislature to pass the new drug bill before 
its 1971 session... .recessed for the holidays."104
Before the first week of December, the Rainbow People 
had been only marginally successful in lining up talent. 
With the inclusion of Jerry Rubin and Ed Sanders (Yippie 
founders) , Bobby Seale (Black Panthers founder), Rennie Davis 
and David Dellinger (MOBE founders) and radical priest Father 
James Groppi, the bill looked more like a replay of Chicago 
'68 than a rock event. The only musical acts signed up in 
early December were Commander Cody, Archie Shepp & Roswell 
Rudd, Detroit's Contemporary Jazz Quintet, Phil Ochs, The UP 
(RPP band), and David Peel & the Lower East Side. Promoter 
Peter Andrews worried that the event would be a flop.
At the last moment, Jerry Rubin convinced his new friend 
John Lennon to appear (with wife Yoko Ono). Everything 
changed overnight. In a matter of hours following the 
announcement, all 14,000 tickets sold out, at $3.00 apiece. 
It would be Lennon's first public appearance in the United 
States since the Beatles final "live" performance at San
‘“Ibid., 2.
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Francisco's Candlestick Park in 1966. Soon thereafter, 
Stevie Wonder and Bob Seger signed on.105
The Rally made international headlines, as a unique 
combination of music and activist politics —  the same 
combination that Sinclair had dedicated his adult life to, 
and which, he believed, had simply not occurred at Woodstock. 
The evening's highlights included two songs from Stevie 
Wonder and Lennon's three-song set, which featured his most 
explicitly political writing to date. He opened with a song 
entitled "John Sinclair," which had been inspired by Ed 
Sander's poem "The Entrapment of John Sinclair." The song's 
lyrics focused on Sinclair's marijuana conviction:
It ain't fair, John Sinclair.
In the stir for breathing air.
Won't you care for John Sinclair?
In the stir for breathing air.
Let him be, set him free.
Let him be like you and me.
They gave him ten for two.
What else can Judge Columbo do?
Gotta, gotta, gotta, gotta, gotta, gotta,
gotta, gotta, gotta, gotta, gotta, gotta,
gotta, gotta, set him free.
,0SIbid., 3-4, 10-11. The John Sinclair Freedom Rally
was recorded for posterity by Lennon's film crew, which 
included award-winning Director Steve Gebhardt, who had 
directed the break-through "live" performance "Ladies and 
Gentlemen, the Rolling Stones" during the mid-sixties. The 
film created as a result of the Sinclair Rally has an unusual 
history. Ten for Two was pulled from theaters only days 
after its national release in 1972. No reason was ever given 
by the Lennons. Gebhardt believes the Justice Department's 
deportation hearings against Lennon, ostensibly due to a 
prior marijuana conviction, led Yoko to pressure John into 
discontinuing overt "political" activities. It remains one 
of the few Lennon performances never released by Ms. Ono.
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Jerry Rubin told the crowd that the event was only the first 
of many, to unite music and revolutionary politics in a 
cross-country tour ending up at the Republican National 
Convention in San Diego.106
Sinclair was released from prison on a $2500 bond two 
days after the Rally. The Michigan Legislature, on December 
9, passed the "drug reclassification bill," significantly 
lowering the penalties for possession and sale of marijuana. 
Soon thereafter, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled in 
Sinclair's appeal; they found the ten year sentence for two 
marijuana "joints" to be "cruel and unusual punishment." 
Although Lennon's appearance at the Rally may have had little 
effect on the Legislature's decision to pass the drug 
reclassification bill, the timing of the bill's passage gave 
the Rally an almost mystical reputation.
Sinclair made a triumphant return to 1520 Hill Street. 
He quickly became involved in the local projects of the "Ann
106Ibid. , 11-12; Jon Wiener, Come Together: John Lennon
In His Time. (New York: Random House, 1984), 187-196. The 
success of the Sinclair Rally led many of the performers to 
believe that an anti-Nixon tour, featuring rock music and 
radical politics, was just what the ailing Movement needed to 
regain its focus. The so-called "1972 Anti-Nixon Tour," 
planned by musicians and "Movement heavies," was to be 
spearheaded by Lennon, who would headline the tour, picking 
up local bands in cities across the country, and leaving a 
large percentage of the profits for local community projects. 
The tour never got past the planning stage, thanks to the 
Nixon Administration's deportation hearings against Lennon. 
The anti-Nixon tour, as well as the meeting between Lennon 
and Sinclair in early 1972, is described in Jonathan Cott and 
Christina Doudna, eds., The Ballad of John and Yoko. (Garden 
City, N.Y.: Rolling Stone Press, 1982), 126-34.
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Arbor Tribal Council," which included the Rainbow People's 
Party and a number of other Ann Arbor-based community groups. 
Sinclair's book, Guitar Armv was released in 1972 .107 The 
Rainbow People also became involved with the Ann Arbor "Human 
Rights Party" (HRP) , a coalition of Movement groups dedicated 
to working within the local democratic "system" to influence 
policy making by electing its own officials. A number of HRP 
candidates were elected to positions on the City Council and 
elsewhere.108
"It is impossible to characterize a Rainbow Nation or 
Rainbow People as in any way threatening to the security of 
Euro-Amerikans," Sinclair stated in February of 1971, in his 
"Message to the Central Committee."109 Once again, he 
underestimated the resolve of his foes. Neither the White 
Panther Party's name change, nor its new tone of moderation, 
made any difference to the FBI or the local and state police, 
whose surveillance continued unabated. A Michigan State
,07Bound by hand, Guitar Army's multi-colored pages, 
slick art design, and numerous photographs make it a good 
example of "Movement literature." However, the publishing 
company, Douglas Books, went bankrupt shortly after the 
book's publication, so promotion and sales lagged.
I08Clashes between the Rainbow People and the Human 
Rights Party led to the final dissolution of Sinclair's group 
in 1973, when he moved back to Detroit with Leni to work in 
publishing the Detroit Sun, as well as the music business. 
The history of Sinclair's life after the Rainbow People is 
contained in a yet-to-be-released documentary film by Steve 
Gebhardt, tentatively titled Twenty To Life. See unpublished 
film script, "Twenty To Life —  A Film By Steve Gebhardt," 
1992-1993, in possession of the author.
l09Sinclair 1971 Central Committee Report, 11.
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Police Red Squad report on the White Panthers, written at
approximately the same time as Sinclair's "Message,"
described the group as second only to the Weathermen and
Black Panthers, "in terms of radical and violent activity to
meet its goal." It further stated: "This office has an
informant attempting to infiltrate the WPP."110 The FBI's
"national security" wiretap of the White Panther commune in
Ann Arbor was discontinued on January 26, 1971, one day after
Keith's landmark ruling. The memorandum from SAC Neil Welch
to Hoover made no mention of Keith's decision:
Detroit Division is discontinuing source....on the 
basis that there has been no recent information of 
value furnished by the source. The leaders of the 
White Panther party... suspect that the telephone 
at WP Headquarters, Ann Arbor, Michigan, is 
tapped. Consequently, occupants of WP
Headquarters have been cautioned to use pay phones 
for sensitive business. In view of the above 
[word obliterated] is being discontinued as of 
11:00 AM, 1/26/71.111
Even without a steady stream of intelligence from 
warrantless taps, Hoover remained interested in the Rainbow
noMichigan State Police, Special Investigation Unit, 
"Confidential Report" on the White Panthers, [date illegible, 
probably early February, 1971], John and Leni Sinclair Red 
Squad Files. The practice of state police red squads 
infiltrating radical groups via informers, unheard of before 
the sixties, is discussed in Donner, Protectors of Privilege. 
69-70. Donner finds no evidence of the use of infiltrators 
and/or informants in either the Detroit or the Michigan State 
Police Red Squads.
inAirtel, SAC, Detroit to Hoover, January 26, 1971, 62- 
112678-210. Hoover informed Mitchell of the discontinued 
wiretap in a February 3, 1971 "Memorandum for the Attorney 
General," [also 62-112678-210]. Despite Welch's statement 
"for the record," the only valid explanation for the date of 
discontinuance is the Keith Decision.
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People during 1971 and 1972. In his testimony before the 
House Subcommittee on Appropriations on March 17, 1971, the 
Director discussed the White Panthers immediately after 
mentioning the Weathermen. He referred to the WPP as 
"typical supporters of the Weathermen-type of terrorism." 
Hoover added that although the WPP has "no clearly defined 
ideology of their own," they nonetheless "constitute local 
communes of New Left terrorists who are capable of committing 
revolutionary violence."112
The FBI continued its close surveillance, sharing its 
intelligence with the Internal Security Division of the 
Justice Department, as it pursued the Keith appeal. A 
report, dated March 25, 1971, indicates that Guy Goodwin had 
requested that all FBI documents pertaining to the White 
Panthers be forwarded to his office for analysis. The cover 
page of the report contains the following subheadings under 
the heading of "Character of Case": "Internal Security -
White Panther Party; New Left - Violence; New Left - Foreign 
Influence." The report further indicates that the Bureau was 
investigating seven WPP chapters in Michigan: Ann Arbor,
1I2U. S. House of Representatives, Committee of the 
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Appropriations, 92nd Congress, 1st 
Session, Part 1, Testimony of J. Edgar Hoover. March 17, 
1971, 46-47.
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Grand Rapids, Mt. Clemens, St. Clair Shores, Jackson, East 
Lansing, and Ypsilanti.1,3
By 1971, the FBI's interest in the White Panthers was 
national. Documents released through the Freedom of 
Information Act reveal that virtually any group which 
referred publicly to itself as a chapter of the White 
Panthers merited FBI surveillance. A report, dated January 
28, 1971, states: "Receiving offices should regard all WPP 
suspected communes investigated as a result of information 
set forth herein as possible sources of violence." The 
Seattle field office put under active surveillance "anyone 
who was identified....as being an associate of [name 
obliterated] in his aborted attempt to establish a WPP 
chapter." A Seattle field office report stated: "White
Panther Party members are known to possess firearms and 
explosives material and should be considered armed and
u3Report, "White Panther Party," Detroit Michigan, March 
26, 1971, 62-112678-231. The reference to "foreign
influence" [emphasis added] indicates the Bureau was 
attempting to locate "evidence" that the WPP was receiving 
monetary or other support from "foreign powers and/or their 
agents." An earlier report, dated January 28, 1971, asserts 
the group received "a cash amount of $1,000.00" from "an 
unidentified source in England," and that a different source 
in Denmark had furnished funds to a WPP member [name 
obliterated, probably either Pun or Genie Plamondon, both of 
whom visited Denmark during the spring of 1970]. See Report, 
Detroit to Hoover, January 28, 1971, page 44, 62-112678-218.
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dangerous." Chapters across America were placed under 
surveillance.114
Much of the FBI attention was aimed at individuals and 
groups lacking a clear connection with the National 
Headquarters of the White Panthers in Ann Arbor. This was 
especially true from the Winter of 1970-1971 forward, when 
the Ann Arbor leadership lost contact, for the most part, 
with the national chapters. By this time, the White Panther 
"myth" was well-known, and sufficiently malleable to be 
utilized for numerous purposes. Any radical desiring 
recognition as a certified member of the "revolutionary 
vanguard" need only put out a flyer or write an article for 
the underground press, announcing his or her affiliation as 
a "White Panther," to receive instant attention from the 
local authorities and the FBI. Yet even the FBI recognized 
that some individuals adopted the White Panther name to sound 
more important. An October, 1970 report from the Newark 
field office to Hoover states that an unnamed individual who 
had been targeted for FBI surveillance, was "believed to have
n4FBI Report, SAC Detroit to Hoover, January 28, 1971, 
62-112678-218. See Figure A-32 in the Appendix. The report 
identifies a total of thirty-five separate cities where 
"chapters, possible chapters or identified personnel of the 
White Panther party (WPP) [are] located." See also Report, 
San Francisco to Hoover, April 8, 1971, 62-112678-274 [cover 
page]; and Report, Seattle to Hoover, May 28, 1971, 62-
112678-274 [cover page].
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used the WPP name as a publicity gimmick to gain 
attention.11,15
The very nature of "politicized" counterculture groups 
such as the WPP and YIP, who believed in the loosest possible 
group structure, contradicted "establishment” ideals, such as 
strict chapter admission procedures or supervision from a 
central office. The Black Panther Party did make a valiant 
effort to enforce strict chapter discipline and adherence to 
national organizing principles; leaders such as Bobby Seale 
and Fred Hampton frequently inspected BPP chapters across the 
country, prior to being taken "off the streets" by Hoover's 
COINTELPRO.
Not so with the White Panthers. By 1971, Sinclair, 
Plamondon, and the other creators of the White Panther Party 
had largely lost control of the Party's name and image 
outside of Michigan. The Ann Arbor White Panther Party's 
reputation —  already damaged by Plamondon's "off the pig" 
rhetoric —  was further damaged by "renegade" White Panthers. 
In July of 1970, a New York radical group calling itself the 
White Panthers successfully extorted a percentage of profits 
from the promoters of the three-day "Randall's Island Rock 
Festival," by threatening "trouble" if their demands were not
u5Report, Newark to Hoover, October, 29, 1971, 157-
18283-7.
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met.116 A similarly damaging incident occurred in September 
of 1971, when a Detroit woman —  whom police referred to as 
a "White Panther" —  attempted to hijack a plane at Detroit's 
Metropolitan Airport, allegedly to force the release of two 
Black Panthers being held in Wayne County Jail.117 In 
addition, a Newsweek article of October 12, 1970, featured an 
interview by Karl Fleming with a "terrorist bomber" named 
"Larry," who, while stationed in Vietnam some years earlier, 
had allegedly become associated with a White Panther 
"recruiter." The White Panther reportedly asked "Larry" if 
he would like to "fight against the U.S." upon returning 
home, and gave him telephone numbers of "contacts" living in 
Arizona, California, Montana, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee. 
It was through the Los Angeles contacts that "Larry" joined 
the revolutionary underground, where "five-man squads train 
in demolition, street fighting, booby trapping, bomb setting, 
sniping, night marching, and foraging." Although "Larry" 
stated that his "own group has no name —  for security 
reasons," Senator Peter H. Dominick of Colorado concluded 
that "Larry"'s conversation with a White Panther in Vietnam, 
proved he must have become one upon returning to the U.S.,
116New York Times. July 7, 1970, 37. The coalition which 
"convinced" the promoters to "donate" a portion of the 
profits included the WPP, Young Lords, and the Revolutionary 
Youth Party Collective. The incident is described in Free, 
a 1976 documentary film of the Randall's Island Festival. 
The incident exemplified the height of the Movement's anger 
at "hip capitalists," who profited from "the people's music."
117New York Times. September 25, 1971, 38.
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despite an absence of evidence. The Senator entered the
Newsweek article in the Congressional Record, with the
following introductory comment:
I believe that we should become more aware of this 
danger and better understand the motives of those 
who would seek to destroy our institutions and 
threaten the safety of our high officials...one 
such group.... [is] the White Panthers.118
The Congressional Record also contained an article,
reprinted from an Associated Press story of March 16, 1971,
outlining among the most unusual of all COINTELPROS employed
against the White Panthers. Containing a Washington, D.C.
dateline, the story alleged that the White Panther Party
considered kidnapping political leaders of the 
prominence of Vice President Agnew to gain release 
of jailed radicals, according to a policeman's 
testimony released today by a Senate 
Subcommittee...kidnapping plans had been among 
several courses of action suggested to or 
considered by White Panther officers.
The press release was reportedly from the Senate Judiciary
Committee's Subcommittee on Internal Security, which, of
course, had heard testimony regarding the White Panthers from
Sergeant Clifford Murray of the Michigan State Police the
previous September. Murray claimed his information came from
"a confidential source who has furnished reliable information
in the past." In fact, the "confidential source" was one of
the FBI's own COINTELPRO letters, sent anonymously to the
Detroit chapter of the White Panthers in late May, 1970. The
U8U.S. Senate, Congressional Record. May 11, 1971, S
6633-34.
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letter, which suggested that the White Panthers "snatch” 
Senator Robert Griffin, Congressman Gerald Ford, and/or Agnew 
in order to secure Sinclair's release, was among the personal 
papers of Jack Forrest which were confiscated by the FBI when 
they apprehended Forrest, Plamondon, and Taube in July of 
1970.119
Hoover's FBI got lots of mileage out of this one 
COINTELPRO letter, used repeatedly to damage the White 
Panthers during the fall of 1970. Detroit SAC Neil Welch had 
included the entire text of the letter in his September, 1970 
report concerning Plamondon's capture, which he circulated to 
Bureau headquarters, as well as to Detroit's Red Squad. 
Several weeks earlier, Hoover had quoted directly from the 
anonymous letter in his initial memorandum to Mitchell 
requesting the installation of "national security" wiretaps 
on the White Panthers' Ann Arbor headquarters. The alleged 
"kidnap plot" born out of the COINTELPRO letter had also been 
a topic of discussion at the September 22, 1970, White House 
meeting between Nixon, Hoover, and Ford, only two weeks 
before William Kunstler presented his motion for disclosure 
of electronic surveillance in Judge Keith's courtroom. 
Assistant FBI Director William Sullivan's October 12, 1970
119New York Times. March 17, 1971, 51; Washington Daily 
News. March 16, 1971, 2; New York Daily News. March 17, 1971, 
17. The first news association to carry the story was UPI, 
on March 16, followed by AP the following day. The headlines 
were damning: "White Panthers' red plot," said the Washington 
Daily News: the New York Times stated "Political Kidnapping 
Plot Tied to the White Panthers."
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address to the editors of United Press International stated 
that the White Panthers "suggested the possibility of 
kidnapping high Government officials... .demanding freedom for 
White Panthers now in prison in exchange for release of the 
officials." Although the text of Sullivan's speech, 
containing the White Panther allegations, had been 
distributed to the UPI editors, they failed to make even a 
passing reference to it in their stories concerning the 
speech. Why then, did a press release containing essentially 
the same information make headlines the following March?
Several aspects of the March, 1971, news release 
indicate high-level coordination. First, the Associated 
Press and UPI stories disseminated via the national press 
were not the same as the "official" press release drafted by 
the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, for release on 
March 16. The Subcommittee's original release, dated March 
16 (now stored in the National Archives), contains no 
references to the kidnapping plot, and focuses instead on 
other aspects of Murray's testimony, such as the fact that 
Plamondon was captured with "65 pounds" of dynamite in his 
possession.120
The national media's interest in political kidnapping 
peaked at the moment the White Panther story appeared. Also,
,20Press release, "From the Senate Internal Security 
Subcommittee," March 16, 1971, Records of the U.S. Senate, 
Internal Security Subcommittee Subject Files, box 222, folder 
for "Rainbow People's Party," Record Group 46, National 
Archives, Washington, D.C.
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in mid-March 1971, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was 
deliberating the Keith case, having heard oral arguments on 
February 15. Two aspects of the release were particularly 
helpful to the government's case: (1) the WPP's consideration 
of high-level political kidnapping demonstrated the 
seriousness of the threat they posed to the national 
security, and (2) the fact that the WPP had allegedly 
received its inspiration to kidnap from the "Tupamaros of 
South America," provided direct support for the Justice 
Department's contention that domestic radical groups posed as 
great a danger to society as "foreign" groups.
The importance of the Keith case to the Nixon 
Administration suggests that by March of 1971, the White 
Panthers had made Chuck Colson's "enemies list" —  and 
Colson's specialty was bogus press "leaks." Senate hearings 
had traditionally been released approximately nine months 
after the hearing dates. In this case, however, the hearing 
was released less than six months following Murray's 
testimony. The timing suggests that high-ranking government 
officials possibly engineered the "kidnap plot"'s release, in 
order to influence the outcome of the Keith case at the 
appellate level. The fact that the sole basis for the 
kidnapping charge was an anonymous FBI COINTELPRO letter, 
adds irony to the bizarre incident.121
121The dissemination of "bogus" press releases, referred 
to in intelligence circles as "disinformation" or "grey
(continued...)
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An additional example of negative White Panther Party 
press occurred in late May, 1971, when the Justice 
Department's top radical hunter, Guy Goodwin, went after two 
WPP members. A Seattle-based federal grand jury
investigating the bombing of the U.S. Capital on March 1 had 
subpoenaed Leslie Bacon, an organizer of the May Day 
demonstrations and, Goodwin suspected, a Weatherwoman. On 
the advice of her attorneys, Bacon refused to testify, citing 
the unconstitutionality of the new "use immunity" laws 
governing grand jury testimony. Federal Judge William 
Goodwin then held her in contempt of court and ordered her to 
jail until such time as she agreed to give testimony. In an 
attempt to acquire evidence regarding Bacon's radical 
activities, Guy Goodwin shifted the investigation's focus, to 
two meetings, in which Bacon had supposedly taken part: (1) 
the gathering of about two thousand radicals from across the 
U.S. in Ann Arbor in February of 1971, during which the 
planning for the May Day demonstrations was allegedly carried 
out, and (2) a series of meetings in Washington, D.C. between 
radical groups and organizers of the May Day demonstrations, 
which occurred during the time that the Capital was bombed. 
Implicated in both meetings were former White Panthers (now
121 (... continued) 
propaganda," was utilized by the Nixon Administration, in its 
"dirty tricks" campaigns, as well as the FBI, in its 
COINTELPRO programs. See Churchill and Vander Wall, Agents 
of Repression. 43-44 and The Cointelpro Papers. 182; see also 
Donner, Age of Surveillance. 238-40; and Lukas, Nightmare. 
43.
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Rainbow People) Ken Kelley and Terry Taube, Skip's younger 
brother. By early June, Goodwin made Detroit the focus for 
his Capital bombing probe, and an additional grand jury was 
impaneled. Like Bacon, both Kelley and Taube refused to 
testify, which put Judge Talbot Smith in the position of 
putting them in prison for contempt or freeing them. He 
chose the latter, but only after weeks of legal wrangling 
between attorneys of both sides.122
It is thus surprising that the White Panther/Rainbow 
People's Party somehow survived through a turbulent period in 
U.S. history, when a considerable number of law enforcement 
officials from all levels of the government were attempting 
to "expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutralize" it. In 
reviewing all of the COINTELPRO and COINTELPRO-like 
initiatives utilized against Sinclair and his tribe over the 
course of five years, 1967-1971, the author has found 
documentation for nine:123
1. "Bogus Mail"/Anonymous Letters. Two 
incidents: August, 1969 FBI COINTELPRO aimed at 
WPP and MOBE, and May, 1970 FBI COINTELPRO 
suggesting kidnapping.
2. Infiltration/Agents Provocateurs. Dennis 
Marnell, 1970; State Police attempt in 1971.
122Washington, D.C. Evening Star. May 28, 1971, B-l and
June 3, 1971, A-2; New York Times. June 2, 1971, 21. Kelley
had assisted in the publication of May Flowers. an
underground newspaper distributed during the Mayday
demonstrations. He and Bacon had also "booked" a number of 
rock acts for the event.
123The categories utilized herein come from Churchill and 
Vander Wall, The Cointelpro Papers and Agents of Repression.
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3. Resource-Draining Litigation. Sinclair's 
arrest on drug charges and repeated denials of 
bond; CIA Conspiracy indictments.
4. Tainting Radical Leaders with Violence. 
Inclusion of Sinclair in the CIA Conspiracy 
indictment, thanks to Valler's coerced testimony.
5. Eavesdropping/Warrantless Electronic 
Surveillance. Continuous from September 9, 1970 
through January 26, 1971. Hidden by the 
government until 1978.
6. I.R.S. Investigations. See Figure A-33 in 
the Appendix.124
7. Police Support for Right-Wing "Pseudo-Gangs11. 
Fire bombings of Trans Love houses in 1967; other 
incidents of unexplained break-ins and 
beatings.125
8. "Kangaroo Grand Juries". 1969 Detroit grand 
jury aimed at getting Sinclair off the streets; 
Guy Goodwin's subpoenas of Kelley and Taube in 
1971.
9. Physical Surveillance. Practically non-stop 
from local, state, and federal agencies throughout 
the history of the WPP and RPP.
1241971 I.R.S. 1040 Form, John and Leni Sinclair, located 
in the John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files; also see FBI 
Report, Detroit to Hoover, September 17, 1969, 62-112678-29, 
"IRS Income Tax By Liaison" agency designation for 
"Dissemination Record."
‘^ Beginning in 1966, and continuing through the early 
seventies, the Detroit field office of the FBI utilized the 
activities of the far-right vigilante group "Breakthrough," 
led by Donald Lopsinger. An October, 1966 memorandum from 
Detroit's SAC to Hoover states: "Detroit is proposing a
Counterintelligence technique that efforts be made to take 
over their activities and use them in such a manner as would 
be best calculated by this office to completely disrupt and 
neutralize the MDCP [Michigan District Communist party]." 
SAC, Detroit to Hoover, October 18, 1966, 100-3-104-15;
Located in Detroit COINTELPRO Files, National Security 
Archive, Washington, D.C. See Figure A-34 in the Appendix. 
For a discussion of FBI-sponsored right-wing vigilantism, see 
Churchill and Vander Wall, The COINTELPRO Papers. 225-27; and 
Agents of Repression. 48.
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V.
The thinking of the Supreme Court of the United 
States with its several recent changes may be 
along the lines of suppressing the activities of 
those who openly espouse the overthrow of 
democratic authority in the United States.
—  J. Edgar Hoover126
During the fall of 1971, as the Keith case awaited
consideration from the Supreme Court, Justices Black and
Harlan announced their retirements. An opportunity suddenly
presented itself for Nixon to select his third and fourth
appointees to the Court, leading to the creation of the
conservative "Nixon Court." The announcements were very
welcome news to both Nixon and Hoover. From Nixon's first
days in office, they had discussed the damage inflicted on
America by the Warren Court.127 Immediately following his
inauguration, the two discussed the High Court, as Alexander
Charns notes:
Hoover complained that at times he was almost 
'despondent' about whether anything could be done 
about the Supreme Court rulings. The president 
said it was 'going to take at least four years or
more to get the Court changed.' Hoover disagreed
—  he felt that 'some progress' could be made 
because there would be four vacancies. Surprised, 
Nixon asked Hoover how he came up with four. 'The
126Quoted in Theoharis, Spying on Americans. 188.
127Alexander Charns's Cloak and Gavel. contends that 
Hoover engaged in a separate COINTELPRO specifically aimed at 
creating a conservative Supreme Court.
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fellow from New York,' Hoover said. 'Harlan?' 
Nixon asked. 'Yes,' Hoover said. 'He's deaf and 
can't hear anything and is planning to retire, and
of course, Warren will be going off and Black's
health is getting worse....Douglas, of course, is 
crazy, and is not in too good health. That makes 
Harlan, Douglas, Black and Warren.'128
Nixon had appointed two Justices almost immediately after
taking office, when Justice Warren retired and Justice Fortas
was forced to resign. Warren Burger, Nixon's selection to
replace Warren as Chief Justice, was easily confirmed. But
Nixon ran into enormous difficulty over Fortas' replacement.
Two bitter fights were waged over the nominations of Clement
Haynsworth and G. Harold Carswell.129 Forced to select a
moderate, Nixon chose Minnesotan Federal Appeals Judge Harry
Blackmun. Yet the campaign to overturn the Warren Court
continued. In April of 1970, Congressman Gerald Ford called
for a special Congressional investigation of Justice William
0. Douglas, initiating an Administration-inspired "impeach
Douglas" campaign. Lacking evidence, Ford was forced to back
down.130
128Ibid., 102.
129Ibid., 108. Charns criticizes the FBI's background
checks on the two nominees. Although they both had 
segregationist pasts, the FBI found "no derogatory 
information."
I30Athan Theoharis has documentation demonstrating Nixon 
and Hoovers' complicity in Ford's impeachment drive. Also, 
Charns has obtained evidence that Douglas' mail had been 
opened by the CIA, and that he had been overheard, although 
not specifically targeted, in FBI "national security" 
wiretaps. See Theoharis and Cox, The Boss. 406; and Charns, 
Cloak and Gavel. 112-13.
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On September 17, Nixon received word of Black and
Harlan's pending retirement from Mitchell, who had telephoned
Haldeman with the news. The President did not announce the
nominations of Lewis F. Powell and William H. Rehnquist until
October 21. During the intervening four weeks, Nixon was
influenced by a variety of forces. Foremost in his thought
was the bitter battle over Carswell and Haynsworth, which
strained the President's relationship with Mitchell and
Hoover. The strain is suggested in Mitchell's conversation
with Haldeman on September 17:
The Attorney General wants guidance from the P on 
what he wants to do on a replacement appointment. 
Feels that we've got to really think it through 
carefully and establish our position on it.131
Nixon also had to consider growing support across America for
a female Justice. By September 25, Haldeman was reporting
that the President "[is] feeling that he really should go for
a woman judge, if we can get a good, tough conservative."132
The force exerting the greatest pressure on Nixon was 
his determination not to repeat the mistakes he had made with 
the Carswell and Haynsworth debacles; but he certainly sought 
to name advocates of "law and order," who would work to 
reverse the Warren Court's rulings. One of the first names 
he had circulated around Washington was Congressman Richard 
H. Poff, the Vice Chairman of the National Commission on the
131Haldeman, Diaries. 355.
I32lbid., 358.
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Reform of Federal Criminal Law. Poff was considered for only 
a few days before media scrutiny forced him to withdraw his 
name. Nixon reacted with anger, as Haldeman stated: "he's 
going to go for a real right-winger now...and really stick it 
to the opposition." Nixon then suggested Senator Robert 
Byrd, who Haldeman referred to as "a former KKK'er....he's 
more reactionary than [George] Wallace."133 Two other names 
also surfaced: Senators Howard Baker and Robert Griffin. As 
each name appeared, the media provided thorough biographical 
sketches, and Senators were urged to comment as to how they 
might vote.134
What Nixon did next was baffling, even to his closest 
aides. Relying on neither Hoover nor Mitchell, Nixon, on 
October 13th, submitted a list of six persons, including two 
women, to the ABA's "Judicial Fitness Committee." All but 
Byrd and U.S. Appeals Court Judge H. H. Friday were relative 
unknowns. The selections angered Chief Justice Burger, who 
told Mitchell he would resign if Nixon did not select 
"distinguished judges." Nixon retorted: "let him
resign."135 From this point until October 21, Nixon did not 
discuss his selections with anyone, not even Haldeman or 
Ehrlichman. The selection of well-known former ABA President 
Lewis Powell surprised few. Nixon's other choice, Assistant
133Ibid.. 361.
l34New York Times. October 12, 1971, 1.
13SHaldeman, Diaries. 365.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
534
Attorney General William Rehnquist, shocked not only the 
media, but also the White House staff.136
Powell and Rehnquist both had impressive credentials, 
graduating first in their law school classes; Powell from 
Washington and Lee, and Rehnquist from Stanford. Powell had 
gone on to become President of the ABA, where he had chaired 
several of the Association's committees. Rehnquist had 
clerked for Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, and had 
become a successful lawyer in Phoenix, where he became 
associated with Senator Barry Goldwater's unsuccessful 
presidential bid in 1964. After Nixon's election, he was one 
of the so-called "Arizona Mafia" who went to work for the 
Mitchell Justice Department.137
Although neither nominee possessed experience as a 
judge, both met Nixon's standards on "law and order." Powell 
had been a member of the Presidential Commission on Violence 
in 1968, which had opted to support Title III wiretapping, 
against the wishes of both President Johnson and Attorney 
General Clark. In addition, he had played a key role in the 
ABA's Commission on Standards for Law Enforcement, which had
136Ibid. . 366-367. Haldeman believes Nixon did not
settle upon Rehnquist until the night prior to the speech. 
Two days prior to the announcement Haldeman wrote: "He's now 
thinking of some different approaches and is not telling 
anybody what he's really up to, but he's forcing Mitchell to 
re-evaluate."
137James F. Simon, In His Own Image: The Supreme Court in 
Richard Nixon's America. (New York: David McKay Company, 
1973), 228. The other members of the "Arizona Mafia" were 
Richard Kleindienst and Robert Mardian.
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delivered a ringing endorsement of court-approved 
wiretapping. Powell had written an article in late July, 
1971, in which he expressed opinions consistent with the 
Nixon Administration's Keith brief. One passage stated that 
the difference between domestic and foreign threats had all 
but disappeared in recent times. In the article, which first 
appeared in the Richmond, Virginia Times Dispatch, and was 
later reprinted by the New York Times. Powell dismissed the 
furor in Washington over wiretapping as "a tempest in a 
teapot.1,138
Rehnquist's "law and order" credentials far exceeded 
those of Powell. As Assistant Attorney General under
Mitchell, he had been a chief architect of several of the
Administration's harshest and most constitutionally-
questionable policies regarding activist dissenters, such as 
mass arrests, so-called "no-knock" laws, and pre-trial 
internment of radicals. Along with Kleindienst, he was 
Mitchell's most outspoken supporter of surveillance
practices. Rehnquist was also a chief theoretician of the 
Mitchell Doctrine. His strong support for eavesdropping had 
been demonstrated in March of 1971, during two appearances 
before the Ervin's Committee on Constitutional Rights.
With Powell and Rehnquist on the Court, Nixon would have 
two staunch supporters of wiretapping in his corner for the 
pending Keith case; perhaps the two strongest such supporters
138New York Times. November 3, 1971, 47.
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possessing the qualifications to be confirmed. Although this 
consideration may have been only one of several weighing on 
Nixon's mind during the selection process, it is difficult to 
imagine that it was not in his thoughts. Less than three 
weeks prior to Nixon's nomination announcement the Justice 
Department had submitted its final Keith brief.139
During the confirmation hearings in the Senate, both 
nominees were questioned by liberals and moderates concerning 
their views on governmental surveillance, and particularly on 
the issue of "national security" wiretapping. Forced to 
defend his "tempest" address, Powell asserted that he had not 
yet made up his mind about the issue of wiretapping domestic 
subversives without court order.140 Rehnquist was grilled 
about this issue, and was forced to admit that he had "helped 
write" the government's Keith brief.141 By admitting his
139New York Times. October 1, 1971, 10.
140In a letter to Senator Birch Bayh on October 27, 
Powell reiterated his indecision concerning the Mitchell 
Doctrine, but added that it was his "general judgement," that 
"it is now extremely difficult to distinguish between foreign 
and domestic threats to our democratic institutions." Quoted 
in Washington Post. October 28, 1971, A-5. On November 8, he 
backed away from this position. Under intense questioning 
from Liberals Bayh, Kennedy, and Philip Hart, Powell 
suggested that "court approval and other safeguards could be 
applied to the Government's wiretapping of domestic groups in 
many cases." Quoted in New York Times. November 9, 1971, 19.
141The "backfire" which took place against the Nixon 
Administration's bold "law and order" initiatives during 1971 
may have been a decisive factor in the Senate's criticism of 
Rehnquist, which ultimately cost Nixon a key vote in the 
Keith case. A series of detailed articles, editorials, and 
"Letters to the Editor" concerning Rehnquist's background
(continued...)
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direct involvement in a pending case before the High Court, 
Rehnquist had no choice but to assert that if confirmed, he 
would not participate in the Keith case. With these words, 
Nixon lost one "sure" vote on the pending case, as well as a 
forceful "law and order" proponent, who might have swayed 
undecided Justices.142
Both of Nixon's nominees were confirmed in the Senate: 
Powell by a nearly unanimous vote (89-1) on December 6, and 
Rehnquist by 68 to 26 on December 10. A New York Times 
editorial claimed that a number of Senators who voted for 
Rehnquist's confirmation had nevertheless worried greatly
141 (... continued) 
appeared in leading newspapers prior to and throughout the 
confirmation hearings. On October 26 Tom Wicker of the New 
York Times stated "it will be remarkable if he does not bring 
something of the Mitchell-Nixon attitude to the task" when 
considering cases involving wiretapping [page 41]. Four days 
later, a letter from three Harvard law students appeared in 
the New York Times, advising the Senate Judiciary Committee 
to "ask Mr. Rehnquist whether he intends to absent himself 
from the Court's resolution of impending wiretap cases. A 
response which indicates a failure by Mr. Rehnquist to 
appreciate his ethical responsibility should weigh heavily on 
his confirmation by the Senate" [page 30]. Four days later, 
Rehnquist disqualified himself from consideration of the 
Keith case.
142New York Times. November 4, 1971, 66. James F.
Simon's In His Own Image states: "Rehnquist was what many 
libertarians had long feared: a smart conservative who,
unlike a mediocrity, could possibly win other justices to his 
point of view" [page 238]. Although losing Rehnquist's vote 
on the Keith case must have been a blow to Nixon, neither he 
nor Haldeman made any mention of it in their later writings. 
White Panther attorney Hugh M. Davis thinks that from this 
time forward, Nixon realized his chances of securing a 
majority in favor of the Mitchell Doctrine were minimal. See 
personal interview with author, July 25, 1992, Detroit,
Michigan.
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about his ideology and "activist conservatism.11 Most were in 
agreement, however, that he possessed high intellectual 
abilities:
The question is whether the nominee should be 
evaluated by the Senate in terms of his specific 
political, social and economic view —  quite apart 
from the obvious requirements of integrity, 
ability, temperament and training.143
An additional reason for Rehnquist's confirmation may 
have been the abrupt softening of his "law and order" 
positions late in the confirmation process. He testified 
that "he had worked behind the scenes to persuade the Justice 
Department to ease rigid positions supporting wiretapping and 
opposing 'speedy trial' legislation." According to his 
testimony, Rehnquist recognized that the government's use of 
the "inherent power" argument in the Keith case was "a 
mistake," because the Justice Department "would be on 
stronger legal grounds to concede that it was subject to the 
Fourth Amendment." Fred Graham concluded that Rehnquist's 
revised views represented a "softened. ... image. "I44
Rehnquist's confirmation may have also been made 
possible, at least in part, by Nixon's maneuvering. Leon 
Friedman's interviews with a number of Senators following 
Rehnquist's confirmation revealed a common theme:
l43New York Times. November 15, 1971, 40.
144Quoted in New York Times. November 5, 1971, 22. Fred 
Graham's article fails to point out how this "softening" of 
the government's position in Keith would in any way change 
the outcome of the case, if the government was victorious.
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The forces which had worked so effectively on the 
prior campaigns against Judges Haynsworth and 
Carswell found it was extremely difficult to crank 
up for a third major fight at the end of the 
legislative session...[One Senator stated] 'This 
man is far worse on most important issues than 
either Haynsworth or Carswell, but we didn't have 
enough time to prove this to the people whose help 
we needed. /I4S
By submitting the list of six names to the ABA, and allowing 
it to be circulated publicly, Nixon diverted his opponents' 
attention. By the time he revealed his true intentions, the 
liberal forces had already expended a great deal of time and 
effort. It was a shrewd political move, reflecting the 
lessons Nixon had learned during the Haynsworth and Carswell 
crises. Powell and Rehnquist were sworn-in as the 99th and 
100th U.S. Supreme Court Justices on January 7, 1972.
On June 21, 1971 the Supreme Court granted a writ of 
certiorari in the Keith case, setting the stage for a full 
year of legal maneuvering and heightened anticipation 
concerning the decision.146 Beginning in October, and 
continuing through mid-February, the two sides submitted 
briefs to the High Court, outlining their final positions. 
Because of the unique nature of the case, separate briefs 
were filed on behalf of Judge Keith and the three White
145New York Times. December 12, 1971, section iv, 12.
146Only four Justices voted to grant the Keith writ: 
Black, Burger, Harlan, and Blackmun. See U.S. Supreme Court 
Docket Sheet, 1971-1972 Term, Case No. 70-153, U.S. v. U.S. 
District Court, et al. located in the Papers of Justice 
William A. Brennan, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress 
[hereafter "Brennan Papers"], container 420, folder 5.
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Panther (now Rainbow People) defendants. Representing Keith 
was Detroit corporate attorney William Gossett, who had been 
recommended to Keith by the Michigan Bar Association.147
Gossett, a Republican, had an impressive background in 
corporate law. He had been general counsel for Ford Motor 
Company for over fifteen years, and was a former ABA 
President. His decision to represent Keith (pro bono), led 
to friction with his law partners and some of his clients, 
who did not believe that he should be risking his 
professional reputation by taking on the Nixon Administration 
in behalf of a black judge. Assisting Gossett in the 
preparation of the legal brief was Professor Abraham Sofaer 
of Columbia Law School, a well-known constitutional historian 
and author.148
The "Ann Arbor Three" were represented by Arthur Kinoy, 
a "people's lawyer," who had represented controversial civil 
rights workers, union organizers, and those targeted by the 
House Committee on UnAmerican Activities [HUAC].149
,47Keith had submitted a request to the Michigan Bar 
Association for a counsel qualified to argue before the 
Supreme Court. William Gossett reports that Chief Judge 
George Edwards of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also 
asked him to represent Judge Keith. Personal interview with 
author, July 23, 1992, Detroit, Michigan.
148Ibid. In a 1992 interview, Gossett referred to Sofaer 
as "very intellectually competent." "He wrote most of the 
brief," Gossett adds, "but I polished it, and added a few key 
points."
l49Kunstler, Mv Life as a Radical Lawyer. 208-209; Kinoy, 
Rights on Trial: The Odvssev of a People's Lawyer.
(continued...)
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Immediately prior to his involvement in the case, Kinoy had 
assisted in the preparation of a 547-page appellate brief in 
the "Chicago Seven" case, which included a detailed 
refutation of the Mitchell Doctrine.150
Robert Mardian and Erwin Griswold continued to direct 
the government's side, assisted by Department of Justice 
Attorneys Daniel J. McAuliffe, Robert L. Keuch, and George W. 
Calhoun. As is customary in Supreme Court cases, the 
government filed its brief first, on October 1, 1971, and 
reserved the right to submit a "Reply Brief" near the end of 
the filing period. The government's case made several major 
points: (1) the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all
searches and seizures without a warrant, but only those that 
are unreasonable; (2) "national security" surveillance 
authorized by the Attorney General to protect the nation from 
"domestic" danger does not constitute an unreasonable search 
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment; (3) the process of 
judicial review by federal magistrates in "national security" 
wiretapping cases is inappropriate, and "outside the
149(... continued)
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 2-16. The
decision to have Kinoy argue the case, rather than Kunstler, 
was based on discussions between Rainbow People members, 
Kinoy, Kunstler, and William Bender, formerly with the Center 
for Constitutional Rights in New York, and then the Director 
of the newly-formed Rutgers Law School Constitutional 
Litigation Clinic. Kunstler says the decision to use Kinoy 
"wounded my ego substantially...[but] eventually I came to 
realize that we would do best with Arthur."
IS0Kinoy, Rights on Trial. 3.
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traditional judicial responsibilities"; (4) in Title III of 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 
"Congress recognized the President's authority to conduct 
such surveillances without prior judicial approval"; and (5) 
in the event that the Court rules warrantless wiretapping of 
U.S. citizens illegal ("contrary to our contention"), the 
Alderman decision's automatic disclosure requirement 
regarding illegal government surveillance should be 
rescinded, in favor of a system permitting judges to make in 
camera determinations of "whether the information obtained by 
the surveillance is arguably relevant to a prosecution before 
turning the material over to a defendant."151
The government's brief displayed a significant shift in 
emphasis from the "inherent power" argument, to a position 
focusing on the "reasonableness" doctrine of the Fourth 
Amendment. The central premise of the argument was that the 
Fourth Amendment should be read as two clauses: first, the 
people have a right to be secure in their "persons, homes, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures." Second, no warrants shall be issued without 
"probable cause." Thus "national security" surveillance 
without prior court order represented "reasonable searches 
under the first clause which need not comply with the second 
clause." This position had been accepted by the Supreme
151Keith case, "Brief for the United States," October 1, 
1971, SCR/B.
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Court until the early fifties, for example in U.S. v. 
Rabinowitz (1950) , which stated that the test "is not whether 
it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the 
search was reasonable." However, by the sixties, the Warren 
Court emphasized the necessity (or "primacy") of warrants in 
most cases involving law enforcement searches and 
seizures.152 In Keith, the government correctly stated that 
the Supreme Court had yet to rule on this issue as it 
pertained to "national security" surveillance. Finally, the 
government's brief again cited numerous cases in which 
searches without a warrant had been held constitutional.
A second theme in the government's brief was related to
the issue of social disorder and fear. It asserted that the
purpose of the Black Panther wiretaps (which picked up
Plamondon's conversations) was "not merely law
enforcement.... but protection of the fabric of society
itself." The brief is full of references to radicals seeking
to "attack and subvert" or commit "acts of sabotage" against
the government. Statistics on the number of campus and other
bombings were supplied from the "National Bomb Data Center."
This heavy-handed attempt to frighten the Justices —  which
Judge Edwards had referred to as "an argument in terrorem" —
provided the backdrop for the government's assertion that:
The President must protect the government... and 
proper performance of this function still 
reguires, as it has in the past, the occasional
152339 U.S. 56, 66; Quoted in CRS, 1041-45.
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use of electronic surveillance to gather 
information concerning the plans of those who have 
committed themselves, in many instances publicly, 
to engage in covert, terrorist tactics to destroy 
and subvert the government.153
The brief reiterated, without significant revision, two 
of the central components of the government's argument, 
dating back to the earliest days of the Mitchell Doctrine. 
Citing section 2511(3) of the Omnibus Act, the government 
asserted "the standard of national security that the Attorney 
General applies is the same standard Congress provided" in 
the statute: namely, that there are certain categories of 
"exceptions" to the standard warrant requirement that the 
President and the Attorney General are entitled to make, in 
this case "investigative" wiretaps of domestic radicals 
seeking "to attack and subvert the existing structure of the 
Government." Also present was the familiar foreign/domestic 
distinction: "To attempt to compartmentalize national
security into rigid separate segments of 'foreign' and 
'domestic' ignores the realities of the way in which many 
organizations and individuals... .operate.1,154
There were two additional substantially revised 
arguments in the government's brief. When the Attorney
,53"Brief for the United States," October 1, 1971, 6-19, 
SCR/B.
I54lbid. . 19-21; 32-34. In response to the Appeals
Court's assertion that section 2511(3) is "completely 
neutral," the government reviewed the legislative history of 
the passage, particularly Senator McClellan's Committee 
Report. See Ibid., 28-29.
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General authorizes wiretaps without prior court order, "the
surveillance is subject to limited judicial review." As if
to deflect charges that the government was seeking immunity
from judicial review, the brief asserted: "Once the
surveillance has been made, the courts may review it to
determine its conformity with the standard of the Fourth
Amendment." The government did concede, however, that "such
judicial review would not take place until a criminal
prosecution has been initiated —  and, of course, most
national security electronic surveillances do not result in
prosecutions...[and therefore] the scope of judicial review
should be extremely limited." Skirting the probable cause
section of the Fourth Amendment, the brief suggested that
this standard would be "wholly inappropriate" to "national
security" cases, which depend on "a wide variety of facts and
considerations, many of which involve information that
necessarily must be kept confidential." As for the issue of
prior warrants from federal judges, the government once again
made the familiar argument that only the Executive Branch
possesses the "entire spectrum of information available" to
make informed decisions concerning probable cause to initiate
such surveillance:
A warrant for national security surveillance would 
compel the judiciary to embark upon a far 
different kind of inquiry than courts now make in 
considering the application of a warrant...In 
national security surveillance cases....the 
justification for surveillance cannot be simply 
stated or easily demonstrated; generally it 
involves a large number of detailed and
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complicated facts whose interrelation may not be 
obvious to one who does not have extensive 
background information.155
A second argument, occupying eleven of the brief's 
forty-seven pages, was the claim that were the Court to find 
the Mitchell Doctrine unconstitutional, it should overturn a 
portion of the Alderman decision which dictates that federal 
judges must automatically disclose all illegal surveillance 
to criminal defendants, regardless of its relevancy to the 
government's case, and without consideration to the damage 
that such disclosure might inflict upon the national 
security. Disputing a position taken by Judge Weick in his 
dissent to the Sixth Circuit's Keith decision, the government 
conceded that "Alderman appears to require automatic 
disclosure." The brief then reviewed the legislative history 
of Title VII, part of the Administration-inspired Omnibus 
Crime Control Act of 1970, warning "if disclosure is required 
in this area, the government must face the dilemma of either 
dropping the prosecution of an often serious criminal 
offense...provid[ing] the defendant with immunity from 
prosecution for all crimes, past, present, or future...or 
revealing sensitive national security information." It 
recommended that the Court adopt the standard of in camera 
review contained in the Title VII statute.156
155Ibid. . 21-27.
,56Ibid. , 35-41.
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The next brief to be filed (December 15, 1971) was
Gossett and Sofaer's, on behalf of Judge Keith.157 Although 
the arguments presented were considerably more detailed than 
Kunstler's, the central premises of his earlier arguments 
were the same. The brief reflected the positions of Keith, 
Ferguson, and the Court of Appeals regarding to the history 
and significance of the Fourth Amendment. It began with the 
case controlling the relationship between electronic 
surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, the Katz decision; 
Gossett argued that the decision was unequivocal, and 
recognized no exceptions to the warrant requirement. The 
brief then addressed the government's position concerning 
certain exceptions to the warrant requirement, asserting that 
where the Supreme Court had made such exceptions, "its 
governing principle" was that warrantless searches "are 
unreasonable except in carefully defined classes of cases."
Next, the brief charged that the government was 
attempting to carve out "a new exception to the warrant 
requirement," which it asserted would be "likely to chill
157A1 though the attorneys for the "Ann Arbor Three" filed 
a motion in opposition to the government's petition for a 
writ of certiorari (obviously hoping that the High Court 
would not grant the writ, which would let stand the Appeals 
Court ruling, allowing the trial to go forward), neither 
Keith nor his attorneys opposed the writ. This was not the 
only issue in which Gossett and the attorneys for the three 
former White Panthers did not see eye-to-eye on. See letter, 
William T. Gossett to Robert E. Seaver, Clerk, U.S. Supreme 
Court, December 6, 1971, Records of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
1971-1972 Term, Case No. 70-153, Record Group 267, National 
Archives, Washington, D.C.
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free expression'1 and therefore undermine constitutional 
checks and balances. The government's after-the-fact 
judicial review was termed "patently deficient," and the 
claim that judicial review would frustrate law enforcement 
was dismissed with the assertion that "Courts are well suited 
to consider complicated fact situations...and Congress 
contemplated that they would do so."; it added "leaks can be 
prevented through special precautions." Section 2511(3) was 
again termed "neutral," and the government's foreign/domestic 
distinction was quickly dismissed: "Whatever authority the 
President may have to utilize warrantless electronic 
surveillance with respect to foreign powers cannot be invoked 
to support this domestic search." Finally, Gossett's brief 
argued that the disclosure provisions of the Alderman case 
should be left unchanged.158
The brief for the three original defendants was filed on 
January 21, 1972, and carries the names of the following
attorneys: Kunstler, Kinoy, Weinglass, Davis, and William J. 
Bender. In language considerably more agitated than 
Gossett's, the 157-page argument made the following main 
points: (1) the Mitchell Doctrine represented a "sweeping" 
and "extraordinary" claim of executive power, "without 
foundation in the Constitution"; (2) the judicial review 
proposed was "wholly non-existent"; (3) the government's
i58iiBrief for the District Court and the Honorable Damon 
J. Keith," December 15, 1971, 4-8, SCR/B.
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"last minute" attempt to "interject considerations of 
'foreign security' into the case...reflects a desperate 
attempt to camouflage the illegality"; (4) the Executive had 
already proven its inability to restrain itself in conducting 
widespread warrantless surveillance of citizens; (5) section 
2511(3) of the Omnibus Act was, as Edwards stated, "not the 
language used for a grant of power"; and (6) Alderman should 
not be revised.159
Several parts of the Kinoy/Bender/Kunstler brief were 
new. Its repeated references to the government's attempts to 
resurrect King George III-style surveillance powers displayed 
a penchant for rhetorical overkill.160 In addition, the
brief disputed the "inherent power" thesis, although the 
government dropped this aspect of its argument prior to 
preparing its final brief. The brief effectively reminded
the Judiciary of its "historic role. as 'the ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution.'" Further, it placed Keith 
among "certain cases in the history of this Court which touch 
the 'bedrock of our political system,'" and required that the 
Court "stand resolutely as an 'impenetrable bulwark against
159"Brief for the Defendant-Respondents," January 21, 
1972, 9-17, SCR/B.
I60Of course, the WPP attorneys were merely developing a 
point in Judge Edwards' decision in the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals.
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every assumption of power' which threatens fundamental 
liberties of the people."161
The final brief was the government's "Reply Brief for 
the United States," submitted on February 18, 1972, less than 
two weeks prior to oral arguments.162 Its principal
argument was that the respondents had erred in viewing the 
case as one in which electronic surveillance were directed at 
the defendants "in connection with a routine criminal 
investigation." Instead, the government asserted that the 
surveillance was of a unique character: investigative in
nature, and aimed at preventing domestic radicals from 
engaging in terrorist acts against the State. Therefore, the 
traditional standards of probable cause, usually associated 
with criminal investigations aimed at prosecuting suspects, 
did not apply. The government still reserved the right to 
utilize any and all information acquired as a result of its 
"national security" surveillance in court. The brief also 
reiterated the narrowing of "foreign/domestic" distinctions, 
as well as the President's constitutional power to quell 
domestic disorder.
161,,Brief for the Defendant-Respondents," January 21, 
1972, 9-10, SCR/B.
162Five additional briefs (or "amicus curiae") were 
submitted in support of Judge Keith and the "Ann Arbor 
Three," by the American Federation of Teachers, American 
Friends Service Committee, United Auto Workers, Black Panther 
Party, National Lawyers Guild, and both the national and 
Michigan offices of the ACLU. The briefs contain many of the 
same arguments that are found in the respondents' main 
briefs.
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The government admitted that the data originally 
provided regarding bombings in America were inaccurate. They 
had reported 3285 bombings; 2022 had actually taken place. 
The brief responded as well to the ACLU's contention, 
supported by correspondence between Senator Kennedy and 
Assistant Attorney General Mardian, that the President, 
Attorney General, and FBI Director had all provided
misleading statistics to the public and Congress concerning 
the total number of warrantless wiretaps that were in
operation; the brief explained this by asserting that the 
government provided figures pertaining to the actual number 
of wiretaps in operation at a given time, while the 
information given to Senator Kennedy "refer[s] to the total 
number of such surveillances in the years involved."163
Oral arguments before the Supreme Court took place on
Thursday, February 24, 1972.164 Outside of the Supreme
Court, a large crowd, unable enter the courtroom, attested to
163,,Reply Brief for the United States," February 18, 
1972, 1-14, SCR/B.
164The Court allowed a half-hour of argument from Gossett 
on behalf of Keith, and an additional half-hour from Kinoy on 
behalf of the three original defendants. The Supreme Court 
also granted the government sixty minutes. In his December 
6, 1971, letter to Clerk of the Court Robert Seaver, Gossett 
asserted: "if only one-half hour is to be allowed for oral 
argument, the full time should be allotted to me as counsel 
for the judges of the District Court, the named parties and 
the only parties before the Court." Correspondence, William 
T. Gossett to Robert E. Seaver, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, 
December 6, 1971, Records of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1971- 
1972 Term, Case No. 70-153, Record Group 267, National 
Archives, Washington, D.C.
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public interest in the case. Kinoy recalls being shocked 
that armed guards with metal detectors scanned every person 
who entered the Court, including the attorneys.165 The 
other major shock for Gossett and Kinoy was that the 
government's argument would be delivered not by Solicitor 
General Erwin Griswold, but instead by Robert Mardian. 
Sometime during the Winter of 1971-1972, Griswold, as well as 
the entire Solicitor General's staff, had refused direct 
involvement in the case; it had thus become the exclusive 
domain of Mitchell and Mardian, as well as the President they 
represented. At the opening of the proceedings, Griswold 
entered the Judges Chambers, greeted Gossett, and whispered 
in his ear: "By the way, I'll argue your position if you 
like."166 A comment in jest? Perhaps. But it was 
nonetheless an amazing statement, coming from the top 
attorney in the Nixon Administration. Griswold then took a 
seat in the front row, to observe the proceedings.167
165Kinoy, Rights on Trial. 19.
166New York Times. June 20, 1972, 1; Personal interview 
with William T. Gossett, July 23, 1992. Gossett and Griswold 
graduated from Columbia University Law School together in 
1928, and had been friends ever since. Gossett relates that 
in conversations with the Solicitor General after the case, 
he was told that Griswold refused to argue the case on the 
grounds that he disagreed with "the issues the government had 
wished him to make."
167Apparently, the tension between Griswold and the 
Justice Department over the Keith case was minor. In a 
letter to Griswold, dated February 28, 1972, Mardian thanked 
him for submitting a memorandum to Mitchell regarding 
Mardian's argument. Referring to Griswold's memorandum,
(continued...)
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Mardian spoke first, stating emphatically that the 
government had dropped its "inherent power" claim and 
recognized the President must abide by the provisions of the 
Fourth Amendment. He placed great emphasis on the in camera 
exhibit, and what he claimed it would prove concerning the 
intentions of the organization under investigation [the Black 
Panther Party] to "engage.... in activities of a type which 
would ultimately lead to the destruction of the United States 
Government by force and violence."168 Mardian then 
summarized points he had made in the government's earlier 
briefs: (1) the surveillance was not initiated for
prosecutorial purposes; (2) the President is "imbued with" 
the constitutional power to protect the nation from all 
dangers, foreign and domestic; and (3) the nature of 
intelligence gathering is such that it is impossible to 
distinguish between foreign and domestic purposes. He was
167(.. .continued)
Mardian states: "As usual, you were quite generous as well as 
thoughtful. Whatever success I enjoyed was contributed to by 
your wise counsel and the moral support you demonstrated in 
sitting with me." Correspondence, Mardian to Griswold, 
February 28, 1972, Personal and Professional Papers of
Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold, [soon to be housed in 
the Harvard University Law School], used with the permission 
of Griswold's former law firm: Jones, Day, Reavis, and Pogue. 
The author is grateful to Secretary Jeanette E. Moe for 
conducting a search for these papers and forwarding copies 
for use in this study.
168It is interesting to note that neither the names of 
the Black Panther Party nor the White Panther Party were 
spoken at any time throughout the proceedings. Official 
Transcript of Proceedings, U.S. v U.S. District Court, et. 
al.. February 24, 1972, SCR/B [hereafter: "Transcript, Oral 
Argument"], 4-5.
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then interrupted repeatedly by Justices Stewart and White, 
who focused on the issue of Congress' powers in internal 
security matters. After getting Mardian to recognize these 
powers, Stewart then reached the main point of his inquiry: 
the Mitchell affidavit presented to Judge Keith, and its 
incompatibility with Title III. He asked Mardian: "do you 
think this affidavit squares with the Safe Streets Act?" 
Mardian responded that the affidavit was only a partial 
justification, and that the in camera submission provided the 
balance. White continued pressing Mardian on the issue:
Does it contain a certification of the Attorney
General that the standards set down by the Safe
Streets Act are complied with?
Mardian responded that the mere signature of the Attorney 
General represented automatic adherence to Title III. 
Justice Marshall had heard enough. He interrupted Mardian, 
asking if the Attorney General's decision to institute 
Surveillance "is.... subject to review by anybody?" Mardian 
began a lengthy discussion concerning how only the Attorney 
General is qualified to interpret the "entire spectrum" of 
intelligence information available, when Marshall again 
interrupted, asking: "Well, let me ask you, does the Federal 
judge take the same oath the Attorney General takes?" Thrown 
off balance, Mardian continued his discussion of how judges 
are "not in a position to determine" whether intelligence is 
needed. He then quoted Professor Telford Taylor's analysis 
concerning how the "Committee of Privy Counselors" in England
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had determined that vesting exclusive power over national 
security surveillance in the hands of a single Minister was 
wise, and protected the privacy of citizens. Mardian 
concluded that the American public's privacy would be better 
protected by leaving the authority over such surveillance "to 
one man, the Attorney General, acting for the President, 
rather than to proliferate it amongst all of the Federal 
sitting justices." Now visibly angry, Marshall interjected: 
"Of course, the Privy Council isn't bound by the Fourth 
Amendment. "I69
Justice White returned to the issue of the Congressional 
statute, the Omnibus Act: "do you rely on the Safe Streets 
Act at all as an authorization?" Answering yes, Mardian 
asserted that the government gained its authority from both 
the Constitution and the Omnibus Act. He then presented a 
lengthy summary of numerous passages from the Constitution 
which, he stressed, conferred power upon the Executive in 
national security areas. He conceded that this enormous 
discretionary Executive power carried with it the possibility 
for abuse, but added: "this is the very essence of our
government." Mardian then reviewed the history of judicial 
review in the U.S., suggesting that the Founding Fathers were 
undecided as to whether the Supreme Court possessed the power 
of judicial review; he added: "I doubt if we can find one 
phrase or word [in the Constitution] which reposes in the
169Ibid. . 2-22.
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Court the power of judicial review." Marshall exploded:
"What about —  you keep ducking the Fourth Amendment! Are
you going to get to it?" Mardian repeated his opening
statement that the Executive was not seeking an exception to
the Fourth Amendment:
We simply suggest that in the area in which he has 
limited and exclusive authority, the President of 
the United States may authorize an electronic 
surveillance, and in those cases it is reasonable.
Marshall responded: "And I  understand your position that if
the President decides its [sic] necessary to bug John Doe's
phone, that's it. There's nothing under the sun John Doe can
do about it?" Mardian answered "if he [the President]
chooses to violate that statute, he might well choose to
violate his oath." Obviously backed into a corner, Mardian
then requested that the remainder of his time be reserved for
rebuttal.170
William Gossett then addressed the Court. "I'm very 
clear on one thing," he began, "the government's case has 
many infirmities, fundamental infirmities." He argued that 
this was the first case in U.S. history where the Executive 
was seeking to legalize what it had known to be illegal for 
more than four decades. Gossett's argument touched upon the 
following points, all of which had been made in the brief he 
and Professor Sofaer had prepared on behalf of Judge Keith: 
(1) section 2511(3) of the Omnibus Act does not confer any
170Ibid. . 22-33.
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additional powers on the President, and the only "national 
security" provision in the statute is for an emergency 
situation, which requires application for a court order 
within 48 hours; (2) though the government attempts to narrow 
the foreign/domestic distinction, no assertion had been made 
that the group in question "has foreign ties nor is 
influenced by foreigners"; and (3) the President, Attorney 
General, and "those who work for him; they're politicians, 
and they should not be given the power to determine how much 
and how long and how great will be the intrusion of private 
citizens." Gossett added "I may trust this
Administration....[but] I'm talking about long, over a 
period.11,71
Kinoy addressed the Court next. He warned that the case 
involved "a claim of executive power so ominous in its 
implications and sweeping in its dimensions that it has 
transformed this appeal into a case which....touches the 
bedrock of our political system." He further stated: "this 
case had become one of those rare cases of peculiar delicacy, 
which call for the historic role of the Court as the ultimate 
interpreter of the Constitution." Then, for thirty 
uninterrupted minutes —  itself unprecedented in Court 
history —  Kinoy outlined the dangers inherent in the 
Mitchell Doctrine:
171 Ibid., 33-50.
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I suggest that we have arrived now in 1972, we've 
already arrived in 1984...[The doctrine is a] 
frank attempt by the Executive to use this case to 
obtain the imprimatur of this Court for a program 
of domestic....espionage and surveillance of 
political opponents unprecedented in our 
history...there's been a great deal of discussion 
today about the security of the Republic and the 
security of the government...Already the subjects 
of the Attorney General's suspicion —  and I use 
that word advisedly —  fall on leaders of the 
Antiwar Movement, black militants, Catholic 
activist pacifists, advocates of the youth 
culture...Now I suggest to the Court would these 
critics [Democratic politicians] be included 
within the scope of this domestic surveillance? 
Unless this program, now loudly proclaimed by the 
Executive, of uncontrolled executive, warrantless, 
open-ended wiretapping of domestic political 
opponents.... is decisively repudiated, not 
sidestepped....the inevitable effect will be...to 
choke and stifle the exercise of First Amendment 
rights by millions of American citizens...this 
Court....must stand resolute now to reject this 
effort to introduce this spectre, this fear which 
erodes the fundamental rights of all Americans.172
The final eighteen minutes of the two-hour proceeding 
were granted to Mardian for his rebuttal. Much of the time 
was used attempting to get the Court, and Keith's attorney, 
Gossett, to view the in camera exhibit, which had been 
"augmented" with Black Panther wiretap logs, ostensibly 
demonstrating "foreign" connections. One Justice argued with 
Mardian concerning why he would be willing to show Gossett 
the logs, while steadfastly refusing to allow Kinoy the same 
courtesy. Mardian then issued a veiled warning that the 
Executive, on its good graces, had openly acknowledged the 
existence of Plamondon's intercepts, but certainly possessed
172Ibid. . 54-68.
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the ability to hide the existence of such surveillance in the
future. He disagreed with Kinoy's suggestion that the
government could use the power it was requesting to monitor
opposing political parties:
Neither this President nor any prior President, to 
my knowledge, has authorized electronic 
surveillance to monitor the activities of an 
opposite political group.
Mardian concluded with Mitchell's earlier assertion that the
Constitution "isn't a suicide pact."173
As the Keith case went before the Supreme Court for 
consideration, the issue of governmental surveillance 
remained prominent in the news. Following Mitchell's remarks 
before the Virginia Bar Association in mid-June, the Nixon 
Administration refrained from discussing the Mitchell 
Doctrine in public. However, the Justice Department and FBI 
continued to speak out concerning the beneficial aspects of 
wiretapping as a law enforcement tool.174 A front-page 
story in the New York Times on May 6, 1972, reported that 
court-approved wiretapping by police and the FBI had risen 37 
percent during 1971, and that twenty states now had 
wiretapping statutes.175 In addition, a highly-publicized 
"FBI Conference," sponsored by Princeton University, featured 
fifty-five prominent journalists, legal scholars, and former
173Ibid. , 71-83.
174Washinaton Post. October 21, 1971, A-6; New York
Times. January 7, 1972, 8.
175New York Times. May 6, 1972, 1.
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Justice Department officials —  all of whom denounced past 
and current FBI surveillance practices. The FBI Director 
declined an invitation to participate.176
Senator Kennedy made headlines in mid-December, when he 
released several months of correspondence between his office 
and Mardian, concerning the extent and duration of 
warrantless wiretaps since the Nixon Administration took 
office. Kennedy's inquiry revealed that "there were from 3.4 
to 9.6 times as many days of listening on warrantless devices 
as there were on devices installed under judicial
authorization." In addition, Kennedy exposed the inaccurate 
information which Mitchell, Hoover, and Nixon had released 
concerning "national security" wiretaps. In all instances 
where the Administration had discussed publicly the total 
number of such surveillances, it had consistently understated 
the actual figures. Also disturbing to Kennedy was the
Justice Department's "'absence of well-defined procedures' to 
promote compliance with the statutes under which executive- 
ordered surveillance was conducted."177
The factor most responsible for keeping the domestic 
surveillance debate in the news during the latter half of
1971 and the first half of 1972, was the prevalence of legal
cases involving wiretapping. As the issue of warrantless
l76Washinqton Post. October 30, 1971, A-2. See also
Theoharis and Cox, The Boss. 426.
177Quoted in New York Times. December 19, 1971, 20.
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domestic wiretaps remained tied up in the courts, pending the 
much-anticipated Keith decision, the Nixon Justice Department 
continued to acknowledge the existence of "national security" 
surveillance in increasing numbers of cases. At the same 
time, defense lawyers, attuned to the atmosphere of public 
concern about warrantless government spying, began utilizing 
this backlash against the Administration's surveillance 
policies, particularly in cases involving anti-war and other 
radical dissenters. Before long, a number of federal judges 
began granting defense attorneys —  rather than the 
government —  the benefit of the doubt, whenever the 
suspicion of surveillance was introduced.
Aside from Keith, the most visible case involving 
wiretapping was the Berrigan trial in Pennsylvania, where 
Sister Jogues Egan of the "East Coast Conspiracy" refused to 
testify before a grand jury, claiming that the government had 
used warrantless surveillance in its preparation of 
questions. When Guy Goodwin and his Justice Department 
attorneys failed to emphatically deny the allegation, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled (5-2) that 
the government could not force her to testify. The case was 
pivotal for defense attorneys across the country.
From this point forward, in cases involving domestic 
dissent, defense attorneys endlessly challenged the
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government over warrantless wiretaps.178 Within a month of 
the Third Circuit's ruling, U.S. District Judge Barrington D. 
Parker handed down an identical decision in a case involving 
a member of the "May Day Collective." He held that a full 
court hearing on the subject of electronic surveillance would 
have to be held prior to defendant Marlene Fishlowitz's 
testimony before a grand jury.179 The government promptly 
appealed, and lost; on July 23, 1971, the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia, in a 2-1 decision, also ruled 
that "the government must reveal in advance whether 
electronic surveillance has been carried out against persons 
subpoenaed to testify before federal grand juries if the 
witness so much as charges that wiretapping has occurred." 
The decision affected Fishlowitz and fellow May Day Tribe 
member Carol Evans.180
Another highly-visible warrantless wiretapping case 
involved the Jewish Defense League [JDL] of New York, in 
which members were charged with the transportation of 
firearms and possession of explosives. In mid-June, 1971,
178New York Times. May 29, 1971, 1. The Justice
Department appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court, and
promptly received a writ of certiorari. In the same case,
the Justice Department admitted it had "probably" overheard 
conversations of a different "East Coast Conspiracy" 
defendant, Sister Elizabeth McAlister, in a warrantless
wiretap. See Washington Post. May 25, 1971, A-8.
179Washinaton Post. June 16, 1971, A-3.
I80Quoted in Washington, D.C. Evening Star. July 24, 
1971, A-35.
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Mitchell acknowledged during a pretrial hearing that the 
government had "overheard” conversations involving Rabbi Meir 
Kahane, the organization's director. The U.S. District Judge 
hearing the case, Jack B. Weinstein, immediately ruled that 
there was "substantial probability" that the wiretap logs 
would "show illegality," and therefore ordered the government 
to make full disclosure to the defense, after consulting with 
"the White House."181 Four months later, Kahane and fifteen 
other members of the JDL filed suit in Federal court, 
charging that Attorney General Mitchell had directed several 
FBI agents to illegally wiretap their telephones.182
Attorneys representing Daniel Ellsberg claimed that the 
government had utilized illegal surveillance in its case 
against him.183 And in yet another government case against 
Abbie Hoffman, alleging that he had crossed state lines to 
incite a riot during the May Day demonstrations, U.S. 
District Judge John Lewis Smith ruled that four of the five 
wiretapped conversations the government submitted in camera 
were illegal. Smith's decision echoed the Keith case: "The 
government has apparently chosen to deal with dissident 
domestic organizations in the same manner as it does with 
hostile foreign powers."184
181Quoted in New York Times. June 25, 1971, 23.
182Washington, D.C. Evening Star. October 8, 1971, A-2.
183New York Daily News. July 16, 1971, 19.
184Quoted in Washington Post. November 25, 1971, B-4.
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The Supreme Court, minus Justice Rehnquist, held its
"Conference Discussion" concerning the Keith case on March 6,
1972, ten days following the oral arguments. Written notes
from four of the Justices have survived, though in
abbreviated form. Summary comments concerning their initial
impressions of the case indicate unanimity on the issue of
affirming the Court of Appeals and Keith. They differed,
however, over what direction the decision should take. Three
Justices —  Burger, Blackmun, and White —  wished to focus
the decision squarely on the statute pertaining to
wiretapping: Title III of the Omnibus Act. The following
comments demonstrate the opinions of four Justices at the
onset of deliberations:
Justice White: Could do it under statute as not
being satisfied. Even on constitutional approval 
the Attorney General's theory of domestic 
subversion is too broad.
Justice Powell: Statute doesn't fit the case,
except portion that says 'nothing in statute shall 
deprive [President] of power he now has.'
Justice Blackmun: Do it on statutory ground if
can be.
Chief Justice Burger: Agree there is some
inherent power in the Executive, but whatever it 
is Congress [failed in] 1968 [to] establish 
guidelines for how that should be exercised. So 
if you can do this on statutory ground, should do 
so [and not touch] constitutional. I'd lean that 
way.185
I85U.S. Supreme Court Docket Sheet, 1971-1972 Term, Case 
No. 70-153, U.S. v. U.S. District Court, et al. Brennan 
Papers, container 420, folder 5.
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On March 6, Chief Justice Burger assigned Justice White 
to write the decision.186 However, as a result of Justice 
William O. Douglas's efforts, the writing of the majority 
decision was soon assigned to newly-appointed Justice Lewis 
F. Powell. On the day of the Conference vote, Douglas wrote 
to Burger, suggesting that since White was in the minority on 
the vote concerning the direction the decision should take, 
perhaps the case should be written by Powell, who "represents 
the consensus." Douglas added that "with all respect....1 am 
sure that Byron, who goes on the statute, will not get a 
[unanimous] court." Douglas felt strongly that in a case of 
such importance, in which all eight of the voting Justices 
were in fundamental agreement opposing the Mitchell Doctrine, 
the majority position —  focusing on the Constitution —  
would be more likely to attain a unanimous decision.187 
Burger responded as follows: "I adhere to my request that 
Byron proceed to write... [but] see no reason why Lewis should 
not undertake to write and see what support his position 
achieves.1,188
,86U .S . Supreme Court, Assignment Sheet, October Term, 
1971, March 6, 1972, located in the Papers of Justice
Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress 
[hereafter "Marshall Papers"], container 75, folder 1, 
"Assignments and Special Lists."
187Letter, Justice William O. Douglas to Chief Justice 
Warren Burger, March 6, 1972, Marshall Papers, container 86, 
folder 6. See Figure 5-3 on page 566.
188Letter, Chief Justice Warren Burger to Justice William 
0. Douglas, March 6, 1972, Marshall Papers, container 86, 
folder 6.
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J8uprnnr CJourt of fljr Jlnilrt Stai/B 
JSaafpngton. |). CJ.
C H A M B E R S  Or
j u s t i c e  w i l l i a m  o. o o u g l a s  March 6, 1972
Dear Chief:
In No. 70-153, U. S. v. U. S. D. C.. I would likfe to make 
a suggestion.
I think the assignment to Byron (much as I love my friend) 
is not an appropriate one for the reason that he and two others 
Including yourself voted to affirm on the statute,, while there were 
five who voted to affirm on the Constitution. Those five were 
Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, myself, and Pcwell.
You will recall that Lewis Powell said that to handle the 
government's problem of searching the country over for an appropriate 
magistrate to issue a warrant, an opinion should be written suggesting 
that the court here in the District of Columbia should handle all 
of the cases, which I thought was a splendid idea.
With all respect, I think Powell represents the consensus.
I have not canvassed everybody, but I am sure that Byron, who goes on 
the statute, will not get a court.
To save time, may I suggest you have a huddle and see to it that 
Powell gets the opinion to write?
Or if you want me to suggest an assignment, that would be mine.
W, 0. D.Cuv
The Chief Justice
(Figure 5-3)
Letter, Justice Douglas to Chief Justice Burger
March 6, 1972 
Recommends Justice Powell Write the Keith Decision
Source: Marshall Papers, Library of Congress
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Douglas then wrote to Powell:
As you know, the Chief and I have had an exchange 
of correspondence on the....case. The vote at 
Conference was to affirm but there were five of us 
who could not do it on the statute but went on the 
Constitution. And according to my notes, you were 
one of the five. Byron, however, was explicit. 
He could not go on the Constitution but would have 
to go on the statute. Traditionally an opinion 
would therefore be in the province of the senior 
Justice [Douglas] to assign. That was not done in 
this case and the matter is of no consequence to 
me as a matter of pride —  but I think it makes a 
tremendous difference in the result. I am writing 
this note, hoping you will put on paper the ideas 
you expressed in Conference and I am sure you will 
get a majority. I gather from the Chief's memo 
that he is not at all averse to that being 
done.189
The first draft of the decision, circulated to the Court on 
March 15, was prepared by Justice White; his second draft was 
circulated on May 5. However, by May 4, Powell's first draft 
had appeared, and apparently had the backing of the 
majority.190 On this day, Douglas wrote to Powell: "I am
happy to join your fine decision in No. 70-153 - United 
States v. U.S. District Court.”191 The same day, Justice
189Letter, Justice William O. Douglas to Justice Lewis F. 
Powell, March 8, 1972, Brennan Papers, container 264, folder 
on case 70-153.
190Drafts of Memorandum Decisions, Case No. 70-153, U.S. 
v. U.S. District Court, et. al.. First Draft of White, March 
3, 1972; Second Draft of White, May 5, 1972; First Draft of 
Powell, May 3, 1972; Third Draft of Powell, May 22, 1972, 
Brennan Papers, container 264, folder for Case No. 70-153.
191Letter, Justice William O. Douglas to Justice Lewis F. 
Powell, May 4, 1972, Marshall Papers, container 86, folder 6. 
Several other documents of this date indicate that another 
Conference meeting probably took place between the eight 
voting Justices, on or immediately prior to May 4. It may
(continued...)
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Stewart wrote to Powell: "I think you have done a fine job in 
this case, and I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court."192
The Keith decision was handed down near the close of the
Court's term, on June 19, 1972. Justice Powell's unanimous
decision began with the statement that the case "is an
important one for the people of our country and their
Government." He continued:
Its resolution is a matter of national concern, 
requiring sensitivity both to the Government's 
right to protect itself from unlawful subversion 
and attack and to the citizen's right to be secure 
in his privacy against unreasonable Government 
intrusion.
After reviewing the history of the case, Powell addressed 
Title III of the Omnibus Act, concluding that Congress, in 
drafting the statute, had been guided by the Katz and Berger 
decisions. Quoting from several sections of Title III —  not 
just section 2511(3), which the government had relied upon —  
Powell concluded that the statute overwhelmingly supported 
prior judicial warrants. Echoing the opinions of Judges 
Ferguson, Keith, and Edwards, he concluded that section
191 (.. .continued) 
have been in this meeting that Powell's draft became the 
majority decision.
I92Letter, Justice Potter Stewart to Justice Lewis F. 
Powell, May 4, 1972, Marshall Papers, container 86, folder 6.
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2511(3) was ''essentially neutral" concerning the President's 
surve i 1 lance power.193
Powell acknowledged that the issue being addressed by 
the Court was "limited" and "narrow," and that it was not 
deciding the constitutionality of Title III itself. Nor was 
it passing judgment regarding "the scope of the President's 
surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign 
powers."194 Therefore, the central issue to be addressed, 
he added, was the one left open in Katz: "'Whether safeguards 
other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy
193U.S. v. U.S. District Court. 407 U.S. 297, 4-8.
Powell addressed section 2511(3) in considerable detail, 
quoting the exchange between Senators McClellan, Holland, and 
Hart on the Senate Floor on May 23, 1968. He concluded that 
in view of Congress' careful attention to the 48-hour 
emergency provision of Title III, which outlines "carefully 
specified conditions" under which warrantless wiretaps can be 
instituted, "it would have been incongruous for Congress to 
have legislated with respect to the important and complex 
area of national security in a single brief and nebulous 
paragraph. This would not comport with the sensitivity of 
the problem involved or with the extraordinary care Congress 
exercised in drafting other sections of the Act. We 
therefore think the conclusion inescapable that Congress only 
intended to make clear that the Act simply did not legislate 
with respect to national security surveillances." Neither 
Powell nor any of the other Justices knew that section 
2511(3) had been largely the idea of J. Edgar Hoover; neither 
could they have known that the passage was specifically 
constructed to be vague, so that a "grey area" in the law 
could be relied upon by the FBI in its continuing use of 
warrantless "national security" wiretaps.
194Ibid., 10-11. Powell agreed with the lower courts
that there was no evidence presented in the case showing any 
involvement, "directly or indirectly," with a foreign power. 
However, in footnote 8 he reiterated his earlier statement, 
dating back to the "tempest in a teapot" article of July, 
1971, that "there are cases where it will be difficult to 
distinguish between 'domestic' and 'foreign' unlawful 
activities...But this is not such a case."
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the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving national 
security.'"195
Powell focused on the history of the "reasonableness"
doctrine concerning the Fourth Amendment, beginning with an
acknowledgment that the President has a "fundamental duty" to
protect the United States from "overthrow.... by unlawful
means," and that in carrying out these duties, he "may find
it necessary to employ electronic surveillance."196 He then
spoke to the temper of the times:
A recognition of these elementary truths does not 
make the employment by Government of electronic 
surveillance a welcome development —  even when 
employed with restraint and under judicial 
supervision. There is, understandably, a deep- 
seated uneasiness and apprehension that this
capability will be used to intrude upon cherished
privacy of law-abiding citizens. We look to the 
Bill of Rights to safeguard this privacy.
Reviewing the history of the Fourth Amendment, Powell
admitted that in national security cases, "the investigative
duty of the executive may be stronger" than in ordinary
cases, but "so also is there greater jeopardy to
constitutionally protected speech." He acknowledged that
because the Fourth Amendment is "not absolute in its terms,"
an examination of the balance between the government's duty
195Ibid., 11.
196Ibid.. 12-13. Powell's decision supported court-
approved wiretapping as a law enforcement tool. He quoted 
Brownell on wiretapping's usefulness, discussed his 
background with the President's Crime Commission in 1968, and 
concluded that "threats and acts of sabotage against the 
Government exist in sufficient number to justify 
investigative powers with respect to them."
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to protect "domestic security" and the privacy rights of 
citizens must be made.
"The question," he continued, "is whether the needs of 
citizens for privacy and free expression may not be better 
protected by requiring a warrant before such surveillance is 
conducted." Powell refused to consider the Fourth 
Amendment's two clauses as separate and distinct, as the 
Court had intimated in the 1950 Rabinowitz decision; instead, 
he cited Chimel v. California (1969), which referred to the 
warrant requirement as not merely "an inconvenience to be 
somehow 'weighed' against the claims of police efficiency." 
He held that the consideration of applications for warrants 
by "neutral and detached" magistrates, based on "probable 
cause," supports "our basic constitutional doctrine that 
individual freedoms will best be preserved through a 
separation of powers and division of functions among the 
different branches and levels of Government."197
Powell next attacked the government's claim that in 
times of heightened social disorder, the Executive Branch 
requires intelligence gathering to prevent acts of violence 
and "subversion"; closely related to this v;ns the argument 
that only the Executive Branch possesses the know-how to
197Ibid., 14-20. Powell dismissed the government's claim 
that the Mitchell Doctrine would allow for "limited" judicial 
review, stating that "post-surveillance review would never 
reach the surveillances which failed to result in 
prosecutions."
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determine whether surveillance is "reasonable." He 
responded:
These contentions....merit the most careful 
consideration. We certainly do not reject them 
lightly, especially at a time when worldwide 
ferment and civil disorders in this country are 
more prevalent than in the less turbulent periods 
of our history.. .But we do not think a case has 
been made for the requested departure from Fourth 
Amendment standards. The circumstances described 
do not justify complete exemption of domestic 
security surveillance from prior judicial 
scrutiny.
Powell also disputed the government's assertion that 
"internal security matters are too subtle and complex for 
judicial evaluation," and, echoing Judge Ferguson, added "If 
the threat is too subtle or complex for our senior law 
enforcement officers to convey its significance to a court, 
one may question whether there is probable cause for 
surveillance." He concluded that the government was 
therefore not exempt from securing warrants in domestic 
surveillance cases, and that whatever burden this process 
places upon law enforcement "is justified in a free society 
to protect constitutional values."198
Powell's ruling was a very limited one. The last few 
pages of the decision were dedicated to the issue of 
"investigative" domestic surveillance, which he clearly 
supported, within the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment's 
warrant requirement:
198Ibid., 21-23. The Court also refused to alter the
Alderman decision, as the government had requested.
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The gathering of security intelligence is often 
long range and involves the interrelation of 
various sources and types of information. The 
exact targets of such surveillance may be more 
difficult to identify than in surveillance 
operations against many types of crime...Often, 
too, the emphasis of domestic intelligence is on 
the prevention of unlawful activity or the 
enhancement of the Government's preparedness for 
some possible future crisis or emergency.
Assuming the role of policy-maker, Powell suggested steps
which Congress might take to allow law enforcement officials
greater leeway to conduct long-term "investigative"
surveillance, while simultaneously abiding by the tenets of
the Keith decision:
Congress may wish to consider protective standards 
[in domestic security cases]...if they are 
reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need 
of Government for intelligence information and the 
protected rights of our citizens. For the warrant 
application may vary according to the governmental 
interest to be enforced...It may be that Congress, 
for example, would judge that the application and 
affidavit showing probable cause need not follow 
the exact requirements of...[Title III] but should 
allege other circumstances more appropriate to 
domestic security cases.
He concluded with a suggestion that "a specially designated
court" —  such as the D.C. District Court or Court of Appeals
—  might be placed in charge of authorizing all such domestic
security wiretap applications, and that the stringent "time
and reporting requirements" of Title III might be relaxed in
these cases.199
199Ibid., 24-25. Congress debated Powell's
recommendation for a separate wiretapping court for six 
years, eventually adopting many of his ideas into the 
"Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act" of 1978.
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Two concurring opinions were filed. Justice White's 
opinion stated: "I would affirm the Court of Appeals on the 
statutory ground urged by respondent Keith....without 
reaching or intimating any views with respect to both the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals." Alluding to his 
questioning of Mardian during the oral argument, White argued 
that regardless of the wording or intent of section 2511(3) 
of Title III, the type of surveillance proposed in Mitchell's 
affidavit was illegal under section 2511(3). He criticized 
both Keith and Edwards for failing to inquire whether the 
challenged wiretaps were illegal under Title III, instead of 
proceeding "directly to the constitutional issue."200
Justice Douglas's concurring opinion went the other way,
focusing squarely on the constitutional dangers presented in
the Mitchell Doctrine. He reviewed the historical tendency
of "police and intelligence agencies," with their "recurring
desire....to employ dragnet techniques to intimidate their
critics," by seeking exceptions from the prohibitions of the
Fourth Amendment. Referring to the large number of cases
before the Court during the term which dealt with
governmental surveillance issues, he asserted:
We are currently in the throes of another national 
seizure of paranoia, resembling the hysteria which 
surrounded the Palmer Raids, and the McCarthy era. 
Those who register dissent or who petition their 
governments for redress are subjected to scrutiny
200Ibid., White's Concurring Opinion, 3-6. White's 
opinion in this respect was very similar to that of Judge 
Weick's dissent in the Sixth Circuit.
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by grand juries, by the FBI, or even by the 
military. Their associates are interrogated. 
Their homes are bugged and their telephones are 
wiretapped. They are befriended by secret 
government informers. Their patriotism and 
loyalty are questioned.
Douglas added that "We have as much to fear from the erosion
of our sense of privacy and independence by the omnipresent
electronic ear of the Government as we do from the likelihood
that fomenters of domestic upheaval will modify our form of
governing," and concluded that had the case been decided in
the negative, "then the federal intelligence machine would
literally enjoy unchecked discretion."201
In their analyses of the 1974 U.S. v. Nixon case, 
constitutional law professor Alan F. Westin and journalist J. 
Anthony Lukas state that the Supreme Court's unanimous 8-0 
decision, with Rehnquist abstaining, was the product of tough 
negotiation between the liberal and conservative wings of the 
Court. It was also a product of the leadership of Chief 
Justice Burger. Westin asserts that the principal challenge 
Burger faced in the case "was to find a way to unite behind 
one unanimous opinion....thus putting the greatest weight of 
judicial authority behind the Court's ruling, earning the 
greatest support from the public, and applying the greatest 
pressure on the President to comply with such a 'definitive
201 Ibid., Douglas' Concurring Opinion, 2-9.
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ruling.'"202 Lukas agrees, adding that Burger's decision 
"had the ring of a heavily 'negotiated' settlement."203
The Keith decision was also a "negotiated 
settlement."204 The 5-3 vote which had divided the Court 
during its March 6 Conference was ultimately smoothed over, 
thanks to the following factors: (1) the close personal
involvement of Justice Douglas, who obviously took a great 
interest in the case; (2) the willingness of Chief Justice 
Burger to cooperate, by allowing Powell to write a decision, 
after he had assigned the case to White; and (3) the 
willingness of Justices Powell and Brennan to work out a 
potentially serious disagreement. Following the circulation 
of Powell's "First Draft," Justice Brennan stated that he was 
"considerably disturbed" by footnote 20, in which Powell 
outlined the position of the ABA Standards Committee 
regarding the possibility that warrantless surveillance might 
be constitutional in the area of "foreign intelligence."
202Leon Friedman, Compiler, United States v. Nixon: The 
Complete Case. (New York: Chelsea House, 1974), xv-xvi.
Westin's introduction further states that Burger's decision 
sounded like "the cool lecture on constitutional fundamentals 
that a rather pedantic school master might deliver to a pupil 
who has handed in a very poor paper on the constitutional 
fundamentals of the American system." Many aspects of 
Powell's decision were similarly "cool," and focused on the 
fundamental constitutional issues involved, while avoiding, 
for the most part, references to both a society gone mad [the 
Government's position] and a Government dedicated to chilling 
dissent [the respondents' position].
203Lukas, Nightmare. 517.
204Chief Justice Burger stated that he concurred "only in 
the result."
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Justice Douglas intervened, writing a letter to Powell, in 
which he related his impression's of Brennan's concerns, and 
expressed his hope "that you could find some way to satisfy 
Bill Brennan so as to bring him into the opinion. It would 
be fine if this could be wholly unanimous."205 In response, 
Powell modified the contents of the footnote to state: "For 
the view that warrantless surveillance, though impermissible 
in domestic security cases, may be constitutional where 
foreign powers are involved see... [etc. ]. 1,206 The changes 
satisfied Brennan, who told Powell that they met "completely" 
his concerns. Brennan then made "one more suggestion" —  
that Powell modify his lengthy passages supporting 
wiretapping as an effective law enforcement tool.207 
Powell's statements were so similar to the government's brief 
that Brennan inquired "Am I correct in believing that those
205Letter, Justice William O. Douglas to Justice Lewis 
Powell, May 4, 1972, Douglas Papers, container 1553, Opinion 
No. 70-153. Douglas' letter indicates that Brennan saw the 
potential for great abuse. He may have been concerned that 
Powell's footnote might subsequently be utilized as a 
justification for the government to initiate warrantless 
wiretapping against citizens with the most casual
affiliations with "foreign" nationals. Brennan may have been 
guided by what had occurred in the Katz case: Justice 
Stewart's footnote and Justice White's concurring opinion 
regarding "national security" surveillance had become major 
tenets of the Administration's defense of the Mitchell 
Doctrine.
206U.S. v. U.S. District Court. 407 U.S. 297, 23-24.
207Draft of Memorandum Decisions, Case No. 70-153, U.S. 
v. U.S. District Court, et. al.. First Draft of White, March 
3, 1972, Brennan Papers, container 264, folder for Case No. 
70-153. It was pages 13 and 14 of the First Draft that 
Brennan objected to.
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paragraphs are a summary of the Government's justification 
for the asserted authority?"208 Powell stood his ground, 
arguing that his experiences with the President's Commission 
had convinced him that "controlled surveillance is in the 
public interest." He also cited the Annual Title III Reports 
to Congress as evidence of the effectiveness of wiretapping. 
Yet, he did agree to modify the wording of several passages, 
to "make them relatively neutral."209 These changes 
satisfied Brennan, who informed Powell: "Your proposed
accommodation is entirely satisfactory."210
The media reported the decision as a "great surprise." 
The New York Times called it a "stunning legal setback" for 
the Administration, while the New York Daily News termed it 
"a major rebuff."211 Many of the persons most directly 
involved were shocked. "It was almost impossible to believe" 
recalls Kinoy; for Kunstler, it was "a monumental
208Letter, Justice William A. Brennan to Justice Lewis F. 
Powell, May 18, 1972, Brennan Papers, container 264, Case No. 
70-153.
209Letter, Justice Lewis F. Powell to Justice William A. 
Brennan, May 19, 1972, Brennan Papers, container 264, Case 
No. 70-153.
210Letter, Justice William A. Brennan to Justice Lewis F. 
Powell, May 19, 1972, Brennan Papers, container 264, Case No. 
70-153.
211New York Times. June 20, 1972, 1; New York Daily News. 
June 20, 1972, 2.
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victory.1,212 The first Nixon Administration spokesperson to 
respond was newly-appointed Attorney General Richard 
Kleindienst, who "directed the termination of all electronic 
surveillance in cases involving security that conflict with 
the Court's opinion."213 In a press conference three days 
after the decision, Nixon refused to refer to the Mitchell 
Doctrine as "this Administration's policy"; he called 
attention to past Presidents' surveillance practices, and 
avowed that since the Kennedy era "the number of taps has 
gone down." Attempting "spin control," he noted that the 
decision "simply prohibits wiretapping unless there is a 
court order" —  as if the destruction of the Mitchell 
Doctrine did not bother him at all.214
One indication that the Administration was indeed very 
bothered by the decision was the number of cases it
dismissed, rather than disclose the contents of surveillance 
logs of warrantless wiretaps —  which it had freely admitted 
initiating against anti-war, Black Power, and counterculture
212Arthur Kinoy, Rights On Trial. 33; Kunstler, Mv Life 
as a Radical Lawyer. 208. Edith Lapidus, in Eavesdropping on 
Trial (page 102), states that the press "treated the
decision.... almost as a personal triumph" for Judge Keith.
213New York Times. June 20, 1972, 1. Mitchell had just 
stepped down as Attorney General, so that he could run
Nixon's reelection campaign. On June 29 the Justice
Department reported that it had discontinued all "national 
security" surveillances in cases involving U.S. citizens, 
except for three cases, which, the government contended, 
involved "groups.... somehow linked with foreign 
organizations." Quoted in New York Times. June 30, 1972, 17.
2l4New York Times. June 23, 1972, 14.
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groups. One of the first to be abandoned was the White 
Panther CIA Conspiracy Trial in Detroit, which Judge Keith 
dismissed "with prejudice" on July 28. Soon thereafter, 
cases against Yippies, Black Panthers, Weathermen, and a 
variety of other Movement groups were also dropped.
Like the Nixon case two years later, the Keith decision 
was a "definitive" repudiation of a Nixon Administration 
attempt to bypass or ignore judicial review of its actions. 
Historically, Executive claims of authority have rarely been 
turned back by the Judiciary.215 As Marc Stickgold argues, 
a vast majority of American judges had traditionally ruled on 
the security end of the "rights-security spectrum."216 The
215Westin, in United States v. Nixon (pages xviii-xix) 
states that research conducted by Professor Glendon Schubert 
demonstrates that between 1790 and 1956, of the 800-odd cases 
in the federal and state courts which "dealt with questions 
of presidential power," only thirty-eight rulings "held 
presidential orders to be invalid, with only fourteen of 
these rulings coming from the United States Supreme Court." 
In addition, only two of the thirty-eight rulings invalidated 
"a major program or policy of the Executive."
216Stickgold, "Yesterday's Paranoia is Today's Reality," 
883-85. Stickgold adds: "In confronting constitutional
attacks on police surveillance of political activity, courts 
(or judges) initially make a significant value choice, 
between first amendment rights and public or state security, 
and then employ almost automatically a complex of 
presumptions about police and citizen behavior." It is 
Stickgold's contention that increasing revelations of 
unwarranted police surveillance of First Amendment activity, 
in this case the Detroit Red Squad, contributes to 
"enlightened judicial attitudes" concerning law enforcement 
surveillance; in other words, judges are less anxious to 
"take the police at their word," and increasingly hand down 
decisions closer to the rights end of the "rights-security 
spectrum."
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Keith case was among the first instances where the Supreme 
Court had acted to curtail presidential claims of authority 
since the 1952 steel seizure case (Youngstown). The Court's 
rejection of the Mitchell Doctrine was rooted in the public's 
strong opposition to the increasing prevalence of government, 
law enforcement, and military surveillance in the domestic 
sphere, as well as in the Constitution's "checks and 
balances." Heightened public concern over domestic 
wiretapping and other surveillance was exacerbated by the 
Nixon Administration's audacious "law and order" campaign. 
At the same time, a steady reduction in social disorder made 
the Administration's actions against dissenters appear all 
the more "repressive." Mitchell's Justice Department did 
little to allay the public's fears, preferring to look "tough 
on crime." The strategy backfired in the Keith case. A 
Court, in which the majority of Justices were not at all 
sympathetic with the counterculture or the values it 
represented, voted unanimously to uphold the "primacy of 
warrants" in Fourth Amendment cases involving domestic 
surveillance. Why they did so is suggested in the following 
passage from Justice White's decision in U.S. v. White 
(1971):
Monitoring, if prevalent, certainly kills free 
discourse and spontaneous utterances. Free 
discourse —  a First Amendment value —  may be 
frivolous or serious, humble or defiant, 
reactionary or revolutionary, profane or in good 
taste; but it is not free if there is
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surveillance...Free discourse liberates the 
spirit, though it may produce only froth.217
An additional point is found in a statement made by William
Gossett in early 1972, as he was preparing for his oral
argument in Keith. When queried as to why a corporate
attorney of his stature, with a strong involvement in the
Republican Party of Michigan, had gotten into this kind of a
case, he replied:
I am a conservative, and I believe in conserving 
the fundamental values of the Constitution.218
217Quoted in Lapidus, Eavesdropping on Trial. 32.
2I8Quoted in Kinoy, Rights On Trial. 17.
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Chapter Six 
Cycles of Wiretapping "Reform"
The crescendo of improper intelligence activity in 
the latter part of the 1960s and the early 1970s 
shows what we must watch out for: In time of 
crisis, the Government will exercise its power to 
conduct domestic intelligence activities to the 
fullest extent. The distinction between legal 
dissent and criminal activity is easily forgotten.
—  Church Committee Final Report, 19761
The tragic bombing of the Murrah Federal Building 
in Oklahoma City on April 19 th stands as a 
challenge to all Americans to preserve a safe 
society...we must ensure that law enforcement 
authorities have the legal tools and resources 
they need to fight terrorism...My legislation will 
provide an effective and comprehensive response to 
the threat of terrorism. —  President Clinton, 
19952
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 's well- 
known dictum "Great cases may only make bad law" certainly 
applies, in several respects, to the Keith decision.3 The 
decision did not end the debate concerning the citizen's 
right to privacy versus the government's right to protect 
internal security. The proper role that electronic 
surveillance should play in "domestic security"
'Church Committee Final Report, Book II, 289.
2U.S. Newswire. May 4, 1995, "Letter from the President 
to Congress on Antiterrorism Amendments Act of 1995," [White 
House Press Release].
3Quoted in Ungar, The Papers & the Papers. 224.
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investigations continued to be debated during the decades 
following Keith, as cycles of intelligence agency abuse and 
reform repeated each other.
Since the notorious "Red Scare" Palmer Raids following 
World War I, tension has existed between the constitutional 
rights of citizens and the nation's intelligence and law 
enforcement community. A cyclical pattern of abuse and 
reform has characterized this relationship. Typically, each 
cycle has contained three phases: lethargy, abuse, and
reform. Long periods of public apathy are followed by 
revelations of domestic surveillance. The degree of public 
concern is critical in determining where the cycle reaches a 
"reform" phase. Because Congress typically reacts to events, 
rather than anticipating them, a public outcry is generally 
required before extensive Congressional and/or Executive 
Branch investigations are conducted. Regardless of the party 
in power, the natural tendency within the Justice Department 
is to attempt damage control by pledging to do better.
When simple assurances from the President and the 
Attorney General are insufficient, Congressional 
investigations commence, the national press begins its own 
probe of abuses, and a reform phase begins. The duration of 
reform varies according to the level of public disgust, the 
willingness of the press to keep surveillance abuse in the 
headlines, and the speed with which Congress and the 
Executive Branch act to "correct" the situation. Periods of
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reform are usually brief, as the public and press quickly 
lose interest. Often, the Executive Branch places great 
pressure on Congress to wrap up its investigations as quickly 
as possible, "for the good of the nation." Congress forgives 
and forgets, and the public returns to a state of lethargy. 
Rarely, if ever, have the statutes and guidelines enacted 
during periods of reform prevented the intelligence 
bureaucracy from renewing illegal surveillance practices 
during a later era.
The pattern of lethargy-abuse-reform has occurred at 
least three times during this century: as a result of the 
"Red Scare" of 1919, the post-World War II era of 
"McCarthyism, " and the COINTELPRO/Watergate period. The most 
recent cycle was unique, in several respects. The special 
circumstances of the early to mid seventies, including the 
discovery of FBI, CIA, Army and other abuses, coming at the 
onset of the Watergate crisis, extended the reform era for 
nearly a decade (1971-1980) —  an unprecedented occurrence.4 
An additional reason for the longevity of the seventies 
reform era was the long period of lethargy which preceded it. 
During the fifties and sixties, when America's Cold War fears 
peaked, intelligence agencies enjoyed substantial public
4Others have argued that the "reform" process did not 
start until the revelations of Watergate in 1973 and 1974. 
However, the beginnings of reform can be traced to 1971, 
after Hoover "officially" ended COINTELPRO, and Senator Sam 
Ervin's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights revealed the 
Army's domestic intelligence abuses. The Keith decision the 
following year is another example of pre-Watergate reform.
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support, protected by a total secrecy that the media dared 
not penetrate.
Some of the defining characteristics of the most recent 
"reform" cycle were: (1) a steady build-up of revelations of 
illegal intelligence agency surveillance of citizens, 
beginning with the Black case in 1965, and continuing through 
the Nixon years; (2) the Watergate crisis, which brought to 
light many of the Nixon Administration's improper wiretapping 
and surveillance practices; (3) the first truly extensive 
Congressional investigations of intelligence agency practices 
in U.S. history; (4) the implementation of intelligence 
reforms via Executive Orders from Presidents Ford and Carter, 
as well as new domestic intelligence guidelines from Attorney 
General Edward H. Levi; and (5) Congress' passage of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, which, after 
more than four years of debate, made statutory the principal 
components of the Keith decision.
When President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, the 
nation entered a time of quietude, accompanied by the 
reversal of many Watergate-era intelligence reforms. With 
President George Bush's election in 1988, new revelations of 
abuses surfaced, the two most significant being the "Iran- 
Contra Affair" and the COINTELPRO-like surveillance and 
harassment of domestic groups opposed to U.S. foreign policy 
in Central America, especially the "Committee in Solidarity 
with the People of El Salvador" (CISPES). Abuses suggested
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that intelligence operatives had already forgotten the 
excesses of the 1960s.
Yet more recent events, such as the World Trade Center 
and Oklahoma City bombings, have created an anti-terrorism 
atmosphere in the country, which may lead to a lessening of 
restrictions on the FBI and other intelligence agencies. The 
eagerness of both the Clinton Administration and the 104th 
Congress to respond to the "terrorist threat" provides ample 
indication that politicians have forgotten the lessons of the 
1970s.
The reform phase of the seventies was in some ways 
unique. The combination of Watergate and a steady stream of 
revelations concerning Cold War intelligence agency abuses 
resulted in the first thorough examination of the 
surveillance practices of the FBI, CIA, NSA, Military 
Intelligence, and other government agencies possessing 
intelligence capabilities. Yet, Nixon and Ford
Administrations' opposition to Congressional "barriers" to 
Executive Branch surveillance practices delayed the 
legislative enactment of Keith for over four years.
Justice Lewis Powell's June, 1972, decision encouraged 
Congress to enact immediately legislation codifying the 
ruling. Powell hoped the unanimous decision refuting the 
Mitchell Doctrine would convince America's public that the 
government was not eavesdropping at will on private 
communications. He also hoped that Congress would relax the
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Title III restrictions on "foreign intelligence" 
surveillance, to allow the FBI easier access to warrants for 
"investigative" wiretaps. Congress in fact took six years to 
respond.
Nixon dragged his feet too. After declaring that his 
Administration would fully comply with Keith, he noted his 
opposition to "corrective legislation" on the topic.5 His 
reasoning may have been related to Powell's other suggestion 
in Keith; the Executive Branch possesses as-yet-undefined, 
"inherent national security" surveillance powers in 
situations involving "foreign powers and/or their agents." 
Within a month of the Keith decision, Attorney General 
Kleindienst acknowledged that several warrantless wiretaps 
were being instituted against Americans "somehow linked" with 
foreign powers.6 This action demonstrated that the 
Administration was again prepared to take full advantage of 
a "gray area" in the law to preserve its "national security" 
surveillance powers. As long as Congress refused to enact 
the Keith decision via statute, or to define the parameters 
of "foreign intelligence," the Executive Branch and its 
expansive intelligence bureaucracy remained free to continue 
wiretapping without warrant any American who was "somehow 
linked" with foreign nations.
5New York Times. June 23, 1972, 14. Nixon made the
announcement during a news conference on June 22.
6New York Times. June 30, 1972, 17.
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Following Keith, the Judiciary also moved slowly to 
enact "barriers" to the Executive's intelligence gathering 
powers. A week after Keith, the Court handed down its 
decision in Laird v. Tatum, which involved the Army's 
domestic surveillance abuses. The 5-4 ruling, written by 
Chief Justice Burger, held that a citizen's constitutional 
rights are not abridged merely by the existence of 
governmental surveillance; standing to sue depended upon 
proving that some specific injury had occurred as a result of 
the surveillance.7 The following year, the Supreme Court let 
stand a decision from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, 
which held that warrants are not required in cases involving 
U.S. citizens acting as "agents of foreign powers."8 The 
resulting state of affairs was not conducive to rebuilding 
public confidence in government.
7408 U.S. 1, 92 S. Ct. 2318, 33 L. Ed. 2d. 154, June 26, 
1972. See New York Times. June 27, 1972, 1. Considerable 
controversy surrounded the decision, focusing on the refusal 
of Justice Rehnquist to abstain in a case in which he might 
have had direct dealings, while in the position of Assistant 
Attorney General. Rehnquist also participated in two other 
cases involving a possible conflict of interest. All three 
were decided by a single vote. These facts indicate that he 
would have made every effort to participate in Keith, had the 
Senate Judiciary Committee failed to question him vigorously 
regarding his involvement with the Mitchell Doctrine during 
the confirmation process. For additional details on the 
Rehnquist controversy in Laird v. Tatum, see New York Times. 
October 11, 1972, 1; and October 12, 1972, 46. The original 
attorneys in the case were still attempting to attain a 
rehearing in the mid-eighties.
8U.S. v. Butenco. 494 F. 2d 593 (3rd Cir. 1973) . See 
Monrad G. Paulson, The Problems of Electronic Surveillance. 
(Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1977), 111-18.
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Of course Watergate helps place things in a different 
context. The crisis monopolized the Legislative Branch's 
attention from the spring of 1973 through Nixon's resignation 
in August of 1974. Nixon's unwillingness to respect 
Congressional and Judicial "barriers" to Executive power 
ultimately brought about his forced resignation. Had 
Congressional impeachment proceedings occurred, illegal 
wiretapping and other surveillance practices would have been 
a prominent part of alleged "high crimes and misdemeanors." 
In 1974, during the peak of the crisis, the Administration 
even resurrected the Mitchell Doctrine's "inherent right" 
defense to justify both past wiretapping practices, as well 
as the FBI's domestic surveillance authority.
Executive claims of "inherent power" continued into the 
Ford Administration. In 1975, during the trial of John 
Ehrlichman for his involvement with the "Plumbers'" 1971 
break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, the 
Justice Department "publicly asserted the power of the 
Executive Branch to conduct warrantless surreptitious entries 
unconnected with the use of electronic surveillance." The 
District of Columbia Circuit Court rejected this argument9
Throughout the Watergate period, the FBI continued to 
monitor suspected domestic radicals and to implement 
COINTELPRO-style actions against them, despite Hoover's 
"official" abolition of COINTELPRO in April of 1971.
9Church Committee Final Report, Book II, 131-35.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
591
Organizations such as the American Indian Movement (AIM), 
Socialist Workers Party (SWP), and the Symbionese Liberation 
Army (SLA) were wiretapped and infiltrated by agents 
provocateurs: several had their offices broken into by FBI 
"black bag" squads.10 The disarray which characterized the 
Bureau in the aftermath of Hoover's death was soon corrected 
by the new Director, Clarence Kelley, who paid lip service to 
reform by promising a new emphasis on "quality over quantity" 
in domestic intelligence gathering. Despite Kelley's 
assurances, the Bureau refused Senator Ervin access to its 
files, and submitted only innocuous records in response to a 
GAO review. The recently published memoirs of career agent 
M. Wesley Swearingen demonstrate that between 1973 and 1975, 
the Los Angeles Field Office continued to open tens of 
thousands of investigative files on individuals guilty of 
nothing more than being on the receiving end of telephone 
calls from organizations under investigation. "Those 
innocent individuals," Swearingen attests, "will never be 
able to obtain a job with the U.S. or any state government, 
and they will never know why they were rejected for 
employment, unless they request their file under the Freedom
10Churchill and Vander Wall, The Cointelpro Papers. 52-4; 
Blackstock, Cointelpro. xi; Halperin, et. al., The Lawless 
State. 240. Churchill and Vander Wall's Agents of Repression 
is particularly useful concerning the FBI's operations 
against AIM during the mid-seventies, long after COINTELPRO 
was supposed to have been discontinued.
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of Information Act."11 In fact, it was through the Freedom 
of Information Act, revised and updated in 1974, that 
journalist Carl Stern acquired the first substantive proof of 
the full scope of the FBI's COINTELPRO programs.12
Following the resignation of Nixon in August of 1974, 
President Ford and Attorneys General William B. Saxbe and 
Edward H. Levi (who replaced Saxbe on February 7, 1975) faced 
a movement in Congress to reform the nation's intelligence 
agencies. The following year, Ford created the so-called 
"Rockefeller Commission," which included Nelson Rockefeller, 
Erwin Griswold, and Ronald Reagan, among others, to 
investigate the improper practices of the CIA within the 
United States. The Commission's "Report to the President" 
disclosed the agency's "CHAOS" program, which monitored 
domestic dissent during the late sixties and early 
seventies.13
Ford found himself in a very awkward position. He 
favored keeping the intelligence agencies' abuses secret, but 
nonetheless recognized the public's concern with surveillance 
issues. His Administration opposed the sweeping reform
nM. Wesley Swearingen, FBI Secrets; An Agent's Expose. 
(Boston: South End Press, 1995), 97-99.
12James K. Davis, Spying on America: The FBI's Domestic 
Counterintelligence Program. (New York: Praeger, 1992), 162- 
64.
13"Report to the President by the Commission on CIA 
Activities Within the United States," (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, June, 1975).
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legislation introduced by Senator Ervin ("Watergate
Reorganization and Reform Act"), while allowing the
Rockefeller Commission's report to become public, against the 
wishes of several Commission members.14 By early 1976, Ford 
recognized that he stood little chance of being elected that 
year without initiating additional reforms of the
surveillance practices of the FBI and other intelligence 
agencies. The result was new domestic surveillance 
guidelines issued by Attorney General Levi, as well as Ford's 
Executive Order 11905.
Levi's guidelines, issued March 10, 1976, represented 
the first serious attempt by the U.S. Government to settle 
the so-called "intelligence versus evidence debate"
concerning domestic security investigations by law
enforcement entities, which had been part of the American 
criminal justice system since the advent of electronic 
surveillance. Did the opening of domestic security
investigations require "probable cause," and if so, what 
"threshold activity" was required to meet this standard? Was 
mere advocacy of intent to break the law sufficient? Or, did 
law enforcement have to wait for the commission of specific 
unlawful acts to initiate investigations? The Smith Act of 
1950 had declared that mere advocacy of criminal intent was 
justiciable in a court of law. The Supreme Court struck down 
this position in 1957, in the Yates and Jencks decisions.
14Kurland, Watergate and the Constitution. 190-95.
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Thereafter, Hoover continued to base his investigations on 
"mere advocacy," but hid the practice. He dared not reveal 
much of what he knew in a court of law, for fear that the 
Court would exclude all evidence based on the improper 
investigation (as had happened in the Black and Coplon 
cases).
Many of the Warren Court's decisions, including Katz and 
Berger, found that domestic security investigations require 
probable cause. The Nixon Administration opposed this dictum 
in its Keith briefs, arguing that the standards for probable 
cause cannot apply to domestic "national security" 
investigations, because the dangers posed by "domestic 
subversives" are too great; if the government were held to 
the probable cause requirement, Nixon argued, by the time it 
had gathered sufficient information concerning a group's 
intentions, bombs could go off or the nation could be 
attacked.15 Although Keith established the primacy of 
warrants in domestic intelligence cases involving electronic 
surveillance, it did not settle the intelligence/evidence 
debate.
The Levi guidelines affected FBI operations in a number 
of ways. Three levels of domestic security investigations 
were created: preliminary, limited, and full. The guiding 
principle was that a "criminal predicate" was required for 
domestic intelligence investigations. FBI field offices were
15Keith Case, Brief for the United States, SCR/B.
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empowered to open preliminary investigations on their own 
initiative, based on "allegations and other information" that 
an individual or group may engage in activities that will 
involve the use of force or violence. Because this was 
perilously close to the old "mere advocacy" standard, the 
agents were limited to "less intrusive" investigative 
methods, such as examining publicly-available information, 
searching Bureau records and indexes, conducting physical 
surveillance, and interviewing persons believed to be 
associated with the individual or group. In order to advance 
to the next level of "limited investigation," written 
authorization was required from a SAC or from Headquarters. 
The most important technique at this level was the 
recruitment and placement of informers. Wiretapping was 
still prohibited. No preliminary or limited investigation 
could exceed ninety days, although extensions could be 
applied for in writing.
The third and most intrusive level, "full 
investigation," required the approval of Headquarters, and 
was only to be authorized "on the basis of specific and 
articulable facts giving reason to believe that an individual 
or a group is or may be engaged in activities which involve 
the use of force or violence and which involve or will 
involve the violation of federal law." Agents could use 
"mail covers," whereby the exterior covers of a targeted 
individual or group's incoming mail were photo-duplicated by
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agents. Agents could also request court approval for 
electronic surveillance. In accordance with Keith,
warrantless wiretapping was prohibited in all cases involving 
U.S. citizens. Strict "minimization1' standards were outlined 
concerning the monitoring of attorney-client conversations; 
agents were required to turn off the monitoring equipment, so 
as to not "taint" the government's possible case against the 
target(s). Levi's guidelines also authorized the Justice
Department to review all full investigations at least once a 
year, via a newly-created "Investigative Review Unit."16
The other important reform of 1976 was Ford's Executive 
Order 11905, issued on February 18. New guidelines were 
issued, affecting the entire intelligence community. These 
required that all intelligence operations be authorized by 
agency heads, and be "subject to approval and review of 
personnel directly responsible to the President."17 Ford 
says that Levi was primarily responsible for drafting these 
guidelines as well.18
Although Levi's guidelines represented a significant 
shift toward the "evidence" side of the intelligence-evidence 
debate, the Ford Administration received a great deal of
16Levi Guidelines, Justice Department Press Release, 
March 10, 1976; see A. Stephen Boyan, Jr., comp.,
Constitutional Aspects of Watergate, vol. 5, (Dobbs Ferry, 
NY: Oceana Publications, 1979), 287-94; see also Morgan,
Domestic Intelligence. 57-8.
17Quoted in Theoharis, Spying on Americans. 23 5.
18Telephone interview with author, July 13, 1992.
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criticism for enacting its "reforms" solely within the 
Executive Branch, rather than via legislation.19 Ford 
states that while his Administration did seek "reformist 
legislation," the "atmosphere in Congress" was not right.20 
Since the Pike Committee in the House, and the Church 
Committee in the Senate, were both investigating these same 
issues at the time, it is fair to assume that Ford opted for 
unilateral Executive action out of concern that the only 
legislation likely to receive Congressional approval in the 
post-Watergate "reform" atmosphere of 1975-1976 would have 
restricted too much the practices of the FBI and the 
intelligence community.
The Church Committee's investigation of intelligence 
agency abuses ran from January 27, 1975 through April 26, 
1976. After examining thousands of heretofore top secret 
documents, the Committee issued a "Final Report" —  a harsh 
indictment of American Cold War intelligence abuses.21 The 
inguiry was facilitated by the powerful new Freedom of 
Information Act, which allowed the committee unprecedented
I9See Halperin, et. al., The Lawless State. 244-54; and 
Theoharis, Spying on Americans. 235-36. Two of the more 
common criticisms include the vague wording of Levi's 
guidelines, as well as Ford's unwillingness to ban all 
intelligence agencies except the FBI from operating within 
the United States.
20Telephone interview with author, July 13, 1992.
21Every credible historical account of U.S. surveillance 
policy since 1976 has relied, to a significant degree, on the
Church Committee's Final Report. The original committee 
files will be opened to researchers in 1995 and 1996.
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access to the inner workings of America's secret intelligence
community. As Athan Theoharis asserts, the internal security
bureaucracy's traditional "posture of defiance" concerning
Congressional inquiries became "politically untenable.1,22
Senator Frank Church was critical of the Administration's
continued reliance upon "inherent power" justifications for
domestic security investigations.23 The committee's Final
Report included ninety-six specific recommendations; number
44 states that the FBI should be prohibited from opening
domestic intelligence investigations based solely on "mere
advocacy" of illegal acts.24 The report continued:
The Committee's approach to FBI domestic security 
investigations is...that the FBI should only 
conduct criminal investigations...the Committee 
would only permit intelligence investigations with 
respect to foreign intelligence activity and 
terrorism.
Church also criticized the Levi guidelines for authorizing 
investigations aimed at "subversives," a term which he deemed 
"so vague as to constitute a license to investigate almost
“Theoharis, Spying on Americans. 118.
“Such an inquiry might never happen again. The CIA's 
practice of leaving no "paper trail" during the Iran-Contra 
affair of the mid-1980s is a case in point. With increasing 
amounts of the government's communications now going out over 
computers and electronic on-line networks, the process of 
hiding secret files and information has been greatly 
facilitated.
24This recommendation mirrored Judge Keith's position 
that domestic groups such as the White Panthers have the 
constitutional right to advocate revolution and overthrow of 
government, and that the FBI cannot legally investigate them 
until they cross the threshold from words to illegal acts.
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any activity of practically any group that actively opposes 
the administration in power." The report concluded that "now 
is the time for Congress to turn its attention to legislating 
restraints upon intelligence activities which may endanger 
the constitutional rights of Americans."25
While Congress debated a variety of intelligence-related 
bills, the Judiciary delivered several important decisions. 
In 1975, the Supreme Court let stand the D.C. Circuit's 
ruling in Zweibon v. Mitchell, the Jewish Defense League's 
suit against the former Attorney General. The decision, 
which relied heavily upon Keith, declared that court orders 
shall be required in all instances where wiretaps are 
utilized against U.S. citizens, regardless of their 
association with "foreign powers," unless the FBI has 
concrete proof that the subjects are agents or 
"collaborators" of foreign nations.26 That same year, in 
White v. Davis, the California Supreme Court ruled that under 
certain circumstances a citizen may bring suit successfully 
against the government for law enforcement surveillance of 
First Amendment activity. Although the ruling did not 
directly challenge Laird v. Tatum, it did represent an 
"expansive judicial view" of citizens' rights concerning 
governmental surveillance practices. According to Marc
“Church Committee Final Report, Book II, 318-21, 289.
26516 F 2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see Paulson, The
Problems of Electronic Eavesdropping. 98-111.
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Stickgold, these two decisions represented the Judiciary's 
shift toward the "rights" end of the "rights-security" 
spectrum.27
Evidence of reform was visible in other quarters as 
well. In 1975, under orders from Attorney General Levi, the 
FBI instituted its "Victim Notification Plan," contacting 
tens of thousands of Americans who had been targeted in 
COINTELPRO investigations. The resulting flood of Freedom of 
Information Act requests for personal and group files kept 
FBI agents busy for years.28 By 1977, both houses of 
Congress abolished their "Internal Security" Committees, and 
established permanent "Intelligence Oversight Committees."29 
Numerous lawsuits were filed against local and national 
government officials, alleging that the FBI and urban "red 
squad" surveillance programs of the sixties and early 
seventies had abridged constitutional rights. As Frank 
Donner states, a "retreat from political intelligence 
operations" was underway.30
One of the many damage suits against the government 
during the period was Sinclair, et al. v. Kleindienst. et
^Morgan, Domestic Intelligence. 119-20; see also 
Stickgold, "Yesterday's Paranoia...," 890-91.
280ne of the agents who processed these requests was M. 
Wesley Swearingen. See FBI Secrets. 105, 158-60.
29The Church Committee had specifically recommended these 
oversight committees in its "Final Report."
30Donner, Protectors of Privilege. 346-7.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
601
al., filed by former WPP leaders Sinclair, Plamondon, and 
Forrest on March 29, 1973.31 The countersuit, which was
argued by attorneys with the Center for Constitutional Rights 
in New York and the Constitutional Litigation Center in New 
Jersey, alleged that several high-ranking government 
officials (including Nixon, Hoover, and Mitchell) instituted 
"illegal surveillance" of the WPP and conducted a "bad faith 
criminal prosecution" in the CIA Conspiracy case. The case 
moved at a glacial pace through the courts for the next 
seventeen years.32
31645 F. 2d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1981); 711 F. 2d 291 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983); 834 F. 2d 103 (6th Cir. 1987-1988); 916 F. 2d 
1109 (6th Cir. 1990).
32The first of several rounds of legal battles occurred 
in Washington, D.C., and involved two judges of diametrically 
opposed political viewpoints: U.S. District Judge Oliver
Gasch and D.C. Circuit Court Chief Judge David Bazelon. On 
April 30, 1975, Judge Gasch dismissed the case, stating that 
there were reasonable grounds to conclude that the government 
had acted in the "good faith belief in the lawfulness of 
their [sic] surveillance" of the California Black Panthers. 
The warrantless White Panther wiretaps of 1970-1971 remained 
secret. On January 27, 1976, the D.C. Court of Appeals,
headed by Bazelon, issued a summary reversal of Gasch's 
decision, and remanded the case back to his court. On 
November 17, 1977, the FBI produced the logs of the five
Plamondon conversations with the BPP during the spring and 
summer of 1969, which the Nixon Administration had utilized 
in the Keith case. A year later, on November 18, 1978, the 
Justice Department admitted for the first time the existence 
of the White Panther [Ann Arbor chapter] wiretaps, and 
submitted a heavily-censored set of logs to Judge Gasch. The 
case dragged on for four more years in Washington, as the WPP 
attorneys sparred with Justice Department lawyers for 
additional discovery of information. Gasch again dismissed 
the case on June 4, 1982. Bazelon reinstated the case for a 
second time on June 24, 1983, and, at the request of the 
plaintiffs' attorneys, transferred it to the Eastern District 
of Michigan, where ultimately it was heard by two judges:
(continued...)
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The election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 led to the apogee 
of the "era of reform." On January 24, 1978, Carter issued 
Executive Order 12036, expanding White House and Justice 
Department oversight of the intelligence bureaucracy, and 
further limiting domestic intelligence operations. 
Warrantless electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens was 
authorized only in instances where "the President has 
authorized the type of activity involved and the Attorney 
General has both approved the particular activity and 
determined that there is probable cause to believe that the 
United States person is an agent of a foreign power."33 On 
July 3, Carter also issued Executive Order 12065, making it 
more difficult for government agencies to withhold 
information requested via the FOIA.34
On October 25, 1978 President Carter signed into law the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the first
32(.. .continued)
Charles W. Joiner and George LaPlata. Seven additional years 
of litigation by attorneys Hugh M. Davis and Dennis M. Hayes 
resulted in the dismissal of the case by the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals on October 23, 1990 (ironically, Judge Keith 
was [and remains] a member of this court, although he did not 
participate in the ruling). Hugh Davis offers the following 
reflection concerning the seventeen year countersuit: 
"Ultimately, we won.. .we got some secrets out, and the people 
were set free." See interview with author, July 25, 1992; 
see also Ann Arbor News. November 6, 1983, 1, and April 30, 
1989, E-l.
33Executive Order 12036, January 24, 1978, Presidential 
Documents, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1978), 3684-85.
^Churchill and Vander Wall, The Cointelpro Papers. 26.
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comprehensive wiretapping legislation since the 1968 Omnibus 
Crime Act, and the operative statute regarding domestic 
electronic surveillance to this day. After more than six 
years of deliberation and debate, Congress finally enacted 
into law the Keith decision's ruling that prior judicial 
warrants are required for domestic intelligence wiretaps of 
U.S. citizens, as well as for almost all types of "foreign 
intelligence" surveillance.35 The act also required that a 
criminal activity "threshold" be crossed prior to requesting 
court orders for electronic surveillance in domestic 
intelligence investigations. Refusing to acknowledge the 
"inherent power" of the Executive Branch in domestic 
surveillance areas, the act specifically repealed section 
2511(3) of Title III, which had been one of the primary 
tenets of the Mitchell Doctrine.
As if specifically responding to Justice Powell's 
suggestion in Keith. Congress also created a special seven- 
member "Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court," to review 
applications for court-ordered electronic surveillance. The 
sitting members on this court are Federal Judges, appointed 
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for seven-year 
terms. They meet in a secret, specially designed courtroom 
within the Justice Department's Washington, D.C., complex, 
behind what James Bamford describes as a "cipher-locked
35FISA defined "U.S. Person," as a citizen, a legally 
resident alien, or an "unincorporated association" made up of 
members of either group.
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door."36 After being presented with detailed written 
requests from the FBI or NSA for court-approved wiretaps, 
which must show the basis for "probable cause," and which 
must be personally signed by the Attorney General, the Court 
can rule in one of two ways: (1) to grant the request for a 
90-day surveillance, subject to renewals for up to one year, 
or (2) to refuse the request. After the government has gone 
to great pains to comply with all of the paperwork and 
restrictions involved in the warrant application, the burden 
of proof shifts to the Court itself. In the event that one 
or more judges vote to deny a warrant, a three-member panel 
of Circuit Court judges —  also appointed by the Chief 
Justice, considers the issue. If a majority of the panel 
upholds the denial, the issue is brought before the Supreme 
Court for a final consideration.
Warrants are required even if the target clearly is a 
"foreign power."37 However, both the probable cause 
requirements and the paperwork involved are much less 
stringent in "foreign" cases. The act also stipulates that 
"no United States person may be considered a foreign power or 
an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of 
activities protected by the first amendment to the
36Bamford, Puzzle Palace. 3 68.
37The FISA statute defines "foreign power" as a foreign 
government, a faction thereof operating within the U.S., "a 
group engaged in international terrorism or activities in 
preparation thereof," and/or "entities" directed or 
controlled by foreign nations.
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Constitution of the United States." In emergency situations 
whereby the FBI and/or NSA are unable to submit their 
requests to the FISA court for its immediate approval, they 
are authorized to institute warrantless surveillance for no 
longer than forty-eight hours (originally twenty-four) before 
applying for a court order. Information gathered from court- 
approved wiretaps can be utilized in court, but the 
government must notify the aggrieved person within a 
"reasonable time" of the trial. Information concerning non­
targeted individuals that has been "unintentionally acquired" 
is to be destroyed by the surveillance agency in question. 
Targeted individuals have standing to submit motions to 
suppress evidence obtained via electronic surveillance, but 
only on the grounds that the information was either 
"unlawfully acquired" or was not made "in conformity with" 
the court order. In the event that the Attorney General 
files an affidavit attesting that disclosure of portions or 
all of the surveillance information in a given case will 
"harm the national security," the trial judge must review the 
information in camera, and determine whether the surveillance 
was "lawfully authorized and conducted." If a judge 
determines that the surveillance was improper, his only 
option is to suppress the evidence which was derived from the 
surveillance. He no longer may not force automatic 
disclosure, as had been the case since the 1969 Alderman 
decision.
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The act also contains several Congressional oversight 
components, involving periodic reporting to the House and 
Senate Permanent Intelligence Oversight Committees. 
Aggrieved HU.S. persons" who have been illegally wiretapped 
have the right to attempt civil liability suits for actual 
damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.38
The FISA bill was originally introduced in 1976 by
Senator Edward Kennedy, and was itself the product of four
consecutive years of unsuccessful attempts by the Senator to
enact into law the Keith decision's prohibition of
warrantless wiretapping of U.S. citizens. However, Executive
Branch support had been lacking prior to 1976. The final
bill was the result of intense discussion between the Justice
Department and members of the Congressional oversight
committees, including Kennedy. As Bamford states, the
resulting legislation was truly indicative of governmental
"give and take":
Its establishment was the product of compromise 
between legislators who wanted the NSA and the 
FBI....to follow the standard procedure of 
obtaining a court order required in criminal 
investigations, and legislators who felt the 
agencies should have no regulation whatsoever in 
their foreign intelligence surveillances.39
Several additional Carter-era reforms were passed, as 
Congress sought to implement still more institutional and
38Public Law 95-511, October 25, 1978, reproduced in
Boyan, comp., Constitutional Aspects of Watergate. 407-22.
39Bamford, Puzzle Palace. 367-68.
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statutory "barriers" against the types of Executive Branch 
abuses which had characterized Watergate. The "Financial 
Privacy Act of 1978" bars government agencies from obtaining 
bank records without the knowledge of the person under 
investigation, except in the rarest of circumstances. And 
the 1980 "Intelligence Oversight Act," requires that the CIA 
report its covert operations to the House and Senate 
Intelligence Oversight Committees.40
In 1980, constitutional historian Richard E. Morgan 
published Domestic Intelligence: Monitoring Dissent in
America. an assessment of the state of intelligence agency 
"reforms." Morgan concluded that "unless they are flagrantly 
ignored, which is unlikely under the new oversight 
arrangements, they severely limit the sort of intelligence 
gathering in which the bureau may engage." Addressing the 
position of the ACLU concerning the threshold required for 
probable cause in domestic surveillance investigations —  
that an actual illegal act has to be committed, and that 
criminal conspiracy cases should be categorically excluded 
from warrant considerations —  Morgan found the position too 
restrictive. Equating the recent "stiffening of opposition" 
by FBI Director William Webster with the continuing demands 
for additional information on the Bureau's past and present 
practices from Senator Kennedy and other "extremist critics" 
on the Senate Judiciary Committee, he expressed concern that
40Kutler, The Wars of Watergate. 588-90.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
608
Congress might do more harm than good if it was allowed to 
institute the sweeping reforms then under consideration. 
Morgan quoted Webster's 1979 statement that 16 percent of all 
FOIA requests received by the Bureau were from "prisoners 
seeking to identify the informers who helped place them in 
jail."
Concluding that "reform may have gone too far," he also 
opposed one of the Church Committee's primary 
recommendations: the expansion of criminal penalties "for law 
enforcement and intelligence officers who behave improperly." 
Morgan's study was not one-sided. He supported the enactment 
of a legislative charter for the FBI and also criticized the 
"vagueness" characterizing the Levi, Ford, and Carter 
guidelines. Comparing the Levi guidelines regarding 
"thresholds" for domestic intelligence investigations with 
those of the Church Committee, he asserted that they should 
be "refined," by modifying the wording to be "considerably 
more precise."41 Morgan believed that the reform process 
was "far from complete."42 The election of Ronald Reagan 
soon made that conclusion seem remarkably prescient.
Just how extensive was the "reform era"? Without 
question, the reforms enacted in the seventies were highly
41Morgan, Domestic Intelligence. 144-61. In the Preface, 
Morgan acknowledges that the study is specifically intended 
to provide background on the current debates taking place in 
society concerning the role of domestic intelligence in 
American society.
42Ibid., 3.
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significant. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
firmly established the primacy of warrants in domestic 
surveillance matters, effectively codifying the Keith 
decision. The government must seek judicial warrants to 
wiretap U.S. citizens, as well as most others who reside in 
America. Other reforms, such as the establishment of 
permanent Intelligence Oversight Committees in both houses of 
Congress, indicate that the types of wholesale political 
surveillance of First Amendment political activity which 
characterized Hoover's half-century as FBI Director are not 
likely to occur again.43
Morton Halperin, one of the Nixon Administration's 
primary targets in the infamous seventeen warrantless 
"national security" wiretaps, criticizes the Ford/Carter 
"reforms," asserting that they proceed from the faulty 
premise that "to reveal abuses is to reform the situation." 
He points out that a vast majority of the era's "reforms" 
were enacted solely within the Executive Branch, "written by 
the very people that they are supposed to control." The 
danger inherent in this situation, he adds, is that these 
reforms "can be repealed in total on whim" by another Chief 
Executive. Halperin also criticizes FBI guidelines 
concerning domestic intelligence investigations. He asserts 
that the vague terminology concerning the necessary threshold
43Assuming of course that the guidelines and statutes 
affecting the intelligence bureaucracy are not significantly 
revised.
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for opening and expanding investigations invites "expansive 
interpretation.1,44
Other studies have criticized the elusive Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court, created in 1978 via the FISA 
act. Louis Fisher states that, as of 1984, after reviewing 
more than 1400 warrant applications, the Court "never 
rejected an intelligence agency's request for a wiretap."45 
James Bamford is critical of the fact that the Court's judges 
hear only the government's side in all applications for 
surveillance, and that there are "no provisions" for judges 
to "'look behind' the application to determine the necessity 
or propriety of the surveillance." He adds that "as long as 
he [a FISA judge] finds....that the proper application 
procedures have been followed, he has no choice but to 
approve it. "46
Athan Theoharis focuses much of his criticism on 
Congress. He states that "Congressional failure" during the 
period prior to 1978, rooted in a "hesitancy to challenge 
Cold War norms," allowed the Executive Branch to continue 
operating with minimal oversight. Ford's Executive Order 
11905 is described as more of a "commitment to ensure
^Halperin, et al., The Lawless State. 239-54.
45Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress 
and the President. 305.
46Bamford, Puzzle Palace. 370. Currently, the person 
responsible for selecting the judges sitting on the FISA 
Court is Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, one of the 
principal drafters of the Mitchell Doctrine.
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presidential control over agencies" than a serious attempt to
reform their operations. Like Halperin, Theoharis condemns
the "broad language" of Levi's guidelines, adding that
"'domestic security' investigations continued thereafter but
under different terminology —  to combat 'terrorism' or as
'foreign counterintelligence. '"47
Theoharis's reference to "terrorism" brings up an
important point regarding the efficacy and legacy of the so-
called "era of reform." By 1980, the FBI refrained from
claiming the authority to investigate "domestic subversives,"
in much the same way that the Executive Branch stopped
asserting expansive "national security" powers following the
flagrant use of the term by President Nixon during Watergate.
The Bureau now claimed that a majority of its domestic
intelligence investigations were aimed at "terrorists" and
"foreign intelligence" targets. The shift in focus may have
been mere lip service. As Frank Donner notes:
The prospect is far from remote of a revival of 
domestic political intelligence activities in 
response to the same social and political 
pressures that have in the past dominated American 
public life...[The] intelligence constituency 
cannot function without an enemy, a hostile 
'they'...The primary contemporary candidate for 
expanded intelligence operations is terrorism, a 
phenomenon that has profoundly shocked popular 
consciousness.48
47Theoharis, Spying on Americans. 234-42.
48Donner, Age of Surveillance. 452-55.
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Churchill and Vander Wall have traced the FBI's
rhetorical shift to the spring of 1972, immediately following
the death of Hoover. An April 12th Airtel from "Acting
Director" L. Patrick Grey to the SAC in Albany, New York
concerning the Black Panther Party uses the word "terrorist"
to describe a local group which "had only months earlier
still been designated as 'agitators' and 'key extremists.'"
Soon thereafter, the Bureau's terminology underwent a rapid
transformation, as Churchill and Vander Wall attest:
The public, which experience had shown would balk 
at the idea of the FBI acting to curtail political 
diversity as such, could be counted on to rally to 
the notion that the Bureau was now acting only to 
protect them against 'terror.' Thus, the Bureau 
secured a terminological license by which to 
pursue precisely the same goals, objectives and 
tactics attending COINTELPRO.49
The limits of reform during the seventies have also been 
demonstrated in other ways. An August, 1980 government 
Accounting Office report states that nearly half of all FBI 
investigations involved no violation of law. The information 
indicates that more than three years after Levi had 
promulgated his guidelines, the FBI was still opening 
investigations based on "mere advocacy." The Judicial Branch 
also continued to send mixed signals concerning intelligence 
agency "reforms." Marc Stickgold's study of judicial 
attitudes examines several damage suits instituted by 
aggrieved parties who had been the targets of police, FBI,
49Churchill and Vander Wall, The Cointelpro Papers. 306.
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and Army surveillance and dossier collection during the 
sixties. He finds that even after the revelations of 
intelligence agency abuses which surfaced during the 
Watergate era, a majority of judges continued to display 
deference to law enforcement and other government authorities 
in their rulings. He also addressed the Benkert. et al. v. 
Michigan State Police case, involving surveillance conducted 
by the Detroit and Michigan State Police "Red Squads." After 
examining the files of several defendants in the suit, 
Stickgold concluded that more than three-quarters of all 
police monitoring involved "constitutionally-protected 
political activity." He argues that if more judges were 
aware of such statistics, they might reconsider their strict 
adherence to the "security" end of the "rights-security 
spectrum. "50
Two Supreme Court decisions during the late seventies 
provide additional support for Stickgold's assertions. In 
U.S. v Donovan (1977), the Court ruled that in instances 
where the FBI had obtained evidence of illegality concerning 
persons not specifically named in a wiretap warrant, the 
evidence obtained was nonetheless admissible in court.51 
Two years later, it ruled in Smith v. Maryland that the FBI's
50Stickgold, "Yesterday's Paranoia...," 877-929.
51 Jay S. Albanese, Justice. Privacy, and Crime Control. 
(Lantham, MD: University Press of America, 1984), 10-11. See 
also Theoharis, Spying on Americans. 241. Theoharis refers 
to this variety of wiretap as "technically illegal."
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warrantless installation of a "pen register," a device which 
records all of the numbers dialed from a given telephone, was 
constitutional.52 Such examples support Stanley Kutler's 
"judgement" that "the effectiveness of post-Watergate reforms 
results in a mixed verdict."53
The "Reagan Revolution" of 1980 reflected the nation's 
eagerness to put the sixties' upheavals and the guilt of the 
Watergate era behind it, and to try to recapture lost 
feelings of patriotism and national pride. Part of this 
movement for change was a backlash against what many 
considered to be "over-restrictive" and "excessive" reforms 
of the seventies.54 Within a year of taking office, Reagan 
overturned the Ford and Carter directives with Executive 
Order 12333. It authorized the FBI to collect "foreign 
intelligence" information within the United States. 
Theoharis concludes that Reagan, like Ford, paid lip service 
to constitutional rights, while simultaneously permitting the 
acquisition and dissemination of domestic intelligence 
information in a wide range of circumstances, including 
"'incidentally obtained information that may indicate
52Albanese, Justice. Privacy, and Crime Control. 12.
53Kutler, Wars of Watergate. 610.
^Morgan's Domestic Intelligence reflects this attitude. 
He concludes that despite past abuses, "limited domestic 
intelligence operations are justifiable," particularly 
against the growing threat of "terrorism" [pp. 9-12].
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involvement in activities that may violate Federal, state, 
local or foreign law.'"55
Although Kutler asserts that E.O. 12333 "unleashed" the 
intelligence agencies, in reality, the provision was minor -- 
when compared with the sweeping new FBI guidelines issued by 
Attorney General William French Smith on March 7, 1983.56
Exploiting "a current fear of international terrorism," as 
well as a final round of Cold War hysteria, Smith/s 
guidelines rescinded two of the central tenets of the Levi 
guidelines: (1) the prohibition against "indefinite
monitoring" of dissident political activities, and (2) the 
requirement that the Attorney General authorize all full FBI 
investigations in writing. Theoharis and Cox assert that the 
net effect of the new guidelines was to erase the distinction 
between preliminary and full investigations. Smith's 
guidelines lowered the much-debated "threshold" for 
investigations, doing away with "the requirement that FBI 
investigations be predicated on a probable violation of 
statute standard." Thus, the FBI can now resume 
investigating individuals who 11 'advocate criminal activity or 
indicate an apparent intent to engage in crime, particularly 
crimes of violence.'" Another Levi guideline, close Justice 
Department oversight, was also rendered pointless, as Smith
55Theoharis and Cox, The Boss. 432-3 3 [emphasis in 
original].
S6Kutler, The Wars of Watergate. 588.
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"invited FBI officials to employ their new authority broadly, 
using their own perception of need"; most reporting 
requirements, which had been mandatory under the Ford/Levi 
system, were now made strictly voluntary.
The new "terminological license" of "terrorism" was used 
throughout the Smith guidelines, providing the appearance 
that the Reagan Administration was "cracking down" on 
international terrorists. In fact, "domestic security" and 
"terrorism" were now linked. The guidelines repeatedly refer 
to "domestic security/terrorism" investigations. Crime 
"prevention" —  one of the Nixon Administration's favored 
justifications for opening sweeping investigations of 
domestic dissenters based on nothing more than "mere 
advocacy" —  was also resurrected to justify the new 
guidelines.57
A month after Smith's guidelines went into effect, 
Reagan issued Executive Order 12356, dramatically revising 
the Freedom of Information Act. The new FOIA guidelines 
empower the FBI and other Federal agencies to withhold 
documents under a wide array of categories, including 
"national security." The 1974 FOIA's requirement that 
agencies demonstrate "identifiable" potential damage to the 
nation's security before they withhold documents was 
reversed. Under NSC Directive 84, issued March 11, 1983, 
Reagan promulgated new rules that made "leaks" of documents
57Theoharis and Cox, The Boss. 432-34 [emphasis added].
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by agency officials punishable by fines and imprisonment.
More than 120,000 government officials with access to
"sensitive compartmented intelligence" must submit to lie
detector tests if requested, and must also submit their
writings to "prepublication censorship" for the rest of their
lives. The net effect of these new Executive Branch policies
and procedures has, as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., concludes,
recreated the "fortress of the Imperial Presidency, the
secrecy system." Schlesinger adds:
The harm to national security through leaks is 
always exaggerated. We have had leaks from the 
start of the republic.. .No one has ever 
demonstrated that these leaks, or the publication 
of the Pentagon Papers either, harmed national 
security. No one can doubt that the disclosures 
benefitted the democratic process.58
The Smith/Reagan guidelines encountered surprisingly 
little opposition. A special committee of the American Bar 
Association praised Attorney General Smith's guidelines for 
their "'healthy degree of balance' between First Amendment 
rights and the demands of domestic security."59
With regard to wiretapping statutes, the Reagan 
Administration proposed few modifications. Reagan lobbied 
Congress for permission to institute so-called "roving 
wiretaps": allowing FBI agents to continue wiretapping (with 
a single court order) all of the telephones used by suspects
58Schlesinger, The Cycles of American History. 298-300; 
Churchill and Vander Wall, The Cointelpro Papers. 27.
59Quoted in Kutler, The Wars of Watergate. 586.
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who move around in order to evade detection. In 1981, 
Justice Department officials, claiming the "inherent power" 
of the President, petitioned the FISA Court for permission to 
re-institute "black bag jobs" as a standard investigative 
technique which could be utilized in "non-residential 
premises." In the Court's only publicly-assessable written 
decision, Presiding Judge George L. Hart turned down the 
Justice Department's specific application order, but agreed 
with the "inherent power" assertion. The effect of the 
decision was to place the authority for future surreptitious 
entries solely at the discretion of the Executive Branch.60
Stanley Kutler states: "It would have been naive to
expect that Watergate-inspired reform legislation could end 
official abuses of power."61 Maybe so. Yet Reagan and 
Smiths' dismantling of the Ford/Carter guidelines certainly 
opened the door for many of the same types of domestic 
intelligence abuses that Congress had spent the decade of the 
seventies debating and "correcting." The most flagrant 
Reagan-era abuses —  Iran-Contra and the FBI's COINTELPRO- 
style investigation and surveillance of "The Committee in 
Solidarity with the People of El Salvador" (CISPES) —  
rivalled any of those perpetuated by Hoover, Mitchell, and 
Nixon. Several aspects of Iran-Contra were reminiscent of
“Bamford, Puzzle Palace. 370-72. Bamford adds that "it 
would be difficult to conclude that it [the FISA Court] has 
become anything other than a rubber stamp."
61Kutler, The Wars of Watergate. 590.
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Watergate. CIA Director William Casey's plan to use the 
profits from Iranian arms sales to create an "'off-the-shelf, 
self-sustaining, stand-alone' entity to conduct intelligence 
operations" —  completely outside of Congressional view —  
was reminiscent of Nixon's "plumbers" operation. In 
addition, the National Security Council's covert operations 
in support of the Nicaraguan Contra Rebels, conducted under 
a "no log" procedure of paperless (primarily electronic) 
communications, involved "government within a government," 
which answered neither to Congress nor to the Judiciary.62
The FBI's CISPES investigation involved the widespread 
surveillance of constitutionally-protected political activity 
within the United States, and closely resembled several 
Hoover-era COINTELPRO programs. In 1983, as Americans began 
protesting the Reagan Administration's foreign policy in 
Central America, the FBI instituted a program aimed at the 
largest and most active protest group: CISPES. A March 30 
memorandum from Headquarters to SACs in eleven field offices 
authorized physical surveillance and COINTELPRO-style 
intimidation techniques, ostensibly to uncover "'the 
involvement of individuals and the CISPES organization in 
international terrorism.'" By the time the Justice 
Department revealed the program in 1985, it involved fifty- 
two of the FBI's fifty-nine field offices, and resulted in 
the investigation of tens of thousands of Americans. The
“Theoharis and Cox, The Boss. 434-35.
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program featured some of the more effective COINTELPRO 
techniques of the past, including the use of informants as 
agents provocateurs, openly photographing demonstrations to 
intimidate participants, and recording the license plate 
numbers of everyone attending CISPES meetings and 
demonstrations, for the purpose of opening investigative 
dossiers on everyone involved. One confidential memorandum, 
acquired via the Freedom of Information Act in 1988, states 
that agents "'deemed it imperative.... to formulate some plan 
of attack against CISPES and specifically against 
individuals....who defiantly display their contempt for the 
U.S. Government.'" Old fashioned patriotism was apparently 
a mandatory feature of the "Reagan Revolution."63
Other revelations of domestic intelligence abuse 
surfaced during the eighties and early nineties. New York 
City's "Joint Terrorism Task Force" (JTTF), cooperated 
closely with the FBI to re-name formerly "domestic 
subversive" individuals and groups as "terrorists." It also 
resurrected grand jury investigations of domestic dissent, 
and published a "terrorist network" listing. Churchill and 
Vander Wall assert that one 1985 occurrence which the JTTF 
categorized as a "terrorist incident" was the arrest of nine 
members of the progressive "May 19th" organization, for 
"trespassing" during a sit-in at the ticket office of South
63Davis, Spying on America. 178-79; Churchill and Vander 
Wall, Agents of Repression. 373-76.
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African Airways. In 1984, following the disbanding of a 
grand jury that had been investigating JTTF cases, several of 
the jurors asserted that "the JTTF tactics revealed at trial 
had constituted a 'clear violation of the civil rights and 
liberties of the accused,' and that the conduct of the 
'counter-terrorists' themselves represented 'a far greater 
threat to freedom," than those of the groups under 
investigation.64
Other organizations targeted by local, state, and/or 
federal surveillance agencies during the eighties included 
the anti-nuclear movement and the Puerto Rican Independence 
Movement.65 One of the most unusual examples of FBI tactics 
occurred as the result of country music singer Willie 
Nelson's appearance at a southern California benefit concert 
for imprisoned AIM leader Leonard Peltier in 1987. Following 
the appearance, FBI agent Richard T. Bretzing denounced 
Nelson publicly and sent several lower-ranking agents to 
local radio stations, asking the owners to stop playing 
Nelson's music. Shortly thereafter, a "random" IRS audit 
found that Nelson owed the government millions of dollars in 
back-taxes.66
“Quoted in Churchill and Vander Wall, The Cointelpro 
Papers. 306-11.
65Ibid.; Donner, Protectors of Privilege. 358-60.
“Churchill and Vander Wall, Agents of Repression. 379.
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The Presidency of George Bush coincided with the 
revelations of Iran-Contra, and the FBI's CISPES program. 
Neither his Administration nor Congress, however, supported 
substantive reforms. In fact, during 1991's "Gulf War," the 
FBI conducted intensive investigations of 200 Arab American 
leaders. Athan Theoharis states that these investigations 
were "ostensibly [intended] to obtain information of (1) 
violations of the civil rights of Arab citizens, and (2) 
planned "terrorist" activities."67 Throughout the war, 
media images of angry, fist-waving Arabs in the streets of 
Baghdad reinforced American fears concerning "terrorism."
The movement to reform the intelligence community did 
enjoy some partial victories during the eighties. The decade 
opened with guilty verdicts for high-ranking FBI officials 
Mark Felt and Edward Miller, in a counter-suit filed by 
members of the Weathermen, which alleged that the FBI had 
conspired to "'injure and oppress citizens of the United 
States.'" For the first time in U.S. history FBI officials 
had been convicted of abridging the constitutional rights of 
domestic dissenters. However, in one of his first official 
acts as President, Reagan granted full pardons to the 
officials.68 In 1984, the House Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights released a report, four years in the
67Theoharis, From the Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover.
360.
68Ibid. . 315.
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making, that documented the FBI's improper use of informants 
during the sixties and early seventies. The report 
acknowledged that many informants, considerably more than the 
FBI had admitted, assumed agent provocateur roles within 
targeted organizations. "Because agents create crime, rather 
than merely detect it" the report stated, "they hold the 
power to create the appearance of guilt." Yet the 
Subcommittee stopped short of recommending significant Bureau 
reforms, once again demonstrating Congress' traditional "to 
reveal is to reform" attitude toward intelligence agency 
abuse.69
Several landmark cases challenged the power of the FBI 
and local "red squads" to monitor domestic dissent. On 
December 30, 1985, Judge Susan Getzendanner ruled in favor of 
the plaintiffs in Alliance to End Repression v. Citv of 
Chicago. a high-profile "Red Squad" case that had been in the 
courts for eleven years. She found that the mere collection 
of "subversive files" on citizens violates First Amendment 
rights and creates "standing" for legal complaints, whether 
or not the aggrieved party can prove linkage between the 
surveillance and actual harm committed by law enforcement 
officials. The Court also found that "organizational
plaintiffs" have justiciability, on the grounds that police
69Ibid. , 376-78.
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agencies publicly disseminated derogatory information 
concerning them.70
Also in 1985, the lengthy Socialist Workers Party v. 
Attorney General case was finally decided by U.S. District 
Judge Thomas P. Greisa, who ruled that the FBI had violated 
the constitutional rights of SWP members over an extended 
period by physical and warrantless electronic surveillance, 
as well as "black bag jobs" and COINTELPRO "disruptions" of 
the Party's political operations. A total of $246,000 in 
damages was awarded. Two years later, Judge Greisa barred 
the FBI from utilizing the estimated one million pages of SWP 
files for any reason whatsoever in the future, without his 
personal consent.71
Another long-running "red squad" suit, Benkert et al. v. 
Michigan State Police, et al.. was decided in 1990 in favor 
of the plaintiffs. Judge Lucile Watts awarded $750,000, 
earmarked for the exclusive use of notifying aggrieved 
persons that the Detroit and/or Michigan State Red Squads had 
targeted them for surveillance during the previous five 
decades. Her decision also allowed aggrieved parties access
70561 F. Supp. 537 (N.D. 111. 1982, 1985); see Donner, 
Protectors of Privilege. 353-55. In light of the "White 
Panther Party kidnapping plot" story leaked to the national 
media by the Nixon Administration during the spring of 1971 
[see chapter Five] —  which utilized an anonymous FBI 
COINTELPRO letter as its source —  the AER v. Chicago case 
could be used as a precedent in another White Panther damage 
suit against the Government.
71458 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1978+) ; see Churchill and 
Vander Wall, The Cointelpro Papers. 62.
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to information contained in their files. These three cases 
made it clear that the Judiciary still could play an 
important role in preventing future domestic intelligence 
abuses.
Nearly fifteen years have passed since the previous 
reform era came to a close. Throughout the long period of 
public lethargy characterizing the Reagan/Bush years, there 
have been signs that domestic intelligence abuses are again 
on the rise. Just as the situation in the mid-sixties (Black 
crisis) was but a prelude to the dramatic expansion of 
domestic surveillance beginning in 1967, there are 
indications that the nation is currently poised for a new 
phase of abuse. Responding to two recent "terrorist 
bombings" —  the New York World Trade Center on February 26, 
1993, and the Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 
1995 —  the Clinton Administration has proposed legislation 
which would greatly expand the domestic surveillance 
capabilities of the FBI and other surveillance agencies; 
ostensibly this is so that they may better respond to the 
"terrorist threat." Clinton also proposed an "Omnibus 
Counterterrorism" bill in early 1995. It remained bogged 
down in Congress until the Oklahoma City bombing. Recent 
amendments to the bill would institute sweeping revisions of 
the guidelines governing the intelligence bureaucracy's 
ability to monitor and infiltrate domestic groups. As a 
whole, the proposed Clinton "anti-terrorism" package
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challenges many of the constitutional principles enumerated 
in the Keith case and invites the same types of abuses which 
occurred during the late sixties and early seventies.
The Clinton Administration's first successful anti­
terrorism legislation was the highly-controversial "Digital 
Telephony" bill, which became law during the fall of 1994.72 
The initiative was originally proposed by President Bush 
during the spring of 1992, but did not receive substantial 
Congressional support until after the World Trade Center 
bombing.73 Officially known as "Public Law 103-414, The 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act," this 
legislation would allow the FBI and NSA instant access to the 
nation's digital communications technologies for wiretaps. 
Since proposing the bill in early 1992, the FBI has 
maintained that the newer, fiber optics-based digital signals 
are impossible to tap with conventional methods. Therefore, 
the initiative requires that telephone companies install 
highly-sophisticated digital electronic equipment and 
software, at the taxpayer's expense, so that the Bureau's
^The initiative remains unfunded. As of this writing, 
however, Clinton's recently-introduced "Omnibus 
Counterterrorism Act" does contain full funding for it. See 
Austin American Statesman. June 8, 1995, A-ll.
73A coalition of telecommunications industry officials 
and civil libertarian groups waged an effective campaign 
against the bill: while civil libertarians objected to the 
dangers of privacy invasion, the telecommunications industry 
opposed the FBI's demand that the companies pass on to 
subscribers the costs of installing this new equipment.
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computers can interface with their telecommunication 
networks.74
The precise threat, if any, which Digital Telephony 
poses to American citizens' privacy rights is much debated. 
FBI and NSA officials assert that without this new equipment, 
their agents will soon lose access to the private 
communications of "drug dealers and terrorists." 
Logistically, the system would also offer much easier access 
to wiretaps, because physically locating a target's telephone 
line would no longer be necessary; the technology should 
allow the FBI to access any of the nation's 140 million 
telephone lines from a single super-computer, in a matter of 
seconds. One example of how this process could potentially 
save thousands of man-hours is during "roving wiretaps." 
With the new technology, the Bureau could immediately access 
a target's conversations wherever he or she went, making 
evasion much more difficult.
Those opposing the plan have presented a variety of 
complaints, as well as some frightening scenarios. Some 
claim the FBI and NSA already possess the technological know­
how to access easily digital communications, but now want 
instantaneous access to every telephone line in the U.S.75 
Others warn that once this initiative has been implemented,
74New York Times. April 19, 1992, E-2 and April 30, 1992, 
D-l; Wall Street Journal. May 12, 1992, B-ll; Washington
Post. March 12, 1994, C-l.
7iNew York Times. April 19, 1992, E-2.
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the intelligence bureaucracy will have access to much more
than personal conversations:
'Transactional data will reveal far more about 
individuals than it has in the past...In fact, in 
some cases it may be equivalent to content 
information. This transactional data certainly 
could make it possible to build a detailed model 
of an individual's behavior and movements.' The 
result....could be Orwellian in its
implications.76
As increasing numbers of Americans utilize telephone lines 
for access to the Internet, as well as a myriad of other 
purposes (shopping, bill-paying, and research, for example), 
the potential dangers posed by government access will 
dramatically increase. Still others complain that
technological innovation in the telecommunications industry, 
the key to lowering communications costs, may be thwarted by 
the initiative.77
It is too early to predict the outcome of "Digital 
Telephony." The rapid advancement of telecommunications 
technology may make such a centralized and sophisticated 
system inevitable. In addition, the opponents of Digital 
Telephony have not yet offered a workable alternative which 
would allow law enforcement legitimate access to the 
conversations of organized crime members and terror bombers 
(among others), at least some of whom are now utilizing the 
latest communications technology, such as encryption, to
76Quoted in Washington Post. March 12, 1994, C-l.
^New York Times. April 30, 1992, D-l.
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avoid detection. The potential for abuse with Digital
Telephony appears great. Richard Morgan discusses a strong
"bureaucratic impulse" within the FBI and other intelligence
agencies, stemming from "the temptation of technology
itself." He adds:
If ways exist for doing things, the nature of 
bureaucratized praetorianism is to make use of 
them...As new capabilities are added to what 
Christopher Pyle calls the 'intelligence 
repertoire,' the temptation to use the new 
technology may be very difficult to control.’8
Although President Clinton, Attorney General Janet Reno, 
and FBI Director Louis Freeh have all given assurances that 
court orders will be sought prior to the institution of 
wiretaps under Digital Telephony, the opportunity and 
temptation for evading both Judicial and Legislative 
oversight might be too much for some over-zealous agents to 
resist. If the FBI and NSA, with or without White House 
approval, revert to wiretapping at will Americans without 
court orders, and hide the practice by not revealing the 
surveillance in court, what "barriers" are in place to 
prevent them from succeeding?
During the decade and a half separating the passage of 
the FISA act and the advent of Digital Telephony, the 
wiretapping process itself was something of a barrier to 
abuse; the necessity of going on-site, installing a court-
78Morgan, Domestic Intelligence. 132. Frank Donner's 
Protectors of Privilege [page 369] asserts that "newer, less 
traceable surveillance technology. .. .has made the maintenance 
and dissemination of files easier to conceal."
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approved wiretap, and completing all of the required 
paperwork may have acted as a deterrent.79 Under Digital 
Telephony, the FBI would only have to flip a switch to tap 
virtually any telephone. There is no small irony in the fact 
that the Clinton Administration is essentially asking the 
American people to believe that the Executive Branch's 
integrity alone will prevent domestic surveillance abuses: 
this was precisely the argument the Nixon Administration made 
in the Mitchell Doctrine.
Since the turn of the century, major periods of law 
enforcement and domestic surveillance abuse have been 
preceded by cataclysmic events, which have shocked the 
American public. The "Red Scare" of 1919 was precipitated by 
several mail bombs, allegedly sent by Communist and 
"anarchist" groups, during the post-war atmosphere of fear 
regarding Bolshevism.80 The McCarthy era featured the 
infamous trial of Judith and Ethel Rosenberg, which also took 
place during a post-war atmosphere of anti-Communist
79New York Times. April 19, 1992, E-2; Anthony Ramirez's 
article addresses the concerns of several editors of privacy- 
related journals, who claim that the "relatively small" 
number of wiretaps under the current system "reflects the 
difficulty cf obtaining judicial permission and installing 
the devices." Ramirez adds that "wiretaps are physically 
onerous to install."
80David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and 
American Society. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 
288-92.
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hysteria.81 During the sixties, the urban riots, especially 
Detroit in 1967, and violent confrontations such as the 1968 
Democratic National Convention, provided the justification 
for the abuses of the late sixties and early seventies. Each 
of these incidents had the effect of galvanizing the forces 
of authority in the nation for a prompt "response," 
characterized by overreaction and massive suppression of 
civil rights.
The Oklahoma City bombing of April 19, 1995, coming just 
two years after the World Trade Center bombing, may be the 
catalyst for a new cycle of domestic surveillance abuses. 
One indication of the incredible impact this tragedy has had 
on the government can be demonstrated by comparing the fate 
of President Clinton's anti-terrorism legislation in February 
and March of 1995, just weeks before the explosion, with the 
situation following it. On February 9 the Administration 
introduced Senate Bill No. 390, "The Omnibus Counterterrorism 
Act of 1995," a comprehensive package of anti-crime measures, 
which included expanded wiretapping powers for the FBI. It 
arrived on Capitol Hill at the onset of the first "Hundred 
Days" of the new Republican-dominated 104th Congress, as the 
G.O.P. focused on implementing its conservative social 
agenda, dubbed the "Contract With America." The new 
Republican majorities in both houses of Congress, the first
81See Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton, The Rosenberg File: 
A Search for the Truth. (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 5-6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
632
since the Eisenhower Presidency, displayed a fierce 
determination to pursue deficit reduction and tax cuts 
simultaneously, which did not portend well for the 
Administration's anti-terrorism bill. The outlook was also 
grim for the Digital Telephony Act, which had become law the 
previous fall but remained unfunded. In early March, 
Attorney General Reno requested partial funding for both 
measures during her testimony before the Senate 
Appropriations Committee. The atmosphere was not
encouraging: the Justice Department's request for a 20
percent budget increase received a very cool reception from 
G.O.P. Committee members, who stressed their Party's 
commitment to across-the-board cuts. In sum, the Clinton 
antiterrorism legislation was going nowhere fast.82
The Oklahoma City bombing changed everything. Appearing
before the same committee on May 11th, three weeks after the
explosion, Reno proposed expensive FBI and Justice Department
initiatives. She made frequent references to the threat of
domestic and international "terrorism":
These resources are needed by law enforcement to 
combat the threat of terrorism, both now and in 
the future...The tragic events of April 19 should 
remind us that we must never forget that terrorism 
can strike any where [sic] and at any time. At 
the same time, we must do all in our power to 
prevent such an event from happening again...there 
are steps that can be taken, and must be taken, to 
provide the Department with the personnel and
82iWashington Telecom News. March 20, 1995, No. 11, vol.
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equipment needed to detect future terrorist events 
when they are in the planning stage.
Reno now requested $100 million dollars for Digital
Telephony's first year alone, adding: "We plan to ask for
more funding in 1996." Some of the additional items on her
"wish list" included a totally-new "Counterterrorism Center,"
five million dollars for "rewards for information related to
terrorism," and $71 million dollars for 570 new agents.83
The Oklahoma City bombing also gave the Administration's 
anti-terrorism bill a new life. In his May 4 letter to 
Congress, Clinton outlined a number of amendments to his 
earlier bill, and urged Congress to give the package its 
"prompt and favorable consideration."84 The principal 
components of the amended legislation are as follows: (1)
full funding for Digital Telephony; (2) a revision of the
83Federal Document Clearing House. "Testimony, May 11, 
1995, of Attorney General Janet Reno, Before the U.S. Senate 
Appropriations Committee."
MThe amendments introduced on May 4, known as "The 
Antiterrorism Amendments Act of 1995," were immediately 
merged with the earlier package (S. 390), forming the
comprehensive "Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995," (S.
761) . Clinton's primary Democratic supporters were Joseph 
Lieberman, Tom Dashle, and Joseph Biden. Soon after the 
Oklahoma City bombing, Senate Republicans (led by Bob Dole 
and Or in Hatch) introduced S. 735, "The Counterterrorism 
Prevention Act of 1995." In late May, a third bill was 
introduced in the House by Rep. Henry Hyde: the
"Comprehensive Antiterrorism Act of 1995." How this 
legislation will ultimately fare is unclear at this writing. 
However, there are powerful indications that Clinton's bill 
will soon receive Congressional approval. The "Omnibus 
Counterterrorism Act of 1995" passed in the Senate by a vote 
of 91-8 on June 7, 1995. At this writing, the measure is 
pending in the House.
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current guidelines governing "roving wiretaps," which would 
allow the FBI increased access to them in "national security" 
cases, as well as the expanded use of "pen registers" and 
"tap and trace" devices; (3) an amendment to the current 
wiretapping statute [Title III], adding "potential terrorist 
actions" as one of the categories under which the FBI can 
institute "emergency" surveillance without court order for 
forty-eight hours; (4) an additional revision to Title III, 
allowing the FBI to use in court any evidence obtained in 
violation of the privacy protections of the law, unless it 
can be proven that the government has acted in "bad faith";
(5) authorization for the use of warrantless "national 
security letters," by FBI agents to "obtain records critical 
to terrorism investigations from hotels, motels, common 
carriers, storage facilities, and vehicle rental facilities";
(6) a requirement that makers of "explosive raw materials" 
include "taggants" in their products, which would permit 
tracing by Federal agencies; (7) an additional revision of 
current domestic surveillance guidelines, which would allow 
the U.S. Army to assist the FBI in investigating "cases 
involving chemical and biological weapons" within the U.S.; 
(8) stiffened sentences for convicted "terrorists," as well 
as minimum ten-year sentences for anyone convicted of 
assisting them; and (9) expanded authority for "law 
enforcement agencies to gain access to financial and credit 
reports in antiterrorism cases." The only component of the
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package which did not receive Senate approval was the 
proposal to allow warrantless emergency wiretaps in domestic 
terrorism cases. The Senate approved the bill by a 91-8 
margin on June 7, reminding some of the frenzied anti-crime 
atmosphere which had characterized Congress prior to the 
passage of the Omnibus Crime Acts in 1968 and 1970.85
"The history of American liberty," asserted Senator Sam 
Ervin, "has been a continuing struggle between the desire for 
security and the human striving for personal freedom."86 
Recent events vividly demonstrate that America is still 
struggling to define the proper "balance" between 
constitutional rights and "national security" priorities. 
This process, known as "balance theory," has been debated 
with greater urgency since the passage of the Omnibus Act in 
1968. Title III was itself an attempt to "balance" the 
desire of law enforcement for access to the "tool" of 
wiretapping, with the Warren Court's 1967 Katz and Berger 
decisions, which made electronic surveillance subject to the 
strictest requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Edith 
Lapidus suggests that at any given point in time, public 
opinion can be pinpointed on a rights-security scale, and 
that "The balance between competing values of privacy and law
8iU.S. Newswire. May 4, 1995, "Letter from the President 
to Congress on the Antiterrorism Amendments Act of 1995," 
White House Press Release; Washington Post. May 27, 1995, A- 
11; Austin American Statesman. June 8, 1995, A-ll.
86Lapidus, Eavesdropping on Trial, i.
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enforcement is constantly shifting and requires periodic 
reexamination.1,87
An assessment of the current state of American public 
opinion on the "rights-security scale” is appropriate. The 
level of public concern with domestic security and its 
related issues of crime, drugs, and "terrorism" is still 
high. Clinton's 1994 anti-crime package, the largest in U.S. 
history, reflected the public's fears concerning violence and 
crime on the streets of America, as well as his "New 
Democrat" image as a tough crime-fighter. Measures such as 
the "three strikes and you're out" bill, whereby criminals 
convicted of three violent felonies will receive life 
sentences without the possibility of parole, have become a 
rallying point for a frightened public and reelection-minded 
politicians. The majority's priorities were clearly spelled 
out in the crime bill: a dramatic expansion in funding for 
additional police officers and prisons, in an era of budget 
cuts for nearly all other social programs. The legislation 
demonstrates that both Congress and the President are 
dedicated to capitalizing on what remains a potent political 
issue.88 The 1996 presidential race, already in its initial 
stages, displays signs that it will focus on such 
emotionally-charged social issues as the "war on drugs," in
87Ibid. , 205.
88Democrats work to dispel the impression that their 
Party is "soft on crime."
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addition to a new "war on Hollywood," as conservatives and 
liberals alike accuse the entertainment industry of 
glorifying sex and violence.89 Violent crime coverage, from 
an increasingly-competitive local and national media, has 
made Americans more fearful than ever about the safety of 
their neighborhoods. Private security services and "victim's 
rights" groups have proliferated. The Oklahoma City tragedy 
has also expanded Congress' interest in the potential hazards 
of the Internet. Some have suggested that because 
information on topics like "how to construct bombs" is so 
readily available to anyone, child or adult, who merely 
cruises "cyberspace," some form of censorship may be needed.
America's heightened security concerns are also related 
to the unsettled status of the post-Cold War world. Economic 
retrenchment at home also has induced many to desire U.S. 
disengagement abroad. Even so, the supposed "geographical 
isolation" of the United States is definitely a thing of the 
past. The media portrayed the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing as irrefutable "proof” that "terrorism has arrived in 
America." Time covers the so-called "terrorist threat" with 
great gusto.90 Poison gas attacks in Japanese subways and
89"The Cronkite Report," a documentary airing on the 
Discovery Channel on June 20, 1995, addressed the failed "war
on drugs" that by now is already ten years old.
^ h e  August 29, 1994, cover of Time shows a masked
nuclear terrorist: "Nuclear Terror For Sale: Once we feared
thugs like Carlos the Jackal. Now no one knows who might buy 
smuggled plutonium —  and hold the world hostage."
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ebola virus "outbreaks" in Africa receive top billing on CNN 
for days running.
The so-called "militia movement" has become an 
additional factor contributing to America's security 
concerns. The Oklahoma City bombing has been linked to a 
growing ultra-right movement —  a "homegrown" variety of 
terrorism, which has shocked many. The Clinton
Administration's first significant clash with these elements 
occurred during the spring of 1993, when a stand-off between 
the FBI and the so-called "Branch Davidians" in Waco, Texas, 
resulted in the deaths of eighty-five cult members on April 
19. Since then, there has been a proliferation of news 
reports regarding groups such as the "Michigan Militia," who 
have allegedly armed themselves in defiance of the authority 
of the U.S. Government. Recent hearings by the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, chaired by Senator Arlen Specter, have 
exposed the paranoid psychology characterizing at least some 
of the militia leaders.91 In addition, Clinton's proposed 
anti-terrorism legislation is clearly aimed at allowing the 
FBI and other government agencies to penetrate and expose the 
militia movement's violent intentions.
Although the nation's concerns with domestic security 
are certainly strong, the issue of the citizen's right to 
privacy is certainly not dead. In fact, one of the militia 
movement's primary arguments is that government intrusion
91New York Times. April 24, 1995, A-12.
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into their lives has reached an unacceptable level. Many 
Americans are uncomfortable about the proliferation of 
surveillance cameras and microphones into such "everyday" 
places as automatic teller machines, fast-food restaurants, 
public elevators, convenience stores, and even the workplace. 
The so-called "privacy lobby," a loose confederation of 
groups including the ACLU, Libertarian Party, and the Center 
For Democracy and Technology (among many others), has proven 
to be an effective force in national policy debate. A recent 
alliance between this lobby and the telecommunications 
industry effectively delayed the passage of the Digital 
Telephony bill for more than two years. The media has also 
played a major role in keeping the issue of privacy alive. 
Television documentaries and print stories dealing with the 
subject have appeared with regularity.
There is no escaping the conclusion, however, that the 
American public's interest in security far outweighs its 
desire for privacy; in Lapidus's terms, the "competing values 
of privacy and law enforcement" are leaning strongly toward 
the latter. The average American appears willing to give up 
a significant amount of his or her constitutional rights in 
the interest of heightened security.
On a psychological level, it is quite easy to understand 
this "trade-off." Fears about crime and security affect 
people in the most primal of ways —  appealing to their most 
basic survival instincts. In contrast, a citizen's interest
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in privacy involves "higher-ordered" thinking, and might be 
directly related to that person's awareness of Constitutional 
issues. People respond much more powerfully to fears about 
security then they do to perceived privacy invasions. The 
fact that the local and national media devote much more 
attention to violent crime than they do to surveillance and 
privacy issues reflects these trends and contributes to a 
further expansion of them. In the end, it is simply no 
contest: the debate between rights and security is, for now 
anyway, decided in favor of security.
This trend toward security over privacy rights in 
general is also reflected by the degree to which opinions 
have changed concerning wiretapping and "national security" 
issues since the Keith decision of June, 1972. A comparison 
of President Clinton's proposed "Omnibus Counterterrorism Act 
of 1995" with the positions taken by the Nixon Administration 
in its Keith briefs is revealing. Clinton's bill contains 
the greatest number of revisions in the Title III wiretapping 
statute since the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978. Some are shocking in their implications. For example, 
the proposal to prevent the exclusion of evidence improperly 
obtained by law enforcement officials, unless the aggrieved 
party can prove the officers acted in "bad faith," represents 
a significant shift away from the original intent of the 
statute —  and challenges much of the case-law concerning the 
exclusionary rule.
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The recent debate surrounding Clinton's counterterrorism 
bill resembles the Keith case in several respects. For Judge 
Keith, as well as for Judge Ferguson, the central issue 
involved in the Mitchell Doctrine was the government's 
attempt to bypass the Fourth Amendment in the interest of 
"national security." Keith cited the precedent-setting cases 
of Weeks. Mapp. Silverthorn. and Katz, which firmly 
established that the Judiciary's primary method of ensuring 
that law enforcement operates within the Fourth Amendment's 
boundaries is the power to exclude improperly obtained 
evidence. Nixon attempted to bypass the warrant procedure 
altogether —  to take the Judiciary completely out of the 
"national security" wiretapping equation. While Clinton's 
bill does not challenge the warrant provision, it would 
nonetheless leave the Fourth Amendment on shaky ground, by 
limiting the involvement of federal judges in wiretapping 
cases simply to approving or disapproving warrant 
applications. Under the Clinton plan, once the government 
obtains a warrant, improper conduct and procedures utilized 
by its officials, no matter how heinous, could in no way 
damage the admissability of wiretap evidence, unless the 
aggrieved party could somehow prove "bad faith" —  an 
undertaking which has been described as "usually impossible" 
to accomplish.92 Suppression of evidence due to improper
^Federal Document Clearing House. "Testimony, May 24, 
1995, of James X. Dempsey, Deputy Director, Center for
(continued...)
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law enforcement procedures (e.g., illegal "search and 
seizure") remains one of the Judiciary's only tools to 
"police the police" in their wiretapping operations.93 The 
Clinton provision demonstrates the Executive Branch's 
continuing assault on the civil and constitutional rights- 
focused Warren Court rulings.
An additional aspect of the Clinton proposal which 
resembles the Nixon Administration's Keith position is its 
focus on the need for "investigative" surveillance concerning 
domestic as well as foreign groups, so that the government 
can both prevent crimes before they are committed and 
investigate them more effectively after they occur.94 The 
"threshold" for initiating investigations currently being 
proposed by the Clinton Administration —  "conspiratorial 
activities characteristic of domestic terrorism" —  is
92(.. .continued)
National Security Studies, Before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee's Counterterrorism Subcommittee." The process of 
proving the Government's "bad faith" in wiretapping cases is 
akin to the standard established in Laird v. Tatum, whereby 
persons who have been monitored by the Government cannot sue 
for damages unless they can prove that the surveillance has 
in some way done them demonstrable injury, above and beyond 
mere "chilling effect." Such standards make it difficult, if 
not impossible, for aggrieved parties to obtain justice. 
They also eliminate any deterrent which might otherwise 
prevent law enforcement officials from acting improperly.
93This fact is often ignored in the current atmosphere 
of "law and order" and "victim's rights."
^Frank Donner's Ace of Surveillance [pp. 17-23 and 462] 
asserts that this crime "prevention" ruse has been advanced 
by supporters of domestic surveillance since the Haymarket 
Riots of 1886.
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dangerously vague, as was the "national security" passage of 
Title III [section 2511(3)]. In fact, one of the principal 
arguments presented by the Nixon Administration in Keith was 
that the "probable cause" standard in criminal cases should 
not be applied to "national security" investigations. The 
brief added:
National security surveillances are not designed 
to obtain facts needed in criminal investigations, 
but to obtain intelligence information...In 
[these] cases, the justification for surveillance 
ordinarily cannot be simply stated or easily 
demonstrated; generally, it involves a large 
number of detailed and complicated facts whose 
interrelation may not be obvious to one who does 
not have extensive background information, and the 
drawing of subtle inferences.95
Just as the Mitchell Doctrine posed a significant threat to
American constitutional liberties, the Clinton guidelines, in
the hands of an over-zealous Attorney General and/or FBI
Director, would allow the government to cast the widest
possible net in its domestic security investigations, by
advancing an expansive definition of "domestic terrorism."
So far, no one in the Executive Branch has offered anything
approaching a precise definition of "terrorist."96
Congress is currently giving serious consideration to 
revising the 1983 Reagan/Smith guidelines pertaining to the 
opening of domestic intelligence investigations. Senate 
Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter has expressed
95Keith Case, Brief for the Government, September, 1971, 
25, SCR/B.
^Quoted in Washington Post. May 27, 1995, A-ll.
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support for a revision which would allow the FBI to 
infiltrate domestic groups such as the "Michigan Militia," 
based on nothing more than their publicly stated support for 
incidents like the Oklahoma City bombing. Numerous FBI 
officials and intelligence "experts" provided testimony 
before Specter's committee to the effect that current 
guidelines are "too stringent" and have effectively "tied the 
hands of law enforcement." One agent complained about the 
large amount of written documentation that is required to 
obtain a FISA wiretap. The overall impression given by the 
law enforcement side of the debate is that the current 
guidelines must be "liberalized" if the FBI is going to 
effectively combat "terrorism.1,97
Speaking for the other side of the debate was James X.
Dempsey of the Center for National Security Studies. In
testimony given on May 24, he stated:
The Smith guidelines make it absolutely clear that 
the FBI does not have to wait for a crime to be 
committed before it can investigate a terrorist 
group. The guidelines expressly state: 'In its
efforts to anticipate or prevent crimes, the FBI 
must at times initiate investigations in advance 
of criminal conduct.' The threshold for opening a 
full investigation is low...[and] the FBI is 
authorized to open a preliminary inquiry on an 
even lower threshold.
Dempsey reminded the Committee that one of the "main
purposes" of Smith's revision of the Levi guidelines in 1983
^U. S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on 
Intelligence, May 5, 1995, and May 24, 1995 [obtained from 
CSPAN].
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was to allow for the opening of preliminary investigations 
based on "advocacy of violence." Dempsey added that "many of 
the same criticisms of the current [Smith] guidelines are 
really the same criticisms lodged against the Levi 
guidelines, which the Smith guidelines were intended to 
rectify." He supported his position with statistical data: 
"over the years since the Smith guidelines were adopted, 
nearly two-thirds of....[the FBI's] full investigations were 
opened before a crime had been committed." A majority of the 
Senators on the Committee were clearly not in sympathy with 
Dempsey's position.98
There are several other similarities between Clinton's 
proposed anti-terrorism legislation and Nixon's own position 
in Keith. Like Nixon, Clinton equates the threat posed by 
domestic "terrorists" with that of "foreign powers" and is 
requesting authority to transfer several of the Executive 
Branch's expansive powers in "foreign" and "national 
security" areas to strictly domestic situations, something 
the Supreme Court may be loathe to support. Clinton also 
employs the tactic, frequently used by the Nixon 
Administration, of seizing upon public outrage and fears 
concerning cataclysmic events (e.g., bombings), in order to 
acquire additional investigative powers. What is more, the 
Clinton Administration's attempt to bypass the exclusionary 
rule in wiretapping cases is tantamount to a "raid" by the
98 Ibid.
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Executive Branch into a domain that traditionally (and 
correctly) has been reserved to the Judiciary; the Keith case 
represented a similar "raid."99
Considered as a whole, the current positions of both the 
Legislative and Executive Branches indicate that the 
"intelligence-evidence debate" concerning domestic 
surveillance has now been decided in favor of allowing the 
government to wiretap and monitor domestic groups, based on 
little more than suspicion. Where the Judiciary presently 
stands on this issue is uncertain.100 These were precisely 
the circumstances sought by Hoover, Nixon, and Mitchell prior 
to and during the Keith case. An informed populace that 
takes an active interest in the issues of privacy and 
domestic intelligence may be the only thing that can prevent 
a repeat of Philip Kurland7s dictum regarding the Watergate 
era: "It seems true once again that we learn nothing from 
history except that we learn nothing from history."101
"Dempsey states that the "roving wiretap," provision in 
Clinton's bill offends the "particularity" standards of the 
Katz and Berger decisions, upon which Title III was based. 
He adds that the current narrow standards covering roving 
wiretaps have been "carefully scrutinized by the courts" 
(citing U.S. v. Bianco. 998 F. 2d 1112, 1st Cir. 1993) . 
Finally, he warns that "Any loosening of those standards 
could open the door to the type of abuse Congress sought to 
avoid in 1986 [when roving wiretaps were first enacted] and 
could render the roving tap authority unconstitutional." See 
Dempsey Testimony.
100The Rehnquist Court is currently split into ultra­
conservative and a moderate wings, each of roughly equal 
size.
101Kurland, Watergate and the Constitution. 171.
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£1389)-TR3NS--L0VB—  ENERGIES UNLIMITED COOP.------
4863 John Lodge 831-6840 •
*+6’+2 Second Ave. * 833-3166
'+99 West Forest -1967
4 i ^ 5 ^ ^ 7 ^ i W rBstat^~a^r76?n2?i£e "DETROIT ARTISTS 
FflBM "TRAITS LOVE ENERGIES COOP."
• The above phnne number is reg. to: ARTISTS WORKSHOP,
4863 John Lodge.
The above will sponsoE TRAITS LOVE WEEKEND including a 
huge celebration on B lie Isle on Sunday - April 28-30 
1967, On April 30, 1967. See file #1389 for DB write up.
(Figure A-l)
Detroit Police Department, Special Investigation Bureau (SIB) 
Master Index Card for Trans-Love Energies
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files.
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SINCLAIR, JOHN ALEXANDER _ _ _ _ _ _ _  (3166).
W25 John. C. .Lodge  831-259h-
Card #2_________    . _ _
.9 -16-65,...Dot. News art In file "BOND INCREASED FOR 
STUDENT IN DdPfi fiAlKll"Tle'; "subject. who was ordere'd~bbuna~ 
over for trial-on-charges of •-botb-aa-le and possession-of—  
narcotics.in.the.latedt oase. No trial date was set. The 
hail bond was jumped fivefold”,’ "from $1,000 to 55,000 .’
2-8-G6, Pejs,_Neva_.ar.t...JLn file "wayne surv.yy pleads. .
GUILTY TO DRUG CHARGE." Re; Subject, who currently re­
sides at 1H6-W: Hancock will-be~•sentenced 2-2U-66V.’The" 
maximum .penalty. is_lQ_years .in-prison. SubJs one of-8 - -.
“  i s s i & z - ' - He
8-16-65, Subj. arrested at 11*00 P.M. at John C.
Lodge, charged with VSNL (SAIE AND Possession of Mari 
juanna. Subject previously for similar charge.;and is 
currently on probation.
Claims he is a graduate from the Univ. of Mich, and is 
currently attending Wayne State Univ. working on his 
masters degree.
This location is but a few door away from the headquarter 
of the Detroit Comm, to End the War in Vietnam, where /
a meeting was in progress. The arresting officers had 
to summon aid in making this arrest at the group from . >
the Peace Center attempted to obstruct police in the k
performance of their duty. See file for list of persons 
investigated and releqsed.
5-18-65, Free Pr0ss art in file "WOULD B" SCHOOL TEACHER 
DEFENDS MARIHUANA HABIT." Re; subject.
See file for integrogation sheet on subject.
(Figure A-2)
Detroit Police Department, Special Investigation Bureau (SIB) 
Master Index Cards for John Sinclair
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files.
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(Figure A-3)
Michigan State Police, Security investigation squad (SIS) 
Master Index Card for Leni Sinclair
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files.
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DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Criminal Information .Riiranu..
MtDOll
John Alexander
lAST NAMt
Si n c l a i r Jr
Aopaiu
Born: Flint, Michigan
•lira OATt COiOl HltONT WllOMT
1 0 -2 -4 1  . W/H 6 '4 "  210
kaii ms
B lk  Brn
DAT!
2 - 5 -6 9
Cll NO.
AUOCUTU omu Nti^ttflcinfAoiNCT) 
is 3
tK
Mich 0 /L  S -5 2 ^ - lf2 9 -O l4 t-7 6 0
%I.111!ii1:111i111i;i;1,r11.
lOCAllTiU fUQUINTID
M<S SrtCIAlTY frUHHUl Ot OCCUPATION
Artists Chairman WPP
c r im in a i  H in o r r
IIM A U S l ~~
8-16-65 Above was arrested for possession of Marijuana_______________________
1-30-6.9 Info, rec’d that prior to 1-21-69, TRANS-LOVE ENERGIES distributed
a flyer to various news agencies announcing SINCLAIR'S trial before Judge
P a r r p n  R n h n r f r c ,  O a V la n r i  C n n n f r y  C t r r l H t  C r m r fc ,  P n n t l w r ,  M ic h .  S l l h j p n t  had
been arrested by Oakland County Sheriff Department last summer for "Assault-
■ ing— a-Po-I-ice-Off-ler", SEE •.'HITS PANTHERS-SIM^--- — — -— — — — ---  ----
5-1-69 Took part in "Free May Huey Newton Rally at Detroit Federal Bldg.
(Figure A-4)
Detroit Police Department/ Special Investigation Bureau (SIB) 
Intelligence Exchange card for John Sinclair
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files.
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Detroit Police Department/ Special Investigation Bureau (SIB) 
Mug Shots for John and Leni Sinclair 
(January 25, 19 67 arrests)
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files.
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CRIMINAL RECORD D E P A R_T_ALEJtT /^ T # 2 4 4 S 8 6
f.s.l. N9/ I O 4 . 7 9  y
d r  338350 >>
NAM E
JOHN ALEXANDER SINCLAIR JR. (vj). " C o lti'a a e "
THIS RECORD FORWARDED TO OR RECEIVED BY_ 
O N __________________  BY_________________
SJGNATU8I A N D /O I AGCNCT O f N IS O N  MCClVINC
DATE IDIN llflCATIO NIfCO lO  lURfAU
CONTRIBUTOR NAME AND NUMI1R DATE CHARGE AN0 DOCKET NUMRE DISPOSITION
•3, Lansing, 
,ich.
John Sinclair 
#37026
4-30-61 Drunk 5-1-61, 5 days or 81 
pd
'D,Det., Kich. John Sinclair 
#244886
10-7-64) Viol St Narc Lav 
(Poss fib Sale)
#A122357
12-30-64, Conv: Poss 
Bulk Ilarij 2 years 
probation 8250 Cost 
3-4-56, Viol Prob 
8300 Cost fib 3 years 
probation
tl II 8-16-||) Viol St Narc Lav. 
#A126310 
(poss fib Sale)
2-24-66, Conv: VSIiL 
(Poss) 3 years 
probation 1st 6 mont 
DEC
)HC Plymouth, 
lich.
John Sinclair 
#155911
2-24-66
(sent)
Viol Hare Law 
(EC Detroit)
6 months 3 years pr
3D,Det., I1ich. John Sinclair 
#244886
l-24-@) Viol St Narc Lav; 
(Sale fib Poss 
MariJ)#Al34588
7-28-69, 93* to 10 
years SPSK
tf 11 6-1-67 Traffic Warrant 10-17-671 Susp Sent
30 Pontiac, 
lich.
John Sinclair 
#15402
7-24-68 AfibB Pol Off /
30 Port Huron, 
/lich.
John Sinclair 
#21787
(  3
4-20-69 
ee Page 2,
Viol Narc Law 4-21-69, TOT US 
Customs
fa s te r mm oe im m file
(Figure A-6)
Detroit Police Department, Special Investigation Bureau (SIB) 
Criminal Record Index for John Sinclair
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
671
\
t
vo
Q
*
5
N
t
£
*50
1
£2 l \
v,
vb
Q
0
>4
1 
ft
fi
V "
S v -
.<c
<
11
*-tl
\ o v‘'I Hj
•o S
2 1 <? (j
o w !«!' O o a V ..
V  s  *  t
'* A * * *K
* » J
" * 9
*  $ J
* $ 9
t ^4
9
? 8 
I fc
j *
“sS-
3
<*
M»
0
*
!
$
i
$
$
fc
^  v j  vj Au >V
(Figure A-7)
Detroit Police Department, Special Investigation Bureau (SIB) 
Undercover Police Officer's Diagram of Artists Workshop
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
672
DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT 
DETECTIVE DIVISION 
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION BUREAU
April 26, 1967
TO: Special Investigation Bureau
SUBJECT: Conference on LOVE-IN to be held on Belle Isle. A p r i l  30. 
1967.
At 10:30 A.M., April 26, 1967, a meeting was conducted 
by District Inspector Anthony Bertonl at Police Head­
quarters Conference Room with the Organizing Committee 
Of TRANS-LOVE ENERGIES.
Representing the Detroit Police-Pepartaent was District
e Tactical huujlab unit, 
a Motor Traffic Bureau, 
of the Harbormaster Bureau.
ireau. .
/ ^  Representing .TRANS-LOVE ENERGIES I/was JOHN SINCLAIR. 25/m/w,
.NOEL COOPER. 20/m/w. DAVE KAPLAnT 19/m7w, all residing at
4867 John C. Lodge, and BRYAN-COLLINS, 24/m/w, 3035 East
Grand Boulevard.
Ground rules governing the "love-in" were formulated.
The Organizing Committee was appraised of the State Laws 
and City Ordinances regarding indecent and obscene conduct, 
comsumption of alcoholic beverages in parks, etc. If the 
gathering becomes disorderly or a disturbance is antici­
pated, the participants will disband on orders from the 
police department. TRANS-LOVE ENERGIES will appoint 
approximately 100 psychedelic rangers to control the 
conduct of the participants. They will be wearing arm 
bands and large buttons with "TRANS-LOVE ENERGY" on 
them.
MR. SINCLAIR stated that the "love-in” is scheduled to 
start at 12:00 noon and will disband shortly after dark.
It will be held in the picnic area adjacent to the band 
shell. Thera will be two flat bed trucks containing 
generators and bands. There will be several musical 
groups and folk singers throughout the area. The 
members were requested to park on the mainland and 
walk to the area to avoid a parking problem. Two 
thousand participants are anticipated.
(Figure A-8)
Detroit Police Department, Special Investigation Bureau (SIB)
April 26, 1967 Report 
Trans-Love's Planned "Love-in" on Belle Isle
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files.
(fig. con'd.)
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The police detail will bet
1 Sergeant and 11 Patrolmen, Mounted Bureau
1 Inspector, 1 Sergeant, and 3 Patrolmen, 
Motor Traffic Bureau
1 Lieutenant, 1 Sergeant, and 10 Patrolmen, 
Belle Isle Station
2 Patrolmen, Stationary Traffic Bureau
Special Investigation BureauT
These officers will be equipped with prep radios. They 
will not.be assigned to the picnic area proper, but will 
work the perimeter. The officers of the Motor Traffic 
Bureau will be in radio equipped cars and on % hour 
pulls. The officers of the Stationary Traffic Bureau 
will be assigned to the bridge entrance at Jefferson 
Avenue, and if it becomes necessary will close the 
bridge to traffic.
The prisoner bus will be on standby at the Municipal 
Garage, 2650 East Jefferson. There will be one wagon 
assigned to the Belle Isle station.
The Tactical Mobile Unit will have one unit working in 
the Fifth Precinct and one unit working in the Seventh 
Precinct. These two units will consist of one Inspector, 
one Lieutenant, three Sergeants, and 40 Patrolmen.
READ AND APPROVED
Ipecial Investigation Bureau
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM
CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE BUREAU /J
ft*. fay 22.1967
Criminal Intolligbnee Bureau 
Sub/.ef, THREATS Cg  SUMMER CI7IL PISICRBAHCBS
Oa Kay 21,1967 at M563 John C. Xndgay*th« headquarter* of the 
ARTIST'S WORKSHOP, also known a* TSAHBjUflVlB ENERGIES, a Second - 
Precinct Scout Car (Set 2-13) drovavny. ana ooserred xnslda -this 
location hut visible throughan open-door a large kite, described 
as red vhlte and blue bearing the Inscription TUCK THE UNITED 
STATES —GO PUT A KIT]?*. The scout eittftiBfrlecra eonflflcot.cu* +h*
r a n  a courcnaaxa or June 7,1907. xnaftnams or this defendant was 
PART Michael QRTwaHAV a V/H/27 who gave bis address as *863 John
Lodge.
A short time after this subject arrived at the police station a 
large group of people entered the station lead by a JOHN SINCLAIR* 
DPB #2w886 also of U863 John C. Lodge. SINCLAIR was a leader In 
the recent so called LOVE IN at Belle Isle. These people demanded 
to knew why GRIKSHAW had been taken In and In the course of there 
complaints one of the group Bade the remark that because of this 
Incident the police would nave more trouble this summer with this 
group than they could handle* *
BEAD AND APPROVED!
«■» C el O -n .M t O.p.0. JU  ttl-AJ)
(Figure A-9)
Detroit Police Department* Criminal Intelligence Bureau (CIB) 
May 22, 1967 Inter-Office Memorandum 
Gary Grimshaw "Go Fly a Kite" Incident
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files.
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DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT
' INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM
n... December. 19. 1057
To,
S u b jtc ii INFORMATION RE I  HARBORIKG RUNAWAY JUVENILES.
Cn 12-19-67 at 7:00 P.M.
the Gang Detail* Youth Bureau were In the Plum Street area attempting to 
locate a MICHAEL O'LEARY 1G/H/W of Royal Oak and JEFFERY HALIERS 1G/II/H 
of Peoria Illinois. The writers talked a U H M B B H B  of 2136
Fourth St. (a former runaway himself) at the "Roc^Shop" at Fourth &
Plum otreots. I .
The Informer stated to.the writers that while he was a runaway* 
he was harbored by a JOHTT SINCLAIR 30/M/w, owner of Artist workshop on 
w.. warren a Lodge Service'Drive.' Informer stated further that Sinclair 
has harbored many teen-age runaways r mostly girls while he had been 
staying at the workshop. informer also stated that Sinclair sells drugs 
to the teenagers and permits them to engage In sexual activities on 
his premises. Informer was In the premises this data end observed about 
twelve teenagers* costly young girls* five of which ho knew ts be 
runaways.
T h e  Artist Workshop Is a known hangout for drug users and several 
orrosia have been made by the Naracotic' Bureau In the past. JOHN SINCLAIR 
is a convicted naracotic pusher and Is now awdfclng trial In Recorder's 
Court for sale and possession of marajauna.
Tho Informer stated that most of "the action" occurs after midnight* 
and that he has seen runaway* MICHAEL O'LEARY at the workshop.
(Figure A-10)
Detroit Police Department, Gang Detail, Youth Bureau 
December 19, 1967 Inter-Office Memorandum 
Alleges Trans-Love is Harboring Teen-age Runaways
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files.
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EETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Dstootlvs Division
Tot
Subject:
Fob3 7, 1968
AR3CH AT U99 W. FOREST; Complainant l JOHN SINCLAIR, 
26/1/, U99 W. Forest, 833-3166 (Store & Resldenoes)
. 1, At U i 3 5  PM, raoeivsd a oall from  __
stating that at 10:1|0 PM, last, he and his partner, 
_  . B S D had a radio run to the above address, on
report of an arson.
2. Complainant told the offloors that at about 10:30 
PM, last, unknown persons had thrown four fire-bombs at his 
store-residenoe— three had landod on the roof, causing minor 
damage, and one had landed short, falling behind the building. 
The bombs ware small brown throw-away type bottles.
Chief !(., Ladder 20,3. Responding to the scene were:
Engine $ and Squad 2.
U. on Bureau, responded and
took a whole bottOTUUl UfUTfticka of 2 bottles to .he Arson 
Bureau where they are held on Evldenoe Tag #6591%.
5. Assigned to DFD Arson Bureau and 13th Pet.; copies 
to Special Investigation, 3oientlfic and Central Photo Bureaus.
(Figure A-ll)
Detroit Police Department, Detective Division 
February 7, 1968 Complaint Report 
Concerning Fire-Bombing of Trans-Love Energies House
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files.
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Conspiracy co Place Explosives With Intent
: ° 9  to Damage Propoety
WITNESSES: ______
sa'jvi.-:
l’Z;«Y SlLL’MIA 
William 
/jo:.:i bomicar
GIMIALU KIcS
ntsc-:: w u.\:;rt:cc io  
Lawrence ciacobozzi
BOBBY TAYLOR
CilARLES S. MC EWEN 
DONALD DAY 
JAMES HASH 
EMUURA JAC1CS0H
n e m o  v u A im  tunstall
MIKE SAUCE 
JOHN BOSTKON 
A m  LEE SIMPSON 
EARL BUGLO
| RONALD STEPHENS 
WILLIAM GAYK 
CRAWFORD BENNETT 
MAX SWARTZ 
jjOAmi INGROA 
JAMES KEELAH 
PHILIP TORSON 
GARY CARLESS 
JAMES IIOUSEY
CUAKL2S JACQCS.......... EDUARD .RADTKE............... iGEOBGE.EIIESHER.______
‘ w 'kluJ STATE OF MICHIGAN S^rrf^S^lfi^bER’S COURT FOR Tl/^W^il^jE^ofiP rLeSt) S
#  - ■ ■ in craXSfi '
WARRANT 
August 27, 1$68 up. to and Including?
OFoffense *kNovember 6. 1968-:H'ff
(seb' . -■■ 
attached c* 
li*t)
TIIE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
1. DAVIO JOSEPH VALLER **ll
2. JOiU '.vAT l'RHOUSE FORREST
3. RONALD PIERCE v 5 0 3  
It. JEFFREY RANDALL FARR
5. JANES RCDM..T MOSCARA S  4 o S
6. CARY BOZC'.T MILTIMORE
7. JCitl SChMITTROTll S  2.05
8. WILLIAM DAVIDSON LADD S’ - 3 0 S
9. 3ENJAMI3 Il'.SRISON PARKS «^"io4
{ a a r a r v,"
12.DHJ1TA FLOWERS . D.f.nd.„,(.>7rtWT----------
DATEt
Varloua locations'In Wayne, M3eoab:.;3'4t 
l o c a t i o n  Oakland end Washtenaw Counties'* 
and other place*} in State of Mlc
COMPLAINANT m i l l . , ,  » .  Hrt P j t v
COMPLAINING
sWTe’S'Sit^idASVSSEAU ^  jjmg DOE 01; 15. JOHN DOE #1; 16, JOHN DOE’ #2; 
c o u n t t  o r  WAYNE } ts 17 J0im DOE 03; 18. JANE DOE 42 and 193 JOHN DOE #4
c r r r  OF DETROIT 5 '  * * '
"V-<L
»  ...
TO: The SupetlMenWem or any Inspector. Lieutenant. SwgMgt, Deteethe er PalrolaM'of lb*.
Metropolitan Police of the City of Detroit. County of WWW, State of MiehlgM, GREETING:}
U’HEREAS the  above-named COMPLAINING WITNESS h a th  Ib is  day made  r t m p l i l n t  tofthe ondetaiped Judge (of Acting: 
Judge) of the Recorder’s Court of the Cily of Delroil that heretofore on Ihe DATE OF OFFENSE listed above, at the L0», 
CATION l is te d  above in the  City of Detroit, County of Wayne, Stale of Michigan, the above-naaed Defeadaat(a), late of
the City of Detroit, ^  - ^
did wickedly, maliciously and feloniously conspiro, combine, confederate . ■j.rfe 
ar.d cgr-e together and with divers other persons and Ronald Duane Tuna tall > y *  
for the purpose and with the intent then and there to place in, upon, 
under, against and nonr buildings, cars, vessels and structures, gun 
powder, dynamite and other explosive substances with Intent to destroy, 
throw or injure the whole or any part thereof, which explosive 
substance:; did cause injury to and destruction of tho property of others, 
to wit: a 1962 Ford Felrlane Couch, 19C3 Michigan License No. HB 07 61 
owned by 1 Llliata Croft; a building conmonly known as 25935 Gratiot, Rose­
ville, Michigan; a building commonly known as 23700 Creator Mack, St. Clair 
Shores, Michigan; a 1965 Plymouth Coach, 1968 Michigan License BB 71 55 
owned by Richard Lloyd; a building commonly known as 4329 Woodward,
Detroit, Michigan; a 1964 Valiant Coach Vehicle 4 32593458 owned by 
U.S. Government; a building cosmonly known as 450 S. Main, Ana Arbor,
.’iichigcn; a building commonly known as Institute of Science & Techtiology 
at 22GD North Campus Boulevard, Ann Arbor, Michigan, contrary to 
Act 290, P.A. 1966 and 750,206, C.L. 1948.
(signed by Judge Thomas L. Poindexter, Nov. 9, 1968)
(Figure A-12)
November 9, 1968 (Michigan state) Bombing Indictment 
"David Valler Bombings case"
Source: state of Michigan Case No. A-149570
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I
S U P T  T O  C O M M .
I DEPUTY fiUPT. '■P
C H IE F S  F IL F
DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT
INTER-OFFICE M EM ORANDUM  
detect: ve division 
SPECIAL IHVr.SllGA.TION BUREAU
To:
S vb jed :
D o t .  September 26. 196S 
Commanding Officer, Special Investigation Bureau 
Sl’VVEIlLANCE OF' DAVID J. VALLER
12:00 PM WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1968: Mc'b.V?
Detective Stanley Douhleday (MSP), Patrolman Charles Henry, and 
Patrolman Crear Mitchell were on duty at the 12th Frecinct.
12:40 PM Crew began a surveillance in the vicinity of Wayne State Univer­
sity, in an attempt to locate subject, DAVID VALLER.
The following vehicles were observed in the vicinity of 4867 
John Lodge service drive:
2690 CA 1967 V.V.'., 2 dr., reoistered to PETEP. A. S KAP.ILYN 
WERBE, 8021 Third - Detroit.
3NH 443 Minnesota plate - 1960 Chevy, registered to DONALD T.
PERRON, 600 K. 80th Street, Bloomington - Minnesota.
MA 9670 .1965 Ford, convertible, registered to JAKES P.. KCSCARA, 
32055 Lancaster Drive - Warren.
6662 CD* A Black and Green Ford.
1:35 PM Crew informed by Patrolman Coulter, via radio, that he would
be working with the night crew, this date.
2:30 PM Patrolmen Mitchell observed VALLER walking eastbound on Hancock
Axr. from Third, where with crew following, he walked to 4820 Cass,
2:35 PM a White Castle Restaurant and entered from view. (VALLER was
wearing dark pants and a Blue jacket).
2:45 PM Patrolman Henry observed VALLER exit the above location, and
Arr. with crew following, walk to 5201 Woodward, the Detroit Main
3:00 PM Library, where he entered via rear Cass entrance away from view.
4:00 PM Detective Doubleday observed VALLER exit the library. Crew
Arr. followed him to 39 W. Warren, Johnnie's Dining Room, where he
4:07 FM entered away from view.
4:45 PM Detective Murray observed VALLER exit the restaurant above and
with crew following, walk to the vicinity of V,'. Forest, and the
LOST southbound John Lodge service drive. VALLER was lost by crew,
5:05 PM while he was running through heavy pedestrian and vehicle traffic.
6:15 PM Detective Doubleday observed VALIEH walking southbound on the
northbound John Lodge service drive, from Hancock. Crew followed 
Arr. him to 4718 Trumbull, the Dairy Treat, where VALLER made a pur-
6:38 PM chase, and then walked to 4755 Commonwealth, home of JOHN V..
FORREST, and entered from view. (VALLER now wearing White pants).
i.T F .i. ’ p e n i y .  c p C 'T r i- 3 iF i  2 5 .  1 9 -  P p.;.ge cr:r or ??.;c r;.crs
(Figure A-13)
Detroit Police Department, Special Investigative Bureau 
September 26, 1968 Surveillance Report, David J. Valler
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red squad Files
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
679
' UNTTED STATES G ERNMENT
Memorandum.
Director, FBI (62-112678)
Y
Detroit (157-3554)
V
oat* :  2/25/69
SUSJZniUfBITE PANTHER PARTY (WPP) 
INFORMATION CONCERNING 
00: Detroit
Qu Re Detroit teletypes to Bureau, 12/26/68 w  
12/27/68, Bureau letter to Detroit, dated 1/2J./69 and 
o  '^■New York airtel to Bureau, dated 1/28/69. / ’ I
"  !=! V' < 1
; Sir Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of an
•\ ^ 3 >- concerning captioned natter. Two copies of the LHM are 
" 23 furnished New York inasmuch as investigation has been
conducted by that Division regarding captioned organization
Investigation regarding captioned organization*:  ,  „  ,  _______________________
■ /.:'^^continuing and further information regarding the White
/  . . j^ vPanther Party (WPP) and its leaders and members will be 
y. £": lij furnished the Bureau in a form suitable for dissemination' 
'Zr at a later date.
' - There is some indication the WPP
S  JOHN SINCLAIR as a method to provide invaluable publicity
for the MC5, the rock band that he manages.
Sources utilised in the LHM are as follows:
l u t i S S T t J h y w / ' - f
New York (100-164951) (Enc. 2) (RM) ^
atroit
Bureau
i s  FEB 28  1989
saudB*•yoKTi uca,oao?.^  ^
R”lU 1969 oiuit Payroll Savingr PI,
S7C
(Figure A-14)
FBI Memorandum, SAC Detroit to Hoover 
February 25, 1969 (62-112678-7)
First Detailed Report on WPP from the Detroit Office
Source: Freedom of Information Act Files on WPP
(fig. con'd.)
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tm tltfly, PUssf fyfcr k 
nitPfk.
VSl’C STATES DEPARTMENT OK J I-' CK 
L D K Q A L  I I UI IGa U OF I N VE ST I C  (ON
Detroit, Michigan 
February 2 5 ,  1969
' "i ..
... ..r^ ;,V£o
Ro: White Panther Party (WPP)
The January 3, 19S9, edition of "Time Magazine”, 
a well-known widely circulated weekly American magazine, 
carried an article entitled,_"The Revolutionary Hype”, 
on pages 49-50.. The article'states that the most violent 
expression of revolutionary rock so far comes from a DatroityW't r! 
quintet calledkfggffoi^ ftPtor City) 5. After months of. 
rumbling about'them in the pop underground, they erupted 
at Manhattan's Fillmore East. Their performance was less 
revolutionary then revolting. The group performed John 
Lee Hooker's Motor City is Burning, and there was no 
mistaking the message.
"All the cities will burn,
You are the people who will build up the ashes.”n n d  
hi^ wZqclair,. 26 years old, maJohaTtSih alr  nager and mentor 
of the MC5, who runs the group's hippie-style communal 
household in Ann Arbor, Michigan. stated the MC5 ore a ■ 
free, high-energy source that will drive us wild into the 
streets of America, yelling and screaming and tearing down 
everything that would keep people slaves. The article 
states that Sinclair and the #C5. .^ re self-styled ‘musical 
guerrillas”, who flaunt the'i? membership in a minuscule 
left-wing organization called the Hhifce_Panther Party (WPP). 
The article states that the MC5 now favor outrageous on 
stage stunts as removing their clothes and burning the 
United States flag.and that the MC5 are taking protest one 
step further to get attention by practicing what they preach, 
as is shown by their string of arrests on charges of 
noisemaking, obscenity, and possession of marijuana.
J - / /  *'& 7 / - r/
ehclosure
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lutii£jn Stiir Piilkr
DDI riONAL COMPLAINT KIPORT
»»i' i i • |4« m •
il-w U l In f*e ll«a tlo n  U nit, Detroit
t-+t- —  - 1 r i ,iiu *“
j P o n t l t o *  I
} l l T i „ .  W•;-------------- —  ' T v t f r .
11/19/M_____________ / 5/W/69
 * '  ^ r r a r * 7 ;— - r
xSfT.i\Z~ uiMi i----
* *7|in»i e*FT7*e
see;7i m:*:* wktt
ri • o. i
! tH r tX 'K C U  □  CLO U D  *T  M IC S T  □  * * « r * r  w » u
i I W V X I  U D D U C D
it genu*
S an tJK l MTEi
on 5/23/49, JCH* snunn appeared before Uw H l« .  ntKtU BOhfckTS, Oakland 
Count/ V lreu ll <3ods* la  Pontine fo r eentenelaf a fte r bcluc fount fu ilt r  
prctleuel/ o f u u t lU o i a polio* o ffic e r.
On notion o f U>* defence ettom ur fo r e now tr ia l, .17X2 BOOSTS eet the 
eentenolng a aide u n til 4 /10/49, 9iOO aa, while he reriew* the non etjdeaoe. 
eutodtted tgr the defence.
XDunrnst
JfflLaatura ruXSJBBB
mucus
/ V ^ WCPltPg ma c u il ^  n rw n e i jmni w h l 
ObStSfPh---.  __
»mtmu
K iiflk T  45 «h*e 2 d r ., JU )657. le flite ra d  to atae r .  nrmtra. 1173 * •  
Saioek, D etro it,
69 Bodge 3  d r, HP <1*31., U  CAMB. SJlSWSST . SO S. George, h w l fc l* .
<4 4>ev 2 d r ., OB *297., te  POHAID E. OOOCH.  1351 B. CUuwo, CUaeeo, ..
69 foot S t* Uga, Sold, V  SadJ, to Budget heat 1 Car e f  inn Irh e r b h ,  . 
2714 MaahUoaw, S p e lU a ti. t •
O n  44 Suiek (w ets  45 O de, IS 372. Cheek tdth Okie BOB revealed m  i»  
rile e  aa y e t.
_ _  _ _________________
Q K flH B M M M B B B E h  e f the lea  Arba? Pella* Poartaeet, eheahed ik e -' ’ 
■ndget Reetal On. and found that the vto lsla aa* reded aa 5-1-47, to the .' 
S le e ra itf e f IH ehtjin . farther eheato to be oUe,
coKPunrr sttnsi
  Ce^ l olnl r eu lne epoa.
•poelal Xm stlgatlee * d t  
Detroit
. M tod ta il |H < | I  |  M M tM
(fill
(Figure A-15)
Michigan State Police, Special Investigative Unit 
May 29, 1969 Report: Surveillance of White Panthers
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files
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t o ' DIRECTOR, F2I (100-449698) d a t e :  9/9 /69
f r o : i : ' , / ' 3A C , WrO ( 100- 47757)  ( P )
p.i ---
subject: COINTELPRO - NEW LEFT
/S POTENTIAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTION
Utilizing sources WFO contemplates the publication
and distribution of anti-New Left literature attacking the New j  
Left from the left as well as from the liberal and conservative 
positions.
ties, through public source information, will be kept up-to-date 
on the policies of prominent New Left organizations so they can 
make informed judgments to forestall and quell potential disrup­
tive activities. Sources within the movement will attempt to 
capitalize on the political differences prevalent within the move 
ment today.
Efforts also will be made to further the rive in the 
black-white movements.
Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC), the Black United Front 
(BUF) demanded a sum of money from the NMC for allowing the NMC 
to hold a demonstration In WDC on 11/14/69 - 11/15/69. BUF warned 
that if the;- money was not forthcoming, they would prevent the NMC 
from demonstrating.
(Figure A-16)
FBI Memorandum, SAC WFO to Hoover 
September 9, 19 69 
Reports Successful COINTELPRO Action Against "The Mobe"
Sources within the administrations of local universi-
PENDING COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTION
During a recent meeting of the National Mobilization
REC-l /
Bureau
WFO
CTG:rms
B .ij U.S. S . / B o n d s  Regularly- an the P ayro ll Sailings P lan
Source: Eynon Collection/BHL
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M E l B T l U r
sponsored by the Free University 
conducted by the White ranther Party
IN DLFENi'.E OF A LIPhSTl'LE
The citizens of the 
Woodstock Nation
shall meet this Thursday
march 5 at a fm
and every Thursday 
thereafter at
1*867 JOHN C# LODCE: corner of barren :
*all persons* 
Hippies, Tipples, Commies 
Dope Fiends, and Other 
Assorted Scum
are cordially invited
to attend- cantribute-
 ..and PARTICIPATE
We can learn vhat.
We are not only good 
world, we are also
at destroying the old 
good at building
Chairman
(Figure A-17)
Flyer, WPP Detroit Chapter, circa Spring, 1970 
Announcing a WPP/YIP "Political Education Meeting"
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files
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To,
DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT
INTER-OFFICE M E M O R A N D U M  
INTELLIGENCE
pol. March IP, 1070
intelligence Bureau
Sub/eel, SURVEILLANCE, "PROJECT EAGLE"
3:00 PM THURSDAY. MARCH 12. 1970. On duty.
k:00 PK The undersigned officers to the Intelligence Bureau office
for information pertaining to PROJECT EAGLE.
7:30 PM Officers began a surveillance in the vicinity of k867 Lodge, 
the last known residence of the target subject-, JOHN 
WATERHOUSE FORREST, DPD 275307,~no'I.B.
9:00 observed subject FORREST, wearing a black
jacket and“whites shirt, accompanied by an unknown white 
male and female, exit a 1965 Dodge Van, blue in color with
white stripe, 1970 Michigan license JVM 90k. All persons
entered k867 Lodge. JVN 90k is registered to DAVID SINCLAIR, 
no DPD or I.E.. of 1520 Hillst., Ann Arbor, Michigan, this 
vehicle is designated as C-l.
9:15 PM^BHBHHHHEKobserved subject FORP.EST, in company with an 
unkown white male and female, exit k867 Lodge and enter C-l. 
With all officers following they drove to the DETROIT
arrived METROPOLITAN AIRPORT where they parked C-l and entered the
9:k0 PM airport complex.Note: subject FORREST was carrying an army- 
type duffle bag when he exited the Lodge address.
9:k°
a n d V B H H B B G I S B H t a B P o f  the '___________________
entered the airport complex for a close-in surveillance in 
1 an efforjLjo detertsine-if-subject..FORREST was leaving on a
flight.'Jatrolmen Keberly and Stover^observed subject FORREST 
greet and unknown white male and“female in the AMERICAN 
AIRLINE TERMINAL. ’
10:00 PM observed subject FORREST in company with
- four white males and four wlfite females exit the building 
and enter C-l. Fersons described as:
Subject FORREST, full beard, medium long hair, left foot 
in'cast, using crutches. Wearing a blue beret, black 
leather Jacket with hippy decals, black pants.
One whito female, 18/5-2, medium build, long black hair. 
Wearing a black leather jacket and blue pants.
PROJECT EAGLE PAGE ONE AFTERNOONS MARCH 12, 1970
C •! 0-77.M1 O.P.O. H I  (13 431
(Figure A-18)
Detroit Police Department, Criminal Intelligence Bureau (CIB)
March 13, 1970 
"Project Eagle" Surveillance of Detroit WPP House
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum JUKE
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (Buflle 62-112678 ) d a te :  6/22/70
: SAC, DETROIT (100-36217 - Sub 2)
SURJtCT: RECOMMENDATION TOR INSTALLATION OF TECHNICAL OR MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE
RE: Title TOOTH INTERNATIONAL PARTY- 
WHITE PANTHER 
Character of Case IS - Y2P-WP 
Field Office DETROIT
Symbol Number
T»= of Surveillance (Technical or Technical 
Microphone)
Name and address of person dr organization on vbom surveillance Is to he 
placed: Youth International Party - White Panther 
1520 Hill Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 
708 Arch Street. Ann Arbor, Michigan
A. Address vhere Installation is to be made (set forth exact roam
number or area to be covered): Same aa above. 
Telephone 761-1709. 769-1333. 769-1
B.
3. Previous tnd other current Installations on the same subject:
Knocks;. ^  ,
M L 7 S3£0 * 5 *
■’P'T" ~ • £-.rhii~iiD
' DAT i 8 Y £?£
h. Cost and man-
h W
A n 7/L -
5. Adequacy of security:
Haxlmm security assured.
CD Bureau
Registered Mall 
1 - Detroit
(Figure A-19)
FBI Memorandum, SAC Detroit to Hoover 
June 22, 1970
Neil Welch's First Request for a Warrantless Wiretap 
on the White Panthers
Source: Freedom of Information Act Files on WPP
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C O N F I D E N T I A L
Re: Lawrence Robert Plamondon; 
Y/hite Panther Party
(right side)
,/J /JtsMZW 
? M J L £ = -
01
LUX
234
SCHNEIDER 
50789,10,11V12,13
1Z~1?13-961-rai9--L- 919-231-1204
10. Note torn from Calendar
Tills item is a scrap of paper torn from a calendar
bearing the notations “769-1535 Marty and Patty".
11. Note regarding Travel to Moscow
This item concerns a one-page note regarding air travel
to Moscow which appears to concern arrival at Stockholm, Sweden, 
via Aroflot for a change at 2:15 PU with arrival at Moscow
3:05 PM. Following this data is a note concerning the North
Vietnamese Embassy in Moscow, followed by nunibers 45-09-79. 
Numbers also follow this entry as follows; 009463, 854545, 
followed by 'words "Embassy of N.V.". This note contains a 
listing of what appear to be immunization requirements, including 
yellow fever, typhoid plague, and cholera. The last entry on the
notes appears as "N. Viet Embassy in Moscow 2 45 1095".
12. Report to the Central Committee, WPP, 
dated April 12, 1970
This item concerns a four-page report prepared 
on the letterhead of the "Youth International Party", 1520 
Kill Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan, and is dated April 12, 1970. 
It is noted as submitted by "Vic Coleman, Field Marshal". This 
report is set forth in part on letterhead bearing the inscrip­
tion, "Folketinget Christiansborg".
This report is set forth below verbatim; however, the 
material was typed on a foreign typewriter and foreign letters 
ere transposed:
C O N F  I D E  N T  I A L
34
(Figure A-2 0)
FBI Report on Plamondon's Capture 
September 3, 1970 
Hand-Written Comment Concerning the White Panthers' 
Telephone conversations
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files
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C O N F I D E N T I A L
R«: Lawrence Robert Plamondon;
Hhlte Panther Party
freedom of the individual. Source advised that 
the VIPP maintains its National headquarters at 
1520 Hill Street. Ann Arbor, Michigan, which he 
described as a "commune" known as the "Trans-Love 
Energies, Incorporated".
August 20, 1970
B. Official Personnel of WPP
A source advised in August, 1970, that the WPP 
is operated by a "Central Committee" (CC), all 
of whom have used 1520 Hill Street, Ann Arbor, 
as their address, including the following with 
their official positions:
John Sinclair, Chairman - WPP
- Lawrence Robert Plamondon, commonly known 
as "Pun.", Minister of. Defense - WPP , - ^ -v
Genie Plamondon (Mrs. Lawrence Robert 0 *
Plamondon), Minister of Foreign. Affairs - WPP, 
formerly Minister of Communication
*■* Milton Edward Taube, commonly known as "Skip" 
or "Tube", Minister of Interior - WPP, formerly 
Minister of Education
Magdaline Sinclair (Mrs. John Sinclair), commonly 
known as "Leni", Minister of Education - WPP
David Sinclair, brother of John Sinclair, 
commonly known as "Dave", Chief of Staff - WPP
x Kenneth Michael Kelley, commonly known as "Ken", 
Minister of Information - WPP
C O N F I D E N T I A L
3
(Figure A-21)
FBI Report on Plamondon's Capture 
September 3, 1970 
Hand-written Inclusion of Dennis Marnell 
as the WPP's "Deputy Minister of Defense"
Sources John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files
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O K P A IlTM tN T  O F  STATE
*• W Ptl«4 W> 0«<wmlii«4 P U m
F lL f  OCSIGNATIOK'
I'urt.K
Department oI Stata'*1"’ *’TOr,ST*Ti
OTTAWA- A# I® 8 UlH IS?®
u s / A H  iJ “-'•sis qrahch
Amecnsul MONTREAL DATE:
Y i« n f» «  Prnr»«e_ C t n x d im  C u it tm *  " S t lT t i r e "
FROM
SU6JECT
Thr«« voocn, Identified, la the press es eeobere ot chetfhl£^ 
Peneher^ . breach of the* Touch Interaatlonel Percy AYlpplssTefld
u i o c c s t c o  O iiT A ie w jn b M
m r  «puT.«a
including th* vlfa of Ylppla laadar Jarry Rubin, hold » pceos 
conference on cho steps of cha Consulate Censral Juaa 10 co 
proEosc cho "solzuro" bp Canadian Custona offlcars of a sulccaao 
full of prlnead naccar, Including 1*3 leccars froa Anarlcan 
prlaonara of war in North Vlacnaa.
Canadian officlals explained Chat cha documents vara not seized 
buc only held for examination pending Inspection and lacar - 
after the press conference - returned to the cbrea women.
Mrs Ijflftbln. a MlssPCunhc/'otToronto 1 and one Cunfi Planondon 
told reporters chat they were en route to the U.S. via Air Canada's 
Moscow co Montreal flight after a month's tour of Vietnam. The 
prisoners' letters were given thea by the Vietnamese Cocmlceaa “ i£: 
for Solidarity with the American Paople because, according co 
Mrs. Rubin, personal delivery Is two to four months faster chan 
delivery by regular channels.
SP
</ Sf}j yiouls^ ®-
Eaelosurs:
Clipping from Thu Montreal Sc. 
Jun« 11. 1970
I
^.44  OS *323
^ a J U L K i g n r t f "
o«'«> V4«r i
/
(Figure A-22)
U.S. State Department "Airgram"
June 18, 19 70 
Concerning the WPP/YIP International Travels 
(Note the Various Intelligence Agencies 
Also Receiving the Information)
Source: Freedom of information Act Files on WPP
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fD*M2 \ S'
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
n„,„ 12/26/68
DAVID JOSEPH VALLER, then an innate at Wayne 
County Jail, Detroit, Michigan, on interview, was presented 
with a rights waiver form, which he read, acknowledged his 
understanding of and signed.
Regarding the bombing of the Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
office of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), September, 
1968, he furnished the following information;
Sometime in August, 1968, VALLER said he attended 
a three day concert, called "Dialogue 1968," which was held 
,at the Unitarian Church, Cass and Forest Streets, Detroit,
‘ on a consecutive Friday, Saturday and Sunday, dates unrecalled. 
On two of those three days, an Ann Arbor band, known as the 
MC/5, performed at this affair. On those two days VALLER 
said he met with JOHN SINCLAIR, who i3 associated with the 
Ann Arbor band referred to.
VALLER advised that he and others had earlier 
purchased a quantity of dynamite from a location in northern 
Michigan. A portion of the dynamite so acquired he said 
was, at the time of the concert referred to, stored in the 
basement of the church referred to. He said that on these 
two occasions he discussed with JOHN SINCLAIR, a friend of 
his, the fact that he had possession of a quantity of a 
quantity of dynamite and asked JOHN SINCLAIR whether SINCLAIR 
had anything he wished to blot/ up. VALLER said SINCLAIR 
said he would be interested in securing some dynamite, but 
that he did not know just what he would want to use it for 
at that time, as there were many things he would like to 
blow up. VALLER recalled that SINCLAIR, on this occasion, 
said something to ‘the effect that he was more interested 
in seeing such bombings occur than' in committing such 
bombings personally, inasmuch as he was deeply involved 
at that time with current charges against him.
VALLER recalled that within one week after his 
meeting with JOHN SINCLAIR, he, VALLER, encountered PETER 
WERBE, editor of the "Fifth Estate" at Detroit, Michigan.
(Figure A-23)
FBI Synopsis of Interview with David Valler 
December 26, 1968 
(Note the Minimal Role Ascribed to John Sinclair)
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files
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Ool.______ 6/6/69
DAVID JOSEPH VALLER, as an inmate, V.'ayno County Jail, 
Dptroit, Michigan, acknowledged hia knowing that the 
interviewing Agents. and B H
v;ere Special Agents of the Federal Dureau of Investigation, 
United States Department of Justice. He acknowledged that 
he had requested this interview with the identified Agents, 
who were previously known to him. He read and executed an 
• "Advice of Rights" form, prior to interview. On interview, 
he furnished the following information:
He had read in the newspapers of a bombing of the
ROTC unit on the University of Michigan (UM) campus, Ann
Arbor, Michigan, June 1, 1969. He said that while he had
ho specific information concerning that bombing, whatever, 
he felt some responsibility for same, inasmuch as he 
believed dynamite he had previously furnished to persons 
in Ann Arbor, Michigan was likely used in the ROTC bombing.
He said he wished to make the following additional information 
available as of possible assistance in bringing to justice 
persons responsible for this bombing, and for two prior 
<>nn Arbor area bombings.
He noted that ho had previously furnished considerable 
information to interviewing Agents concerning his part in 
making dynamite available to an individual known to him as 
rTUM" PLAivOMCOH. He added that all previous information 
\ furnished by him was true and accurate; however, that he 
• had recalled the following' additional details:
Regarding JOHN SINCLAIR of Ann Arbor, Michigan, he 
recalled having furnished information to the effect that he 
had met with SINCLAIR at Detroit, Michigan, in August or 
early September, 1953, and prior to the bombing of the CIA 
office at Ann Arbor, Michigan, September, 195!2. • They met 
at the Unitarian Church, Cass at Forrest Streets, Detroit, 
during the time that SIHCL.il.l's band, the "MC/5" was doing 
a^concert at that church. He recalled that he met with 
SINCLAIR in the basement of that church, along with s<?veral 
other persons, including JACK FOXIEST, and possibly SUM y-.V.y/.S.
(Figure A-24)
FBI synopsis of Interview with David Valler 
June 6, 1969
(Valler has Changed his Story since his 12/26/68 Interview 
He Now Ascribes a Primary conspiratorial Role to Sinclair)
Source; John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files
(fig. con'd.)
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He recalled offering SINCLAIR dynamite and asking SINCLAIR if 
■he. had anything he would like to blow up. SINCLAIR responded 
something to the offect there were many things he would like 
to blow up, but that he was more interested in seeing 
things blown up than doing the thing himself. He said he 
was under observation of the police because of several 
charges then held against him.
At the time of the above-described encounter with 
. SINCLAIR, there was located in the same basement of this 
church a catche of dynamite. It was stored in a crate, and 
- represented something more than a case of dynamite. Some 
may have been stored in. a brown paper bag. This dynamite, and 
some additional loose dynamite was at the time stored in the 
basement of the building in which JOHN FORRJSf resided.
All of it represented the results of several purchasing 
expeditions made by DAVID VALLER to acquire dynamite and 
‘related equipment, intended for "cnti-ostoblishmcnt" bombings 
in the Detroit, Hichigan area. In acquiring this catche 
of dynamite, V>XLSR was accompanied by several different 
individuals on several different occasions, none of these 
individuals identical with porsons referred to heroin.
• SINCLAIR'S concert at the Unitarian Church was 
scheduled over a three day weekend. VALL3R, a day or two 
following the contact referred to above, was contacted 
privately by SIIIOL.'jR who at that time referred to VALL3A's 
earlier offer of dynamite and said something to the effect,
"I'want some of that stuff,' but I can't handle it. I'll have 
"PUN" make arrangements to pick it up." He then referred to 
I the "Pigs* having him under observation.
VALL3R said he knew "PUN" to be "PUtl" FLANONXiN, 
whom he knew to be a close associate of SINCLAIR'S in the 
operation of both the "Trans-Love Energies" organization, 
as woll as of the operation of the "MC/5" .band. He added 
that he knew "PUN" PLAM0H301J, with JO:nt SINCLAIR, to be 
an officer in. an organization known as the "White Panther 
Party" (ift'T), 'which organization was developed by them.
VALLER said he knew "FUN" to be one of SINCLAIR'S closest 
and most trusted associates.
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• , • Regarding "PUH" PLAMONDON, VALL3A said he
recalled' that shortly after his above-referred to discussions 
with JONH SINCLAIR, and in any case probably witliln a 
week of those discussions, he was contacted personally by 
one PET3R W3RDE in Detroit, Michigan, who advised him 
' that "PUtl" was then at HERBS's offices at the "Fifth Estate” 
in Detroit, looking for DAVID VaLLER.'
VALLER went to the "Fifth Estate" offices where 
he met with "PUN", who told him he had been requested 
by JOHN SINCLAIR to follow up on SINCLAIR'S earlier- contact 
''with V,LL3il, and'to make arrangements to pick up some 
explosives from VALLER, "PUN" did not Identify any specific 
intended target for use of this material, but in 
conversation made it clear that the dynamite would be 
used in an "anti-establishment" manner.
VrtLLER said that on this occasion, he instructed 
?PUH" in the safe use of dynamite, and the manner of fusing 
same. Me gave him instructions on the location of the 
Detroit, Michigan residence of JFlCK FORREST on Commonwealth 
Street. He told him that the dynamite would be placed in a 
package for pick up by "FUN" in, or on, a garbage can, and 
located in the alley behind the residence of FORREST. They 
agreed on the time and date of pickup,- which VALLER believed 
was the 6ame evening as the meeting referred to. No funds 
changed hands in this arrangement, V.-LL3R explaining that 
he was not "selling" explosives, but simply making it 
available to persons with intended "anti-establishment" uses.
VaLLSA recalled that he contacted JACK FORREST 
and gavo him’instructions that dynamite and fuse and caps, 
were to be placed’iii a package and placed as explained 
’above for pickup by "FUN".- He .also recalled that he wrote 
out detailed Instructions for the use of this equipment 
and gave same to’FORREST for placement with the package 
for "PUH". VnLLER believes that he instructed FORREST 
to‘place some 15 sticks of dynamite in-the package along 
with an unspecified, or unrccalled quantity of safety fuse 
and blasting caps.
VALLSA later in the evening of the day designated 
for the above-described pickup by "FUN" verified that FORREST
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(Figure A-25)
Michigan State Police, Security Investigation Squad (SIS)
December 11, 1970 
Information Regarding WPP's "CIA Conspiracy" Defense 
(Note the Reference to a Scheduled Telephone Installation)
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files
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COKflDINTJAL
REPORT
tp*cla1 tm tttfe a ilon  Itait
Whit* Panther Part? (Ami Arbor)
PkWlfCAtlO*
l*cl’ nil
12-1-70
**01 MO, 
1
JANE PONDA to spook st the Union Ball Rcca, 0, 
Uhlto Panther Party of Ann Arbor and Nsv Kobo, 
12-1-70 at biOOf/m,
of M. oampus, oponaorad 
bsadad by 1UVZ OOhEON,
ATTENDANCE I
LICENSE PLATES j
SPEECHI
JANS PONDA apoka at tba Union ballroom In tha Hlohlfan Union at BiOOp.m. 
on 12-1-70. Sha apoka In bahalf of tba Whlta Panther Dafanaa PUad, 
for JOHN SINCLAIR and JACK POHESt and PUN PLAMUNDON.
JANE POND! baa baan staying at 1520 Hill St., Ann Arbor Whlta Panthers 
headquarters,for tba past waak aba baa baan tharo and bolds news and TV 
oonfaranaaa. Aooordlng to Inalda Information sbs la vary dlaousnad as 
no ona paid any attantlon to bar nnd aha la Just ona of tbs group.
JANE PWSA apoka for about ona hour and tba TUP HAND* startad to ploy 
JANE PONDA told avaryooa that won tad to talk end aakqwestlons to go 
ovar to South Quad as soon as she was dona.
Bawtaan 250-300 tha moot attandad tba talk and many of tham ware glrfta 
looked aa If all tbs girls were lntarestad In Juat listening and 
seeing a az- movie actress, aa they all oroved around bar after tba talk 
Many of tba girls that wars there ware wall dressed and seem to be by 
themself.
Thare waa many smoking pot lnalds,thla oome from a very reliable sour*:.
The following plates ware obtained from 1520 Hill St., area, t at Union Bl<
GHB-W06, 67 Vol. SW, KAREN A. SWANSON, *0} S. 7th, Apt. #2,Ann Arbor. 
JUN-904, 65 Dodge SW, DAVE SINCLAIR, 1520 11111, AA.
HXL-771, 63 Vd, adr. ARTHUR M. ARMSTRONG,212J0 Koaonlo, St. Clair Shores. 
JKJ-661 63 Maro. SW, MILTON SKIP TAUBE, 1520 Hill, AA. is driven by his
sister PEOCW TAUBE moat of tha time, la getting real radical no 
MTL-309,64 vw, SW, BOKNA S. JACOBS ,21750 Oates Birmingham, Mich. 
023-663,69- VOL. 2 dr. JAKES CHKISTOPKOt HASSEIT,19315 Parks Lasa.Groase E 
IXP-2B5, 67 Rom Adr. ALRUfT JOSEPH ALLEN JR. 223 K. Military, ^aarborn. 
HHO-235, 61 Cbev. 2dr.WILLIAM A MARK CARTER, 39321 Eliot, Mt. Claasna. 
HXK-311, 66 Pont 2 dr, PAUL R. WERT 19611 Oamus, Livonia.
JANE PONDA talked about changing to tha Socialist form or Cocrrunist form 
of government. Also 2 movlas were shown on Red China, the rsootlon of tha 
group did not response too well to this.
A K P K O V IO A P M O V t O S tR lA i  M O.
(Figure A-2 6)
Michigan State Police, Security Investigation Squad (SIS)
December l, 1970 
Surveillance of Jane Fonda's Appearance in Ann Arbor 
on Behalf of Sinclair, Plamondon, and Forrest
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files
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Michigan Sfala PoMce 
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Reports that seven subjeots have Just bssn arrested by Ann Arbor City 
Polios who are oooupants of a vehicle reported stolen on ccaplslnt
Ibis vehiole reported etolen by tha Herts Rent a Car on 12-*5-70 from 
Metro Airport.
Subjeots reportedly produced papers Indicating that tha vehicle m  s  
rented Bron Avlo Rent a Car wlxm stopped. Tlwec papers can not be 
oorreot eoeordlns to the nansgar of Herts and suet be a forgery.
Ona of tha oooupants In the vslilola was JAKE FCS*A,
All subjeots being hold at Ana Arbor W .  at this tlae.
Va have on officer froa this unit at tha soens at this tlse.
ADDITIONAL HMHMATION J04T RECEIVED........
froa the seene reports that It appears at this tine as If the 
subjeots gut Into tha wrong ear by mistake at the airport. They apparently 
did rent a Avis Cer and this hoe been ohocked out. Subjeots will be 
reloeeod aa soon as papers fro* the Avle Ccapeny and cnothar aer arrive 
In Ann Arbi>r.
IANALTSI5-E V ALU A TIO N
I f i l l  £9 Mi.My R.li.& l. |.e] □  MM R.k.b). 1171 Q  Hcli.M.-Surv.iltMii. (10) Q  un.v.lu.lM*
■' I ( IB )  □ R . m . i t t
10 0 ) 0  f  « i ’va:>n9 O n*ar (91) 0  fane (99) 0  Date
(D ISSEM IN ATIO N
1(931 0  E lec to r 170; 0  O d lh fl CommtAilsii ftwHeil.n 170. W Oimr
1(9*1 Q  Otpvty OrffCie*. (MW S tn ie o i (771 0  OpciMtoni (30. Q  Hf, G*»*«” i*nai>on OuttOtf
1199) 0  Cjm manj*. 176) 0  Unilo.m Dt*n.n>o fttaM.gehc* Sat**©*
I lS t)  0  O n iim if li trd  by 139) □  I***© I33i Q  Dai*.
10i00 1M __ .12-5-7D. .
(Figure A-2 7)
Michigan State Police, Security Investigation Squad (SIS)
December 5, 1970 
Intelligence Report Regarding the Detainment of Jane Fonda 
(Hertz/Avis Rental "Incident")
Source: John and Leni Sinclair Red Squad Files
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F B I 
Dal.: 2 /2 7 /6 9
raiumU tho following In . 
AIRTEL
(Typt iM platnttxt or eodt)
AIR MAIL - REGISTERED
(Priority)
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO
R£$WHITE PANTHER PARTY
/
J
INFORMATION CONCERNING£1!
On 2/27/69 reported that on the
afternoon of 2/26/69, anindividual who identified himsel 
only as a representative of the White Panther Headquarters 
Ann Arbor, Michigan, contacted Black Panther Party (BPP) 
National Headquarter^Jftrkfilev^£alifornia, attempting to 
get in touch w i t M H H H H H H i ^ P who was not available.
' This individual advised that the Tfliite Panther Party has a 
rock and roll band called "NC-5“ which is coming to San 
Francisco, California, on 3/10-13/69. He said they would 
like to volunteer to use this band to hold a fund-raising 
benefit for the BPP while in San Francisco.
individual stated he had been told to contact 
in this regard and he indicated he would 
ational BPP Headquarters in the near future and
Since none of the BPP officers were available at 
the time this individual made his contact, National BPP 
Headquarters made no commitment whatsoever.
San Francisco will furnish the Bureau and Detroit 
with any additional information received in this regard.
Detroit is requested to identify the White Panther 
iy and determine if they have any kind of alliance with 
the BPP, arl advise B,
J C^j)m Bureau (AM-RM)
Detroit (AM-RM)
n n o n & u wt u i
V**i8MAR 1 1969
pprovtd:
Special Agon! In Charge
(Figure A-28)
FBI Airtel, SAC San Francisco to Hoover 
February 21, 1969 (62-112678-9)
Informs Hoover of Plamondon's Telephone Call to BPP 
(Conversation Picked-Up in FBI's Warrantless Wiretaps)
Source: Freedom of Information Act Files on WPP
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the number of overhearings occuring on each date.
| B. The duration of each overhearing.
| C. The address* apartment number and room
, * where such overhearing took place.
, Answer to Interrogatory No. 2:
A) Plaintiff Plamondon*s conversations were incidentally 
overheard on five occasions (February 26, 1969; April 15* 1969;
Hay 6* 1969*; Hay 29* 1969; and July 6* 1969) on an electronic 
surveillance at 3106 Shattuck Avenue* Berkley* California* and 
on one occasion (June 2, 1969) on an electronic surveillance at 
1336 1/2 Fillmore, San Francisco, California.
B) Please see*the copies of the logs of the above-
| referenced overhearings which are attched hereto as Attachments
1 through 6. ;
C) Please see the answer to subpart A) above.
! Interrogatory No. 3:
i :
, For each specific overhearing, indicate if a tape or other
recording and/or transcript or other report of the contents of
I (
tha overheard conversations exists, and if the answer is yes,
t I
specify verbatim the contents of each iteo, or in lieu thereof*
• attach copies of each of the said items.
Answer to Interrogatory Wo. 3;
No tapes, other recordings, or transcripts exist. Summary j
logs of the above-referenced overhearings do exist, however,
and copies are attached hereto as Attachments 1 through 6.
Defendant objects to producing those portions of the
summary logs which reflaet conversations of persons other than j
the plaintiff on the grounds that such conversations are not j
relevant to the issues in this case and that disclosure might j
be Injurious to the privacy of third persons.
Interrogatory Ho. 4:
For each overhearing, indicate:
A. The names of all persons wlio requested per­
mission to conduct the overhearing; all persons 
| who were the recipients of such requests; and the
; decision such recipients made upon said requests.
-2- A-7YZ- 
(Figure A-29)
FBI's Admission that Five Plamondon Conversations were 
"Incidentally Overheard" in Warrantless Wiretaps 
on two California Black Panther Party Chapters
Source: Legal Papers of Hugh M. Davis
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ATTACK.'SXT 2: Kelley Ans. to int.; Sinclair v. K2elr.tfier.st
Civil Action No. olC-72 (C.L.C.)
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?aK . fror. White Pcnther In Ann Arbor, Klehi.-sr..
to GBOCS for DAVIE HILIIAED who Is in eonrerer.ee '
and cannot speak to anyone. PLlt talks to TCB:X JOIXir, 
seyinc that he heard that DAVIE KILLIA3D would be In 
Cleveland, Ohio, on Jiay 9th, 10th or 11th, and if so, 
the White Panthers want to aeet with hir. in Cleveland 
Tor “forr-al dlelocuo" between the VPP and the BPP.
POH explains that the WPP has several thinjs soir.s with 
the BPP: they printed a thousand rosters for the I!ay 1st 
rally and save then, to the Detroit 3P? chapter; they aell 
tOO papers everyveek ("Black Farther"J and other projects. 
If DH or sortebne frcn SPP HQ is going to be in Cleveland 
over the weekend of May lOth-llth, the WPP will cose there 
early for a nesting. The WPP has been invited to a rally 
in Cleveland on 5/11. TJ says that he will pass this 
request on and soncone will call P W  about le. PUB gives 
his ntaber as 313-769-2017.
/
. SF 3215-!t-2 _12_
1^5 ------------- Pg"> x<;-
' SeyTi!£;g-rfv-. 5/6/69
CsQloytt’s Nose Dote Stenp
SE C E C IL  J .C .M .  LE BLANC
.1
/ ..
(Figure A-30)
FBI Wiretap Transcript 
May 6, 1969
Text of a Plamondon Conversation with the BPP 
Source: Legal Papers of Hugh M. Davis
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9.1-', -J. : iurnishsd the following information of value:
1. On 9/9/70 it was learned that the White Panther
Party (WPP) is planning a conference in the near future when
a largo farm house for the meeting can be obtained.
2.' • On 9/9/70 it was learned that a meeting of all
political groups in Ann Arbor is being organized to be held
9/16/70 at Alice Lloyd Hall, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 
Michigan.
- • 3. - On 9/9/70 as unidentified male called and asked 
for KEN KELLEY. Tbo unidentified male stated that he was from 
Lockport, Illinois and wanted to get two friends into Canada who 
were arrested on drug charges. Caller was told not to discuss 
this catter on the phone but to come and see KELLEY.
4. On 9/10/70 a caller Identified as JUDY (from 
Hew York) spoke with KEN KELLEY regarding a rumor of a split 
In the WPP and of dissension in the Pittsburgh Chapter.
5. On 9/10/70 MIKE JACOBS, WPP, South California 
Chapter, advised his new'address and stated that ho and others 
froa California and Portland, Oregon will try to attend a 
conference in Michigan.
6. On 9/10/70 a MARY LOU from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
called for a mail-out regarding Liberation 3.
7. On 9/11/70 STEVE PARKINSON, 7 Golden Rod Avenue, 
North Port, Hew York, requested that 50 copies of tho "Ann Arbor 
Argus" be sent to him so be could attempt to sell them. -
8. On 9/11/70 CARL BROOXS called to tell KEN KELLEY 
that students at Huron High School are starting an underground 
newspaper and neod typewriters and other, supplies,
9. On 9/12/70 it was learned that WILLIAM KUNTSLZR, 
ABBIE HOFFMAN, JERRY RUBIN and WEINGLA5S would be in town
for a hearing involving PUN PLAMONDON on 9/21/70.
- 10. On 9/11/70 ROBIN FARUQHASOX, London, England,
callod and advised that he is the Minister of Information in 
the United Kingdom. He gave bis address and requested WPP 
literature.
e •
- 5 -■ • . ■*
EXHIBIT # 12 TO INTERROGATORIES
(Figure A-31)
FBI Memorandum/ SAC Detroit to Hoover 
September 14, 1970 (62-112678-103)
"Examples of Valuable Information" Provided by Welch 
In Support of his Request for a 3 0-Day Continuation 
of the Warrantless White Panther Wiretap 
(Note Reference to Hoffman, Rubin, and Kunstler in No. 9)
Source: Legal Papers of Hugh M. Davis
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•• Tbe title Is marked changed to reflect the proper 
'title of subject organization. It wsb previously carried at 
®  Youth International. Party (White Panther), IS - yiP - WP.----------     b7C
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of the White Panther Party (WPP) located.
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(Figure A-32)
FBI Report, SAC Detroit to Hoover 
January 28, 1971 (62-112678-218) 
Lists "Possible" WPP chapters
Source: Freedom of Information Act Files on WPP
(fig. con'd.)
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DE 100-36217 V
2 - Albuquerque (RU) 
2 - Atlanta (RU) .
2 - Baltimore (RU)
Ccples:
1 - HIC, Detroit (RM) 
1 - NIS, Chicago ( r m ) 
1 - OSI, Dayton (RM)
2 - Boston (RU)
2 - Buffalo (RU)
1 - Secret Service, Detroit 
(RU)
2 - Chicago (RM)
2 - Cleveland (RU)
2 - Cincinnati (RU)
2 - Dallas (RM)
2 - Honolulu (RU)
2 - Indianapolis (RM)’
2 - Kansas City (RM)
2 - Knoxville (RU)
2 - Las Vegas (RU)
2 - Los Angeles .(RU)
2 - Louisville (RU)
2 - Milwaukee (RU)
2 - Minneapolis (RU)
2 - Hew Haven (RU)
2 - New Orleans (RM)
2 - Hew York (RU)
2 - Newark (RU)
2 - Oklahoma City (RU)
2 - Omaha (RU)
2 - Philadelphia (RU)
2 - Phoenix (RU)
2 - Pittsburgh (RU)
2 - Portland (RU)
2 - San Antonio (RU)
2 - San Francisco (RU)
2 - Springfield (RU)
2 - Seattle (RM)
2 - Washington Field (RU)
- Aa -
COVER PAGE
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TITLE OF CASE 
•
WHITE PANTHER PART?
J7c
TVMCO •
4mt
CHARACTER OF CASE " 
«  - ■ »
REFERENCES: Detroit letter and LHM, dated 2/25/69J 
Detroit letter and LHU, dated 5/21/6|' 
Detroit letter,’ dated 7/17/69^ ,^ /
LEADS
DETROIT
at Ann arbor. Michigan
1. Will continue to follow the activities o
organization
2. Will continue investigation
information regarding
NTS CLAIMED q H O N t ACQUIT
TALS
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VJ- Bureau (62-112678) (RM) 
(See Cover Page B for Copies)
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DOVER PAGE
(Figure A-33)
FBI Report, SAC Detroit to Hoover 
September 17, 1969 (62-112678-29) 
"Dissemination Record" Lists i.R.s. as Recipient
Source: Freedom of Information Act Files on WPP
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V
* VNITED STATES C < ^ R N M £ N T
• Memoraifdum
t o  : Director, FBI (100-3-104-19)
ft' .
0
D*™! 10/18/90 ...
8
.rp> 81C, Detroit
ilSArr: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
1 ' COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM 
» IS - C
(Breakthrough Operation)
Re Bureau letter to Detroit, dated 10/13/66, 
pertaining to i “  ‘ .................
• -• ■«».•
i v;/
-t ■. ■
V*
1
>4
,.N
* I-
Breakthrough la known to the Detroit Office aa a 
■llltant antl-Coaaunlet right vine organization. It la aora 
of a activist group than la the aore veil-knovn John Birch 
Society vhose activities are generally Halted to study and 
the political activities of its Individual aeabers. Break­
through on'the contrary has engaged In aueh activities 
counter denonstratlons at the speech of KLIiB f i M !. B U f l on 
the Wayne State University (WSU) caapus."BfflroiT 1 cOUSter 
denonstratlons at various antl-Vletnan denonstratlons; and 
aost recently distributionj f  p leaflet denouncing the.
pro-Cegenp.lst rocord of I _____
A eOflf ui lliis IFaTToT has 
furnisfiLu- 'lu' Uiu'liuiojirunder the Counterintelligence 
prograa. . .
As can be 6een froa the foregoing general outline 
regarding activities the organization has been extrenely active 
In De.trolt. Inforaatlon available to this office froa our 
lnforaants Indicates that Breakthrough tactics are beginning 
to cause coocern In the Michigan District CP (MDCP), . . . . .
It has been the observation of this office that 
aost of the aenbers of Breakthrough are young, nearly all are 
under 35 and eany are under 25. They are, therefore, probably .- 
"eager to be active", but not experienced In the actual tactics /)  
and not knowledgeable concerning the Identities of aeabers of //• .  
the MDCP. It is doubtful If they have been able'To build f  J
up a reservoir of public source Inforaatlon concerning the —^
MDCP. This lack of experience and knowledge by Breakthrough 
can be attributed to the decline of attention activities of/- 
the 1IDCP has received froa the local press dating from approximately 
Che Hungarian Revolution and the Xruschev denouncement of 
Stalin, both In 1956. Y
' S- 1/o
Bureau (RM)
Detroit 
LWC/cc 
(3)
< K £
j j y
REC-3 a OCT 21 S *  ■
Buj U.S. Saving Bondi Rr£uhr!j m tht Pajnll Sat/inn
(Figure A-34)
FBI Memorandum/ SAC Detroit to Hoover 
October 18, 1966 (100-3-104-15-301)
Early FBI Plans to "Take Over"
Right-Wing Paramilitary Group "Breakthrough"
Source: National Security Archives, Washington, D.C.
(fig. con'd.)
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* • Therefore, In vie* of the activist nature of this JSfV/r*
organization and their lack of experience and knowledge :
concerning the interior workings of the HDCP, Detroit Is —  
proposing as a Counterintelligence technique that efforts • 
be nade to take over their activities and use thee in such - 
a wanner as would be best calculated by this office to V .’.~
completely disrupt and neutralize the MDCP. ->•••-
This action would, of course, be accomplished 
without Breakthrough becoming avarc- of the Bureau's interest 
in its operation.
Detroit considers the following to be a general ‘ ’ 
outline of this contemplated action. Individual steps would 
be taken ah the opportunity arises and undoubtedly there L\~"v. 
would need to be a sophistication and change of various 
actions an experience is gained and as the entire operation -: 
is analysed.~This outline is being furnished only for the 
Bureau’s consideration, appraisement, suggestions, comments 
and assistance. No action will be taken in any of the - 
steps being set out pending specific Bureau authority in - 
each Instance.
In view of the Bureau’s frequent, request for 
unique.and aggressive Counterintelligence recommendations 
and in view of what Detroit'considers a strong likelihood ' 
of success in this operation, Detroit strongly recommends ■ 
that ,the Bureau favorably consider this operation.
The following is the outline for a Counterintelligence 
operation designed to take over and/or guide the activities of T—  
Breakthrough In a Banner best calculated to disrupt the MDCP:. . ■
1. To effect such take over lines of communication 
must be established between this office and Breakthrough. . •’
Detroit feels a start will have been made if the Bureau approves 
Detroit recommendation to send the letter to Breakthrough 
which was furnished for Bureau approval I n  Counter I n  t e l  l l w n m
program under the heading of in Detroit
letter'dated 10/i/66. This tettCr lo Break I hroujjn is to be 
signed with the pseudonym LESTER JOHNSTON. This office thufe ', 
will have no problem with communicating with Breakthrough JvV •• 
Utilizing the letter c o n c e r n i n g s  a stepping stone. ■ .
I i i i ' V
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